

CONTENTS



KAZISS

Kazakhstan Institute
for Strategic Studies under
the President of the Republic
of Kazakhstan

Issued Quarterly Since 2003

Editor-in-Chief
IRINA CHERNYKH
Chief Research Fellow of KazISS

Editor
ANASTASSIYA RESHETNYAK
Senior Research Fellow of KazISS

Responsible for publication:
Almas Arzikulov
Layout:
Ernar Imangaliev

Translation by LLC «Delta Consulting Group»

Address:
Kazakhstan Institute
for Strategic Studies under the President
of the Republic of Kazakhstan
4, Beybitshilik St.
Astana, 010000, Republic of Kazakhstan

Phone: (7172) 75 20 20
Fax: (7172) 75 20 21
E-mail: office@kisi.kz
www.kisi.kz

This Journal was registered
with the Ministry of Culture and Information
of the Republic of Kazakhstan
on January 24, 2003.
Registration certificate No. 3529-zh.
ISSN 2414-570X

None of the articles shall be
reproduced without reference to the
Journal.

The opinion of the editorial board may
differ from that of the authors
of articles.

Printed by Limited liability
"Society of the Disabled "ZAMAN"
VP-6, 22/2, Manas str., Astana city
Copies 350.

PEACEBUILDING PROCESSES IN THE GLOBAL WORLD

- Murat Laumulin*
Central Asia - 2025
Forecasts for the Development of the Region and Individual States
of Central Asia and Changes in the International and Geopolitical
Situation by 2025 7
- Zhao Huasheng*
New Strategy of the Trump Administration in Afghanistan
and Chinese Politics..... 22
- Alimzhan Akhmetov / Timur Zhantikin*
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons – for and against 29
- Anna Alshanskaya / Adilkhan Gadelshiyev*
Results of Kazakhstan’s Chairmanship
in the UN Security Council..... 40
- Vyacheslav Dodonov*
The Positioning of National Economies in the International
Quality-assessment Ratings of Institutions and Foreign
Investment inflows 48

МАЗМҰНЫ



Бас редактор
ИРИНА ЧЕРНЫХ
ҚСЗИ-дың бас ғылыми қызметкері

Редактор
АНАСТАСИЯ РЕШЕТНЯК
ҚСЗИ-дың аға ғылыми қызмекері

Басуға жауапты:
Алмас Арзықұлов
Беттеу:
Ернар Иманғалиев
Аударма: ЖШС «Астана білім ордасы»

Мекен-жайы:
Қазақстан Республикасының Президенті жанындағы Қазақстан стратегиялық зерттеулер институты
010000, Қазақстан Республикасы, Астана, Бейбітшілік көш, 4

Телефон: (7172) 75 20 20
Факс: (7172) 75 20 21
E-mail: office@kisi.kz
www.kisi.kz

Журнал Қазақстан Республикасының мәдениет және ақпарат министрлігінде 2003 жылдың 24 қаңтарында тіркелген

Тіркеу туралы №. 3529-ж. күәлігі берілді

ISSN 2414-570X

Мақалаларды көшіріп басқан жағдайда журналға сілтеме жасалынуы тиіс.

Мақала авторларының пікірі редакция көзқарасымен сәйкес келмеуі мүмкін

"Общество инвалидов "ЗАМАН" ЖШС Астана қ., Манас к., 22/2, ВП-6 баспасынан басылып шығарылды

350 дана.

ЖАҒАНДЫҚ ӘЛЕМДЕГІ БІТІМГЕРШЛІК ҮДЕРІСТЕР

Мұрат Лаумулин
Орталық Азия - 2025
ОА өңірі мен жеке мемлекеттерінің дамуы және 2025 жылға халықаралық және геосаяси жағдайдағы өзгерістердің болжамы 7

Чжао Хуашэн
Ауғанстандағы Трамп Әкімшілігінің жаңа стратегиясы және Қытай саясаты 22

Әлімжан Ахметов / Тимур Жантикин
Ядролық қаруға тыйым салу келісім-шарты – қолдау және қарсы 29

Анна Алишанская / Әділхан Ғадельшиев
«БҰҰ-ның Қауіпсіздік Кеңесінде Қазақстан төрағалығының қорытындылары» 40

Вячеслав Додонов
Ұлттық экономикаларды институт ретінде халықаралық сапа рейтингтеріне орналастыру және шетел инвестицияларды тарту 48

СОДЕРЖАНИЕ



Главный редактор
ИРИНА ЧЕРНЫХ
Главный научный сотрудник КИСИ

Редактор
АНАСТАСИЯ РЕШЕТНЯК
Старший научный сотрудник КИСИ

Ответственный за публикацию:
Алмас Арзықұлов
Верстка:
Ернар Иманғалиев

Перевод: ТОО «Астана білім ордасы»

Адрес:
Казахстанский институт стратегических исследований при Президенте Республики Казахстан
010000, Республика Казахстан, Астана ул. Бейбитшилик 4

Телефон: (7172) 75 20 20
Факс: (7172) 75 20 21
E-mail: office@kisi.kz
www.kisi.kz

Журнал зарегистрирован в Министерстве культуры и информации Республики Казахстан 24 января 2003 года

Регистрационное свидетельство № 3529-ж.

ISSN 2414-570X

Статьи не могут быть воспроизведены без ссылки на Журнал.

Мнение редакторской коллегии может отличаться от мнения авторов статей

Отпечатано ТОО "Общество инвалидов "ЗАМАН" г.Астана, МАНАСА, 22/2, ВП-6

350 экз.

МИРОТВОРЧЕСКИЕ ПРОЦЕССЫ В ГЛОБАЛЬНОМ МИРЕ

Мұрат Лаумулин
Центральная Азия - 2025
Прогнозы развития региона и отдельных государств ЦА и изменений в международном и геополитическом положении к 2025 году 7

Чжао Хуашэн
Новая стратегия Администрации Трампа в Афганистане и китайская политика 22

Алимжан Ахметов / Тимур Жантикин
Договор о запрещении ядерного оружия – за и против 29

Анна Алишанская / Адильхан Ғадельшиев
«Итоги председательства Казахстана в совете безопасности ООН» 40

Вячеслав Додонов
Позиционирование национальных экономик в международных рейтингах оценки качества институтов и приток иностранных инвестиций 48

THE EDITORIAL BOARD



Maulen Ashimbayev	The Chairman of the Editorial Board, First Deputy Chairman of the "Nur Otan" Party, Candidate of Political Sciences
Irina Chernykh	Editor-in-Chief, the Chief Research Fellow of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Doctor of Historical Sciences
Anastassiya Reshetnyak	Editor, Senior Research Fellow at the Department of International Studies the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Master of International Relations
Sanat Kushkumbayev	Deputy Director of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of RK, Doctor of Political Sciences
Murat Laumulin	Minister-Counselor of the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the Republic of Belarus, Doctor of Political Sciences
Konstantin Syroyezhkin	Chief Research Fellow of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Doctor of Political Sciences
Timur Dadabayev	Professor of International Relations, Director of Combined MA/Ph.D. Program for Japanese and Eurasian Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Tsukuba, Ph.D. (Japan)
Marlène Laruelle	Director of the Central Asia Program (CAP) of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) at the Elliot School of International Affairs at the George Washington University, Ph.D. (USA)
Thomas Ruttig	Director of Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), Ph.D. (Germany)
Ding Xiaoxing	Head of the Central Asia Department at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (China)

РЕДАКЦИЈАЛЫҚ КЕҢЕС



Мәулен Әшімбаев	Редакциялық кеңестің төрағасы, "Нұр Отан" партиясы Төрағасының Бірінші орынбасары, саяси ғылымдарының кандидаты
Ирина Черных	Бас редактор, ҚР Президенті жанындағы Қазақстанның стратегиялық зерттеулер институтының бас ғылыми қызметкері, тарих ғылымдарының докторы
Анастасия Решетняк	Редактор, ҚР Президенті жанындағы Қазақстанның стратегиялық зерттеулер институтының Халықаралық зерттеулер бөлімінің аға ғылыми қызметкері, әлеуметтік ғылымдары магистрі
Санат Көшкімбаев	ҚР Президенті жанындағы Қазақстанның стратегиялық зерттеулер институты директорының орынбасары, саяси ғылымдарының докторы
Мұрат Лаумулин	Беларусь Республикасындағы Қазақстан Республикасы Елшілігінің кеңесші-уәкілі, саяси ғылымдарының докторы
Константин Сыроежкин	ҚР Президенті жанындағы Қазақстанның стратегиялық зерттеулер институтының бас ғылыми қызметкері, саяси ғылымдарының докторы
Тимур Дадабаев	Халықаралық қатынастар кафедрасының доценті, Цукуба Университеті Әлеуметтік және гуманитарлық ғылымдар факультетінің жапон және еуразиялық зерттеулерге арналған біріктірілген MA/Ph.D. бағдарламасының директоры, Ph.D. (Жапония)
Марлен Ларуэль	Джордж Вашингтон университеті Эллиот Халықаралық қатынастар мектебі Орталық Азияны зерттеу бағдарламасының жетекшісі, Ph.D. (АҚШ)
Томас Руттиг	Ауғанстан бойынша сарапшылар желісінің директоры, Ph.D. (Германия)
Дин Сяосин	Қытайлық заманауи халықаралық қатынастар институтының Орталық Азияны зерттеу бөлімінің директоры (Қытай)

РЕДАКЦИОННЫЙ СОВЕТ

МРПТИ
11.25.40

Маулен Ашимбаев	Председатель Редакционного совета, Первый заместитель Председателя партии "Нур Отан", кандидат политических наук
Ирина Черных	Шеф-редактор, главный научный сотрудник Казахстанского института стратегических исследований при Президенте РК, доктор исторических наук
Анастасия Решетняк	Редактор, старший научный сотрудник Отдела международных исследований Казахстанского института стратегических исследований при Президенте РК, магистр социальных наук
Санат Кушкумбаев	Заместитель директора Казахстанского института стратегических исследований при Президенте РК, доктор политических наук
Мурат Лаумулин	Советник-посланник Посольства Республики Казахстан в Республике Беларусь, доктор политических наук
Константин Сыроежкин	Главный научный сотрудник Казахстанского института стратегических исследований при Президенте РК, доктор политических наук
Тимур Дадабаев	Доцент кафедры международных отношений, директор Объединенной программы магистратуры и Ph.D. докторантуры по японским и евразийским исследованиям факультета социальных и гуманитарных наук Университета Цукуба, доктор Ph.D. (Япония)
Марлен Ларуэль	Руководитель программы по изучению Центральной Азии Школы Международных отношений Эллиота университета Джорджа Вашингтона, доктор Ph.D. (США)
Томас Руттиг	Директор Сети аналитиков по Афганистану, доктор Ph.D. (Германия)
Дин Сяосин	Директор отдела по изучению Центральной Азии Китайской академии современных международных отношений (Китай)

CENTRAL ASIA - 2025 FORECASTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGION AND INDIVIDUAL STATES OF CENTRAL ASIA AND CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL AND GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION BY 2025

(Part 2. The first part of the article was published in CAA #4-2017.)

Murat Laumulin

Counselor-Ambassador of the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the Republic of Belarus, Ph.D., prof. (Minsk, Belarus)

Abstract. Currently, sweeping changes in the balance of power are taking place at the heart of Eurasia. Central Asia is going through a fundamental geopolitical shift resulting in the new roles of China, Iran, Russia, South Africa and USA and new relationships with them. Collectively, these changes will lead to the geopolitical reorientation of the region from Eurasia and USA to Asia.

In the short term (till 2025), CA States will try to preserve the current power balance. In turn, international and regional players which are interested in region, proceeding from their perspectives and opportunities, will provide security and stability of the regions to advance their own practical use. Meanwhile, in the medium turn (after 2025) Central Asian Republics will be faced with the global impact of the world political transitions.

Keywords: Central Asia, China, Russia, USA, EU, regional co-operation, geopolitics, foreign policy.

ОРТАЛЫҚ АЗИЯ – 2025

ОА ӨНІРІ МЕН ЖЕКЕ МЕМЛЕКЕТТЕРІНІҢ ДАМУЫ ЖӘНЕ 2025 ЖЫЛҒА ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ ЖӘНЕ ГЕОСАЯСИ ЖАҒДАЙДАҒЫ ӨЗГЕРІСТЕРДІҢ БОЛЖАМЫ

Мұрат Лаумулин

Аңдатпа. Қазіргі таңда Еуразия құрлығының ортасында күшті орналастыруға қатысты масштабтық өзгерістер орын алуда. Орталық Азия Қытайдың, Еуропаның, Иранның, Ресейдің, Оңтүстік Азияның және АҚШ-тың жаңа рөлдеріне және олармен жаңа қарым-қатынасқа әкеліп соқтыратын іргелі геосаяси ілгерілеуді бастан кешіруде. Нәтижесінде бұл өзгертулер өңірдің геосаяси тұрғыдан Еуропа мен АҚШ-тан Азияға қайта бұрылуына алып келеді.

Орталық Азия мемлекеттері қысқа мерзімдік келешекте (2025 жылға дейін) ағымдағы күштер теңгерімін сақтауға тырысады. Өз кезегінде, өңірде қызығушылығы бар халықаралық және өңірлік ойыншылар, өз мүдделері мен мүмкіндіктеріне сүйеніп, өздерінің нақты мүдделерін жылжыту үшін өңірдің қауіпсіздігі мен тұрақтылығын қамтамасыз етеді. Сонымен қатар, орташа мерзімдік келешекте (2025 жылдан кейін) ортаазиялық республикаларына әлемдік саяси трансформациялардың ғаламдық әсеріне қақтығысуға тура келеді.

Түйінді сөздер: Орталық Азия, Қытай, Ресей, АҚШ, ЕО, өңірлік ынтымақтастық, геосаясат, сыртқы саясат.

ЦЕНТРАЛЬНАЯ АЗИЯ – 2025

ПРОГНОЗЫ РАЗВИТИЯ РЕГИОНА И ОТДЕЛЬНЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ ЦА И ИЗМЕНЕНИЙ В МЕЖДУНАРОДНОМ И ГЕОПОЛИТИЧЕСКОМ ПОЛОЖЕНИИ К 2025 ГОДУ /часть вторая. первая часть опубликована в САА #4, 2017.

Мурат Лаумулин

Аннотация. В настоящее время в центре Евразии происходит масштабное изменение расстановки сил. Центральная Азия переживает фундаментальный геополитический сдвиг, результатом которого станут новые роли Китая, Европы, Ирана, России, Южной Азии и США и новые отношения с ними. В совокупности эти изменения приведут к геополитической переориентации региона с Европы и США на Азию.

В краткосрочной перспективе (до 2025 г.) государства ЦА будут стремиться сохранить существующий баланс сил. В свою очередь, заинтересованные в регионе международные и региональные игроки, исходя из своих интересов и возможностей, будут обеспечивать безопасность и стабильность региона ради продвижения своих практических интересов. В тоже время, в среднесрочной перспективе (после 2025 г.) центральноазиатским республикам придется столкнуться с глобальным воздействием мировых политических трансформаций.

Ключевые слова: Центральная Азия, Китай, Россия, США, ЕС, региональное сотрудничество, геополитика, внешняя политика.

Tajikistan – 2025

Tajikistan as a state has a very small set of advantages - inexpensive labor, the availability of a number of minerals and favorable weather conditions for the development of agriculture. Experts consider the negative factors as underdevelopment of infrastructure, a narrow internal market, high risks of political destabilization, corruption and bureaucracy and the lack of real mechanisms for entrepreneurs to protect their rights. [1]

At the same time, the economy of Tajikistan depends largely on transfers of labor migrants. If in previous years (2011-2014) transfers reached 4.5 billion dollars per year, then by 2016 the amount of transfers, according to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, decreased to 1.8 billion dollars. Total external debt of Tajikistan as of July 1, 2017 is \$2.3 billion, or 35.8% of GDP.

According to its water reserves, Tajikistan, whose territory is almost six percent covered by glaciers, ranks first in Central Asia. Hydroelectric power plants produce more than 90% of all electricity produced in the country. Therefore, in the development of water management analysts see an essential element of the development strategy of Tajikistan as a whole.

On September 1, 2017, Tajikistan began a series of meetings with investors in Europe and the US, dedicated to the debut issue of Eurobonds for \$500 million for a period of 10 years. Using funds from the placement of Eurobonds in foreign markets, Dushanbe plans to complete the construction of the Rogun HPS. However, if Tajikistan spends money not on purpose or does not timely service debt on eurobonds, it will get very serious problems for decades ahead.

One of the specific features of the manifestation of the Islamic factor in Tajikistan is the legal activity of a political party of an Islamic character - the IRPT. In recent years, the regime of E.Rahmon has practically marginalized and displaced from the political arena (Islamic) opposition (IRPT). But experts believe that the inclusion of the opposition in state administration would only benefit the current authorities in this difficult period.

On the geopolitical field, Dushanbe is in some way in touch with the interests of the world's leading and regional players - the Russian Federation, China, the United States, the EU, NATO, Iran, India and Pakistan. Recently, Saudi Arabia joined to them.

Riyadh, ready to finance hydropower and mining sectors of Tajikistan. However, the rapprochement between Dushanbe and Riyadh can complicate its already difficult relations with its neighbors. Especially with Russia, Uzbekistan and Iran. The expert believes that rapprochement with Riyadh is considered in Dushanbe and as a subject of bidding - with the same Tehran, as well as with Moscow, and as a lever against the involvement of Tajikistan in the Eurasian Economic Community.

China became the main trade and economic partner of Tajikistan, pushing Russia to second place. It is expected that by 2020 the trade turnover between Beijing and Dushanbe will reach \$3 billion. The total amount of Chinese accumulated direct investment for the first three months of 2017 amounted to \$76.6 million, or 58.2% of total foreign investment.

Cooperation between Beijing and Dushanbe is also reduced to drawing Tajikistan into the zone of interests of China. Experts believe that the provision of loans by Beijing, in fact, pushes Tajikistan into a debt hole that will lead to enslaving the republic. Given the fact that Dushanbe has no money and is not expected to appear in large quantities, it is obviously necessary to pay the Chinese side's admission to raw materials, the transfer of controlling stakes in strategic enterprises or the transfer of certain transport routes and even the territories of Tajikistan under China's control.

Strengthening the US position in Central Asia through Tajikistan does not meet the interests of the Russian Federation. Russia is worried about the growing threats to the countries of Central Asia coming from Afghanistan. According to experts, Tajikistan is threatened by internal instability, which is strengthened by the participation of Saudi Arabia in the affairs of the Republic.

The Afghan problem remains actual and current for the republic, and will remain such until 2025. The problem is being solved through the development of the energy sector. In Afghanistan and in neighboring countries, they hope: if electricity goes on, energy-intensive mills start operating, then Afghans will postpone poppy production and weapons for peaceful labor.

Observers evaluate as a disturbing the estrangement tendency of Dushanbe from Moscow. Compared with the PRC, during the same period, Russia invested only \$20.6 million in Tajikistan. Almost all observers say about the reduction of Russian investments in the republic. The reason for the reduction is high tax rates. Nevertheless, Russia will continue to play an important role for Tajikistan, while hundreds of thousands of migrant workers work in Russia.

Thus, in the last two years Dushanbe has drastically changed the country's development strategy. The main direction now is not social and economic development, but the preservation of stability and

security. It is assumed that this trend will affect the development of the country until 2025.

Turkmenistan – 2025

The main restrictor in the international arena and in matters of Turkmenistan's military cooperation remains the neutrality proclaimed in 1995, which implies the rejection of participation in wars, and in peacetime non-participation in military blocs.

Today, the Turkmen authorities are trying to enlist the support of Russia, the United States and neighbors in the region in containing Afghan threats, but, above all, rely on their own forces [2].

This approach is conditioned not only by the policy of neutrality, but also by the unwillingness to excessively strengthen the military influence of any country that, like in any other Central Asian state, can violate the balance of power, diligently supported by the authorities of the region.

Turkmenistan, which declared its neutrality, is not a member of any military-political bloc. In Moscow, they believe that the aggravation of the situation in this country can destabilize the whole Central Asia. In northern Afghanistan, the situation is greatly exacerbated, in three years the number of attacks on the bordering to the north of Turkmenistan increased 17 times. For Russia, the sphere of security and military cooperation in Central Asia is a topic of special sensitivity, so an important task will be to demonstrate the restoration and improvement of relations between Russia and Turkmenistan.

As for other republics of the region, the threat posed by Afghanistan remains topical for Turkmenistan. Although the constructive work of Ashgabat with the border provinces creates a positive atmosphere, but the issue of stabilization lies in the geopolitical plane. The activity of military groups in the region, analysts suppose, is connected with the opposition to the construction of the TAPI gas pipeline (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India).

Turkmenistan, according to experts, can refuse Russian aid also because it has already been promised to him by the NATO coalition in Afghanistan: The West, presumably, will not allow any massive attack on Turkmenistan. The escalating tension is not interested to the Iran, which is ambivalent towards Russia, and is also ready to help Turkmenistan.

The most acute problem for Ashgabat is the sharp deterioration of the social and economic situation in the country, the drop in export earnings from the sale of gas.

At present, China has been the only buyer of Turkmen gas. The existing gas pipeline threads are not yet fully operational. The throughput capacity of gas pipelines A and B is now 15 billion cubic meters of gas, and C is 25 billion cubic meters. The total throughput of three gas pipelines, through which Turkmen gas goes to China, is 55 billion cubic meters of gas. They pass through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which are also gas producing countries. Both states supply China with 10 billion cubic meters of gas per year, but Astana has already stated that it would like to sell more blue fuel to Beijing. So, only 35 billion cubic meters of gas remains a share of Turkmenistan per year. In 2016, according to experts, Ashgabat supplied Beijing with about 30 billion cubic meters. In the near future, if there is an increase in supplies, then a maximum of 5 billion m³.

Relations between Turkmenistan and Russia in the past were determined by two factors of soft power. This agreement on dual citizenship, which expired in 2014, and economic cooperation, the main component of which was the purchase of Turkmen gas by Russia, discontinued in January 2016. The absence of these factors resulted in the loss of Russia's influence on Turkmenistan.

Thus, the contradictions between Moscow and Ashgabat are not eliminated, because of which the Turkmen side considers itself infringed - it is a question of Gazprom's refusal to purchase Turkmen gas, according to the contract concluded for 25 years. Russia, which purchased from Turkmenistan more than 40 billion cubic meters of gas per year, reduced the volume of purchases to 10-12 billion cubic meters of gas, and then completely refused Turkmen hydrocarbons.

Thus, the main interest of Ashgabat until 2025 is to persuade, not for the first time, the management of Gazprom in the need to resume export to Russia.

On the other hand, Russia is trying to tie Turkmenistan to its military-industrial complex. In times of crisis, Russian arms for Turkmenistan, as a rule, go through leasing. It is advantageous for Russia and Turkmenistan to maintain such contacts. In addition, cooperation in the defense sphere compensates for Turkmenistan's participa-

tion in the ODBC and the SCO. However, it is too early to talk about creating a unified anti-aircraft defense system with Ashgabat, as Turkmenistan tries in every possible way to avoid participation in any alliances.

Thus, Ashgabat remains with 35 billion cubic meters of gas per year for China, part of which is supplied as payment for loans. In the future decade, a major gas projects is not expected.

It is obvious that until 2025 and after Ashgabat will try to solve the problem of export pipelines for its gas. The European market in this context has long attracted Turkmenistan, especially since many years have been tempting proposals (anti-Russian and anti-Iranian) from Washington and Brussels.

According to experts, the problem lies in the absence of a system through which 30-40 billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas can be supplied to Europe annually. In the crisis, when the parties do not have the means to build infrastructure, the option with the use of Azerbaijan's export capacity is more realistic. Baku does not object to such cooperation, but expects to resolve in its favor the dispute over the issue of belonging to the gas-bearing deposit in the Caspian.

This is taking place against the background of the deterioration of Ashgabat's relations with Tehran. Gas dispute between Iran and Turkmenistan is toughened. Tehran proposes Ashgabat to reduce gas price and resume supplies.

Surrendering to the promises of the US and the EU, Ashgabat is betting on projects that initially contradict Iran's interests - the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline (under the Caspian) and TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India). First, creates a conflict situation with Russia. At the same time, they behave in Ashgabat outside the categories of real politics, not realizing that in addition to mythical money for gas exports in these areas, such a decision will create serious problems for Turkmenistan itself.

Under the pretext of preparations for the Asian Games-2017, the head of Turkmenistan dealt with the hidden opposition. According to observers, many of the convicts by origin belong to the Mary elite (Mary vilayat), consisting in a covert opposition to the ruling Ahal clan. G.Berdimuhamedov thus decided to get rid of the possible political opposition.

In 2017 G.Berdimuhamedov turned to the issue of social benefits of the population of Turk-

menistan. He said that he considers the existing system to be ineffective, and therefore it must be canceled.

Analysts predict that until 2025 Turkmenistan will not transition to the market, since it implies a weakening of the state control over society, economic life and business activity.

Kazakhstan – 2025

Kazakhstan has come a long way in the 25 years of its sovereignty. The country's governance can note the impressive economic development, stability, strengthened sovereignty and respect for the brand "Kazakhstan" in the international arena. Looking far beyond 2025 and further, Kazakhstani authorities have formed an ambitious concept to transform the country into one of the most developed countries in the world [3].

Occupying a strategically important position between Russia, China and Central Asia, Kazakhstan was forced by the geography and geopolitics to develop far-reaching strategies for its development. At the same time, the country faces difficult problems, such as weak institutionalization, patronage, authoritarianism and regional pitfalls of socio-economic standards, constantly endangering stability and the achieved level of prosperity. Herewith, there is a constant transformation of Kazakhstan society.

In the sphere of economic development, it can be predicted that long-term economic development will require transformation of Kazakhstan's economic structure and management system. Kazakhstan has the potential to become the breadbasket of Eurasia. Nevertheless, despite recent improvements, the agricultural sector needs major restructuring. New opportunities for the development of a modern economy of production and services will arise due to the location of Kazakhstan in the very center of a huge continental economic space. In order to ensure the emergence of Kazakhstan and the rest of Central Asia as a land bridge connecting China and India with Europe, Kazakhstan should strengthen within regional contacts and interaction at all levels. In the subsequent period after 2025, Kazakhstan and its region will inevitably and strongly be subject to globalization, as well as counter currents towards it.

At the same time, it is impossible not to take into account the potential and existing risks. Thus,

political and economic leaders of Kazakhstan perceive the premature decentralization of political power as a risky step, impregnated with the potential for putting the state out of action.

In view of this changing geopolitical dynamics in 2010, Kazakhstan finds it increasingly difficult to maintain the previous balance in its relations with various major powers. Apparently, this trend will continue until 2025. The fact that this new problem arose from the actions of the partners of Kazakhstan, and not from any activity of Astana, complicates the search for a solution to it.

In the long term (i.e. after 2025), energy will cease to be the main driver of the country's growth. One of the non-carbon sectors, capable of developing the export potential, is agriculture. In order to become a leader in the export of agricultural products, it is recommended to establish a single agricultural educational and research center as the leading institution that facilitates the transformation of Kazakhstan's agriculture, and receives sufficient funding to achieve its goals.

In April 2017, the President of Kazakhstan issued an order to develop the standard of the Kazakh alphabet on the basis of the Latin alphabet by the end of 2017 and translate by 2025 into the Latin alphabet the printing of all books, business documents, periodicals. The results of the "cultural revolution" planned in Kazakhstan can be assessed only in the long term. There is another danger: a radical change in the cultural and linguistic sphere of the country inevitably entails the mastering by the external forces of its political and religious spaces.

The central issue, that all external observers put, is the forthcoming transit of power in the Republic of Kazakhstan (before or after 2025). An optimal scenario arises, when the political elite develops a consolidated solution and finds a compromise figure that suits the main influence groups. But it will be difficult to implement such a scenario. First, Kazakhstan is an open state, in which the factor of public policy, media, including opposition, is of great importance. Secondly, the elite of Kazakhstan is not consolidated, at least outwardly. There are competing business groups with their representation in the governance of the republic and media assets. Thirdly, Kazakhstan, according to a number of authoritative experts, does not have large stabilizing figures on the political field [4].

In the socio-political space of Kazakhstan there are several small nationalist groups, whose current efforts are concentrated on nationalist propaganda. Among the organizational-administrative and material-financial means of supporting the camp of Kazakh nationalists, internal sources prevail. However, the Western structures are also potentially interested in helping to the nationalists. In general, the representatives of the national-patriotic camp, despite their small numbers, remain prominent players on the local political scene. The financial administrative, financial and ideological channels of nationalists can be successfully activated by foreign and Kazakh forces in case of aggravation of the situation in the republic in conditions of transit of power.

Russia and China until 2025

For the cooperation of Russia and China in Central Asia, it is extremely important that both countries have in many ways consensual and harmoniously co-ordinated strategic and geopolitical interests. First, both sides are interested in counteracting the growth of unconventional security threats. For Russia this is especially important, since these threats are of a transboundary nature. Secondly, Russia and the PRC are not interested in strengthening the influence in the region of a potentially hostile third force. Beijing strategically considers Central Asia and the post-Soviet space as a whole a fairly reliable backbone for implementing its policy in the Asia-Pacific region (APR).

Moscow perceives the countries of the region as CSTO allies or as neutral states in terms of ensuring a balance of power with NATO in the European theater. The economic interests of Russia and China in Central Asia have traditionally been more competitive than relations in the field of politics and strategy. Russia is interested in the reintegration of the post-Soviet space on a new economic basis. Since the collapse of the USSR, China has shown interest in accessing Central Asian resources, establishing effective trade and investment cooperation with the countries of the region, building a powerful transport and pipeline infrastructure, both transit and connecting the region with China.

Experts suggest a number of principles on which cooperation between the Russian Federation and the PRC in the region should be based until 2025 and in the future. An important principle of cooper-

ation should be a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between security problems and political stability with the problems of socio-economic and cultural development. The main criterion for the effectiveness of cooperation between Moscow and Beijing in Central Asia can only be assistance to the countries of the region in ensuring economic development and socio-political stability.

To areas in which the interests of Russia and the PRC do not overlap, is primarily labor migration. The second sphere, in which the interests of the two countries do not overlap, are arms deliveries. Here Russia plays a dominant role. The third is the regional transport infrastructure, to which China invests heavily. Russia prefers to modernize and build new roads on its side of the border with Kazakhstan. Fourth sphere - machine building. China became the largest investor in the region. The Chinese not only buy goods and raw materials, traditionally exported to Russia, but also compete for markets with Russian enterprises.

The inflow of financial resources from China to Central Asia, on the one hand, contributes to the development of infrastructure, the maintenance of socio-economic stability, but on the other hand, puts the countries of the region in front of a number of challenges, such as the conservation of the resource structure of the economy, the reduction of incentives for economic modernization, etc. Over the past decade, Russia has weakened its economic position in Central Asia. At present, Russia and China have comparable economic positions in Central Asia. This further increases the responsibility of the two powers for strengthening the economy and social sphere of the countries of the region, stimulates their cooperation in ensuring development.

In terms of the "Silk Road" Initiative, the Chinese governance will try to create a large international economic "niche" in Eurasia, where it will be possible to "invest" almost all projects planned in the foreign policy and foreign economic spheres of the PRC - from transport to humanitarian and tourist. Without the cooperation of the EU and the EAEC, it is likely that many of the key Chinese SREB and EU linkages, including transport, will be implemented bypassing the territory of the Russian Federation, which will miss the opportunity to obtain economic benefits and lose the chance to realize its transit potential.

The worsening security situation may threaten China's strategic plans for the implementation of the SREB project. In this connection, a whole set of 12 steps can be developed in the direction of developing cooperation between Russia and China - up to 2025 [4]. These steps are as follows:

1. Form cooperation institutions aimed at overcoming the asymmetry of the EAEC and SREB. The EAEC as an international organization could take on the coordination of the bilateral partnership of its member states with the PRC through the mechanisms for harmonizing industrial and transport policies, labor market regulation policies, and so on.

2. To expand the cooperation of the EAEC and China in the fields of science, education and high technologies. Therefore, it is necessary to expand interaction in education on the basis of the largest universities of Russia and China with the participation of partners from the EAEC member states and the SCO.

3. Russia and the EAEC need to broadly connect their financial institutions to the financing of joint projects.

4. Support Russian exports to Central Asia. In this regard, it is advisable to develop mechanisms for providing state guarantees to Russian businesses and insurance for their political and economic risks in Central Asia.

5. To accelerate the implementation of joint Russian-Chinese transport projects. Proceeding from this, it is necessary to work out the issue of creating not only latitudinal, but also meridional transport communications (railways and river fleet) that will make it possible to use the opportunities of the Northern Sea Route more effectively.

6. Coordination of labor migration policies and implementation of joint investment projects. It is proposed to create within the SCO an advisory multilateral structure with the participation of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the integrated solution of labor migration problems. Joint transport, industrial and other projects of SREB and EAEC should be aimed at creating new jobs in the countries of the region.

7. Establish a pragmatic dialogue in the triangle of the EU-EAEC-China on the formation of the common Eurasian infrastructure and transport, freedom of movement of goods, capital,

people and services. Thus, it is advisable to work out the possibility of signing a trilateral document on cooperation between the EU, the EAEC and the SCO.

8. Agree on Russia-China security strategies in Central Asia. In the sphere of maintaining security in Central Asia, the role of Russia significantly exceeds the role of the PRC. The coordination of the general list of terrorist organizations, the exchange of information through the special services on recruiting, the transfer of militants to Afghanistan and the Middle East, and their financing belong to the complex of urgent antiterrorist measures. The SCO should become the main format for intensifying cooperation in this area.

9. Strengthen the joint struggle against the threat of the spread of instability from the territory of Afghanistan. In this context, it is necessary to expand the interaction of the SCO and the CSTO in countering the interconnected security challenges.

10. Counteraction to the spread of the ideology of radical Islam. Opposition to extremism is possible, the report notes, first, through Islamic education, and secondly, through secular education, the education of local societies, their familiarization with world culture.

11. Coordination of work with civil society in Central Asia. The objectives of such cooperation are to overcome the risks of social destabilization and security challenges emanating from international terrorism, the prevention of ethnic conflicts, the formation of a common and holistic view of the Central Eurasia region and the opportunities arising from regional cooperation.

12. To intensify the cooperation of experts from Russia, China and the countries of Central Asia. To Russia and China, it is advisable to create a permanent expert platform for dialogue on the interface issues of the EAEC and SREB, where experts could discuss current tasks in various areas - from infrastructure projects to humanitarian cooperation.

Thus, if the parties manage to use them correctly, there will be an opportunity to neutralize the growth of cross-border security threats in the region, which is a prerequisite for ensuring the sustainable economic development of all participants in the association of the Eurasian integration and the Silk Road Economic Belt.

USA in Central Asia until 2025

It is obvious that Central Asia is on the periphery of US economic interests. The region maintains limited trade and investment relations, concentrated mainly around oil production in Kazakhstan. Caspian oil plays the role of an attractive raw material bonus for US corporations, but its reserves are not strategically important for the US on a global scale, and the share of US companies in local oil production is gradually falling. Nevertheless, Washington is pursuing an energetic economic policy in the region that is disproportionate to the level of relations achieved in this sphere, actively interferes in the course of economic transformations in Central Asian countries and influences the choice of integration preferences [5].

The main instruments of American economic policy are infrastructural (primarily pipeline) planning, MFI programs, grants for liberal reforms, sanctions. There is no doubt that this tool will continue until 2025.

The strategy of the United States is focused not so much on expanding its own economic ties as on the tasks of geopolitical containment of Russia and China. The White House promotes transit corridors and integration plans, alternative to the proposals of Moscow and Beijing, and designed to reduce their impact on the economy of Central Asia.

The consistency and results of the actions of the American side suggest that the growth of the source of instability in the middle Eurasia is considered by it as a perfectly acceptable variant of the development of events, at least in case, the political protectorate and long-term military presence of the USA in this region are not guaranteed. If we exclude stocks of Caspian oil, inflated estimates of which at the initial stage attracted foreign capital, the region was and remains for the United States a deep economic periphery. Periodic spikes in the activity of US economic policy, no matter how they are served by the public, are mainly due to the desire to slow or undermine the emerging economic cooperation of Central Asia with Russia and China.

According to experts, the US achievements were broken because of the inability to keep the result, and successful moves were replaced by frank failures, a vivid example of which was in 2005, the Uzbek Andijan.

At such critical moments, the strengths and weaknesses of American foreign policy are clearly discernible. Its unconditional advantages remain a clear priority of its own national interests; the ability to mobilize allies to solve their tasks; adaptation to the diplomatic work of modern social, communication and digital technologies; and, of course, a clear ideological message attractive to many foreign citizens, despite the striking divergence of liberal rhetoric with the real deeds that it masks.

Among the weaknesses of the American course are inter-party and inter-agency competition in the US, which affects international relations; wasteful handling of material resources, which, even for the world's first economy, are not boundless; ignoring, sometimes demonstrative, Asian cultural and political traditions, although many American experts know that, for example, the projects of popularizing homosexual relations are poorly perceived in patriarchal Eastern society. But perhaps, the most obvious vulnerability, to which the American establishment is inclined, is the predominant sense of superiority and exclusivity that not only breeds a desire for world hegemony but also dulls the perception of reality.

One thing can be expected with a certain degree of confidence: Washington will retain for the period until 2025 the overall strategic plan for Central Asia. The actions of the White House in one way or another obeyed the logic of restraining US geopolitical competitors. First of all, they were aimed at breaking the region with Russia, and subsequently also at the curbing of China's growing influence and the isolation of Iran. Historically, the imperatives of the American strategy include providing access to raw materials, including the creation of routes for their transportation to the West. These basic principles of US policy will remain unchanged in the near future, as long as the political class in Washington perceives its country as a superpower with interests in all, even the most remote corners of the world. Unchanged, in all likelihood, will remain rigid and cynical methods of conducting geopolitical struggle in the spirit of a big "dirty" game.

It is assumed that for the period until 2025 Washington will act according to the following scheme:

- build a hierarchy of cooperation; i.e. make cooperation with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan a priority.

- recognize and accept the contribution and capabilities of other countries; i.e. recognize that the US in the region has some common goals with Russia and China, and find a way to use the actions of Beijing and Moscow to realize American interests.

- do not insist on reforms if they are not demanded; i.e. the demands of changes must come from the citizens of the Central Asian countries themselves, and the US reform program should be aimed primarily at improving the socio-economic situation, rather than spreading democracy.

- find a balance between security and values; i.e. do not put cooperation in the field of security depending on the situation with human rights.

- To avoid militarization of US policy as a response to the exaggerated threat of Islamic extremism i.e. Washington should not exaggerate the threat to US security stemming from Islamic radicalism in the region, and, accordingly, react to it too painfully.

- it is more effective to use the available levers of influence, "to enhance its own value" and to put more realistic tasks, built according to the importance [6].

EU-CA

At the present time, there is a radical change in the EU's approaches to Central Asian politics. If in previous years the EU-Central Asia partnership strategy involved a serious component of projects in the field of political reform, the development of NGOs, human rights, the future priority will be given to the implementation of economic projects. Instead of imposing its agenda, its priorities, projects, the EU proposes a new approach when the integration of EU programs and strategic development goals takes place.

As priorities, some directions are highlighted, such as growth of incomes of the population, creation of workplaces, development of private sector, strengthening of regional trade in Central Asia. The EU projects involve work in these areas, the EU intends to promote economic activity in the country, create new jobs, especially in rural areas.

Experts propose nine recommendations for future cooperation of the EU with Central Asian countries in the field of politics and security. They can be considered as an EU strategy for the period until 2025.

First, the EU needs to reconsider its interests in Central Asia. The EU should do this taking into account four factors. In the beginning, when reviewing its interests, the EU should take into account the new context in Central Asia, as well as the new context in countries neighboring Central Asia. When revising its interests in Central Asia, the EU should realistically assess what it can achieve. Finally, the redefinition of EU interests should also take into account the interests of the Central Asian countries. However, it is important to distinguish between the interests of countries as a whole and the interests of elites, since they do not necessarily coincide.

Secondly, the EU strategy for Central Asia should focus on a smaller number of areas in order to increase efficiency. Third, in accordance with the previous paragraph, the main areas to be covered in future cooperation between the EU and Central Asia should be determined on the basis of where the EU can provide real value added and achieve concrete results, as well as in areas where Central Asian countries have real needs.

Fourthly, there is a need for additional scientifically based knowledge about Central Asia. Moreover, research in Central Asia should be more mainstreamed in the policy making process. Fifthly, the EU should continue to work in Central Asia from the top to the bottom, and from the bottom to the top. In addition to interacting with Central Asian countries at the government level, the EU must continue to support civil society. Sixth, the EU member states need to participate more in the implementation of this strategy. This should be particularly prevalent in areas where the member-countries have comparative advantages and where they are perceived as models for imitation by the countries of Central Asia.

Seventh, the EU should adhere to a more results-based approach. Considering the lack of concrete results in many areas, the EU needs to focus more on achieving such results. Eighth, the EU should continue to develop regional cooperation with the countries of Central Asia. Ninth, the EU should continue to address the issue of borders. Considering the unique experience of the EU in addressing border issues and vital needs of the region in improving border management, the EU should continue to work actively in the field of border management.

Conclusions and forecasts

An attempt to forecast the development of the situation around Central Asia by 2025 looks to be as follows. The future of Central Asian countries depends on five interrelated factors: a change in governance, or a transition to a new generation of leaders; economic situation; corruption and management inefficiency; political repression; threats of Islamic extremism.

From a regional perspective, it remains to be seen whether these new leaders will adhere to more nationalist views than their predecessors, or whether the regional spirit of cooperation will prevail. Water management is likely to become a major challenge for the long-term future stability and development of Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

The most important conflict issue is the use of transboundary water resources, the conflict between the countries of the upper reaches of the SyrDarya and the Amudarya - Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and other downstream countries - Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan.

Today, the main disagreements between the countries of the region are concentrated around the processes of joint use of transboundary water resources, the issues of optimizing the regimes for using the cascade of reservoirs. In general, the main contradictions at the political level are manifested when questions are raised: who should manage water resources and how to distribute water in order to maintain the balance of interests of all countries.

To prevent water conflicts in the countries of Central Asia, it is necessary to undertake cardinal measures in the perspective of 2025, including: to determine the legislative norms for the development of irrigation. To overcome the water use crisis, the countries of the region should, on the basis of interstate agreements, determine the extent of expansion of crop areas and, if necessary, be ready to reduce them; use scientific advice on water resources management, take practical measures to save water resources, repair irrigation facilities and canals; to refuse the construction of grandiose hydraulic structures; to involve the countries from other regions and international organizations in the discussion of the problem; use a multilateral approach to solving water problems; take the necessary measures to prevent a water crisis.

The water problem can either create a serious threat to the security of the countries of the region,

or contribute to the establishment of relations of peace and good-neighborliness in the region. Proceeding from this, the activities of the Interstate Commission on Water Problems can help to ease tensions in all spheres of life in the countries of the region. In this respect, it would be useful to create new regional structures on water issues, in particular, the Interstate Council on the Use of the Potential of Transboundary Rivers.

In 2018-2025, interest in the hydrocarbon resources of Central Asia will continue, and the countries of the region and their neighbors will be involved in the discussion of new projects for the export of hydrocarbon raw materials. While the final decision on many projects has not been made, since the issue of their financing has not yet been resolved, there is no clarity about the reliability and security of supply, the influence of Western countries are very high. Finally, forecasts for oil and gas production are still politicized. Based on the dynamics of production in the countries of the region in the last decade and taking into account objectively existing difficulties, one can not expect that most of the planned pipelines can be commissioned before 2025. By this time it will become clear to what level of hydrocarbon production the countries of Central Asia will emerge, and whether they will be sufficient to fill the existing and planned export pipelines.

Until 2025, Turkmenistan may face the problem of depletion of large deposits, which in the last decade have yielded the bulk of the gas produced. In addition, Turkmenistan will have to compete with Iran, which has developed plans to increase exports of its gas to Europe and China. Finally, Kazakhstan expects in the coming years to increase gas supplies to China. As a result, it can be expected that in Central Asia competition will increase for the right to supply hydrocarbons to China and India, which still have a need for hydrocarbon raw materials.

Uzbekistan's regional policy for the future will be different by a perceptible desire to resolve conflicts where possible. The relations between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will be of decisive importance. While Tashkent was openly skeptical for many regional initiatives, although recent developments show that this situation may well change over the next two decades. In the next decade, the future viability of Kazakhstan's for-

eign policy will depend both on the political elections of Kazakhstan itself and on more large-scale events outside the country.

Experts consider that statements about the formation of the geopolitical partner axis Astana-Tashkent are premature. Success would be the achievement of such a level of coordination of regional policies of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, in which two key countries of the region could seriously affect the situation in the region as a whole, including with regard to extra-regional centers of power. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will jointly solve issues of water and energy complex, interface of transport and communication policy and region-wide stability.

If Kazakhstan is ready for regional integration, then Uzbekistan, despite all the reforms, does not accept it. All attempts to create the Central Asian Union failed. The three leaders are already an international integration structure, which needs to transfer some of the powers. Uzbekistan, and even more Turkmenistan with its strategic system and neutrality will never be ready to transfer some of its powers somewhere up. The Turkmen elite is also set for isolation. We can only expect an increase in bilateral trade volumes between countries.

A threat to Uzbekistan may be represented by mercenaries who fought or are fighting in Syria and Iraq. A significant number of militants who fight or fought in Syria and Iraq are from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, statistics show that they do not return to Uzbekistan, knowing what they expect in the country.

External threats from extremists and terrorists affect all the Central Asian republics. This situation will undoubtedly be preserved before and after 2025. These countries and their leaders are well aware of the serious and real threat posed by the global "specter of Islamism". Religious extremism in Central Asia, despite the reality of its threats, still has not been unequivocally assessed in the political and social circles of the region.

Closer by 2025, the main line of development of trade relations for sufficiently long distances can still be made not by road, but railway transport.

China is working on this direction in its own interests, promoting its projects and initiatives. But his work in this respect is not transparent and its ultimate goals, results and consequences are unknown to Russia and to the countries of Central Asia.

In case Kyrgyzstan withdraws from the EAEC, it will join to the kind of block of China with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, through which the transcontinental highway to Europe should pass - bypassing Kazakhstan and Russia. In Bishkek, there are already advanced groups of Chinese businessmen ready to invest in local projects up to several billion dollars. Beijing, as some political analysts in Bishkek fear, may turn to an open demonstration of its influence in the region, especially if it gets hold of Kyrgyzstan's water and energy resources.

Despite the Kremlin's bombastic statements about promoting Eurasian integration on its terms, neighbors in the east, south and southwest will play an increasingly important role in the economic and political development of Central Asia and in the security situation in the region. In the next ten years the future of Central Asia will be determined by five trends that can be seen now.

These trends are as follows: China becomes the most significant geopolitical and economic actor in the region. The economic presence of this country in Central Asia has increased dramatically, and Beijing's large-scale plans for further expansion of influence will have important consequences - both economically and politically. Beijing will closely monitor the domestic political developments in the region and the change of leaders of Central Asian countries to make sure that they guarantee the protection of Chinese interests.

The conquest by China of strong, virtually monopolistic positions in the sphere of the extraction and purchase of natural gas of Turkmenistan in the 21st century seems to be a natural and almost inevitable process in view of the great investment potential of the PRC and the known problems of Turkmen gas exports in other directions. However, in the context of the declining importance of Russia in this strategically important sector of the Turkmen economy, the costs for Ashgabat from China's complete domination are becoming increasingly evident. Following the achievement of leadership in the energy partnership and the establishment of the credit dependence of Ashgabat, China is more increasing its presence in Turkmenistan, primarily through military and humanitarian cooperation.

As Turkmenistan's economic dependence on China grows, bilateral humanitarian cooperation

is gradually stepped up. The Turkmen leadership, which for a long time actually shied away from its development, in recent years has been forced to make concessions and expand the population's access to learning Chinese. In general, the 25-year history of the development of Chinese-Turkmen relations in the post-Soviet period revealed both positive and negative (from the standpoint of Turkmen interests) sides of cooperation with China.

The positive side should be attributed to the ability of the PRC in a short time and, in fact, by its own efforts to achieve the implementation of complex multinational projects such as the Trans-Asian gas pipeline, which can bring economic benefits to all of their participants. The negative side is the narrow focus of China's economic interests in countries remote from it (control in the fuel and energy complex), the active use of instruments of credit and financial dependence. The degree of readiness of the PRC to participate in resolving numerous problems of Turkmenistan, as well as other countries of Central Asia is not clear: socio-political, economic, environmental, in the sphere of security, etc., the relevance of which only grows with time.

The trend associated with Russia indicates that the economic difficulties and the negative consequences of its actions in Ukraine are likely to result in a further reduction of Russia's already diminished presence in Central Asia. Accordingly, its political influence in the region will also decrease. Perhaps the only thing in which Russia continues to play a unique and leading role is military security. Moscow ties with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan through the CSTO - a special bridge for Russia in Central Asia.

Politically, even if the Ukrainian conflict is resolved, Russia is unlikely to be an attractive partner for Central Asian neighbors who fear its territorial claims, belligerent nationalism and brutal tactics towards weaker countries. Most of the countries of the region that have depended on Russia in the past, of course, will not want to enter into direct confrontation with Moscow. But all of them, of course, will look for other partners capable of serving as a counterweight to an uneasy northern neighbor. So Russia's goal, which is to preserve the sphere of its privileged interests in Central Asia, seems difficult to achieve.

The third trend is connected with Iran. Gradual normalization and strengthening of relations with Iran promise the appearance of a number of important and favorable economic, political and strategic opportunities. The prospect of Iran's withdrawal from isolation and the renewal of ties with its neighbors is a significant geopolitical factor that creates both new opportunities and new problems. To determine what will be more is not yet possible. One thing is obvious: the foreign policy agenda in Central Asia is becoming more complicated: a new actor is entering the stage. Iran either takes an empty place, or displaces some of the current players.

The fourth trend concerns the situation in Afghanistan and remains the number one security problem for the leaders of Central Asian countries. Instability in the north of Afghanistan creates a double threat for Central Asia. The conflict spread to the very edge of the region, which could exacerbate problems with extremism in Central Asia. The situation in Afghanistan, considering its potential impact on the internal structure of the Central Asian states and on the region's partnership in defense and security, will continue to prevail over other problems in this area, including the geopolitical expansion of China and Russia. [12]

The fifth trend is the weakening of the West's interest. It is a remote region that has no access to the sea, it has no historical, cultural and ethnic ties with America and Europe, therefore, in the USA and the European Union there are no naturally formed groups advocating rapprochement with Central Asia. In addition, Central Asia is surrounded by large powers, which have more interests and close ties with it. These powers are wary of foreign attempts to create footholds in the strategically important territory for them. The US and Europe have no primary interests in Central Asia, but they have goals related to China, Iran and Russia. All this together leads to the fact that in the political agenda of the West, the neighbors of Central Asia are given much more importance than to the CA.

At the present stage, the post-Soviet countries of Central Asia connect diverse economic interests, security problems and geopolitical imperatives with Turkey and Iran. At the same time, the development of relations with them is constrained by a number of objective factors. There is one

important obstacle - the presence in the region of other countries also seeking to strengthen their influence in the geopolitical space of Central Asia. Among them - India, Pakistan, South Korea, a number of Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, rivals and competitors of Iran and Turkey in regional and world politics. Of course, Russia remains the main partner of the Central Asian countries, making significant efforts to restore its political, economic and military presence in the region of Central Asia, as well as China, which seeks to expand its economic expansion zone here. This situation, of course, will remain until 2025.

In a situation where the relations between Russia and the West are exacerbating, for Central Asian countries the probability of a large-scale confrontation in Eurasia is no longer only a matter of possible temporary economic losses. There is no doubt that the alleged complication of the confrontation structure and the growing number of directly and indirectly involved actors will affect the vital interests of the countries of Central Asia. In the short term (i.e. by 2025), rivalry between the Russian Federation and the West will become a long-term, systemic factor and will significantly influence the national foreign policy and economic strategies of the Central Asian countries.

Despite the fact that sometimes the sphere of American interests in words is greatly expanding, Central Asia has no critical significance for the United States. It will remain unresponsive to American influence and values, efforts to build state and develop democracy. This means that it is necessary to adjust US policy in the region in order to bring the commitments that Washington takes on, in accordance with its real goals and limited capabilities. The countries of Central Asia are interested in maintaining friendly relations with America, at least in order to balance the influence of China and Russia; this should create real opportunities for US interaction with the countries of the region and respect for mutual interests.

In the field of the international situation of Kazakhstan, experts name two important variables - the fate of radical trends in the Muslim world and the global position of the United States. At the regional level, Kazakhstan should expect important, even fateful changes in China and in Russia. Russia is a country with a demographic and economic downturn, whose population will be much

less Russian and much more Turkic and Muslim after 2025. This should have a significant impact on Russia's foreign policy towards the RK and CA as a whole.

Already after 2025, China will become a country with average income or higher than average income, which has experienced a sharp rise in development, whose focus will be on maintaining central control over a vast and diverse territory and meeting the needs of a rapidly aging population. Europe is unlikely to become a leading security player in Central Asia before and after 2025. Nevertheless, in view of its economic role, Europe will continue to play an important role in Kazakhstan's balanced foreign policy.

In the short term (until 2025), the Central Asian countries will strive to maintain the existing balance of power. In turn, international and regional players interested in the region, based on their interests and capabilities, will ensure the

security and stability of the region in order to promote their practical interests. At the same time, in the medium term (after 2025), the Central Asian republics will have to face the global impact of world political transformations.

Ideally, the ruling elites in Central Asia would like to preserve geopolitical neutrality, focus on economic development and maintain social stability. However, there is also an understanding that in the modern world this is extremely difficult, and perhaps impossible. Increasing competition of major players leads to increasing politicization of economic issues. Therefore, geopolitical neutrality does not save economic development, but rather - restrains it. The period until 2025 will show whether the big players are ready to accept a regional request for de-geopolitization, and whether the ruling elites of Central Asia will be able to defend their vision of geopolitical neutrality.

REFERENCES:

1. Laruelle M. (ed.) Tajikistan: Islam, Migration, and Economic Challenges. – Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University, Central Asia Program, 2017. – 125 p.
2. Laruelle M. (ed.) Turkmenistan: Changes and Stability under Berdimuhamedow. – Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University, Central Asia Program, 2017. – 55 p.
3. Laruelle M. (ed.) Kazakhstan: Nation-Branding, Economic Trials, and Cultural Changes. – Washington, D.C.: The George Washington University, Central Asia Program, 2017. – 85 p.
4. Starr S. Frederick, Engvall J., Cornell Svante E. Kazakhstan 2041: The Next Twenty-Five Years. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. – Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University, 2016. – 67 p.
5. Перспективы сотрудничества России и Китая в Центральной Азии. А.А. Казанцев, И.Д. Звягельская, Е.М. Кузьмина, С.Г. Лузянин. Гл. ред. И. С. Иванов. Российский совет по международным делам. – М.: НП РСМД, 2016. – 52 с.
6. Румер Ю, Сокольский Р., Пол Стронски П. Политика США в Центральной Азии. – М.: МЦК, 2016. – V+41 с.
7. Saikal A., Nourzhanov K. (eds.) Afghanistan and Its Neighbors after the NATO Withdrawal. – New York: Lexington Books, 2016. – 240 p.; Laruelle M. (ed.) The Central Asia – Afghanistan Relationship from Soviet Intervention to the Silk Road Initiatives. – New York: Lexington Books, 2017. – XVII+253 pp.; Joshi N. Russian, Chinese and American Interplay in Central Asia and Afghanistan: Options for India. - New Delhi: Vivekananda International Foundation, 2017. – VI+52 p.; Safranchuk I. Afghanistan and Its Central Asian Neighbors. – New York, London: CSIS, 2017. – VI+36 pp.; Афганистан и Центральная Азия: подходы России и США // Проблемы терроризма, насильственного экстремизма и радикализации (российские и американские подходы). Спецвыпуск. Под ред. Е.А. Степановой. – М.: ИМЭМО РАН, 2017. – 262 с.; Karine E. L'Asie centrale à l'épreuve de l'islam radical. – Paris: IFRI, 2017. – 30 p.

МРПТИ
11.25.91

NEW STRATEGY OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND CHINESE POLITICS

Zhao Huasheng

Professor of the School of International Studies, Fudan University

Abstract. In August 2017, President Trump announced a new US strategy for Afghanistan. The new strategy is not a fundamental substitute for the US strategy in Afghanistan - its main goals and approaches have not changed significantly with regard to the strategy adopted by the Obama administration. The difference is mainly in tactical and operational aspects. However, Trump's new strategy offers some new ideas in the process of national political construction in Afghanistan. The new Trump strategy in Afghanistan has its advantages and disadvantages for China. China and the US lack the foundations for long-term strategic cooperation in Afghanistan. However, both countries can cooperate on specific issues to achieve certain goals.

Key words: USA, China, Afghanistan., Trump Administration, New Trump Strategy

АУҒАНСТАНДАҒЫ ТРАМП ӘКІМШІЛІГІНІҢ ЖАҢА СТРАТЕГИЯСЫ ЖӘНЕ ҚЫТАЙ САЯСАТЫ

Чжао Хуашэн

Аңдатпа. 2017 жылдың тамыз айында Президент Трамп Ауғанстанға қатысты АҚШ-тың жаңа стратегиясын жариялады. Жаңа стратегия АҚШ-тың Ауғанстандағы стратегиясының түбегейлі алмастырмайды, оның негізгі мақсаттары мен тәсілдері Обаманың әкімшілігі қабылданған стратегиядан айтарлықтай өзгерген жоқ. Айырмашылық негізінен тактикалық және операциялық аспектілерде. Дегенмен Ауғанстандағы ұлттық саяси құрылыста Трамптың жаңа стратегиясы жаңа идеяларды ұсынады. Трамптың Ауғанстандағы жаңа стратегиясында Қытай үшін артықшылықтары мен кемшіліктері бар. Қытай мен АҚШ Ауғанстандағы ұзақ мерзімді стратегиялық ынтымақтастықтың негізін қаламайды. Алайда, екі ел нақты мақсаттарға қол жеткізу үшін нақты мәселелер бойынша ынтымақтасуы мүмкін.

Түйінді сөздер: АҚШ, Қытай, Ауғанстан, Трамп Әкімшілігі, Трамптың жаңа стратегиясы.

НОВАЯ СТРАТЕГИЯ АДМИНИСТРАЦИИ ТРАМПА В АФГАНИСТАНЕ И КИТАЙСКАЯ ПОЛИТИКА

Чжао Хуашэн

Аннотация. В августе 2017 года президент Трамп объявил о новой стратегии США в отношении Афганистана. Новая стратегия не является фундаментальной заменой стратегии США в Афганистане, ее основные цели и подходы существенно не изменились относительно стратегии, принятой Администрацией Обамы. Разница заключается главным образом в тактических и оперативных аспектах. Однако в процессе национального политического строительства в Афганистане новая стратегия Трампа предлагает некоторые новые идеи. Новая стратегия Трампа в Афганистане имеет свои плюсы и минусы для Китая. Китаю и США недостает основ для долгосрочного стратегического сотрудничества в Афганистане. Однако обе страны могут осуществлять сотрудничество по конкретным вопросам для достижения определенных целей.

Ключевые слова: США, Китай, Афганистан., Администрации Трампа, Новая стратегия Трампа.

Introduction

Eight months after the change of the US president, the American strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia was finally expounded. On August 21, 2017, the US President Trump issued a statement on Afghanistan and South Asia, in which he announced a new strategy for the United States regarding Afghanistan and South Asia.

Being a neighboring country to China, as well as a geographical center connecting Central Asia, South Asia and Western Asia, Afghanistan occupies an important place in the security sphere of China and its plans for the Economic Belt of the Silk Road. The new US strategy will affect the development of Afghanistan, and also affect the strategic presence of China in Afghanistan and creation of the Economic Belt of the Silk Road. In this regard, China should conduct an objective assessment and respond appropriately.

The Obama Administration's Legacy in Afghanistan

The Administration of George W. Bush began the war in Afghanistan in 2001, and the end of this war was a difficult problem for three American presidents.

In March 2009, two months after he became President, Barack Obama proposed an "American New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan"

in an attempt to end the war in Afghanistan and solve the Afghan problem. The aim of this strategy is to defeat "Al-Qaeda". The Obama Administration has put forward a number of new ideas, among which are: increasing military power in Afghanistan; general approaches to the problems of Afghanistan and Pakistan; transition from military strikes to methods of military and civil diplomacy; strengthening the support of the Afghan government and the military, gradual transfer to the government of Afghanistan of basic functions related to ensuring the country's internal security; separation of Taliban and Al Qaeda, focusing on fighting Al-Qaeda, differentiating the Taliban, seeking dialogue with the "moderate" Taliban; providing more support from its allies and the international community, and so on.

However, while Obama's strategy looked offensive, its main idea was withdrawal from Afghanistan. The new strategy just lays the foundation for the military withdrawal [1]. In June 2011, Obama announced the military withdrawal from Afghanistan and completion of transfer of the combat operations to the Afghan side by the end of 2014. By that time, the United States retained only a small number of military forces in Afghanistan, while their main task was to train the Afghan army [2].

2014 is an important turning point in the situation around Afghanistan. As the main American forces involved in military operations were withdrawn by the end of the year, Afghanistan faces trials and challenges to the future and destiny of the state. However, the US military retained more troops in Afghanistan than planned. In October 2015, President Obama signed a decree that in 2016, 9,800 troops will still remain in Afghanistan, and by 2017 it will be reduced to about 5,500 [3]. These goals of President Obama were not achieved. In 2017, the US Armed Forces announced the presence in Afghanistan of 8,400 American troops, in fact, they account for 11,000 [4]. During the 16-year war, the US military suffered heavy losses. By May 2017, the US Armed Forces lost a total of 1,865 people and 20,272 were wounded [5].

There are various forecasts about the development of the situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US troops. Now it seems that, on the one hand, the situation in Afghanistan is really developing in the direction of deterioration. According to information provided by the US military, there are currently about 20 insurgent and terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan that pose a threat, including the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Al-Qaida and the Islamic State (ISIS) [5]. After the withdrawal of the US Armed Forces from Afghanistan at the end of 2014, terrorist attacks increased in the country and the level of security in the capital of Kabul was sharply weakened. For a short time, the Taliban even captured the strategically important city of Kunduz in the north-east of the country, which caused a colossal shock in Afghanistan. On the other hand, after the withdrawal of the main forces of the US armed forces, Afghanistan has not experienced the big collapse predicted by many. Although the Afghan government is fragile, it still exists. The Taliban could not seize state power, and the Afghan government did not plunge into uncontrolled chaos. According to the United States estimate, the Taliban control 11% of the 407 districts of Afghanistan, the Afghan government controls 60%, and control of 29% of the districts passes from one side to the other [6].

Thus, the United States could not put an end to the Afghan problem for itself; but there was no collapse. There are no hopes of winning; but

they are not going to retreat - both directions are difficult.

The new strategy of the Trump Administration in Afghanistan

After Trump took office, Afghanistan was one acute problem that he could not avoid. The war in Afghanistan was the longest ongoing war in the history of the United States, not won by them.. Trump urgently needed to formulate a policy and make a choice in the Afghan issue. Thus, soon after taking office, Trump demanded that the US Department of Defense and the National Security Agency came up with strategies. Trump himself admitted that his initial plans were to withdraw completely from Afghanistan and no longer use American money to fill this bottomless pit. However, regarding the Afghan issue, Trump did not demonstrate his stubbornness in his views.

The US State Department announced the Trump's new strategy "Strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia", which differs from the Obama's strategy of "The United States for Afghanistan and Pakistan" by name.

The background for Trump's new strategy is as follows: The United States believes that anti-terrorist efforts in Afghanistan are part of the US global anti-terrorist strategy, and Afghanistan can still pose a serious threat to US security; the Americans are committed to Afghanistan, including continuing to support the Afghan national security forces and assisting the country; the United States does not repeat the mistakes of the rapid withdrawal of troops from Iraq and do not leave Afghanistan too quickly, since the rapid withdrawal of troops will have intolerable negative consequences for the United States.

The core of the new strategy is to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a source of threats to US security. The main objectives of the United States in Afghanistan are: to guarantee absence of sharp changes and fractures in the country; to destroy the terrorist organization of Al-Qaeda in the country, as well as ISIS and other organizations; not to seek to destroy the Taliban, but make them believe in the impossibility of victory in order to stop the Taliban from seizing power and to force the organization to sit down at the negotiating table; not to seek to build an American state model in Afghanistan, not to require the country to create its own state

structure on the basis of American concepts and adopt any form of government that will be adopted as a result of negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban [7].

The main approach to the implementation of the new strategy is to increase strength in Afghanistan so that the US can engage once more in ground operations; resort to comprehensive political, economic and diplomatic methods; expand the capabilities of Afghan government forces; require more support from NATO and international partners; exert pressure on Pakistan, forcing it to no longer provide “shelter” to the Taliban and terrorist groups; strengthen strategic cooperation with India and ask Delhi to provide additional financial support to Afghanistan [8].

The biggest change in the new strategy is the adoption of a new guiding principle, according to which policies and actions must be implemented on the basis of real need without any preconceived restrictions. This means that the United States can pursue any policy and action at the tactical level if it is deemed necessary. This principle will not only be reflected in the number and duration of presence of the US troops deployed in Afghanistan, but also in US diplomacy [7]. At the same time, the new strategy allows the military to act more autonomously, and frees the hands of military commanders on the battlefield.

In comparison with Obama's strategy, Trump's new strategy does not show any fundamental strategic changes. Although it has some changes in philosophy and specific goals, the main difference is in the tactical and operational aspects.

The core and strategy of Obama and Trump's strategy is not to “leave” Afghanistan, and after leaving without loss of face ensure the impossibility of a destructive scenario. The view that the United States is leaving Afghanistan in a mess and running away from responsibility has not been confirmed - even Trump, having come to power, has changed his views.

The Afghan strategy of the Trump Administration, like the strategy of the Obama Administration, has adopted a version of the peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban as the most acceptable option. The Obama Administration pinned hopes on the “moderate” Taliban, while the Trump Administration does not

distinguish between the “moderate” and “tough” Taliban. Compared to terrorist organizations such as ISIS, the Taliban are not only relatively “moderate”, but also not so progressive and ambitious outside Afghanistan. The Obama Administration sent a replenishment of 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, and then announced a massive withdrawal by the end of 2014. Neither the increase in the number of troops nor the withdrawal led to the fact that the Taliban went to serious negotiations with the Afghan government, and the security situation is getting worse and worse. This forced the Obama Administration to adjust its policy during the last phase of the tenure and suspend the withdrawal of troops. Trump does not have the opposite strategy at all, without limiting the size, duration and regime of the presence of American troops in Afghanistan. Instead of trying to defeat the Taliban, the stakes were set to deprive the Taliban of the hope of seizing power and show that it is better to share power with the central government and move on the path of negotiations than to arrive on the outskirts of political processes. In fact, in the last period of the Obama Administration's tenure, he held the same positions, but did not develop a clear policy [9].

Both Obama's Afghan strategy and Trump's strategy attach great importance to India and Pakistan, and their roles and positions are similar: both strategies are based on a strategic partnership with India, as well as cooperation with Pakistan, as the key to solving the Afghanistan problem. Nevertheless, Trump used the tactics of pressure and the use of tough methods and ultimatums to force Pakistan to meet the needs of the United States.

Trump's Afghan strategy emphasizes only the desire to achieve the goals of security and common interests, while not touching the state structure of Afghanistan, and not using American ideas to reform the country. It is emphasized that “non-ideological position” is indeed a sign of the New Trump's strategy in Afghanistan. During the Obama's tenure, the United States agreed with the principle that “Afghanistan is run by Afghans and Afghanistan is owned by Afghans” in the peace process in Afghanistan, but the current Afghan constitution and democratic Afghanistan are the cornerstone of national reconciliation and national

construction. Although it is difficult to believe at the practical level that the Afghan government will abandon the current constitutional framework and agree to return to a religious form of government, that is, not a secular regime, but theoretically, from the Trump's new strategy, one can assume that the current constitution can no longer serve the basis for political reconciliation and state building. According to US Secretary of State Tillerson, there are no preconditions for negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Any national model that Afghans are prepared to accept will be acceptable if this does not pose a threat to the United States [7].

As expected, Trump's new strategy may bring some positive results on the battlefield, but the question is whether this strategy can lead to political achievements and put the Taliban at the negotiating table. The Taliban have their own assessments about the situation and they adhere to their own logic and way of thinking. They may not necessarily follow the path developed by the Americans.

However, the possibility that the Taliban will negotiate with the Afghan government cannot be excluded. This is not ruled out not only by the new US strategy, but also by a combination of factors. Negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government, which were held in July 2015 and were not continued because of the death of the leader of the Taliban, showed that negotiations are not impossible. The military presence of ISIS in Afghanistan is also an important factor, as it has become a strong competitor and rival of the Taliban in Afghanistan. In addition, reconciliation between the Taliban and the Afghan government is also supported by China, Pakistan, Russia and other countries in the region, which is also an important driving force for the negotiations.

There is one more question: What should Trump do if the new strategy is not successful?

Trump hopes that the new strategy will be implemented quickly and immediately. Nevertheless, the effect of the new strategy not meeting its expectations is highly probable. Trump said that he accepts Afghanistan is in chaos; but he also claims the role of a person who can close the issue, that is, who is in a position to solve the problem of Afghanistan.

The success or failure of the new strategy can first of all be checked in three aspects: first, whether or not the Taliban will agree to negotiate, secondly, whether Pakistan will comply with the US requirements, and thirdly, whether the Afghan government will be able to carry out serious reforms. Trump said that the United States does not give out blank checks and does not bear unlimited liability - the patience of the United States is limited [8]. This means that if the new strategy fails, Trump can change course. The new strategy basically reflects the judgments and programs of the US military, [5] if Trump refuses the new strategy, options to abandon Afghanistan or abandon the current Afghan government are eliminated; and the only option is a return to Trump's original “instinctive” thinking. But will the United States do this? If this is the case, serious upheavals and changes in the geopolitical structure in Afghanistan and the region will inevitably occur. And if we do not abandon the new strategy, Afghanistan will once again plunge into confusion and a dead end; and the United States will return to a state of uncertainty. In addition, Trump's team and even Trump himself are in permanent instability, and their long-term policy implementation is also questioned.

China's Responses to the Situation in Afghanistan

The differences and similarities between the interests and positions of China and the United States on the issue of Afghanistan should be objectively and accurately assessed; it is necessary to make rational decisions on how the China-US cooperation on Afghanistan will develop.

Although there is a strategic mistrust and competition in general, as well as a different understanding of the problem and the way of thinking between China and the United States, the interests and positions of the two countries on the problem of Afghanistan in fact have much in common.

Both China and the United States support the Afghan government and consider it a guarantor of restoration and maintenance of security. At the same time, both China and the United States hope that Afghanistan will maintain secular state power.

Both countries believe that stability in Afghanistan corresponds to their own security

interests: the main goals of both states are to ensure security and stability in Afghanistan. There is a doubt that the United States intends to bring Afghanistan controlled instability as a basis for maintaining a long-term presence in the country. The US Armed Forces intend to maintain a long-term military presence in Afghanistan, [10]. In addition, there are still a number of US military bases in the country [5]. However, it is difficult to conclude that the situation in Afghanistan has been intentionally inspired by the Americans. This conclusion means that the US is able to solve the Afghan issue, but knowingly do not use the opportunities, but the reality is that regardless of whether the US deliberately misses the opportunity to decide or not, the Americans do not have the opportunity to achieve a complete victory on the battlefield. The United States cannot completely eliminate the rebel and terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

China and the United States do not have clear fundamental differences in understanding the final solution to the Afghan problem. Both countries consider political reconciliation to be the final decision. It is generally accepted that the United States wants to use military means to solve the problem without paying attention to political means. In fact, the policy of the United States has changed during the Obama's tenure, and this policy now promotes political reconciliation between the Taliban and the Afghan government. The Trump's new strategy also inherited this policy. The military means of the United States nowadays mainly serves to promote political reconciliation.

The differences between Beijing and Washington have narrowed considerably as regards the issue of political reconciliation in Afghanistan. Both China and the United States agree with the principle that "Afghanistan is run by Afghans and Afghanistan is owned by Afghans". Trump's new Afghan strategy makes it clear that the rejection of the idea of using the American model of the state to upgrade Afghanistan in favor of adopting any form of government chosen by the Afghan people is consistent with the China's position that the Afghan people should have the right to autonomous existence without introducing alien

elements. China and the United States adhere to close positions in responding to anti-government and terrorist organizations. China has always regarded the Taliban as a political entity, viewing it as a representative of political and social forces that will exist for a long time. The United States now also applies a differentiated approach to the Taliban. With respect to Al Qaeda, the Haqqani network, the Islamic state, the term "terrorist organizations" is used, while the Taliban is called a "rebel organization". This qualitative change has laid the foundation for the US to accept the political legitimization of the Taliban movement.

Trump's new strategy in Afghanistan has both a negative impact on China and the positive sides. One of the negative aspects is the strengthening of the US military presence in Afghanistan and ensuring a long-term American influence.

The long-term military presence of the United States in Afghanistan does not meet the interests of China's strategic security. This gives the United States a military pillar in the center between Central Asia, South Asia and West Asia, and provides the United States with a powerful geopolitical leverage that can be used in Central, South and West Asia, as well as Russia and China. The military presence of the United States also threatens the China's potential strategic deterrence from the northwest. In the event of a serious incident in relations between China and the United States, US military forces in Afghanistan will become part of the strategic siege of China and a potential hidden danger to China's strategic security. In addition, the US policy towards India and Pakistan can increase tensions between these countries, increase the risk of political disagreements and confrontation in South Asia and deepen regional instability. On the other hand, theoretically it could be assumed that under the pressure of the United States, a tripartite mechanism of the United States, India and Pakistan on the problem of Afghanistan will be created.

The positive side of the new US strategy is that this strategy can help curb the Taliban movement, crack down on Al-Qaeda and stop ISIS in Afghanistan. If this can stabilize the worsening situation in Afghanistan, it will be useful for China's security, as well as for

construction of "the Belt and the Way". The new strategy of the United States in Afghanistan, which is trying to transfer the Taliban to the negotiating table, is also an incentive for the China's efforts to promote political reconciliation in Afghanistan.

Although China does not want the United States to deploy its troops in Afghanistan on an ongoing basis, under current conditions, China should not seek an early US withdrawal. In particular, Washington should not abandon political responsibility. On the one hand, the presence of Americans is an irritant; on the other, US involvement still plays an important role in solving the Afghan problem. Afghanistan's national security is ultimately to be ensured by the Afghan army itself; but at this stage the United States is the largest source of funding for the Afghan government and the military [5, pp.84-85]. If this source of resources runs out, then it will be difficult for the Afghan government and the military to support themselves. After the Afghan government and the armed forces are unable to provide themselves, chaos will begin in Afghanistan; the Islamic state and Al-Qaeda will certainly take advantage of the opportunity to expand their positions, and state power could fall into the hands of the Taliban. The fate of the Najibullah regime is a warning.

In the short term, the Afghan government will not be financially self-sufficient, and it will be difficult to find a full alternative source of funding. 16 billion US dollars for financial assistance to Afghanistan, established by the Tokyo International Conference on Afghanistan in 2012, ended by 2016. In October 2016, the Brussels International Conference on Afghanistan outlined its plan to help Afghanistan in 2017-2020. The international community promised to provide Afghanistan with a total amount of 15.2 billion US dollars [11]. The United States plays an important role in these arrangements and is also the largest provider of funds for the Afghan government to hold 325,000 troops and the police.

The new strategy of the United States in Afghanistan pursues pragmatism, while its volatility and uncertainty will be significant. When Washington considers that the strategy needs to be changed, it will not take into account

the interests of other countries. Therefore, China and the United States have no basis for long-term, comprehensive and stable strategic cooperation in Afghanistan. However, this does not mean that China and the United States cannot and should not cooperate in Afghanistan. However, such cooperation will mainly focus on specific issues and pursue narrow goals.

At present, the most important aspect of cooperation between China and the United States in Afghanistan should be facilitation of peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban and resumption of the process of political reconciliation in Afghanistan. Both China and the United States are particularly important players in promoting political reconciliation in Afghanistan. Both countries are members of the "Afghanistan-Pakistan-China-US" quartet, as well as participated in the first talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. As China has good relations with the Afghan government, close relations with Pakistan, opportunities for contacts with the Taliban and powerful economic leverage, China has more favorable conditions than any other major player in promoting political reconciliation in Afghanistan. In this regard, the new US strategy in Afghanistan will require cooperation with China, especially if the new strategy fails or in case of deterioration of relations with Pakistan. China and the United States need to intensify consultations on how to resume the process of political reconciliation in Afghanistan, strengthen coordination and cooperation and conduct more effective cooperation.

Antiterrorist cooperation is mandatory in interaction on the Afghan issue. At present, the current China-US anti-terrorist cooperation in Afghanistan should focus on ISIS, the destruction of the foundations of Al-Qaida, curbing the growth of terrorist forces and preventing the spread of terrorism to nearby areas. Since China does not participate in military operations in Afghanistan, the interaction between the two countries is carried out in the form of the China-US cooperation in the fight against terrorism, primarily cooperation in various fields, exchange of intelligence information, creation of networks of anti-terrorist networks, fight against terrorism in the financial sphere, anti-drug cooperation,

prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and political coordination at the regional and international levels.

In addition, China and the United States also have the opportunity to cooperate in promoting economic development and building regional infrastructure in Afghanistan. Although Trump announced the new strategy in Afghanistan to get rid of the financial burden, domestic economic construction and infrastructure development

increases the economic independence of Afghanistan, which is also an important basis for long-term stability in Afghanistan and, thereby, contributes to the goals of the new US strategy in Afghanistan. The United States has both economic potential and international resources, and organizational capabilities. China should push the Trump Administration to continue the policy of helping Afghanistan's economic development and regional ties.

REFERENCES:

1. 赵华胜, 《美国新阿富汗战略及评估》, 载《复旦学报》(社会科学版) 2009年第6期。第8页。
2. Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan, June 22, 2011 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/22/remarks-president-way-forward-afghanistan> \
3. Statement by the President on Afghanistan, October 15, 2015. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/15/statement-president-afghanistan>
4. Afghanistan Force Management Accounting Change Emphasizes Transparency, Aug. 30, 2017. <https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1295647/afghanistan-force-management-accounting-change-emphasizes-transparency/>
5. Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Department of Defense, USA. Report to Congress In Accordance With Section 1225 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291), as amended. June 2017. P.6. https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/June_2017_1225_Report_to_Congress.pdf
6. Krishnadev Calamur, Is Trump Right About Afghanistan? Aug 3, 2017. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/trump-afghanistan/535788/>
7. Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary of State, Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia, August 22, 2017 <https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/08/273577.htm>
8. Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia, August 21, 2017. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/21/remarks-president-trump-strategy-afghanistan-and-south-asia>
9. In the speech, the US special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Olsen said: "The Taliban should not expect that the United States will refuse to support the Afghan government. The United States will not leave until the peace process is guaranteed." Richard Olson, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Remarks to the Atlantic Council, June 21, 2016.
10. Kevin Sieff and Sayed Salahuddin, Karzai says U.S. wants to keep 9 bases in Afghanistan, May 10, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/karzai-says-us-wants-to-keep-9-bases/2013/05/09/aba57866-b8bf-11e2-b568-6917f6ac6d9d_story.html
11. The Brussels Conference on Afghanistan, 4-5 October, 2016. <http://mfa.gov.af/en/page/the-brussels-conference-on-afghanistan>.

МРҲТИ
11.25.35

TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS – FOR AND AGAINST

Alimzhan Akhmetov

Director of the Center for International Security and Policy

Timur Zhantikin

Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Atomic and Energy Supervision and Control of the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Candidate of Physical and Mathematical Sciences

Abstract. This article examines the elements of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons; the positions of the States which are parties to the negotiations on the preparation of the Treaty text; and its relationship with other legal instruments in the field of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The main source of information for the writing of this article was the personal participation of one of the co-authors in two sessions of a conference in March and June-July 2017 in New York.

Keywords: *disarmament, nuclear weapons, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.*

ЯДРОЛЫҚ ҚАРУҒА ТЫЙЫМ САЛУ КЕЛІСІМ-ШАРТЫ – ҚОЛДАУ ЖӘНЕ ҚАРСЫ

Әлімжан Ахметов, Тимур Жанткин

Аңдатпа. Мақалада Ядролық қаруға тыйым салу туралы шарттың элементтері, оның мәтінін дайындау бойынша келіссөзге қатысушы мемлекеттің ұстанымдары, ядролық қарусыздану және ядролық қаруды таратпау саласындағы басқа да құқықтық инструменттермен олардың өзара байланысы қарастырылады. Нью-Йорк қаласында

2017 жылы наурызда және маусым-шілдеде өткен Конференцияның екі сессиясында тең авторлардың бірінің дербес қатысуы осы мақаланы жазу үшін негізгі ақпарат көзі болды.

Түйінді сөздер: қарусыздану, ядролық қару, Ядролық қаруға тыйым салу туралы шарт.

ДОГОВОР О ЗАПРЕЩЕНИИ ЯДЕРНОГО ОРУЖИЯ – ЗА И ПРОТИВ

Алимжан Ахметов, Тимур Жанткин

Аннотация. В статье рассматриваются элементы Договора о запрещении ядерного оружия, позиции государств-участников переговоров по подготовке текста Договора, его взаимосвязь с другими правовыми инструментами в области ядерного разоружения и нераспространения ядерного оружия. Основным источником информации для написания данной статьи явилось личное участие одного из соавторов в двух сессиях Конференции в марте и июне-июле 2017 года в Нью-Йорке.

Ключевые слова: разоружение, ядерное оружие, Договор о запрещении ядерного оружия.

Research Methodology

To prepare this article, general scientific methods of research were used – analytical; comparative-historical; descriptive; and methods including observation, generalization and abstraction. The main source of information for this article was the personal participation of one of the co-authors in two sessions of the talks in March and June-July 2017 in New York [1], as well as the materials of the meetings of the Conference on the preparation of the text of the TPNW and the UN documents.

Introduction

On July 7, 2017, at the UN headquarters in New York, during the final session of the negotiations on the development of a legally binding instrument on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the overwhelming majority of participants approved the text of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as “the Treaty” [2].

On September 20, 2017, the Treaty was opened for signature. It will enter into force after it will be ratified by 50 participating states. To date, the Treaty has been signed by 57 states (including Kazakhstan), five of which have ratified the document. The five are Cuba, Guyana, Mexico, Thailand and Vatican [3].

The main goal of the adoption of the Treaty is the legal prohibition of nuclear weapons. As a reminder, only nuclear weapons have not yet been legally prohibited from among the three types of weapons of mass destruction: nuclear; chemical (prohibited by the 1972 Convention); and biological (prohibited by the 1993 Convention).

Moreover, the status of the five nuclear-weapon states - the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China - is legalized in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Another four states - Israel, India, Pakistan and the DPRK - possess nuclear weapons, but are not parties to the NPT.

The fact of the adoption of the Treaty of the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is a historic event in the field of nuclear disarmament; but there are several ambiguous points that had emerged in the process of its development and preparation for signing.

First of all, despite the efforts of 137 negotiators and the President of the Conference (negotiations) to reach a consensus, the Treaty was put to the vote. As a result, 122 states voted in favor. The Netherlands, who insisted on voting, voted against the adoption of the Treaty. Singapore abstained [4].

To this, we must add the fact that the states possessing nuclear weapons and their allies did not take part in the negotiation process. 13 negotiators - Andorra, Armenia, Barbados, Cameroon, Guinea, Libya, Monaco, Nauru, Nicaragua, Swaziland, Syria, Macedonia and Zambia - refused to vote [5]. All this significantly reduces the likelihood of the practical implementation of the Treaty, even if it enters into force.

It is obvious that the states possessing nuclear weapons, despite their refusal to participate in the negotiation process, followed the negotiations closely and actively influenced them through their allies. This is evidenced by the position of the Netherlands, for example, a member of NATO, which, in fact, did not allow the adoption of the text of the Treaty by consensus.

Iran was the only state among the negotiating participants which from the very beginning of the negotiation process called insistently for the harmonization of the most compact document, the main focus of which would be the legal prohibition of nuclear weapons and the removal of a legal gap in this area [6].

Ideally, in our opinion, the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons would have to be carried out in two stages:

Stage 1 – the complete and exhaustive prohibition of nuclear weapons de jure - the adoption of the Treaty;

Stage 2 – the adoption of the Convention, which regulates the destruction of nuclear weapons within the agreed timeframe, the adoption of verification mechanisms, as well as the identification (or establishment) of a specialized Agency for the verification of disarmament.

The development and adoption of the Convention requires considerably more time and scrupulous elaboration of all technical issues on the destruction of nuclear weapons, as well as the development and adoption of acceptable verification mechanisms. This is confirmed by the experience of the international community in developing an appropriate model convention in 1997 and 2007 [7].

Thus, the task of the Treaty is to secure the “point of no return” - the signing and entry into force of the first-ever international treaty on the legal prohibition of nuclear weapons.

The decision of the states participating in the negotiations to adopt provisions on both the legal prohibition and the destruction of nuclear weapons in one Treaty may in the future damage the process of nuclear disarmament, in view of the poorly developed issues of verifying nuclear disarmament in the text of the document.

II. Development and Adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: complexities and problem issues

Problems of both a technical and an ideological nature arose within the process of developing and adopting the Treaty. Technical complexities can be identified, such as, for example, the poorly developed original text of the Treaty, which was submitted to the negotiating states on May 22, 2017. This factor, along with a shortage of time, did not allow participants to qualitatively finalize the text of the Treaty during the negotiation process.

Certain technical complexities were also associated with the format for organizing the discussion of the text of the Treaty. In addition to the classic negotiating process, panel sessions were organized with the participation of independent experts, which, in fact, was a substitute for real negotiations between the participating states and led to the loss of precious time.

However, the greatest interest lies in the analysis of the complexities and issues of an ideological nature, according to which states have different positions. These are problems such as the structure of the treaty and the content of its preamble, prohibitions related to nuclear weapons, and especially its transit, verification of nuclear disarmament, etc.

Position of the Nuclear Powers and Their Allies

As noted above, the Nuclear Possessing States and their allies boycotted negotiations on the preparation of the text of the Treaty.

On March 27, 2017, in New York on the first day of the negotiations, 21 states, led by the United States, Britain and France, issued a statement to the press opposed to the negotiations [8]. The nuclear trio was supported by 18 states - Australia, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Denmark,

Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, Croatia, Czech Republic and Estonia.

Japan took part only in the general debate of the first session of the Conference in March 2017 and stated the following: “A ban treaty, if it does not lead to an actual reduction of a single nuclear warhead, would be of little significance. In fact, efforts to make such a treaty without the involvement of nuclear-weapon states will only deepen the schism and division not only between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, but also among non-nuclear-weapon states, which will further divide the international community. Therefore, our common goal will be pushed away, a goal of reaching a world free of nuclear weapons. Even if such a ban treaty is agreed upon, we don't think that it would lead to the solution of real security issues, such as the threat by North Korea. This is why we voted against the UN General Assembly resolution 71/258 last year” [9].

It should also be noted that although at the vote of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the DPRK voted in favor of Resolution No. 71/258 “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”, and China, India and Pakistan abstained [10], these states did not participate in the negotiations.

Following the second session of the talks on July 7, 2017, the United States, Britain and France issued a joint statement stressing that “France, the United Kingdom and the United States have not taken part in the negotiation of the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. We do not intend to sign, ratify or ever become party to it” [11].

The Russian side, during the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference in May 2017 in Vienna, stated that: “... this is an erroneous path, fraught with unforeseen consequences, including for the NPT. We call on all to remember in New York about the responsibility for the fate of the NPT and not for damage to the NPT”.

On September 20, 2017, the NATO member states issued a press release, which, in particular, stressed the following: “The ban treaty is at odds with the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. This risk undermining the NPT, which has been

at the heart of global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts for almost 50 years, and the IAEA Safeguards regime which supports it. The crisis caused by North Korea underlines the importance of preserving and enhancing the existing framework of the NPT” [12].

Thus, the Nuclear Possessing States a designated unequivocally their attitude to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, clearly indicating the impossibility of their acceptance of the Treaty. Non-participation of the Nuclear Possessing States in the Treaty and, most likely, of their allies reduces its provisions to a purely declarative statement. The only rational gain in this case will be the existence of an international legal instrument (when the Treaty enters into force) that legally prohibits nuclear weapons, which can serve as the basis for the adoption of international arbitral and judicial decisions against any attempt to legalize the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in relations between states.

As noted above, participation of the Netherlands in the negotiations is most likely related to their role as a conductor of the position of Nuclear Possessing States. In principle, even at the first session of the Conference in March 2017, the participation of the Netherlands, a NATO member state, on whose territory nuclear weapons were stationed, was at least strange, against the backdrop of a boycott of nuclear powers and their allies.

However, at that time there were some so-called logical justifications, which amounted to the fact that the Netherlands participated in the negotiations on the basis of the demands of its Parliament; and also wished not to spoil its chairmanship at the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was held in Vienna in May 2017.

On the first day of the second session of the Conference, on 15 June 2017, the Netherlands, as in March 2017, stated that they would be able to support the draft Treaty only if it did not conflict with their obligations under NATO [13]. This position was also confirmed by them on the second day of the Conference.

It was thus clear from the very first days of the Conference that consensus adoption of the document could be forgotten about; and in any case, would be put to the vote.

On the other hand, the President of the Conference could take advantage of this situation and achieve maximum strengthening of the text of the Treaty; but did not do so.

Preamble

The Preamble is important because it sets the tone for the document and reflects the importance that the participating states give it.

In the first draft of the Treaty (at that time called the Convention) [14], the historical importance of the document as a breakthrough in the field of nuclear disarmament was not reflected. In particular, there were no references to the first UN resolution, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, the First Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament (SSOD-1), etc.

Unfortunately, the negotiating states very easily agreed not to include the following binding references in the Preamble of the Treaty:

- The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice dated 8 July 1996;
- The final document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament dated 30 June 1978;
- Conferences held on the humanitarian implications of the use of nuclear weapons;
- References to conventions banning biological (1972) and chemical (1993) weapons.

Earlier, New Zealand at the first session of negotiations in March 2017 noted rightly that “it is necessary to show the path traveled by the world community since 1946” [15].

In addition, in the context of the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the direct reference in the preamble to humanitarian law and the principles of warfare raises questions: “Basing themselves on the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, in particular the principle that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not

unlimited, the rule of distinction, the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks, the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack, the prohibition on the use of weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, and the rules for the protection of the natural environment” [16], which does not meet either the objectives of the Treaty or its spirit.

Article 1. Prohibitions

Until June 27, 2017 (the second session of the negotiations began on June 15, 2017), Article 1, despite numerous proposals by states to amend it and strengthen it, remained unchanged.

The negotiating states failed to agree on the inclusion of the following prohibitions:

- military or other preparations for the use of nuclear weapons;
- financing of research in the field of nuclear weapons;
- transit of nuclear weapons.

And the inclusion of a prohibition on the threat of nuclear weapons required the colossal efforts of the participating states. In addition, it is surprising that the the President of the Conference adopted the minority position (Switzerland and Austria), while the following countries were in favor of banning the threat of nuclear weapons: Algeria; Brazil; Vietnam; Indonesia; Argentina; Guatemala; Kazakhstan; Cuba; Nigeria; Thailand; Ecuador; Philippines; Chile; Uganda; Palestine; Mozambique; Venezuela; Bangladesh; Singapore; Malaysia; Republic of South Africa; Egypt and Peru [17].

Only after the Iran's detailed speech with an overview of the prohibition on the threat by force in the international law, the Conference Chairman was forced to include this provision in the draft Treaty.

The most interesting discussion at the Conference took place around the ban on the transit of nuclear weapons. Argentina, Guatemala, Peru, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Ecuador, Malaysia, Iran, Cuba and New Zealand advocated a ban on transit [18].

On June 22, 2017, a separate discussion took place on the provisions of Article 1 of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Transit of Nuclear Weapons. The Chairman of the Conference

organized a panel session with the participation of three independent experts who tried to persuade states not to include a ban on transit in the text of the Treaty. In particular, these experts cited the pseudo argument that the prohibition of the transit of nuclear weapons in the draft Convention (TPNW) “could undermine the existing disarmament instrument - nuclear-weapon-free zones”, the creation of which does not prohibit transit, but leaves the issue at the national level.

Efforts to include provisions on the prohibition of transit of nuclear weapons, adopted by the majority of the participating states, could not overcome the opposition of the minority, in particular, Austria and Singapore, which opposed the inclusion of this prohibition. In this regard, Austria's argument that “the transit of nuclear weapons will be difficult to control” [19], and also that there will be no vacuum in prohibitions, since “transit” is covered by “assistance”. The argument is really untenable, given that the complexity of monitoring the disarmament process itself cannot be the basis for refusing the Treaty.

In this context, in order to exclude any possible legal loopholes in the future, the inclusion of a provision prohibiting the transit of nuclear weapons was critically important and justified.

Given the importance of this issue, we believe it appropriate to bring forward the “backdating” arguments for the prohibition of the transit of nuclear weapons now.

1. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is the first international legal instrument to ban nuclear weapons in history.

In this regard, it was important to provide for an exhaustive ban on nuclear weapons and any actions that had anything to do with nuclear weapons.

The argument that the prohibition of the transit of nuclear weapons is covered by other prohibitions also does not withstand any criticism. After all, if we proceed from this logic, then along with a direct ban on nuclear weapons, it makes no sense to prohibit the threat of use of nuclear weapons, production, stockpiling, storage, deployment, military preparations and many other bans that are, as it were, covered by a general ban on nuclear weapons.

Here it will be appropriate to recall one of the rules of chess: overprotection is protection with a “reserve”, that is, the number of defenders exceeds the number of attackers focused on a particular point on the board around which the fight must unfold.

Paraphrasing chess terminology, the prohibition of the transit of nuclear weapons, along with other prohibitions, would provide “excessive protection” of the obligations of states to ban nuclear weapons and their complete destruction.

2. With regard to the complexity of monitoring the ban on the transit of nuclear weapons, it is important to recall that the Treaty will strive for universality, and all nuclear weapons will be prohibited and destroyed. Accordingly, all states, including nine states that possess nuclear weapons or have nuclear weapons programs, will be interested in its strict observance.

3. As the importance of including a ban on the transit of nuclear weapons, we recall the Russian Federation's reservation to the Protocol on Negative Security Assurances to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia: “The Russian Federation reserves the right not to consider itself bound by the obligations provided for by the Protocol, in the event that any state party to the Treaty, in accordance with Article 4 of the Treaty, admits entry into its ports and landing on its airfields of foreign military vessels and aircraft with nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on board, as well as in any form of transit through their territory of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” [20].

This reservation shows how important is the issue of the ban of transit even in present reality.

4. The argument put forward in the discussions of independent experts on the weakening of zones free of nuclear weapons is untenable, because the areas prohibit nuclear weapons on their territory, meaning its existence outside.

The Treaty, in fact, seeks to transform the entire planet Earth into one large nuclear-free zone. Accordingly, there will not be any territories where nuclear weapons will exist.

Thus, the Treaty does not weaken the nuclear-weapon-free zones but strengthens them.

5. Hypothetically, the nuclear powers can declare that the issue of banning and destroying nuclear weapons affects the interests of national security and, if signed or acceded to the Treaty, they must be sure of an unconditional and exhaustive ban to exclude a possible violation of the provisions of the Treaty by one of the nuclear powers.

The absence of a transit ban can serve as a basis for the nuclear powers to argue that the Treaty is weak and that it needs to be supplemented and amended accordingly.

6. Obviously, the nuclear powers will refuse to join the Treaty, since they did not take part in its development.

Most states will sign and ratify the Treaty, and sooner or later it will come into force. And here would be a legally binding ban on the transit of nuclear weapons, which in the future will greatly discomfort the nuclear powers.

Unfortunately, as noted above, most states could not overcome the resistance of the minority.

Complexity of Implementing the Verification of Nuclear Disarmament

Articles 2-4 of the Treaty on verification of nuclear disarmament are the “Achilles' heel” of the Treaty because of their complicated and intricate formulation. Even at the first reading the following questions arise:

1. How will the nuclear-weapon states that have signed or acceded to the Treaty agree and independently adopt a legally binding plan for the destruction of nuclear weapons?

2. The timeframe for a plan for the destruction of nuclear weapons will be interpreted by each state in its own way, which will inevitably cause a different speed of fulfillment of its obligations. This, as a result, will lead to mutual distrust and make it impossible for each state to implement these plans independently.

It is obvious that a single unified transparent plan should be adopted for the destruction of nuclear weapons, approved in the text of the Treaty (or in the Convention on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons).

3. Determination of the competent international verification authority (Article 4, clause 6 of the Treaty) - will it be the

establishment of a new body or the granting of new powers to the operating organization?

For instance, during the talks, Iran expressed doubts about the possibility of using existing organizations to verify the Treaty. In particular, in March 2017, during the first session of the Conference, Iran drew attention to the fact that “the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the main verification organization. We seriously doubt that the IAEA will be able to play this role, since the IAEA Board of Governors includes, basically, states that are not present at this Conference”.

If a decision is made to empower the existing organization, it will be necessary to make appropriate changes to the Statute, their entry into force, and the resolution of other organizational matters.

In this context, a striking example is the amendment to Article VI of the IAEA's Statute adopted in 1999, which increases the number of members of the IAEA's Board of Governors from 35 to 43 states. The entry into force of this amendment is not visible in the foreseeable future since this amendment was ratified by only 60 states as of 2017 [21].

Thus, there is a high probability that the requirements of the Treaty for the approval of time-bound plans for the destruction of nuclear weapons at the national level and the need to identify a competent international body will lead to an endless delay in the implementation of these provisions and make it impossible to implement the Treaty even if nuclear powers accede it.

And again, we note that the desire of states to take into account in one document both the issues of the prohibition of nuclear weapons and their destruction naturally led to a significant weakening of the text of the Treaty.

It is important to recall that the 2007 Model Convention on Nuclear Weapons outlines in sufficient detail what should be reflected in the declaration of the state, consisting of four parts: nuclear weapons; nuclear material; nuclear facilities and installations; means of delivery [22].

The Model Convention also sets out in detail five stages of the destruction of nuclear weapons with clear unified timeframes for all states possessing nuclear weapons.

Alignment of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

The development of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is aimed at strengthening and developing Article VI of the NPT, according to which the participating states committed to "... negotiate in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and on nuclear disarmament..." [23].

However, the UN member states have different understanding of the alignment between the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The nuclear possessing states and their allies are convinced that the negotiating a ban on nuclear weapons is premature. The adoption of a binding document on nuclear disarmament, in their view, would damage the NPT and, as a consequence, the existing architecture of international security - arguments such as strategic stability, nuclear deterrence, the principle of indivisible security were used.

On the other hand, the proponents of the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons are certain that there is no legal conflict between the TPNW and the existing regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons based on the NPT.

In this connection, the course of discussion at the Conference of Article 18 of the Treaty "Relationship with other agreements" is indicative: "The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing international agreements, to which they are party, where those obligations are consistent with the Treaty".

Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, Singapore and Argentina [24] actively promoted the thesis on the need to exclude the last eight words of the article "... where those obligations are consistent with the Treaty". This, in fact, would put the new Treaty in a subordinate position to the NPT and would preserve the right of the "nuclear five" to possess nuclear weapons.

In a statement in explanation of vote, Sweden reiterated that it considers the role of the NPT to be prevalent and supports the deletion of the last eight words from Article 18 of the Treaty.

Alignment of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons with Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

The main issue with regard to the integration of the TPNW and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) relates to the need for a special mention in the new Treaty of a ban on nuclear testing, while there is a separate Treaty, although not yet in force today.

An interesting discussion unfolded at the Conference around this issue, reflecting a different understanding of the role and place of the TPNW.

Thus, Switzerland, Sweden, Egypt, Mexico and Nigeria argued that there is no need to include a ban on testing nuclear weapons, since there is a separate Treaty on this ban - the CTBT [25].

On the other hand, Algeria, Brazil, Vietnam, Venezuela, Singapore, Iran, Cuba, Kazakhstan, the Philippines and Ecuador supported the inclusion of the maximum prohibition on nuclear testing - subcritical testing and computer simulation of nuclear tests - given that these types of tests are not included in the CTBT [26].

As a result, the parties agreed on a simple reference to the prohibition of tests in Article 1 of the Treaty.

In our opinion, while striving for an exhaustive ban on nuclear weapons, the inclusion of the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests in the broadest sense, including the prohibition of subcritical testing and computer modeling, would strengthen the text of the Treaty and make it possible to supplement significantly the provisions of the CTBT.

III. Strong Treaty or Declarative Document?

What is better - a soft text and a larger number of states-parties to the Treaty or a strong document, but fewer states that support it?

Given the fact that the nuclear weapons states and their allies are not expected to

participate in the TPNW, it was necessary to insist on the inclusion of strong provisions in the text of the Treaty - in particular, the ban on the transit of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, it did not happen. This was hampered by the position of some European states, most likely being influenced by nuclear-weapon states. It was this fact, and not the arguments that they brought, that explained their desire to weaken the text of the Treaty.

The overwhelming majority of the states participating in the negotiations who showed responsibility and political will needed to understand that the states that advocate weakening the provisions of the Treaty do not in fact believe that this document is capable of making a significant contribution to the process of nuclear disarmament. And here it was important to add stronger language to the text of the Treaty, since from the very beginning of the talks it was clear that the Treaty would be adopted through a vote and there was no need to seek consensus.

It can be predicted that in the future, after persistent calls for nuclear states to join the Treaty, the latter may provide an analysis showing that the Treaty, from a practical point of view, is compromised and requires substantial changes and additions. And then, with time, it will become clear that it is necessary to develop and adopt the Convention on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, which will clearly and unambiguously describe the mechanisms for the destruction of nuclear weapons, the establishment for this purpose of a specialized agency and other issues of practical implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. And in this case, Articles 2-4 of the TPNW will interfere with the adoption of such a Convention, which may further delay the process of nuclear disarmament.

IV. Further Steps to Strengthen the Process of Nuclear Disarmament

Despite all of the above, the mere fact of the development and opening of the Treaty for signature is a historic event in the field of nuclear disarmament.

In the future, after the entry into force of the Treaty, it will have a direct impact on the

nature of the work and documents adopted by the Conference on Disarmament, the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Preparatory Committees of the NPT Review Conference, the IAEA General Conference.

At this stage, we believe that the states parties to the Treaty need to take the following priority measures:

1. To ensure the entry of the Treaty into force as soon as possible.

The above analysis of the progress of negotiations on the new Treaty shows that its entry into force does not promise to be easy.

2. To re-initiate a resolution of the UN General Assembly requesting the International Court of Justice to issue an advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

In particular, as is known, in paragraph 2B of the relevant opinion of the International Court of Justice dated 8 July 1996, the following is delivered: "There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such or its application".

In clause 2D: "A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons".

In clause 2E: "It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law".

However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake" [27].

Obviously, this conclusion needs to be revised taking into account the adopted text of the TPNW.

3. States-parties to the Treaty will need to conduct a full audit of their international legal obligations with a view to avoiding a conflict with the new Treaty (to be entrusted to the UN Secretariat).

3.1. For instance, questions arise regarding the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, with more than 100 states parties. Out of the states that possess nuclear weapons de jure and de facto, the United Kingdom, France, the USA, Russia, China and India are parties to this Convention.

Clause 4 of Article 4 of this Convention, in particular, notes that “This Convention does not address, nor can it be interpreted as addressing, in any way, the issue of the legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by States” [28].

This provision can be interpreted as recognition by the states parties to the Convention of the right to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons by one state against another, which is in direct opposition to the provisions and spirit of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

It is necessary, in our opinion, to initiate the Conference of states which are parties to the Convention with a view to deleting clause 4 of Article 4 of the Convention.

3.2. States which are parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques dated May 18, 1977, need to convene the Conference and recognize that, in accordance with Article 1 of this Convention, nuclear weapons are illegal and should be prohibited.

Thus, Article 1 of the Convention states: “1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party. 2. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce any State, group of States or international organization to engage in

activities contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article” [29].

Out of the states that possess nuclear weapons de jure and de facto, the United Kingdom, Russia, the USA, China, India and DPRK are parties to this Convention.

Adoption of the aforementioned priority measures will make it possible to exert effective pressure on the “nuclear five” to fulfill their obligations under Article VI of the NPT and help strengthen and advance the new Treaty.

V. Conclusion

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons has a number of shortcomings, due to the poor preparation of the initial text of the draft Convention, which was submitted for discussion at the Conference on Negotiations on the draft TPNW. Finalization of the text of the Treaty was carried out by negotiators under a severe time pressure, which did not allow the effective study of significant gaps in the formulation of provisions on the prohibition of certain aspects of nuclear weapons activities and the identification of effective mechanisms for verification of the Treaty.

The absence of the nuclear-weapon states and their allies, which actually boycotted the work of the Conference, did not contribute to the successful conduct of the talks.

The possibility of practical implementation of the TPNW in the foreseeable future is also doubtful, which is related to the rather tough and unambiguous statements by the nuclear-weapon states and their allies that the Treaty is not acceptable to them.

Nevertheless, the entry of the TPNW into force will have a tangible impact on the process of nuclear disarmament, placing nuclear weapons de jure off-limits, which in turn will affect many other documents of international law.

The adoption of the TPNW will gradually make it possible to “squeeze out” of international relations the threat and the very possibility of using nuclear weapons, and thereby bring closer to the common goal of building a world free of nuclear weapons.

REFERENCES:

1. Смотрите рабочий документ Центра международной безопасности и политики ко второй сессии переговоров по выработке юридически обязывающего инструмента по запрещению ядерного оружия: <https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/A-CONF.229-2017-NGO-WP.31-English-by-Centre-for-Intl-Security-and-Policy2.pdf>, а также выступления директора CISP А.Ахметова на двух сессиях переговоров в марте и июне-июле 2017 года: <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/statements/31%20March%202017%20CISP.pdf> и http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/statements/21June_CISP.pdf
2. United Nations General Assembly document A/CONF.229/2017/8, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 7 July 2017 // <http://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8>
3. Signature/ratification status of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons // <http://www.icanw.org/status-of-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/>
4. Voting record // <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/documents/voting-record.pdf>
5. Report of the Credentials Committee // <http://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/7>
6. News in brief // Nuclear Ban Daily, 16 June 2017, Vol. 2, No. 2 // <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/reports/NBD2.2.pdf>
7. Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, United Nations General Assembly document A/62/650, 18 January 2008 // <http://undocs.org/A/62/650>
8. US leads boycott of UN talks on nuclear weapons ban, Al Jazeera, 28 March 2017 // <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/leads-boycott-talks-nuclear-weapons-ban-170327191952287.html>
9. Statement by H.E. Mr. Nobushige TAKAMIZAWA, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament at the High-level Segment of the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, 27 March 2017 // http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/statements/27March_Japan.pdf
10. United Nations General Assembly document A/71/450, Report of the First Committee, 9 November 2016 // <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N16/373/79/PDF/N1637379.pdf?OpenElement>, page 38
11. Joint Press Statement from the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of the United States, United Kingdom, and France Following the Adoption of a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons, 7 July 2017 // <https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7892>
12. North Atlantic Council Statement on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 20 September 2017 // https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_146954.htm?selectedLocale=en
13. Statement by The Netherlands, 28 March 2017 // http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/statements/28March_Netherlands.pdf
14. Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 22 May 2017 // <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/documents/CRP1.pdf>
15. Statement by H.E. Dell Higgie Ambassador for Disarmament of New Zealand, 28 March 2017 // http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/statements/28March_NZ-T1.pdf
16. United Nations General Assembly document A/CONF.229/2017/8, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 7 July 2017 // <http://undocs.org/A/CONF.229/2017/8>
17. News in brief // Nuclear Ban Daily, 19 June 2017, Vol. 2, No. 3 // <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/reports/NBD2.3.pdf> News in brief // Nuclear Ban Daily, 20 June 2017, Vol. 2, No. 4 // <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/reports/NBD2.4.pdf>
18. News in brief // Nuclear Ban Daily, 6 July 2017, Vol. 2, No. 13 // <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/reports/NBD2.13.pdf>
19. News in brief // Nuclear Ban Daily, 19 June 2017, Vol. 2, No. 3 // <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/reports/NBD2.3.pdf>
20. Arguments For Including Transit In The Nuclear Ban Treaty, Alimzhan Akhmetov // Nuclear Ban Daily, 28 June 2017, Vol. 2, No. 9 // <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/reports/NBD2.9.pdf>
21. IAEA General Conference document GC(61)/9, Amendment to Article VI of the Statute, Report by the Director General, 20 July 2017 // https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC61/GC61Documents/English/gc61-9_en.pdf
22. Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, United Nations General Assembly document A/62/650, 18 January 2008 // <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/213/77/PDF/N0821377.pdf?OpenElement>
23. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons // <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text>
24. News in brief // Nuclear Ban Daily, 21 June 2017, Vol. 2, No. 5 // <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/reports/NBD2.5.pdf> News in brief // Nuclear Ban Daily, 6 July 2017, Vol. 2, No. 13 // <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/reports/NBD2.13.pdf>
25. News in brief // Nuclear Ban Daily, 20 June 2017, Vol. 2, No. 4 // <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/reports/NBD2.4.pdf>
26. News in brief // Nuclear Ban Daily, 19 June 2017, Vol. 2, No. 3 // <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/reports/NBD2.3.pdf> (page 8). News in brief // Nuclear Ban Daily, 6 July 2017, Vol. 2, No. 13 // <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/reports/NBD2.13.pdf> . News in brief // Nuclear Ban Daily, 28 June 2017, Vol. 2, No. 9 // <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/reports/NBD2.9.pdf>
27. United Nations General Assembly document A/51/218, Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, 15 October 1996 // <https://undocs.org/A/51/218> (pp. 36-37)
28. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism // <https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/terrorism/english-18-15.pdf>
29. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques // <http://www.un-documents.net/enmod.htm>

МРНТИ
11.25.42

RESULTS OF KAZAKHSTAN'S CHAIRMANSHIP IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

Anna Alshanskaya

Senior Research Fellow at the Department of Social and Economic Analysis of the KAZISS under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Adilkhan Gadelshiyev

Research Fellow in the Foreign Policy and International Security Department of the KAZISS under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Abstract. This article analyzes the activities carried out by the Kazakh delegation as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. The authors studied the key moments of Kazakhstan's work in 2017 and its chairmanship in January 2018. The main issues are considered, including stabilization of the situation in the countries of the Horn of Africa and the Middle East region; the strengthening of regional security and the cooperation of Central Asia and Afghanistan; and the issues surrounding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Key words: *The UN Security Council, foreign policy, security, non-proliferation of WMD, nuclear disarmament, peacekeeping.*

«БҰҰ-НЫҢ ҚАУІПСІЗДІК КЕҢЕСІНДЕ ҚАЗАҚСТАН ТӨРАҒАЛЫҒЫНЫҢ ҚОРЫТЫНДЫЛАРЫ»

Анна Алшанская, Әділхан Ғаділшиев

Андатпа. Мақалада БҰҰ Қауіпсіздік Кеңесінің тұрақты емес мүшесі ретінде қазақстандық делегацияның атқарған жұмысына талдау жасалынған. Авторлар Қазақстанның 2017 жылы жұмысының және 2018 жылғы қаңтардағы төрағалығының негізгі бағыттарын зерттеген. Африка мүйізіндегі елдер мен таяушығыс аймағындағы жағдайды тұрақтандыруға қатысты, Орталық Азия мен Ауғанстандағы өңірлік қауіпсіздік пен ынтымақтастықты арттыру, сондай-ақ жаппай қырып-жою қаруын таратпау мәселелері қарастырылған.

Түйінді сөздер: Біріккен Ұлттар Ұйымы Қауіпсіздік Кеңесі, сыртқы саясат, қауіпсіздік, жаппай қырып-жою қаруын таратпау, ядролық қарусыздану, бітімгершілік.

«ИТОГИ ПРЕДСЕДАТЕЛЬСТВА КАЗАХСТАНА В СОВЕТЕ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ ООН»

Анна Альшанская, Адильхан Гадельшиев

Аннотация. В данной статье проведен анализ деятельности, проделанной казахстанской делегацией в качестве непостоянного члена в Совете Безопасности ООН. Авторами исследованы ключевые моменты работы Казахстана в 2017 году и председательства в январе 2018 года. Рассмотрены основные вопросы, касающиеся стабилизации положения в странах Африканского рога и ближневосточного региона, укрепления региональной безопасности и сотрудничества Центральной Азии и Афганистана, а также нераспространения оружия массового уничтожения.

Ключевые слова: *Совет Безопасности ООН, внешняя политика, безопасность, нераспространение ОМУ, ядерное разоружение, миротворчество.*

Introduction

Kazakhstan launched a campaign on nomination its candidature for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council in 2013. During this period, the country faced several challenges in its foreign policy. Firstly, this was fueled by the ongoing crisis in relations between the West and Russia and the onset of conflicts in the Middle East and later in Ukraine. Secondly, against the backdrop of the increasing influence of Russia and China in the post-Soviet space, Kazakhstan was extremely interested in enhancing interaction with the United States. In general, the country needed not only a balanced foreign policy, but also the strengthening of its positions at the global level as an important regional and international actor. The country was extremely concerned with resolving regional problems that the region had faced for many years. The issues of an unstable Afghanistan were still relevant and represented threats to the entire Central Asian region.

Accordingly, only the promotion of common interests within UN Security Council framework could attract the attention of the entire world community to Central Asian themes and provide a constructive approach in this area, as well as securing the status of a peacekeeper at the global level.

It is important to emphasize that since gaining independence, Kazakhstan has established part-

nership relations with all the permanent members of the UN Security Council: USA, Russia, China, France and Great Britain. As a result, this assisted not only to enlist the support of permanent members in the vote, but also, relying on the former approach of a balanced policy, to conduct further constructive negotiations with all participants in the international process.

It should be noted that Kazakhstani non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council was at the same time related to its flexible foreign policy, which suits the majority of geopolitical players. Kazakhstan, the first from Central Asian countries a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, once again proved itself not only as a reliable and responsible member of the UN, but also as a peacemaker in international conflicts and an uncompromising fighter against terrorism and extremism.

Work of Kazakhstan delegation for 2017

The priorities of Kazakhstan as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2017-2018 are indicated by Nursultan Nazarbayev's Policy Address "Kazakhstan's Concept and Vision for Sustaining Global Partnerships for a Secure, Just Prosperous World" to the UN Security Council. These include : 1) achieving a world free of nuclear weapons, 2) eliminating the treat of a global

war and reaching the settlement of local conflicts, 3) promoting the interests of Central Asia while strengthening regional security and cooperation, 4) countering terrorism, 5) peace and security in Africa, 6) ensuring an inextricable link between security and sustainable development, 7) adapting the Security Council and the entire UN system to the threats and challenges of the 21st century.

During Kazakhstan was taking part in 295 meetings UN Security Council. In addition to public meetings, 136 closed consultations and 41 extraordinary unscheduled meetings were also held. Moreover, 12 monthly meetings of the E-10 group (the non-permanent members of the Security Council) took place at the level of permanent representatives and 12 meetings at the level of political coordinators, as well as a number of special meetings with the UN Secretary-General and his deputies. [1]

The most discussed issues in the course of the year remained the situation around the Korean Peninsula - namely, the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons - and the situations of the African continent and the Middle East.

In the meetings on nuclear non-proliferation issues related to the numerous violations of the UN Security Council resolutions by North Korea, Kazakhstan demonstrated a decisive position. Taking into account the ballistic-missile launches by Pyongyang from the beginning of 2017, as well as the sixth round of nuclear weapons tests in early September 2017, Kazakhstan voted for the adoption of 2345 sanctions Resolution N 2345 in March, Resolution N 2356 in June, Resolution N 2371 in August and Resolution 2375 in September 2017.

In this context, it should be said that Nursultan Nazarbayev's initiative "Building a world without nuclear weapons by the UN's 100th anniversary in 2045" remains one of the most important priorities of the country's foreign policy. Kazakhstan, along with the other 122 UN member states, voted in favor of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, approved on July 7, 2017, which is in line with the "Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World" adopted by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in December 2015 at the initiative of Kazakhstan.

One of the prior directions for Kazakhstan as a non-permanent member of UN Security Council

is peacekeeping where it relied on expanding its participation in UN peacekeeping operations, and also promoted its position within the framework of the UN Security Council and its working bodies on peacemaking. Involvement in peacekeeping processes for Kazakhstan has almost always been one of the most important vectors of foreign policy strategy. The foreign policy of the country was conditioned by the nature of applying preventive measures and reconciliation of the parties.

Along with this, one of the important activities of Kazakhstan in the UN Security Council was the search for a solution to the Middle East crisis, including within the framework of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus, the significant event of the period under discussion was the talks on Syria held in Astana. The results of the past eight rounds of talks not only contributed to a constructive negotiation process with all parties to the conflict, but also gave hope for gradual progress in resolving the Syrian crisis.

It is worth emphasizing that the Astana process has significantly strengthened Kazakhstan's reputation in the Security Council as an objective, reliable and neutral partner. All members of the UN Security Council have repeatedly recognized the inter-Syrian negotiations in Astana as a productive process. Most members of the Security Council supported the adoption of the Memorandum on creation of zones of de-escalation in Syria, signed in Astana on May 4, 2017.

Another very important issue where Kazakhstan was actively involuted is management of the strongly resonated around the Muslim World, the Kazakhstan delegation supported and actively participated in the extraordinary and scheduled meetings of the UN Security Council, which called on the Myanmar authorities to cooperate actively with the international community, including the UN and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

Regarding issues related to the Central Asian region, throughout 2017, Kazakhstan has actively promoted common interests, including issues of further successful development. Thus, monthly briefings were held in New York for the permanent representatives of the Central Asian states at the UN, in order to reconcile positions and be introduced to the main trends of the work of the UN Security Council. On September 22, 2017, during the participation of the Foreign Minister of

the Republic of Kazakhstan, K. Abdrakhmanov, in the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly, a meeting was held with the heads of foreign affairs agencies of the countries of the region; following which, for the first time, a five-sided joint statement of the foreign ministers of the countries of Central Asia was adopted as an adjunct to the UN General Assembly.

Regarding a situation in Afghanistan, the Kazakhstan delegation actively promoted the that its really important to provide Afghanistan with comprehensive and effective assistance in terms of economic and social development. These efforts were made in order to build communication with the outside world - above all, as part of the expansion of the potential for joint transport and trade investment with Central Asia.

Thus, the resolution on Afghanistan, adopted in March 2017, included fresh additions, highlighting the existence of threats to the countries of Central Asia emanating from terrorist organizations that use the territory of Afghanistan. In May 2017, consultations were organized between Central Asian and Afghan experts on the draft of the Statement of the President of the UN Security Council on Central Asia and Afghanistan, initiated by the Kazakh side, which was adopted in January 2018 during the chairmanship of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the UN Security Council. At the end of November 2017, the Kazakhstani side, together with the German delegation and the Afghan Mission, organized a meeting of the UN Security Council members on the Arria formula entitled: "Partners for Afghanistan: Linking Security, Development and Peace in the Central Asian Region".

Regarding the issue of counter-terrorism, work on promoting "A Code of Conduct for the Achievement of a Terrorism-Free World" was carried out in the UN throughout the year. Kazakhstan became a co-author of resolution 2354, prepared by the Security Council's counter-terrorism committee, which applies everywhere in countering terrorist propaganda.

In terms of the situation on the African continent, to which about 75% of the agenda of the UN Security Council is devoted, Kazakhstan participated in more than 100 meetings and consultations. In this area, the members of the Security Council recognized the significant intensification of the work of the Sanctions Committee in rela-

tion to Somalia and Eritrea, work which was led by the Kazakhstan side. Today, the issues of the destructive activity of the Al-Shabaab and ISIS/DAISH terrorist groups are still at the center of the committee's attention.

Further, in order to ensure sustainable development, the Kazakh delegation to the UN is still working to launch the UN Regional Hub in Almaty, aimed at implementing the goals of sustainable development and humanitarian support in the Central Asian region.

In general, the Kazakh delegation contributed to the adoption of 61 resolutions of the UN Security Council, including 11 co-authorships, and 27 statements by the Chairman of Security Council. The meetings of the UN Security Council were attended by the leaders and representatives of the state bodies of Kazakhstan, including the Security Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Taking into account the tense relations in the area, we may note a marked decrease in the level of trust between the main world and regional players, which undoubtedly affects the effectiveness of the work of the UN Security Council.

Kazakhstan's chairmanship of the Security Council in January, 2018

According to set procedure, the Kazakhstan delegation took over the chairmanship position in the Security Council at the beginning of 2018. It is interesting that one of the first initiatives for the Kazakh delegation in this role was the official ceremony of raising the flags of the newly elected six non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, which is unusual.

The next step in the process was the program of work of the Kazakh delegation which was approved at the January meeting of the Security Council members. A number of issues covered the most pressing matters on the agenda of the UN Security Council: non-proliferation of WMD; terrorism and extremism issues; settlement of local conflicts; the situation in Afghanistan; as well as pressing issues in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.

During January 2018, under the chairmanship of Kazakhstan, about 30 meetings were held in the form of consultations, briefings and debates, resulting in the adoption of resolutions and press statements on behalf of the Chairman of the Council. [2]

Under Kazakhstan's chairmanship, planned events were held on the situation in the Middle East and Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Colombia, Darfur (Sudan), West Africa and the Sahel, Libya, Mali, Somalia and Southern Sudan; the activities of the UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia; as well as a visit by the UN Security Council members to Washington for a meeting with the US leadership. In addition, at the request of the US delegation, Kazakhstan convened an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council on the situation in Iran against the backdrop of mass social protest.

On January 9, under the chairmanship of Kazakhstan, a briefing and consultations took place on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, following which the Security Council members called on the Government of the Congo and the opposition forces to create the necessary conditions for the normal operation of the political process in the country, to prevent escalation of violence and to hold transparent and inclusive elections in December 2018.

Another important event organized under Kazakhstan's chairmanship was the visit of the UN Security Council delegation to Afghanistan on January 12-15, 2018, during which meetings were held with the leadership of the country, representatives of political parties and civil society.

The key activities of the chairmanship of the Kazakh delegation were:

- a high-level thematic debate with the participation of the Head of State on the topic: "Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD): confidence building measures";
- a ministerial debate on the topic: "Building Regional Partnership in Afghanistan and Central Asia as a Model to Link Security and Development";
- scheduled briefings and consultations on the situation in the Middle East: "The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian".

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: confidence-building measures

An important high-level thematic briefing on the nonproliferation of WMD was held on January 18 under the chairmanship of the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev. This topic is a key one for Kazakhstan and is actively promoted in the international arena, as well as being an

approved topic on the list of topical issues on the agenda of the UN Security Council.

During the briefing, Nursultan Nazarbayev stated that he was paying close attention to the issue of increasing mutual trust between countries, something which is becoming an ever-more urgent topic. Special emphasis was placed on the role of Kazakhstan as an authority on anti-nuclear strategy.

Along with this, the Kazakh side emphasized the risks of WMD falling into the hands of destructive forces. The necessity of complicating the procedure for withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was stressed, as well as the possibility of developing a special resolution determining the consequences for countries that violated the treaty. [3]

The permanent members of the Security Council reaffirmed their commitment to their strategic interests. For example, the Russian side stressed that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is possible only in the context of general and complete disarmament in conditions of ensuring equal and indivisible security for all. [4]

Also the meeting considered the issue of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. In this context, the participants have repeatedly stressed the promising example of Kazakhstan. An important project was the proposed Code of Conduct on the Achievement of a Terrorism-Free World.

The result of the thematic briefing was the Statement of the UN Security Council Chairman under the number S/PRST/2018/1 on the Comprehensive Strategy for Conflict Prevention. Thus, along with issues of early warning, preventive deployment, mediation, peacemaking, post-conflict peace-building and strengthening accountability measures, this document for the first time included the problems of the non-proliferation of WMD. [5]

It is important to emphasize that, previously, such Security Council documents never had a focus on the broad resolution of local problems around the world within the framework of the general model. This is the first politically binding international act of the Security Council, developed and adopted under the leadership of Kazakhstan. The President touched upon the issues of conflict within contemporary international relations, offering practical solutions and recommendations.

Strengthening the partnership between Astana and Washington

Most notably, the chairmanship with the participation of the President of Kazakhstan coincided with his official visit to the United States. The invitation extended to Nursultan Nazarbayev by Donald Trump has acquired special significance for strengthening bilateral cooperation.

Firstly, against the background of the growing influence of Russia and China on the Eurasian space, the USA began to experience a clear deficit in partners, including in the countries of Central Asia. For American partners Kazakhstan is becoming the best way to implement the formula "C5 + 1" (five Central Asian countries plus the USA) proposed by N. Nazarbayev.

Secondly, Kazakhstan, can act as an intermediary in order to harmonize relations between the West and Russia, and the Islamic world.

Thirdly, today, in the light of the tension between Pyongyang and Washington, the most urgent issue is the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. In this context, the role of Kazakhstan can be amounted to maximizing the use of all interactive political mechanisms to resolve this contradiction.

In general, the meeting demonstrated that confidence-building measures, as well as strengthening of the instruments of preventive diplomacy, can serve as a starting point for making progress on many critical issues that have not been speedily resolved due to political issues between world powers. Nursultan Nazarbayev's visit to the US has been a successful continuation of Kazakhstan's multi-vector policy providing constructive dialogue and balance. The participation of the President of Kazakhstan gave the Security Council meeting political weight and public reaction. As a result, the UN Security Council has become an additional international platform for sounding out Nursultan Nazarbayev's initiatives on global and regional security.

Building regional partnership in Afghanistan and Central Asia

For almost two decades, Afghanistan has been one of the priority problems of the countries of the region in the sphere of security. Today, instability in the northern part of the country is of particular concern to the Central Asian states. Therefore, during its chairmanship, Kazakhstan

decided to initiate discussions on stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan.

During the ministerial debates on January 19, 2018, Kazakhstan put forward its own idea regarding the integration of Afghanistan into the Central Asian region. Thus, taking into account the human capital and internal potential of Afghanistan, the interconnectedness of security and development issues in order to combat terrorism, violence and illicit drug trafficking can be a promising example, the so-called model zone of peace, cooperation and security.

Within its framework the permanent members of the Security Council focused attention on different problems of Afghanistan. For example, the Russian side attached greater importance to the unprecedented growth of drug production and the development of the Afghan wing of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or otherwise the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham; while the American side paid special attention to the process of resolving the conflict in Afghanistan, as well as potential negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban. In turn, the Central Asian countries noted the need for economic assistance to Afghanistan while simultaneously addressing security issues. They also stressed that Afghanistan should be viewed not as a threat, but as an important and promising partner with great undiscovered potential. [6]

In general, representatives of the member states of the Security Council positively assessed Kazakhstan's efforts to promote peace and stability in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Participants noted the need to ensure the security and stabilization of Afghanistan through strengthening the holding of peaceful elections and intensification of joint efforts to counter terrorist narcotic threats, which will become a key factor in the country's sustainable social and economic development. At the same time, the importance of the first visit of the Security Council to Afghanistan, carried out at the initiative of Kazakhstan, was especially noted.

One of the main achievements of Kazakhstan in the Afghan case was the mission on Afghanistan, which took place from 12 to 15 February last year. Firstly, the mission successfully met with more than 120 representatives of the gov-

ernment and non-state sectors. Both the Security Council and the Afghan side expressed the need not only to expand regional cooperation in the fight against terrorism, but also noted the importance of providing donor assistance and the implementation of the “One United Nations” process at this stage. The issue of the active expansion of women's rights in Afghanistan, which was discussed with the first lady and representatives of women's non-governmental organizations, did not bypass the issue.

Thus, the results of the ministerial debates showed that the Central Asian countries are ready to strengthen cooperation with Afghanistan by expanding cooperation and implementing specific regional projects. In this context, the regional formats that were raised on the agenda of the Security Council should contribute to the creation of incentives for regional peace and development, without losing its relevance.

As a result of the debate, the Presidential Statement, unanimously approved by all members of the UN Security Council, was adopted. It calls on the international community to support Afghanistan through the expansion of regional cooperation and the more effective use of preventive diplomacy tools. Moreover, the importance of applying the three-vector model of peace and development in Afghanistan was noted: the relationship between security and sustainable development, and a regional and coordinated approach within the UN.

The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian issue

To the states of the Middle East. During the chairmanship, Kazakhstan presented itself as an objective and mostly neutral partner. At the next open debate on the situation in the Middle East, which was attended by more than 50 representatives of member countries and regional organizations, special attention was focused on the status of Jerusalem. The members of the Security Council called for the observance of international agreements, taking into account the inalienable right of Palestinians to statehood and Israel's right to security and the speedy resumption of negotiations in a bilateral format.

The Kazakh side stressed its commitment to a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict and called for avoiding unilateral actions that would impede the resolution of the conflict.

It is important to note that a significant number of states expressed concern over the reduction of the US financial assistance to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, which covers 50% of the needs of Palestinian refugees in the Middle East, which could become a factor of social vulnerability and growth of radicalization of refugees.

Conclusion

In general, Kazakhstan's chairmanship in the UN Security Council was evaluated by most Kazakhstani and foreign experts as productive and effective, becoming both an invaluable experience for the diplomatic service and the entire state apparatus; and is thus a triumph for Kazakhstan's foreign policy, one which received a wide resonance in the world arena.

Despite the fact that the chairmanship of the UN Security Council is often formal and the permanent members are responsible for determining the main agenda, the work of the Security Council was undoubtedly provided with a “Kazakhstan dimension”.

As foreign experts note, during the chairmanship, Kazakhstan managed to tackle issues such as how the situation in Afghanistan can be regularized; and the regional security of the Central Asian countries, which are often not key on the agenda of the UN Security Council. Thus, the first visit of the UN Security Council members to Afghanistan on the eve of the ministerial debate organized by Kazakhstan made it possible to assess the effectiveness of the efforts of the Government of Afghanistan to establish stability in the country and stressed the need to consider it as a long-term partner. [7]

In addition, the personal participation of the President of Kazakhstan, N. Nazarbayev, in the thematic briefing, once again confirmed the high importance that Kazakhstan attaches to the problem of the growing tension around nuclear weapons and the danger of their proliferation. According to experts, having established itself as an effective platform for negotiations on Iran's nuclear program and the Astana process on Syria, Kazakhstan can act as a model for resolving the nuclear issue caused by North Korea. [8]

The launch of the Code of Conduct on the Achievement of a Terrorism-Free World demonstrated, as a number of Chinese experts emphasize, the practical embodiment of the idea of Kazakhstan to create a universal system for countering terrorism. [9]

In the opinion of a number of Kazakhstani experts, the chairmanship of the Security Council, firstly, is a tool to improve one's image and recognition in the eyes of the world community; and, secondly, it will contribute to the growth of the economic rating and improvement of the country's investment climate.

In general, summing up the results, we can say that the delegation of Kazakhstan in all the activities carried out impressive work, in particular, in the expansion on the UN platform of cooperation between all regional organizations in terms of the collective security of Europe and America, Asia and Africa.

Membership of the UN Security Council has increased the country's role on a global scale; strengthened its position in international negotiations; provided a qualitatively new level of interaction with other countries; and the opportunity to declare national priorities in the field of conflict prevention and peacekeeping. At the same time, Kazakhstan's activities in the Council have become a unique opportunity to advance Nursultan Nazarbayev's peacekeeping initiatives.

Summing up, it was unrealistic to think that Kazakhstan, being a non-permanent member of the Security Council, could solve certain global problems in such a short time. The Security Council has its alliances. Nevertheless, the Kazakh side, having worked more than a year in a purely pragmatic and realistic manner, demonstrated that it would not be swayed by anyone else's side or interests; and operated instead primarily from its own and its regional interests.

REFERENCES:

1. Meetings conducted by the Security Council in 2017 // Security Council United Nations official website // <https://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/records/2017.shtml>
2. Meetings conducted by the Security Council in 2018 // Security Council United Nations official website // <http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/records/2018.shtml>
3. Meeting Record during 8160th meeting // Security Council United Nations official website. – 2018. – January, 18 // <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N18/014/80/PDF/N1801480.pdf?OpenElement>
4. Выступление Министра иностранных дел России С.В.Лаврова на заседании Совета Безопасности ООН по теме «Нераспространение ОМУ: построение мер доверия», Нью-Йорк, // Официальные сетевые ресурсы МИД РФ. – 2018. – 18 января (Statement by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at the UN Security Council Meeting on “Non-proliferation of WMD: Confidence-Building Measures, New York, // Official Network Resources of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. – 2018. - January 18) // http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3024503
5. Statement by the President of the Security Council United Nations official website. – 2018. – January, 18 // <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N18/015/65/PDF/N1801565.pdf?OpenElement>
6. Meeting Record during 8162nd meeting // Security Council United Nations official website. – 2018. – January, 19 // http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.8162
7. How Kazakhstan reconciled the members of the UN Security Council // Central Asia monitor // <http://centralasiamonitor.com/2018/02/how-kazakhstan-reconciled-the-members-of-the-un-security-council/>
8. A Kazakhstan Model for North Korea Nuclear Settlement // Huffpost. – 2018. – January, 10 // https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/a-kazakhstan-model-for-north-korea-nuclear-settlement_us_5a566f0ee4b088f20c39591d
9. Китайские эксперты рассказали о значении председательства Казахстана в СБ ООН // Международное информационное агентство Kazinform. – 2018. – 13 февраля (Chinese experts talked about the importance of Kazakhstan's chairmanship in the UN Security Council // International Information Agency Kazinform. - 2018. - February 13) // http://www.inform.kz/ru/kitayskie-eksperty-rasskazali-o-znachenii-predsedatelstva-kazahstana-v-sb-oon_a3152557

МРНТИ
06.91

THE POSITIONING OF NATIONAL ECONOMIES IN THE INTER-NATIONAL QUALITY-ASSESSMENT RATINGS OF INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT INFLOWS

Vyacheslav Dodonov

Chief Research Fellow of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Doctor of Economic Sciences

Abstract. The article examines the interrelation between the position of the countries in international ratings characterizing the quality of institutions, and the volume of foreign direct investments accumulated in these countries. The positions and progress of countries in the Doing Business rating of the World Bank, the Global Competitiveness Index and the Index of Economic Freedom on the one hand, and the change in the volume of foreign direct investment stock, on the other hand, are compared. The purpose of this comparison is to check on the data of the last decade the previously formulated theses on the relationship between the level of institutions development and the investment attractiveness of national economies. The obtained results demonstrate the loss of this relationship, which is expressed in the absence of an intensive positive dynamics of foreign investment in the leading countries of these ratings.

Key words: *Institutes, Foreign Direct Investment, Global Competitiveness Index, Index of Economic Freedom, Doing Business Rating.*

ҰЛТТЫҚ ЭКОНОМИКАЛАРДЫ ИНСТИТУТ РЕТІНДЕ ХАЛЫҚАРАЛЫҚ САПА РЕЙТИНГТЕРІНЕ ОРНАЛАСТЫРУ ЖӘНЕ ШЕТЕЛ ИНВЕСТИЦИЯЛАРДЫ ТАРТУ

Вячеслав Додонов

Аңдатпа. Мақалада институттар сапасын сипаттайтын халықаралық рейтингтегі әлем елдерінің орны мен осы елдерде жинақталған тікелей шетелдік инвестициялардың көлемі арасындағы қарым-қатынас тексерілген. Бірінші жағынан, елдердің Дүниежүзілік банктің

Doing Business рейтингіндегі, Жаһандық бәсекеге қабілеттілік индексі және Экономикалық бостандық индексінің орны мен жылжыту салыстырады, ал екінші жағынан, жинақталған тікелей шетел инвестициясы көлемінің өзгерістері қарастырылады. Осы салыстырудың мақсаты институционалдық даму деңгейі және ұлттық экономикалардың инвестициялық тартымдылығы арасындағы қарым-қатынас деңгейі туралы тұжырымдалған тезистерін соңғы онжылдық деректері бойынша тексеру болып табылады. Бұл нәтижелер осы қарым-қатынастың жоғалуына көрсетеді, ол осы рейтингтер көшбасшылары – елдердегі шетелдік инвестициялардың қарқынды оң динамикасы болмаған көрінеді.

Түйінді сөздер: *институттар, шетелдік тікелей инвестициялар, жаһандық бәсекеге қабілеттілік көрсеткіші, экономикалық еркіндік көрсеткіші, Doing Business рейтингі.*

ПОЗИЦИОНИРОВАНИЕ НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫХ ЭКОНОМИК В МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ РЕЙТИНГАХ ОЦЕНКИ КАЧЕСТВА ИНСТИТУТОВ И ПРИТОК ИНОСТРАННЫХ ИНВЕСТИЦИЙ

Вячеслав Додонов

Аннотация. В статье проверяется наличие взаимосвязи между положением стран мира в международных рейтингах, характеризующих качество институтов, и объемом прямых иностранных инвестиций, накопленных в этих странах. Сопоставляются позиции и продвижение стран в рейтинге Doing Business Всемирного банка, Индексе глобальной конкурентоспособности и Индексе экономической свободы с одной стороны, и изменением объема накопленных прямых иностранных инвестиций – с другой стороны. Целью данного сопоставления является проверка на данных последнего десятилетия ранее сформулированных тезисов о взаимосвязи уровня развития институтов и инвестиционной привлекательностью национальных экономик. Полученные результаты демонстрируют утрату этой взаимосвязи, что выражается в отсутствии интенсивной положительной динамики иностранных инвестиций у стран – лидеров указанных рейтингов.

Ключевые слова: *институты, прямые иностранные инвестиции, Индекс глобальной конкурентоспособности, Индекс экономической свободы, рейтинг Doing Business.*

Introduction

The attractiveness of national economies for foreign investment is now tied to the level of development of institutions; economic freedom; the reduction of administrative barriers; and other aspects of the business environment as assessed by numerous ratings compiled by a wide variety of organizations - from the UN to small private institutions. The annual publication of these ratings is widely covered in the press and discussed in the expert community; and the progress or decline of individual countries in relation to them is a priori identified with the quality and outcomes of the public administration and economy of the respective states.

The most common and well-recognized ratings have begun to be used not only at expert but also at state level as indices for the success of reforms and

economic policy. Progress on such rankings as the Human Development Index, the Global Competitiveness Index and the World Bank's Doing Business rating have been used as targets in government programs at various levels, including in the CIS countries.

In Russia, for instance, progress in the World Bank's Doing Business rating is one of the key objectives of the Presidential Decree, "On Long-Term State Economic Policy", dated May 7, 2012 (one of the so-called "May decrees"), wherein the Government is instructed to take measures "to improve the position of the Russian Federation in the World Bank's rating in terms of doing business from 120th in 2011 to 50th in 2015 and 20th in 2018".¹

In Kazakhstan, improvement in the World Bank's Doing Business rating was first announced as a goal in the Government Program of the Re-

public of Kazakhstan for 2007-2009² (in Section 4.2.4.); and in subsequent years it continues to figure in this capacity in many documents at national and sectoral levels. In particular, a growth in profile indicators is set out in the Strategic Plans of most sectoral ministries and a number of programs: “work is under way on an ongoing basis to improve Kazakhstan's legislation on corporate governance, including work to improve Kazakhstan's position in the international Doing Business rating”³. A similar situation appears with the advancement of Kazakhstan in the rating of the Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum, which is also the target indicator of many sectoral programs and appears in the strategic plans of the leading ministries. International ratings are considered in Kazakhstan government programs in direct correlation with improving the investment attractiveness of the country. Thus, in the National Investment Strategy adopted in 2017, both the Doing Business rating and the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) act as target indicators for improving the investment climate in the Republic of Kazakhstan.⁴

Literature review

The developers of the ratings also note their influence on state policy in the relevant spheres. Thus, the World Economic Forum regards the GCI as “an instrument that helps governments, the private sector and civil society work together for future prosperity”⁵; and cites examples of recent changes in the economic policies of countries such as the Dominican Republic and Saudi Arabia that occurred under the influence of the GCI. The World Bank, presenting the Doing Business rating, notes that it encourages countries to implement more effective

regulation, provides measurable guidelines for implementation of reforms⁶, and also cites the number of reforms carried out around the world under the influence of the desire of various countries to improve their positions in this rating: “In the period from June 2, 2016 through June 1, 2017⁷, the Doing Business report took into account 264 reforms that simplified business in 119 countries that implemented at least one reform in the areas assessed by the Doing Business report. From the very beginning of its existence, the Doing Business project has taken into account more than 3,188 regulatory reforms”⁸.

At the same time, the real relationship between advancement in such ratings and macroeconomic statistics is not obvious. The area of the economy in which such interconnection should be manifested most clearly is perhaps that of the flow of foreign investment - the axiom is the positive influence of the level of development of institutions, forming a favorable environment, on the investment attractiveness of the national economy in the eyes of foreign investors. This relationship is also to a great extent confirmed by many academic studies. For instance, C. Daude and E. Stein found that “the quality of institutions has a positive effect on foreign direct investment (FDI)” [8, 27]⁹, taking into consideration from several sources such parameters as the risk of expropriation, corruption, law and order, the level of democracy, the quality of bureaucracy and others, all taken as characteristics of the development of institutions. B. Buchanan, Q.V.Le and M. Rishi found that “institutional quality has a positive and significant effect on attracting FDI” [9, 1]¹⁰, having analyzed the data for 164 countries for the period of 1996-2006. C. Coffman, examining the relationship between FDI inflows and institutional differences

¹ The Decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On Long-Term State Economic Policy”. May 7, 2012. Pres-ident of Russia. URL: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15232> (access date: February 13, 2018).
² The Program of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2007-2009. Approved by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated April 6, 2007 No.310.
³ The Plan of joint actions of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the development of the national stock market for 2018-2021. Approved by the Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated January 25, 2018 No.32.
⁴ The program on attracting investments “National Investment Strategy”. Approved by the Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated August 22, 2017 No.498. URL: <http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P1700000498> (access date: February 13, 2018).
⁵ Our Impact. Redefining Global Competitiveness. World Economic Forum website. URL: [https://www.weforum.org/our-impact/](https://www.weforum.org/our-impact/redefining-global-competitiveness)
⁶ About the Doing Business project. DOING BUSINESS. Business Regulation Assessment. World Bank website. URL: <http://russian.doingbusiness.org/about-us> (access date: February 13, 2018).
⁷ The spelling of the source is preserved.
⁸ The reforms aimed at regulating business. DOING BUSINESS. Business Regulation Assessment. World Bank website. URL: <http://russian.doingbusiness.org/reforms> (access date: February 13, 2018).
⁹ The Quality of Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment. Christian Daude, Ernesto Stein. March 2001. This Version: February 2004. URL: http://econweb.umd.edu/~daude/research_files/institutions.pdf

among countries in the ten components of the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom, revealed “statistically significant results for the five institutional variables” [10, 2]¹¹.

Results and conclusions

At the same time, a review of a number of key ratings that use indicators related to institutions, economic freedom and other aspects of an administrative nature often demonstrates a discouraging discrepancy between the high positions of individual countries in these indicators and the FDI indicators. An example of this kind can be the Index of Economic Freedom - 2018 from The Heritage

Foundation, the authoritative American analytical center, which ranks first in the global ranking of such institutions of the Global Go-To Think Tank Index¹². In the latest rating of this fund, the countries that occupy a leading position in the Index of Economic Freedom have a very wide range of values for the volume of annual FDI inflows, including several outflows of these investments (Table 1). At the same time, the correlation between the inflow of FDI and positions in the rating is not very pronounced, not only when taking into account the positions in the general rating, but also in the rating of the specialized pillar of the Index - “freedom of investment”.

Table 1. Interrelation of positions in the rating of The Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom and the positions on the annual inflow of foreign direct investment¹³.

	Place in the rating	Score	Rank in terms of the rating “freedom of investment”	Score on the “freedom of investment” indicator	Rank according to the inflow of FDI per capita	FDI in-flow per capita per year, USD
Hong Kong	1	90.2	2-7	90	2	14,677
Singapore	2	88.8	8-23	85	3	10,986
New Zealand	3	84.2	24-39	80	33	483
Switzerland	4	81.7	8-23	85	181	-3,163
Australia	5	80.9	24-39	80	11	1,985
Ireland	6	80.4	2-7	90	7	4,753
Estonia	7	78.8	2-7	90	24	663
United Kingdom	8	78	2-7	90	9	3,871
Canada	9	77.7	24-39	80	20	931
United Arab Emirates	10	77.6	144-152	40	21	912
Iceland	11	77	8-23	85	180	-1,442
Denmark	12	76.6	2-7	90	70	167
Taiwan	13	76.6	86-103	60	47	354
Luxembourg	14	76.4	1	95	1	46,627
Sweden	15	76.3	8-23	85	12	1,959

In part, these discrepancies can be explained by fluctuations in the indicator of a single period, but, in our opinion, their causes are deeper and more complex; and lie in the specifics of the economic situation and patterns in different countries that are not taken into account by aggregated indices like

the Index of Economic Freedom. Academic studies, which have a more specialized character, also testify in favor of this. In particular, in Coffman's study mentioned above, the author notes differences in the impact of institutional quality on FDI inflows in countries with different levels of income: “strong

¹⁰ Foreign direct investment and institutional quality: Some empirical evidence. Bonnie G. Buchanan, Quan V. Le, Meenakshi Rishi. International Review of Financial Analysis. Volume 21, January 2012, Pages 81-89.
¹¹ Coffman, Charles, “Institutions, Distance, and Foreign Direct Investment” (2015). Honors Theses. Paper 779. <http://digitalcommons.colby.edu/honorstheses/779>
¹² Heritage Ranked No. 1 Globally for Impact on Public Policy February 1st, 2018. URL: <https://www.heritage.org/impact/heritage-ranked-no-1-globally-impact-public-policy> (access date: February 15, 2018).
¹³ Compiled according to the 2018 Index of Economic Freedom. The Heritage Foundation website. URL: <https://www.heritage.org/index/explore> (access date: February 7, 2018).

institutions are negatively associated with FDI inflows in low-income countries... For middle- and high-income countries, strong institutions are positively associated with FDI; but for middle-income countries, governance and regulation are important, and for high-income countries, financial markets and capital mobility are more important¹⁴.

Another explanation for the fact that many studies have identified a link between FDI inflows and high institutional ratings with different ratings, which is currently not obvious, may be changes in the global economy, including investment flows in recent years. These changes are caused by many factors and take

place within the transformation of the world economic system, the center of which is shifting to Asia, and the key investors are not the traditional centers of economic power (the USA and Europe), but the rapidly growing economies of China, India, Russia and other countries, investors of which refer somewhat differently to the traditional values of the institutional environment for the West and are ready to conduct business in conditions that differ from the preferences of the Euro-Atlantic business. Meanwhile, it is during the last decade that the ratio of the volume of FDI flows from developed and developing countries has significantly changed (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Dynamics of the share of developed and developing economies in the global outflow of foreign direct investment in 2007-2016.¹⁵

Back in 1999, developed countries accounted for 95% of the world outflow of FDI, whereas by 2014 the positions of developed and developing economies have almost equaled. The crisis and the fall of commodity markets, which are the basis of many developing economies, have undermined their positions, but the trend of changing the alignment of forces in global investment processes is evident. The largest emerging economies in the 2000s increased their investments abroad by dozens of times - only the outflow of FDI from the PRC increased from 916 million US dollars in 2000 to 183.1 billion US dollars in 2016¹⁶(200 times). Together with the change in the type of investing economies and their economic entities

(which are largely represented by the state and quasi-public sector), both investment models and criteria are changing. At the same time, the criteria of state-owned companies from Asia are not always the same as those of corporate business from Europe, including the requirements for the quality of institutions and other aspects that are given great importance in compilation of various international ratings whose methodology is based on the Western attitude to business conditions and institutions.

In our opinion, it is this discrepancy between the traditional criteria for assessing the economic conditions of the FDI recipient countries and the changed structure of foreign investors, among which the growing economies play an increasing

¹⁴ Coffman, Charles, "Institutions, Distance, and Foreign Direct Investment" (2015). Honors Theses. Paper 779. <http://digitalcommons.colby.edu/honorsthesis/779>

¹⁵ Calculated according to the UNCTAD data: Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual, 1970-2016. UNCTADStat Data Center. UNCTAD website, URL: <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/tableViewer/tableView.aspx> (access date: February 16, 2018).

role, that has become one of the reasons for the growing discrepancy between the scores of certain countries and the ratings and investors. If the ratings are still traditionally highly valued by many developed economies, the FDI statistics in these countries often show stagnation or even outflow. We analyzed the indicators of the volume of accumulated FDI and country assessments by the three well-known ratings in order to better understand the relationship between the ratings of recognized international indices and foreign investment activity in national markets.

The study was conducted on the data representing the period of 2007-2016, for which the indicators of the change in the volume of accumulated FDI for 171 economies were calculated. The UNCTAD database was used as a source of data on the volume of FDI. These indicators were compared with the indicators of advancement of individual economies in three ratings - The Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom, the World Bank's Doing Business, and one of the pillars of the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), namely, the "Institutions", assessing the effectiveness of public and private institutions based on calculation of 21 indicators. Three rating data were examined for the

period comparable with the data for foreign investment - reports from 2007 to 2017 were used. For the analysis, the indicators of the countries occupying the first 15 positions in the relevant samples were used, which, in our opinion, made it possible to obtain representative results, given that the number of countries estimated by these ratings ranges from 152 to 190.

In the course of the study, indicators of changes in the volume of accumulated FDI were compared with changes in the positions of countries in these ratings, as well as with their absolute positions. The aim of the analysis was to find the relationship between progress (or regress) in the respective ratings with the change in the volume of FDI, as well as to test the hypothesis that a high level of development of the institutional environment of business in the leading countries of the rating should be accompanied by a high level of attracting foreign investment to these countries.

Considering the best states in absolute positions in the ranking of the "Institutions" of the GCI, it can be noted that out of the 15 leading countries, six have experienced a decline in the amount of accumulated FDI, and another three have had a minimal growth of 20% over a 10-year period (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Change in the volume of accumulated foreign direct investment of the countries occupying the first positions in the "Institutions" pillar¹⁷ of the 2017-2018 Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum and advancement in the ranking for this pillar from 2007 to 2017.¹⁸

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ In the original - 1st pillar: Institutions.

¹⁸ Calculated and compiled from the data from the following sources: The Global Competitiveness Index Historical Dataset © 2007-2017 World Economic Forum | Version 20171002. World Economic Forum website. URL: <http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-index-2017-2018/competitiveness-rankings/#series=GCI.A.01>; Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual, 1970-2016. UNCTADStat Data Center. UNCTAD website, URL: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_ChosenLang=en (access date: February 7, 2018).

At the same time, the average growth in accumulated FDI in the sample countries was 39.8%, which is five times less than the average of 199.4% for 171 economies (the entire sample) that were considered in the study. Thus, the leading countries in assessment of their institutions rated by the World Economic Forum demonstrated a much smaller inflow of FDI. If we look at the progress of these countries in this rating over the last decade, also reflected in the diagram of Figure 2, we can find a particular relationship - out of 10 states that showed upward advancement in the rating, eight had an increase

in accumulated FDI, while the three countries that worsened their position had a decrease. Thus, with the example of the leading countries in the ranking of the "Institutions" pillar of the GCI, it can be concluded that progress in the advancement of this rating is interlinked with the inflow of FDI more than the high positions themselves.

To clarify this thesis, economies were chosen that achieved the maximum progress in this rating in order to compare this progress with their indicators on the change in the volume of accumulated FDI (Table 2).

Table 2. The change in the volume of accumulated foreign direct investment for the last decade in the countries that have shown the greatest progress in the advancement on the "Institutions" pillar of the 2017-2018 Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum.¹⁹

	Country	Advancement for the period, the number of positions	Position in 2017 rating	Change in the volume of accumulated FDI in 2007-2016, %
1	Azerbaijan	50	33	304.4
2	Albania	46	68	85.1
3	Tajikistan	46	42	288.0
4	Lesotho	43	69	-51.8
5	Armenia	41	55	79.1
6	China	36	41	314.1
7	Georgia	36	50	162.6
8	Russia	33	83	-22.4
9	Nepal	30	89	476.6
10	Senegal	30	67	340.8
11	Kenya	26	75	394.4
12	Jamaica	24	63	73.4
13	Kyrgyzstan	24	103	419.2
14	Kazakhstan	20	60	191.0
15	Bangladesh	19	107	230.5
Average sample value				219.0
Average for all countries				199.4

In this case there are no strong inconsistencies between the compared indicators - in 13 of the 15 economies that are leading in terms of progress in the rating, the increase in the volume of accumu-

lated FDI is positive and only in two it is negative. At the same time, the average indicator for the increase in the volume of accumulated FDI in the sample is above the national average for all coun-

¹⁹ Calculated and compiled from the data from the following sources: *The Global Competitiveness Index Historical Dataset © 2007-2017 World Economic Forum | Version 20171002. World Economic Forum website. URL: <http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-index-2017-2018/competitiveness-rankings/#series=GCI.A.01>; Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual, 1970-2016. UNCTADStat Data Center. UNCTAD website, URL: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_ChosenLang=en (access date: 2/7/2018).*

tries - 219% versus 119.4%. At the same time, the attempt to identify a closer relationship between these two indicators was not successful: the number of positions that the economy advanced in the GCI's "Institutions" rankings does not practically correspond to the intensity of the increase in FDI. Thus, among the countries that have advanced by 40-50 positions, the spread of FDI growth is very large - from a decline of 52% to a growth of 304%, and the correlation coefficient between the two data sets is -0.25. Therefore, the comparison results given in Table 2 can be interpreted as follows: the strong progress of economies in the GCI's "Institutions" rankings is in most cases accompanied by an outflow of FDI, which is ahead of the average level, but this advance is insignificant and is not related to the intensity of advancement.

A similar comparison was made for the worst economies in the ranking (Table 3), which also showed mixed results. In particular, the three leaders of this anti-rating (Mauritania, Tunisia and El Salvador) demonstrated an increase in the volume of accumulated FDI. Four out of the worst fifteen in terms of progress in the country rating, had the growth in accumulated FDI above the average for all countries in the sample. A negative increase in accumulated FDI was recorded only in four economies out of fifteen. At the same time, the average indicator of the change in the volume of accumulated FDI among the worst 15 countries is still significantly below the average for the whole sample.

Table 3. Change in the volume of accumulated foreign direct investment for the last decade in the countries that have shown the greatest regress on the "Institutions" pillar of the 2017-2018 Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum.²⁰

	Country	Advancement for the period by number of positions	Position in 2017 rating	Change in the volume of accumulated FDI in 2007-2016, %
1	Mauritania	-60	132	254.9
2	Tunisia	-59	80	12.6
3	Salvador	-49	133	54.4
4	Hungary	-47	101	-18.6
5	Mali	-43	110	214.2
6	Greece	-38	87	-48.6
7	Colombia	-38	117	190.9
8	Mexico	-38	123	49.6
9	Republic of South Africa	-37	76	3.8
10	Croatia	-37	102	-33.7
11	Madagascar	-37	130	231.7
12	Slovakia	-33	93	-12.8
13	Korea	-32	58	51.7
14	Thailand	-31	78	99.3
15	Honduras	-31	120	206.9
Average sample value				83.7
Average for all countries				199.4

²⁰ Calculated and compiled from the data from the following sources: *The Global Competitiveness Index Historical Dataset © 2007-2017 World Economic Forum | Version 20171002. World Economic Forum website. URL: <http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-index-2017-2018/competitiveness-rankings/#series=GCI.A.01>; Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual, 1970-2016. UNCTADStat Data Center. UNCTAD website, URL: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_ChosenLang=en (access date: 2/7/2018).*

Special attention should be paid to the fact that countries with low absolute positions in the rating, both among the best in terms of progress in it and among the worst, have shown the best results in terms of growth in the volume of accumulated FDI. There are eleven such countries occupying positions below the 100th rank in both tables, and nine of them have the positive investment result, and in seven the average value of the change in the volume of accumulated FDI is above the average for all countries in the sample (199.4%); that is, most countries that occupy extremely low positions in the level of development of institutions are very successful in attracting foreign investment. The results of the comparison of both the best and the worst countries on advancing in the GCI's "Institutions" rating demonstrate, in our opinion, its low adequacy to the real state of affairs with investment attractiveness at the level of

individual economies, as well as the weak correlation of the indicators taken into account in this rating²¹ with an investment climate.

It can be assumed that the methodology of the World Economic Forum, according to which the Global Competitiveness Index is compiled and its components, differs in some specific way that does not allow to take fully into account all the factors that determine the investment attractiveness of individual economies, but the high attention, paid to international ratings of this kind, is justified by the reliability of other estimates. In this regard, we compared the volume of accumulated FDI with the positions of countries in the Doing Business rating of the World Bank. For economies that occupy the first 15 positions in this rating, the results of attracting FDI were in the same way contradictory as in the case with the rating of "Institutions" of the GCI (Figure 3).




Figure 3. Changes in the volume of accumulated foreign direct investment in 2007-2016 in the economies that occupy the first 15 positions in the World Bank's Doing Business-2018 rating.²²

In four out of the fifteen countries that are at the top of the rating, the volume of accumulated FDI has declined over the past decade, another two had a symbolic growth, amounting to less

than 20%. In none of the countries among the leaders of the rating, the increase in the volume of accumulated FDI reached the average for the total sample at 199.4%, while the average for the fif-

²¹ This pillar is formed from 21 indicators, including such as: property rights, protection of intellectual property, public trust in politicians, independence of justice, favoritism in the decisions of government officials, efficiency of public spending, burden of state regulation, transparency of government decisions, organized crime, business ethics, protection of minority shareholders, investor protection force and others.

²² Calculated and compiled from the data from the following sources: Country rating. DOING BUSINESS. Business Regulation Assessment. World Bank website. URL: <http://russian.doingbusiness.org/rankings> (access date: February 9, 2018).

teen countries was 41.9% - five times lower than this level. Thus, just as in the case of the Global Competitiveness Index, leadership in the ranking was not only not accompanied by better indicators of FDI inflows, but, on the contrary, was a sign of a serious lag from the world average.

A comparison was also made of the progress in the Doing Business rating with the change in the volume of accumulated FDI for the best and worst economies. Countries that have demonstrated the maximum progress in the rating (Ta-

ble 4), have a higher average index of change in the volume of accumulated FDI (225.1%) than for the entire sample (199.4%). At the same time, in two states that are among the leaders on the progress in the rating (Croatia and Russia), the change in the volume of FDI was negative. Only in four out of the fifteen states this indicator exceeded the average for the whole sample, but due to its very high values in these four cases, the average for 15 economies exceeded the average for all studied countries.

Table 4. Change in the volume of accumulated foreign direct investment over the past ten years in countries that have made the greatest progress in advancing the World Economic Forum's Doing Business-2018 rating.²³

		Progress for 2007-2018, the number of positions	Position in 2018 rating	Change in the volume of accumulated FDI in 2007-2016, %
1	Rwanda	117	41	1,213.2
2	Belarus	91	38	323.2
3	Macedonia, FYR	81	11	33.9
4	Uzbekistan	74	74	311.6
5	Croatia	73	51	-33.7
6	Indonesia	63	72	194.0
7	Bhutan	63	75	740.1
8	Russian Federation	61	35	-22.4
9	Moldova	59	44	90.9
10	United Arab Emirates	56	21	141.3
11	Ukraine	56	76	27.1
12	Albania	50	65	85.1
13	Poland	48	27	13.1
14	Morocco	46	69	41.9
15	Costa Rica	44	61	217.3
Average sample value				225.1
Average for all countries				199.4

The relationship between the number of positions for which a particular state has advanced over decade and the change in the volume of accumulated FDI in this case can be called pronounced, in contrast to the "Institutions" rating of the GCI, which was reflected in the correlation coefficient between two

data sets at level of 0.68. The same ratio for the worst-performing economies of the Doing Business rating was 0.25, and a comparison of their regress with the FDI volumes confirmed the lack of correlation between this regress and the processes of attracting foreign investments (Table 5).

²³ Calculated and compiled from the data from the following sources: Country rating. DOING BUSINESS. Business Regulation Assessment. World Bank website. URL: <http://russian.doingbusiness.org/rankings> (access date: February 9, 2018); Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual, 1970-2016. UNCTADStat Data Center. UNCTAD website. URL: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_ChosenLang=en (access date: February 7, 2018).

Table 5. Change in the volume of accumulated foreign direct investment over the past decade in countries that have made the greatest regress in the World Economic Forum's Doing Business-2018 rating.²⁴

		Regress for 2007-2018, the number of positions	Position in 2018 rating	Change in the volume of accumulated FDI in 2007-2016, %
1	Bangladesh	-89	177	230.5
2	Pakistan	-73	147	52.3
3	Fiji	-70	101	100.4
4	Grenada	-69	142	69.5
5	Belize	-65	121	142.7
6	Saint Lucia	-64	91	57.7
7	Namibia	-64	106	13.3
8	Nicaragua	-64	131	217.0
9	Ethiopia	-64	161	281.8
10	Saudi Arabia	-54	92	215.1
11	Republic of South Africa	-53	82	3.8
12	Papua New Guinea	-52	109	184.4
13	Kuwait	-50	96	1,408.3
14	Algeria	-50	166	134.3
15	Lebanon	-47	133	89.5
Average sample value				213.4
Average for all countries				199.4

Unlike the list of the best in terms of progress in the World Bank's rating, in this case, all fifteen of the worst economies showed a positive trend in the change in the volume of FDI. At the same time, the average for this sample is 213.4%, that is practically equal to that of the best progressing countries (225.1%) and exceeds the average level for all studied economies (199.4%). The best indicator of the increase in the volume of FDI from the two given samples was shown by Kuwait (1,408.3%) - the country that lost 50 positions in the ranking in ten years, and the absolute leader on regress - Bangladesh - slipped by 89 positions, demonstrated an increase in the volume of FDI in 230.5 %, which is almost one and a half times higher than the best country among the absolute leaders of the rating - Georgia (162.5%), and is significantly better than the average for the group of absolute leaders of Doing Business-2018.

These facts testify, in our opinion, the inadequacy of the Doing Business rating as an indicator of the investment attractiveness of certain economies, the investment climate in them, and, finally, the criteria for foreign investors, according to which they

make decisions about entering local markets and increasing investment in them. The situation, when the leaders of the rating demonstrate a multiple backlog in the volume of attracted FDI from outsiders, and the progress or regress in this rating is not accompanied by obvious differences in investment flows, characterizes this rating as not reflecting the real situation in the investment sphere and actually useless for improving the business environment.

Comparison of positions and progress/regress in the ratings of the development of the institutional environment with the change in the volume of accumulated investments did not reveal a stable interrelation between these indicators. To complete the process of revealing such relationships, the author also ranked countries in terms of leadership in attracting FDI over the past decade in order to identify the positions occupied by these countries in the three rankings - the GCI's "Institutions" pillar, the Doing Business ranking and the Index of Economic Freedom (Table 6). The 15 best and worst economies were identified to change the volume of accumulated FDI in the period of 2007-2016.

²⁴ Calculated and compiled from the data from the following sources: Country rating. DOING BUSINESS. Business Regulation Assessment. World Bank website. URL: <http://russian.doingbusiness.org/rankings> (access date: February 9, 2018); Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual, 1970-2016. UNCTADStat Data Center. UNCTAD website. URL: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_ChosenLang=en (access date: February 7, 2018).

Table 6. Comparison of the best and worst performing countries in terms of accumulated foreign direct investment with their positions in the ratings of the Index of Economic Freedom, the "Institutions" pillar of the Global Competitiveness Index and Doing Business-2017.²⁵

		Change in the volume of accumulated FDI in 2007-2016, %	Positions in ratings		
			Index of Economic Freedom (out of 183 countries)	The GCI "Institutions" pillar (out of 152 countries)	Doing Business (out of 190 countries)
The best economies in terms of growth in accumulated FDI					
1	Burundi	2,239	157	122	164
2	Niger	1,809	160	n/a	144
3	Guinea-Bissau	1,424	118	n/a	176
4	Kuwait	1,408	81	57	96
5	Rwanda	1,213	39	16	41
6	Mozambique	891	170	127	138
7	Mongolia	860	125	108	62
8	Cyprus	841	48	51	53
9	Turkmenistan	811	169	n/a	n/a
10	Ghana	770	122	59	120
11	Bhutan	740	87	32	75
12	Gabon	659	109	85	167
13	Somalia	657	n/a	n/a	190
14	Nepal	477	133	89	105
15	Cambodia	447	101	106	135
The worst economies in terms of growth in accumulated FDI					
1	Finland	-11	26	1	13
2	Denmark	-12	12	13	3
3	Slovakia	-13	59	93	39
4	Turkey	-14	58	71	60
5	Hungary	-19	55	101	48
6	Germany	-19	25	21	20
7	Russia	-22	107	83	35
8	Norway	-23	23	6	8
9	Venezuela	-33	179	137	188
10	Croatia	-34	92	102	51
11	Swaziland	-39	123	61	112
12	Iceland	-41	11	14	23
13	Belgium	-41	52	25	52
14	Samoa	-48	90	n/a	87
15	Greece	-49	115	87	67

The data given in Table 6 allows us to make the following generalizations. Firstly, almost all countries that have shown the largest increase in accumulated FDI over the past decade are ranked low or very low in the three ratings, and in some cases, they are not even considered by these ratings (Somalia, Turkmenistan, Niger, Guinea-Bis-

sau). The average positions for 15 countries are: for the Index of Economic Freedom - 116 position out of 183, for the GCI's "Institutions" pillar - 77 position out of 152, according to Doing Business rating - 119 position out of 190. At the same time, the average FDI growth rate for these 15 economies was 1,016%, which is 5.1 times higher than

²⁵ Calculated and compiled from the data from the following sources: Country rating. DOING BUSINESS. Business Regulation Assessment. World Bank website. URL: <http://russian.doingbusiness.org/rankings> (access date: February 9, 2018); Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual, 1970-2016. UNCTADStat Data Center. UNCTAD website. URL: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_ChosenLang=en (access date: February 7, 2018); The Global Competitiveness Index Historical Dataset © 2007-2017 World Economic Forum | Version 20171002. World Economic Forum website. URL: <http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-index-2017-2018/competitiveness-rankings/#series=GCI.A.01>; 2018 Index of Economic Freedom. The Heritage Foundation website. URL: <https://www.heritage.org/index/explore> (access date: February 7, 2018).

the average for all studied countries (199.4%).

Secondly, among the worst countries in terms of growth in the accumulated FDI, a number of countries occupy leading positions in the reviewed ratings - Finland, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Iceland; while there are few outsiders in terms of these ratings - Venezuela, Croatia, Swaziland. The average positions for 15 countries are: Index of Economic Freedom: 68th position out of 183; GCI's "Institutions" pillar: 58th position out of 152; and Doing Business rating: 54th position out of 190. That is, the average position of countries from this list for all three ratings is at the top - in the first third.

Thus, there is a clear contradiction between the quality of business conditions that are assessed by these three ratings and the inflow of foreign direct investment: according to the assessments of The Heritage Foundation, the World Bank and the World Economic Forum, there is an inverse relationship between the positions of countries in their ratings and the inflow of investments from abroad. Low positions in the ratings are accompanied by a high inflow of FDI and vice versa - high positions are held by states with low or even negative volumes of growth. Obviously, this discrepancy may indicate systemic drawbacks in the methodology of drawing up appropriate indica-

tors of these ratings, which distort the relationship between the level of development of institutions and the investment attractiveness of economies, as revealed by the majority of studies.

The reasons for this discrepancy will be diverse and their identification is not included in the purpose of this paper. It can only be noted that among the factors of high FDI inflow to developing economies with low ratings can be such things as a low starting base; the small absolute size of economies in which even single large projects provide intensive growth dynamics; and the origin of foreign investment from developing countries (such as China), for which the institutional environment is secondary. It can also be noted that the low level of FDI increase in the leading countries of the ratings may be related to the fact that they are mostly developed countries, which often act as sources of FDI, rather than their recipients. However, the explanations (these or other) of discrepancies between the country's rating estimates and their actual investment attractiveness do not abolish the fact that these ratings do not correspond to the real state of affairs in most of the assessed economies and, as a consequence, cannot serve as a basis for judging the investment attractiveness, nor a criterion for its improvement, including in state economic programs.

REFERENCES:

1. The Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On Long-Term State Economic Policy". May 7, 2012. President of Russia. URL: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15232>.
2. The Program of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2007-2009. Approved by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated April 6, 2007 No.310.
3. The Plan of joint actions of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the development of the national stock market for 2018-2021. Approved by the Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated January 25, 2018 No.32.
4. The program on attracting investments "National Investment Strategy". Approved by the Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated August 22, 2017 No.498. URL: <http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P1700000498>.
5. Our Impact. Redefining Global Competitiveness. World Economic Forum website. URL: <https://www.weforum.org/our-impact/redefining-global-competitiveness>.
6. About the Doing Business project. DOING BUSINESS. Business Regulation Assessment. World Bank website. URL: <http://russian.doingbusiness.org/about-us>.
7. Reforms aimed at regulating business. DOING BUSINESS. Business Regulation Assessment. World Bank website. URL: <http://russian.doingbusiness.org/reforms>.
8. The Quality of Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment. Christian Daude, Ernesto Stein. March 2001. This Version: February 2004. URL: http://econweb.umd.edu/~daude/research_files/institutions.pdf.
9. Foreign direct investment and institutional quality: Some empirical evidence. Bonnie G. Buchanan, Quan V. Le, Meenakshi Rishi. International Review of Financial Analysis. Volume 21, January 2012, Pages 81-89.
10. Coffman, Charles, "Institutions, Distance, and Foreign Direct Investment" (2015). Honors Theses. Paper 779. <http://digitalcommons.colby.edu/honorstheses/779>
11. Heritage Ranked No. 1 Globally for Impact on Public Policy February 1st, 2018. URL: <https://www.heritage.org/impact/heritage-ranked-no-1-globally-impact-public-policy>.
12. Compiled according to the 2018 Index of Economic Freedom. The Heritage Foundation website. URL: <https://www.heritage.org/index/explore>
13. Foreign direct investment: Inward and outward flows and stock, annual, 1970-2016. UNCTADStat Data Center. UNCTAD website, URL: <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx>.
14. The Global Competitiveness Index Historical Dataset © 2007-2017 World Economic Forum | Version 20171002. World Economic Forum website. URL: <http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-index-2017-2018/competitiveness-rankings/#series=GCI.A.01>.
15. Country rating. DOING BUSINESS. Business Regulation Assessment. World Bank website. URL: <http://russian.doingbusiness.org/rankings>.