

CONTENTS



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KAZISS' ANALYTICS: GOLDEN POOL

Irina Chernykh

Opening Remarks.....7

Umirserik Kasenov

Central Asia: National, Regional and Global Aspects of Security.....8

Lev Tarakov

Nazarbayev's Victory is inevitable 15

Alma Sultangaliyeva

Women and Religion in Post-soviet Kazakhstan – a View from
Within.....20

Yermukhamet Yertysbayev

Mass Consciousness During the Period
of Public Transformation in Kazakhstan.....32

Maulen Ashimbayev

On the Issue of the Basic Political Transit Models43

Bulat Sultanov

Kazakhstan and the EAEU: Current State and Trends49

Erlan Karin

Central Asia: Facing Radical Islam56

Zarema Shaukenova

25 Years of Kazakhstan's Independence:
the Philosophical/Political Implications61

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ҚСЗИ САРАПТАМАСЫ: АЛТЫН ҚОР

<i>Ирина Черных</i> Алғы сөз.....	7
<u>Өмірсерік Қасенов</u> Орталық Азия: қауіпсіздіктің ұлттық, аймақтық және ғаламдық аспектілері.....	8
<i>Лев Тараков</i> Назарбаевтың жеңісі даусыз	15
<i>Алма Сұлтанғалиева</i> Посткеңестік Қазақстандағы әйелдер және дін – бейтарап көзқарас.....	20
<i>Ермұхамет Ертысбаев</i> Қазақстанда қоғамдық трансформация кезеңіндегі бұқаралық сана.....	32
<i>Мәулен Әшімбаев</i> Саяси транзиттің негізгі модельдері	43
<i>Болат Сұлтанов</i> Қазақстан және ЕАЭО: жағдайы және перспективалары	49
<i>Ерлан Карин</i> Орталық Азия: радикалды ислам қатерлері	56
<i>Зарема Шаукенова</i> Қазақстан тәуелсіздігінің 25 жылдығы: философиялық / саяси өлшемдер	61

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АНАЛИТИКА КИСИ: ЗОЛОТОЙ ФОНД

<i>Ирина Черных</i> Вступительное слово	7
<u>Умирсерік Қасенов</u> Центральная Азия: национальные, региональные и глобальные аспекты безопасности	8
<i>Лев Тараков</i> Победа Назарбаева неизбежна.....	15
<i>Алма Сұлтанғалиева</i> Женщины и религия в постсоветском Казахстане - взгляд со стороны	20
<i>Ермұхамет Ертысбаев</i> Массовое сознание в период общественной трансформации в Казахстане	32
<i>Маулен Ашимбаев</i> К вопросу об основных моделях политического транзита	43
<i>Болат Сұлтанов</i> Казахстан и ЕАЭС: состояние и перспективы	49
<i>Ерлан Карин</i> Центральная Азия: вызовы радикального ислама	56
<i>Зарема Шаукенова</i> 25 лет независимости Казахстана в философско-политологическом измерении	61

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OPENING REMARKS

You are holding in your hand a unique issue of the 'Central Asia Affairs' magazine. It is devoted to the 25th anniversary of the activities of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies (KISS) under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan and includes articles by the directors who have supervised the institute at different times.

Since its inception, KISS has provided analytical support for the activities of the Executive Office of the President and the National Security Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan, as well as other state institutions, influencing the adoption of strategic decisions for state development. The Institute and its performance are represented by, first of all, the staff – that is, the experts working in it; and, of course, the director. There have been seven directors of KISS during the twenty-five years of its work. They are: Umirserik Tuleshovich Kasenov (June 1993- May 1997); Leo Yurievich Tarakov (May-December 1997); Alma Sultangalieva (December 1997-April 1998); Ermukhamet Kabidinovich Ertysbaev (April 1998 May 2000); Maulen Saghatkhanovich Ashimbaev (May 2000-May 2005); Bulat Klychbaevich Sultanov (May 2005-October 2014); Yerlan Tynimbayuly Karin (October 2014-February 2017); and Zarema Kaukenovna Shaukenova (February 2017 - present).

Each leader made their own unique contribution to the development of the Institute's work; and each not only managed but was also a recognized specialist in his or her field, making a contribution to the development of Kazakhstan' analytical and scientific thought. The concept of this issue of the magazine is a desire to show KISS through the prism of the scientific and analytical research of its directors, who, by virtue of their academic, public and political activities, are included in the "golden pool" of the Kazakh nation.

The articles included in this issue have been published in various domestic and foreign publications at different times. The selection of articles reflects the specifics of the work of KISS and the style of its leadership; and also shows the dynamics of topics and tasks that the institute faced in its different periods of operation. Despite the fact that the articles have already been presented in scientific and journalistic collections and journals, they remain relevant and testify to the depth of analysis of their authors; the scale of their thought; and their ability to predict the future.

The subjects in this issue are very diverse and include analysis of both international and foreign policy issues in the context of Kazakhstan's role in the regional and global systems of international relations and security (Kasenov UT A New Role for Central Asia in Modern International Relations, Sultanov B.K. Kazakhstan and the EAEU: Current State and Trends), as well as the transformation processes taking place in Kazakhstan over the past 25 years. This is an analysis of the fundamental problems of Kazakhstan's transformation, such as socio-political reform, changing the mass consciousness and forming its own development model (Tarakov LU Nazarbayev's victory is inevitable, Ertysbaev E.K. Mass Consciousness During The Period Of Public Transformation In Kazakhstan, Ashimbayev M.S. On The Issue Of The Basic Political Transit Models). This issue of the magazine also contains an analysis of the new global problems of the modern world which have manifestations in Kazakhstan, such as the Islamic revival and re-Islamization of women and the emergence of Central Asian combatants participating in the Syrian conflict zone (Sultangaleyeva AK Women And Religion In Post-Soviet Kazakhstan – A View From Within, Karin E.T Central Asia: Facing Radical Islam).). The final article of the issue, from the pen of the acting director of the institute, Z.K. Shaukenova, provides a comprehensive philosophical and political analysis of the social and humanitarian processes taking place in the Kazakhstan society during the period of Independence; and conceptualizes the idea of independence as the idea of Kazakhstan's integration into the global historical process.

Irina Chernykh
Chief Editor

ICSTI
02.41.11

CENTRAL ASIA: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY*

Umirserik Kasenov

(headed the KazISS between June 1993 and May 1997)

Abstract. The weight of any Central Asian state in the framework of current international relations is determined by its economic and demographic potential, geographical location, character of its relations with other states, primarily with neighboring ones, by its role in the regional and global international organizations. With the completion of the trans-Asian railway constructions, with the development of road and air communications, the geostrategic, trade and economic significance of Central Asia will rise further for it will start to serve as a route for considerable cargo flows from Asia and the Pacific region to Europe and West Asia and back.

Key words: Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Security, Regional Integration.

ОРТАЛЫҚ АЗИЯ: ҚАУІПСІЗДІКТІҢ ҰЛТТЫҚ, АЙМАҚТЫҚ ЖӘНЕ ҒАЛАМДЫҚ АСПЕКТІЛЕРІ

Өмірсерік Қасенов

Андатпа. Мақалада Орталық Азияның халықаралық қатынастардағы жаңа рөлін сипаттау және талдау қарастырылған. Автор біріншіден Орталық Азия аймағының маңыздылығын айқындап, жаңадан қайта құрылған Орталық Азия мемлекеттеріне әскери қауіптерді анықтайды. Мемлекеттердің қорғаныс саясаты кейінірек Қазақстан, Қырғызстан, Өзбекстан және Түркменстанның қорғаныс магистральдері сипатталған жағдайда қарастырылады. Сонымен қатар, Орталық Азия мемлекеттерімен аймақтық (ТМД, Орталық Азия) және халықаралық (ЕҚЫҰ, НАТО) қатынастарды талдау жүргізіледі. Автор Орталық Азиядағы жоғарыда аталған мемлекеттердегі интеграцияны бағалаумен қорытындылайды.

Түйін сөздер: қауіпсіздік, аймақтық қауіпсіздік, Орталық Азия, ЕҚЫҰ, НАТО, ТМД қауіпсіздігі, Ұлттық қауіпсіздік.

ЦЕНТРАЛЬНАЯ АЗИЯ: НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЕ, РЕГИОНАЛЬНЫЕ И ГЛОБАЛЬНЫЕ АСПЕКТЫ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ

Умирсерик Касенов

Аннотация. Эта статья является характеристикой и анализом новой роли Центральной Азии в международных отношениях. Касенов вначале излагает важность региона Центральной Азии и далее определяет военные угрозы для вновь созданных центральноазиатских государств. После этого политика обороны государств рассматривается в каждом конкретном случае, когда описываются оборонные магистрали Казахстана, Кыргызстана, Узбекистана и Туркменистана. Далее приводится анализ региональных (СНГ, Центральная Азия) и международных (ОБСЕ, НАТО) отношений со странами Центральной Азии. Автор завершает оценкой интеграции в Центральной Азии для вышеупомянутых государств.

Ключевые слова: безопасность, региональная безопасность, Центральная Азия, ОБСЕ, НАТО, безопасность СНГ, национальная безопасность.

*Himalayan and Central Asian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, April-June 1997, p. 30-50.

A New Role for Central Asia in Modern International Relations

Over 55 million people live in the region of Central Asia, it is quite rich in natural resources and has at its disposal a rather developed economic, scientific, and technical potential.

The strategic significance of the region lies in the fact that it borders with two out of five nuclear states of the world - Russia and China - and through Iran and Afghanistan it has an access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

An interesting and internationally significant phenomenon is that Central Asian states are simultaneously members of European (OSCE, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and Asian (Organization of Economic Cooperation - OEC, Organization of Islamic Conference, Asian Bank of Development, Islamic Bank of Development) regional international organizations and banks.

Kazakhstan

What is the backbone of the defence policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan?

Firstly, currently the formation of the armed forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan capable to defend the state sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country is under the way.

Secondly, on 25 May 1992, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation concluded the Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, in which they fixed the obligation to render each other military assistance in case of aggression against one of them. As an extension of it, there were signed the Agreement on Military Cooperation and a whole package of documents regarding the military sphere. Russia is leasing Baykonur, military grounds. There are forces and military objects on the territory of Kazakhstan which are under the Russian jurisdiction.

Thirdly, the Republic of Kazakhstan signed the Agreement on Collective Security on 15 May 1992, which involves nine countries of the CIS, and it is making every effort to create a joint defence space aimed at the coordination of defence activities.

One of the important factors on the way to strengthening the security of the Republic of Kazakhstan after its joining the Agreement on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear state, was the acceptance of formal affirmations of security from Russia, USA and Great Britain. On December 5, 1994, in Budapest, during the OSCE summit, the President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin, President of the USA B. Clinton and Prime-Minister of Great Britain J. Major signed the Memorandum on Security Guarantees.

In that document Russia, USA and Great Britain have confirmed their commitments to the Republic of Kazakhstan, in accordance with the principles of the OSCE, to respect its independence, sovereignty and existing borders, to avoid threatening with force or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan, to avoid economic pressure.

In case the Republic of Kazakhstan becomes a victim of aggression or an object of aggression threat with use of nuclear weapons, Russia, USA and

Great Britain will demand immediate actions of the UN Security Council in order to render assistance to the Republic of Kazakhstan as to a non-nuclear member-state of the Agreement on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon [2, p. 107].

The Chinese Government also has declared that it gives to Kazakhstan guarantees of security, and that declaration was published by Xinhua agency on February 8, 1995. It says: "China fully understands the desire of Kazakhstan to get security guarantees. To abstain unreservedly from the use of nuclear weapon or threat of its use against non-nuclear states and non-nuclear zones, this is the consistent position of the Chinese Government. This position of principle applies to Kazakhstan" [2, p. 113].

Kyrgyzstan

According to the inter-governmental agreement concluded in October 1992 between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, the latter, to ensure its own security, the security of the Russian Federation, and the collective security of the CIS member-states, delegated the issues of guarding of its state border with China to border troops of Russia.

As an extension of that agreement, in April 1994, the parties signed another document - on the order of recruitment and military services of citizens of Kyrgyzstan in the border troops of Russia deployed on the territory of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. According to that document, the parties create required conditions for recruiting Kyrgyzstani citizens for military services and ensure activities of personnel in compliance with the legislation of both states.

By mutual agreement Russia covers 80% and Kyrgyzstan 20% of the expenses of those troops.

Also in April there was signed the Protocol on the Interaction in the operative provision of guarding between the Federal Border Services - Chief Headquarters of the Border Troops of Russia and the State Committee of Kyrgyzstan on National Security.

Russia is helping Kyrgyzstan to form its own border troops in the course of the transition period. However, the terms of the transition period are not specified.

Uzbekistan

In his report to the first plenary session of Oliy Majlis, the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan I. Karimov, characterizing the principles of national security, said: "In the surrounding us unrest world we have friends, but there are those as well, who would like to drag Uzbekistan into their leverage sphere. And those forces may use any available methods, including military ones. Therefore, we must have a mobile, well-trained and equipped army, capable to defend our borders, our independence and sovereignty" [3].

The key elements of the concept of national security declared by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan I. Karimov are the following:

- Uzbekistan occupies an extremely favorable geographic location, in the center of transportation and autonomous energy and water systems of the region;
- Uzbekistan outnumbers its neighbors, and surpasses them in its scientific and technical potential, and other capacities;
- the Republic has unique natural and climatic conditions, long agricultural traditions and mineral resources that allow it to achieve self-sufficient production of foods, production and export of most valuable types of technical agricultural produce;
- the Republic has oil, oil products, gas, that is, those resources which are the backbone of any economy. It has all chances to increase its economic potential;
- Uzbekistan occupies a deserved place in human civilization. Its land is rich in spiritual heritage, and it exerts a strong influence on various spiritual and political processes not only in the region but all over the world.

"If one takes into account all these aspects - concludes I. Karimov, - then Uzbekistan is capable to achieve high positions in the world in the spheres of culture, science, technology, and economy and to become an integration center in Central Asia".

At the 48th session of the UN General Assembly I. Karimov proposed to set up in Tashkent a permanent seminar of the UN on issues of security, well-being and cooperation in Central Asia. In this connection he thinks that "the Republic could serve as an outpost in Asia, bridge-head of cooperation between the OSCE and the UN in provision of regional security and cooperation, preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention".

Uzbekistan is a full-fledged member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Does this membership, which stipulates non-participation in military blocks, contradict the commitments of Uzbekistan according to the Agreement on Collective Security signed in its capital on 15 May 1992?

It doesn't, since NM is not intended to undertake

any actions against any member of the CIS, and the Agreement on Collective Security cannot serve as a basis for the formation of certain military blocks, therefore, participation in it does not contradict the objectives of the NM. Another aspect of this matter is that the criteria of membership in the NM are not clear-cut, and it includes a lot of countries which have defence agreements with other countries of the world.

Military Integration in Central Asia

During the summit of the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in Bishkek, April 29-30, 1994, Kyrgyzstan joined the earlier signed Agreement on the Creation of a Single Economic Space between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Since then it became a trilateral agreement. It is noteworthy that the integration of three Central Asian states is deepening not only in the economic, but also in the defence area. There is created the Council of Defence Ministers which guides the process of working out concrete proposals on military cooperation.

During the session of the Interstate Council of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, held on December 15, 1995, in Jambyl, the Regulation on the Council of Defence Ministers of these three states was approved. According to it, the Council, as a working body of the Interstate Council, considers all relevant issues of the regional security, defence coordination and cooperation. In the framework of the latter issue, it will coordinate operative and military exercises, air defence, mutual supplies, as well as repair of weaponry and equipment, military research work and other works [4].

In order to ensure the national and regional security, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan should direct and coordinate their efforts in the following directions:

Individual defence - forming and strengthening of national armed forces;

Collective defence - forming a collective security system in the framework of the CIS. Since the Agreement on Collective Security, signed in Tashkent in May 15, 1992, mechanisms of its realization haven't been worked out. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have to proceed with their efforts aimed at the coordination of their defence activities in Central Asia;

Creation of a system of Euro-Central Asian security, coordination of defence policies and cooperation, as well as peace-keeping activities - jointly with member-states of OSCE and NATO;

Creation of an Asian security system, strengthening of cooperation and confidence-building measures - jointly with the Asian states;

Creation of a global security system - jointly with all the UN member-states, primarily with the members of the Security Council.

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan, which didn't join the Concept of Military Security and the Agreement on Collective Security and a number of other CIS documents related to issues of military policy, fixed in its military doctrine that it did not treat any state as an enemy.

In his speech at the Ashgabat International Conference "Neutrality of Turkmenistan and International Relations in Asia" held in September 1995, President of Turkmenistan S. Niazov substantiated the neutrality policy: "Having today over 30% of the world reserves of natural gas, up to 12 billion tons of oil only in the Caspian shelf, a huge territory and just about 5 million population, it is impossible to do without neutrality, it's impossible to join any group of countries for that would lead to the creation of blocks and weaken the neutrality" [5].

Abiding to those principles, Turkmenistan didn't sign the Tashkent Agreement on Collective Security and didn't join the Council of Collective Security.

At the same time, Turkmenistan has stepped into strategic partnership relations with Russia and solves jointly with it many defence issues, including guarding of its borders on a bilateral basis.

The year of 1995 demonstrated a record number of border conflicts in the entire history of the existence of the Turkmenistan's external borders. There were registered 50 armed clashes on the Turkmen-Afghan border, resulting in the extermination of about 20 frontier intruders, seizure of more than 2 tons of drugs and confiscation of more than 50 guns. Turkmen border troops lost four people killed. The growing tension on the border with Afghanistan forces Turkmenistan to strengthen guarding of its frontiers jointly with the operative groups of Russian border troops.

The armed forces of Turkmenistan number about 35 thousand people. There are formed the General Headquarters and Headquarters of Armed Forces and Rear Services of Turkmenistan, as well as the Headquarters of National Air Forces and Air Defence and Land Forces.

The President of Turkmenistan, Chief Commander of the Armed Forces of Turkmenistan Mr. Saparmurat Niazov, while declaring that Turkmenistan will follow the principles of positive neutrality, stresses that his country will achieve these goals with the support of Russia.

It is noteworthy that the Armed Forces of Turkmenistan employ many Russian military officers, and the Defence and National Security Council of Turkmenistan includes the Head of the Operative Sector of the Russian Defence Ministry in the Defence Ministry of Turkmenistan Major-General V.M.Zavarzin, Commander of Border Troops K. Kabulov and his First Deputy V.S. Grishchak.

It is obvious that without Russian support Turkmenistan will not be able to guard its 2300 km-long border with Afghanistan and Iran in the nearest future.

Another feature of the formation of the armed forces of Turkmenistan is that its officers are being trained at military schools not only of Russia, but also those of Turkey. Turkmenistan has agreements on training its officers with the defence departments of Iran and Pakistan as well.

System of Collective Security of the CIS

Radical geopolitical changes which happened in the world after the dissolution of the USSR and the appearance of substantially new threats to the security of the states dictate the necessity of the elaboration of new approaches to the formation and functioning of a collective security system and geography of its members.

Economic, social and political, interethnic, and eventually state and territorial instability in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia undermines the international security. From the military and strategic standpoint, the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty and the single defence space of the USSR has contributed to that.

Nothing emerged to replace it. NATO is the only real and effective military and political alliance left in Europe which is comparable by its military power only with Russia. Eastern European states which escaped the external ring of the Soviet Empire want to enter NATO, though it is not in a rush to accept them due to a number of reasons, one of most important being the desire not to change too radically the geostrategic balance that would push Russia to neoimperial revival.

Attempts to create a new system of collective security within the framework of the CIS so far haven't been successful. The cool attitude of Russia towards the Tashkent Agreement on Collective Security signed in May 15, 1992, its orientation more towards bilateral rather than multilateral cooperation in a military field, negative attitudes of a number of the CIS states to the idea of the creation of the system of collective security or attempts to use it in cases of confrontation between each other (Armenia and Azerbaijan) are considerably hindering the process of reintegration of the defence space of the former Soviet Union.

Another hindrance is the absence of real external threat for the CIS states. More realistic are threats to their security from each other. Lieutenant-General L. Ivashov, Secretary of the Council of Defence Ministers of the CIS, considers that "CIS countries have a right to consider NATO as a factor of military threat". He draws his conclusion on the basis of a possibility of NATO expansion to the east [6].

Does the issue of "NATO threat" really exist? This is a disputable question. If certain circles in Russia consider the "expansion of NATO to the east" as a real external threat to the national security of the Russian Federation, the other states of the post-Soviet space do not think in this way. Anyway, nobody, except the President of Belarus A. Lukashenko, supported the

statement of Defence Minister P. Grachev that in such case the CIS states should set up a military block. And how could one support such proposals taking into account the Russian policy of neoimperial pressure, its desire to dominate on the territory of the former Soviet Union and many other aspects of the real, not declarative Russian policy in the near abroad.

If Russia wants to protect its interests on the international arena using the CIS and the united defence potential, then it is obvious that it should build its relationships with the other CIS members on the basis of equality, rather than domination as it is expressed in the Decree of the President of the RF, dated September 14, 1995, on the approval of the strategic course of the Russian Federation in the CIS.

Protection of External Borders of the CIS

The Agreement on cooperation in the protection of the borders of the CIS countries with the non-CIS states was signed on May 26, 1995. It was signed by Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan. The list of the countries which did not sign it included Azerbaijan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine.

According to this Agreement the parties bear mutual responsibility for the provision of guarding of their sections of the frontier, taking into consideration the security interests of the Parties (Article 3) [7, p. 44].

The Russian Federation also signed bilateral agreements on the protection of the external borders with a number of CIS countries.

At present, the system of the united air defence of the former republics of the Soviet Union is being built up.

Neither Russia, nor Central Asian states are able to equip new state borders among themselves. According to Russian estimates, the equipment of one kilometer of frontier would cost no less than 1 billion Roubles. An acute issue for Russia is whether to continue to guard the Tajik-Afghan 1300 km long border, or to leave Tajikistan and to start the equipment of a new Kazakhstan-Russian border which is 6200 km long. As for the Central Asian states, they cannot afford the equipment of new state borders. Therefore, it is in the interests of Russia and Central Asian states to leave "transparent" borders among themselves and strengthen the guarding of outer borders of the CIS, especially the Tajik-Afghan section.

Peace-keeping Forces in the CIS and Central Asia

A real danger in the foreseeable future is not any external threat, but the possibility of disintegration of the newly independent states as a result of interethnic, intraethnic, regional, tribal and other contradictions caused by social and economic chaos and crisis of power or actions of external forces.

This is confirmed by the events in the former Yugoslavia, Moldova, Transcaucasia and Tajikistan. People and politicians of the Ukraine are facing a threat of the breakdown of the state for ethnic and religious reasons and opposite geopolitical orientations. This threat is realistic for Russia as well, for it is being affected by increasing regionalism caused not only by ethnic reasons, but even by geographic ones.

Despite the fact that the number of "hot points" on the post-Soviet space is growing, so far no one is able to eliminate discrepancy of interests of CIS states regarding the participation and funding of peace-keeping operations.

The first attempt to create peace-keeping forces of the CIS was undertaken at the Kiev summit of the CIS states on March 21, 1992. There was signed the Agreement on Groups of Military Observers and Peace-Keeping Collective Forces in the CIS.

The Nagorny Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia served as the backbone for such decision. Azerbaijan signed it with the note saying "The Agreement comes into force after the ratification by the Parliament of the Republic", and Ukraine added "In every concrete case the decision on the involvement of Ukraine is to be made by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine."

During The Tashkent summit on 15 May 1992, the leaders of the countries signed the Protocol on the Status of Groups of Military Observers and Peace-Keeping Collective Forces, and the Protocol on Recruitment, Structure, Logistics and Funding of Groups of Military Observers and Peace-Keeping Collective Forces in the CIS. These documents were not signed by Belarus, Moldova and Turkmenistan.

As for the Protocol on the Temporary Order of Recruitment and Performance of Groups of Military Observers and Peace-Keeping Collective Forces in the Zones of Conflicts between the States and within the Member-States of the CIS, it was not signed by Azerbaijan, Belarus, Turkmenistan and Ukraine.

On September 24, 1993, in Moscow, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan signed the Agreement of the leaders of the CIS states on Collective Forces and Joint Measures for Material and Technical Supply.

Also there was adopted the Regulation on the United Command of Collective Peace-Keeping Forces, and shares of member-states in the funding of the UC CPKF were approved. Russia covers 50%. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, by 15%, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, by 10%.

It was decided to form CPKF by October 1, 1993, and to provide their arrival to their destinations on the agreed terms. It was decided to form CPKF for the period of six months. Further, on the request of the government of a hosting country, their stay on the territory of the hosting country may be prolonged by the resolution of the leaders of member-states. Major

discussion topics during the meeting of Defence Ministers of the CIS states in Moscow, July 18-19, 1994, were peace-restoration operations in Abkhazia and Tajikistan.

Taking into account the fact that peace-keeping forces and funds from the UN are not available for Abkhazia and Tajikistan, Russia proposed to create a special foundation at the HQ for the coordination of military cooperation of the CIS countries. In this case the peace-keeping activities of the CIS states would be reflected not only in the physical participation, but also in cost-sharing of certain expensive operations.

However, due to economic and financial difficulties, and, probably, because of the fear to be involved in conflicts far away from their own territories, there were proposed other variants of financing peace-keeping operations. So, Kazakhstan proposed that CIS members should participate in such operations according to territorial features, rather than pay shares for every operation on the territory of the entire CIS.

The post-Soviet space will serve as an arena of interethnic and interstate conflicts for a long time. Demand for peace-keeping operations will be rising. Who will be conducting them: only Russia or cooperative peace-keeping forces of the CIS, where the dominance of Russia will be present, or international peace-keeping forces with a mandate from the UN or OSCE? This question is very important in the post-Soviet space.

It became obvious that the UN cannot afford involvement of peace-keeping forces because of the shortage of funds and lack of interest from the side of the majority of Afro-Asian-Latin American members. The attention and funds of the UN are already spread all over the world in 17 peace-keeping operations costing 3.6 million USD a year [1].

The UN has contributed very little to the resolution of the conflicts in Transcaucasia and Tajikistan. It tried instead to give a greater role in the resolution of these problems to the OSCE. The first place to test the OSCE was the conflict in Nagorny Karabakh. There already exists and is being implemented actively the "Consolidated Plan of OSCE, CIS and Russian Federation" on Nagorny Karabakh. The OSCE has sent observers to Tajikistan.

It is noteworthy, that both the West and the conflicting states within the CIS prefer the involvement of Russian troops, if any, only under the international control. Obviously, this reflects the fear of the conduct by Russia of neoimperial policy under the umbrella of peace-keeping operations.

Neither the UN, nor OSCE and NATO want to free Russia's hands in the post-Soviet space, allow peace-keeping operations without an international mandate.

During the meeting of the Interstate Council of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, held in Jambyl on December 15, 1995, the countries signed

the resolution on the formation of joint peace-keeping battalion of three countries under the aegis of the UN and the agreement on the organization and formation of a collective peace-keeping battalion.

Presidents N. Nazarbaev, A. Akaev and I. Karimov appealed to the UN Secretary General Mr. Butros Gali with the request to send a UN mission for consultations with representative of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, as well as for the preparation of required documents in order to join the Agreement on Reserve Forces of the UN.

The Presidents of three Central Asian states decided to form a joint peace-keeping battalion because of their concern with the situation in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Perhaps, it was initiated by the understanding of the inefficiency of collective peace-keeping forces in the framework of the CIS.

Integration in Central Asia as a Factor of Regional Security.

Economic orientations of the Central Asian states do not coincide. Kazakhstan is mostly interested in development of trade and economic relations with Russia and other states situated in the European part of the CIS due to the established close contacts in the framework of a single economy of the USSR. Kyrgyzstan has similar orientations, however, a smaller economy and its smaller dependence on Russia allow it to hope on solving its economic problems in the framework of Central Asian integration and cooperation with China.

Tajikistan war-torn and disliked by Uzbekistan has to gravitate toward Russia, in fact it is Russia's protectorate.

Uzbekistan making pretensions to being the regional leader shows its rather cool if not negative attitude to integration processes in the CIS framework.

Turkmenistan counting on its rich natural gas reserves and geographic remoteness declared a policy of permanent neutrality and doesn't participate in integration processes both in the framework of the CIS and in the region of Central Asia.

Taking into account different orientations of the newly independent Central Asian states, unfortunately, it should be stated that presently the region of Central Asia cannot be characterized as an integrated economically and politically region.

Central Asia, despite the common historic fortunes and interests of the states of the region, is pregnant with potential conflicts. They can emerge both on economic (land and water disputes) and ethnic grounds (bloody clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the town of Osh in summer 1990). There is a disguised rivalry for leadership in the region between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. As Russian researcher V. Y. Belokrenitsky forecasts: "it is conceivable that in prospect an overfall of potentials among the states of the region and (or) aggravation of internal problems will make Uzbekistan look for a way out along the

use-of-force tracks of open or masked expansion. An obvious consequence of such a development will be alienation between it and Kazakhstan.” [8, p. 44].

It is well-known that Central Asia suffers from shortage of water resources. Disputes about the distribution of water resources can instigate interstate conflicts, especially between the “upper-stream” states (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) and “lower-stream” states (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan).

On 23 September 1993, the deepening of cooperation among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was marked with the signing of an Agreement on creation of an economic union. On 10 February 1994, a Single Economic Space was declared. On 8 July 1994, an Interstate Council was created; later appeared its Executive Committee. Then a Central Asian Bank for Development and Cooperation was created. A Program for economic cooperation until 2000 is being worked out.

Due to the efforts of President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbaev, President of Uzbekistan I. Karimov and President of Kyrgyzstan A. Akaev, there were created a foundation for the union of Central Asian states and specific mechanisms (Interstate Council of the three Central Asian states and its Executive Committee) allowing for the creation of a single economic space in the region. This union is open to all the other states of the CIS.

Integration processes in Central Asia go far beyond just economy. New aspects appear - political, legal, humanitarian, and those of information and regional security.

It's noteworthy that the integration of three Central Asian states is deepening both in the spheres of economy and defence. A Council of Ministers of Defence has been created which is supervising the development of specific proposals for military cooperation.

At the session of the Interstate Council of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan which took place on 14 December 1995 in Zhambyl the Regulations on the Council of Ministers of Defence of these three states were confirmed. In accordance with them, the Council of Ministers of Defence, as a working organ of the Interstate Council, considers all issues in the sphere of regional security, defence interaction and military cooperation. In the framework of the latter it will coordinate the operative and military training, air defence, mutual supplies, and repair of weapons and

equipment, research in the military sphere, etc.

At the same session, a decision on formation of a joint peace-keeping battalion of three states under the aegis of the UN and Agreements among these Republics on organization and formation of a collective peace-keeping battalion were signed.

At the later summits, it was decided to prepare and conduct trainings of the Central Asian battalion under the aegis of the UN with the participation of multi-national forces on the territory of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and the Regulations on the Central Asian peace-keeping battalion under the aegis of the UN were signed.

At the Bishkek session of the Council of Ministers of Defence which took place on 10 January 1997 an Agreement on creation of a Committee of the Headquarters Heads was reached. Its main tasks are planning and coordination of military activities, training, conduct of joint trainings. Special attention will be paid to preparation and conduct of the coming summer military training of the Central Asian peace-keeping battalion with the participation of the US.

The activities of the Committee as well as those of the Council of Ministers of Defence will be conducted in strict accordance with the aims and objectives of the Agreement on collective security of the CIS states.

The readiness and political will of three Central Asian states to deepen the process of integration were manifested by the signing on 10 January 1997 in Bishkek of an Agreement on friendship by the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The Central Asian states have a lot in common from the historic, cultural, linguistic and religious points of view. Of course, the integration of the states of Central Asia is hindered by the similarity of their economies - all of them are mostly raw material economies. To reach close cooperation among the raw material economies isn't easy. However, this process is underway; new projects appear which despite their modest scale help to solve problems of the regional development and complete each other.

The geopolitical situation that emerged by now around Central Asia is such that integration processes in Central Asia have a deeper and more dynamic character than similar processes in the CIS. At the same time, bilateral and multilateral relations within the framework of the CIS and OEC are developing.

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NAZARBAYEV'S VICTORY IS INEVITABLE

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Abstract. The article presents an analysis of the political situation ahead of the 2005 presidential elections in Kazakhstan. Assessing the preferences of the Kazakh electorate, the author lists the reasons for the superiority of the incumbent president over his opponents, highlighting the problems of the Kazakhstan opposition. At the same time, the political opposition plays an important role in the state on the road to democratization.

Key words: Elections 2005, Kazakhstan's elections, opposition in Kazakhstan, N. Nazarbayev, opposition

НАЗАРБАЕВТЫҢ ЖЕҢІСІ ДАУСЫЗ

Лев Тараков

Аңдатпа. Мақалада Қазақстандағы 2005 жылғы президенттік сайлау алдындағы саяси жағдайдың талдауы берілген. Қазақ электоратының артықшылықтарын бағалай отырып, автор қазіргі президенттің оппоненттерінен артықшылығының себептерін тізе отырып, Қазақстанның оппозициясының проблемаларын атап өтті. Сонымен қатар, саяси оппозиция демократияландыру жолында мемлекетте маңызды рөл атқарады.

Түйін сөздер: 2005 жылғы сайлау, Қазақстандағы сайлау, Қазақстандағы оппозиция, Н. Назарбаев, оппозиция.

ПОБЕДА НАЗАРБАЕВА НЕИЗБЕЖНА

Лев Тараков

Аннотация. В статье представлен анализ политической ситуации в преддверии президентских выборов 2005 года в Казахстане. Оценив предпочтения казахстанского электората, автор перечисляет причины превосходства действующего президента над его оппонентами, выделяя проблемы оппозиции Казахстана. В то же время политическая оппозиция играет важную роль в государстве на пути к демократизации.

Ключевые слова: Выборы 2005, выборы Казахстана, оппозиция в Казахстане, Н. Назарбаев, оппозиция.

During the elections, Kazakhstan will not repeat the Kyrgyz scenario

This may seem paradoxical, but almost everyone has said that the opposing parties have spoken about the official start of the election campaign in Kazakhstan, where presidential elections will take place on December 41, which will be determined by the owner of the newly built luxurious residence, Ak

Orda. The outcome of the campaign is predetermined, and no one doubts the victory of incumbent President Nursultan Nazarbayev – even his opponents. In the headquarters of candidates, more and more talk about the struggle for the second place, the owner of which is supposed to automatically become a factor, the presence of which N. Nazarbayev will somehow have to reckon with.

Nazarbayev will win, even if supernatural forces take over.

Only two nominees announced their intention to challenge the incumbent president at the elections. These are women who, for the first time in Kazakhstan's history, intend to run for the highest state office: the "clairvoyant" from Almaty and the unemployed from Aktyubinsk, the author of the draft Constitution in verse. However, they failed to pass the required examination for knowledge of the state language. In the Kazakh legislation there is no norm on the examination of candidates for mental health; but even if such extraordinary ladies were at odds with the Kazakh language, they could hardly have collected the number of signatures required for registration.

Excitements within the country are also excluded. For this, there are no economic prerequisites in the country, and the example of neighboring Kyrgyzstan has become a moral justification for repelling revolutionary attempts on the part of the state and that part of the population which values property acquired in recent years which is generally small, but privately owned.

Subject of choice and personal preferences of the electorate

In the commentary of the analysts concerning the phenomenon of the Kazakhstani voter, who will again give its preference to Nursultan Nazarbayev, there is often a formula

In this article, the author analyzes the pre-election situation on the eve of the presidential elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan, which took place on December 4, 2005 "being determines consciousness", which is extremely relevant in Kazakh society. For the people living in an open information society and knowledgeable about the state of affairs in the world and the region, the absence of upheavals and the "iron" routine during the past transitional period, even if the democratic processes did not go as some wanted it, is the best recommendation.

Especially now, when most of them have acquired property and have seen real prospects. Nazarbayev's predictability, his ability to manage the situation for Kazakhstanis, is more valuable than participation in experiments to improve what is good for half, and for a quarter - not bad or, at worst, tolerable. At the same time, the remaining part of the population (mainly state employees), being educated people, perfectly understand that no new power under the current economic conditions will solve their problems overnight.

In addition, people are encouraged by the proposals of Nazarbayev to correct the situation in the social sphere. To solve the problems of teachers, doctors, students, disabled people, single mothers and pensioners, a record amount of money has

been allocated from the budget - about 800 million dollars. And this is with the 15 million population of Kazakhstan. Almost immediately the incomes of the low-income part of the population increased by 30%. Nazarbayev promised a new increase - next year.

Of course, Nazarbayev outperforms his main opponents with his ability to communicate with people. He has the ability to take over the audience - whether it's a factory workshop, an audience of a major forum or viewers.

In general, there was no social group left in the society, whose representatives would not have heard the answer to the questions of interest to it. During the year Nazarbayev traveled to all regions of the country; and participants in formal and informal meetings with the President were representatives of all social strata - from children to the elderly, from teachers to large entrepreneurs. The effect of the permanent presence of power on the ground today is provided by the prime minister, who, following the President, travels around the regions and where necessary "exercises leadership on the spot."

As for the opposition, the propaganda stereotype of the early 1990s, "the people have mercy on weak and offended people" is not effective in Kazakhstan.

Firstly, because times have changed, people have somehow penetrated into the psychology of the free market, where the strongest wins. It is more sympathetic. It is not by chance that Nazarbayev's foreign policy moves, his meetings with representatives of the world's political elite, are the source of great pride among ordinary people. Kazakhstan and its leaders have never before had such weight in the international arena.

Secondly, former high-ranking officials, who at one time did a lot of work in the context of the criticized regime, are weakly associated with the outcast. It is noteworthy that the main part of the propaganda campaign of Nazarbayev's opponents take place around the presently convicted former governor of Pavlodar region, Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, one of the founders of the opposition movement "Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan". (By the way, Zhakiyanov was once over-exuberantly treated with power). Officially, the grounds for the verdict of the court in the Zhakiyanov case revealed financial irregularities. There are other views on the causes of criminal prosecution. However, in any case, analogies with the Bolsheviks, Narodnaya Volya or repressed members of the Kazakh democratic party "Alash" in this case are not valid. In addition, another co-founder of the DCK - Mukhtar Ablyazov, who has been pardoned - lives well and is engaged in big business dealings. It is obvious that, after the release of Zhakiyanov, and apparently, in the near future this will happen, the opposition will have to create artificial motives in order to act "offended".

The following circumstance is also important. It is difficult for current opposition members to act as people's tribunes. In the ranks of Nazarbayev's opponents there are former members of the government; but there is also a big businessman whose fortune in the hungry 90s could not have arisen without high patronage.

The presidential candidate from the association called "For a Just Kazakhstan" (so, in its present form, he is "not fair") - Zharmakhan Tuyakbai headed the Majilis of the Parliament and was the deputy chairman of the Otan party. The start of his oppositional career was promoted by the news that in the new parliament, the first chair will have to give way. Immediately followed by a loud statement about the "unjust" parliamentary elections. Even earlier in the "unjust" Kazakhstan Tuyakbai was the Procurator General.

There is among the opposition and representatives of Nazarbayev's headquarters in the 1999 elections representatives of another candidate for the presidency - Alikhan Baimenov.

Most of the comrades in misfortune are unreasonably ambitious, moreover: in different years they were at enmity with each other. In many ways, excessive claims have caused splits of the main opposition parties of Kazakhstan - the Communist, the "Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan" and "Ak Zhol".

It is noteworthy that among oppositionists it is difficult to find a policy capable of speaking to the audience or directly communicating with the population. Measured against Nazarbayev, they are clearly far away. The role of the main public speaker is taken on by businessman Bulat Abilov. He is ready to answer any question. However this answer will be the same.

In this situation, the opponents of the incumbent president will not even be able to concentrate the voices of the protest electorate, which is a minority. And in addition to Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, Alikhan Baimenov, who split from Ak Zhol together with his brand, is fighting for him, as well as the neocommunist and the Zhirinovskiy of Kazakhstan, in one person, MP Yerasyl Abylkasymov. Candidates nominated for the popularization of their forgotten names should not be taken into account.

Chief Democrat Nazarbayev

The publication is expected of an official document summarizing the numerous initiatives of the incumbent president, voiced at different times. It is no coincidence that Nazarbaev's "election program" is often called his speeches in various audiences. This time, the president's real electoral program was developed over two years in the form of sectoral and bloc developments. They were made public and

implemented without waiting for the official moment when the president announced his intention to run for the next term. Therefore, the real, acting program of Nazarbayev's candidate is not a set of promises designed for specific elections.

It is difficult to challenge the objective achievements of the country - starting with an annual economic growth of 8-9%. Nazarbayev does not intend to stop at what has been achieved and set the task for the economy of the state with the characteristic scope: for the next 7 years, Kazakhstan must become one of the 50 developed countries of the world that support the modern standards of life of their citizens. By 2012, per capita GDP in the republic should be increased from the current 3-4 thousand dollars to 8-9 thousand dollars, or 2.5 times, and the incomes of the population are doubled. Social benefits to the population and scholarships to students by this date should be increased by 2.5 times. By 2012, according to Nazarbayev, the pension savings of citizens will be increased by almost 1 trillion tenge, which, in his opinion, will increase the average monthly pension by 1.5-2 times. In the next seven years, special attention will be paid to the growth of salaries of federal officers.

Over the next seven years, Nazarbayev intends to devote himself to achieving full diversification of the economy, overcoming its dependence on the export of hydrocarbons and metals, although by 2012 more than 100 million tons of oil will have been extracted in the country, which is twice as much as now. Knowledge-based and high-tech industries will become a priority for the country's economy. At the same time, for seven years the funding of research and development activities should increase by not less than 25 times. Small and medium businesses as the foundation of the economy of Kazakhstan will form 40% of the country's GDP.

On September 1, opening the next session of the parliament, Nursultan Nazarbayev made several notable statements.

First of all, he promised to do the best to ensure that the presidential election "will be absolutely free, fair, transparent, and results will not cause a shred of doubt neither among Kazakhstanis or the international community". Many considered this a reaction to the wish contained in the personal message of US President George W. Bush, who made it clear that Kazakhstan is becoming the main regional preference for Washington. However, it is clear that transparent elections do not threaten Nazarbayev. On the contrary, in the present conditions, when his rating is very high, and the opposition has shown complete inconsistency, the elections are simply necessary for Nazarbayev.

Secondly, Nazarbayev reaffirmed Kazakhstan's commitment to a policy of openness and transparency

in relations with foreign companies working in the field of subsoil use. Nazarbayev was allowed to play on the opposition's field by the fact that Kazakhstan's business has accumulated enough power to compete for the development of new deposits. A law was passed that gives the state, in fact, control functions in transactions of purchase and sale of assets to private foreign companies developing Kazakh minerals.

Thirdly, Nazarbayev announced his intention to create and lead the state commission for the development and concretization of the six-year program of democratic reforms. Work with it, he invited representatives of all political parties, social movements and non-governmental organizations.

Fourthly, Nazarbayev confirmed the intention to carry out exactly those reforms, the need for which the opposition points out. This is the development of local self-government; and continuation of the process of delineation of powers between central and local executive bodies, which in the long run will create the possibility of transition to the election of akims (governors). In addition, the rights and control functions of the parliament will be strengthened, its role in the formation of the government will increase; and it is obvious that the number of deputies of both chambers will increase.

Fifthly, Nazarbayev put the early ratification of international human rights instruments as a priority task of the parliament and stated about further expansion of cooperation with the OSCE, including taking into account plans for him to become chairman of this organization in 2009. He called this task "systemic, meeting both the domestic political and foreign policy goals of the country". Nazarbayev instructed his administration "to develop a comprehensive program for the preparation of Kazakhstan's chairmanship in the OSCE, which would impose on the government, relevant ministries and departments relevant obligations to implement it".

At this point, you should stop. Until recent the OSCE was the main international organization criticizing Kazakhstan and its leadership. The unexpected move with the idea of chairmanship of the OSCE was first received with disbelief. Nazarbayev's proposal has begun to be treated seriously only today. Numerous international counterparts positively assess the chances of Kazakhstan, especially taking into account the directions of political modernization promulgated by the president.

However, one must know Nazarbayev before doubting his ability to achieve seemingly unrealistic goals. There are many examples of this. To take at least the "Kazakhstan-2030" Strategy - in the difficult 1997, when only ways out of the system crisis were outlined, the Kazakh president planned the stages of

the state development until 2030. Then the skeptics were outnumbered the optimists. But now it turns out that the Kazakhstani economy outstrips the "covenants" of this strategy on certain positions, in particular, questions about the terms of doubling and tripling the GDP.

The transfer of the capital to Astana was called an *idée fixe*. But now no-one wants to return to the provincial Tselinograd.

Nursultan Nazarbayev, who in 1994 proposed a plan for creating the Eurasian Union of States, seemed to be too ambitious. Today, he can present concrete results to the skeptics - the EurAsEC and CACO, also, built according to his model. Therefore, Kazakhstan's chairmanship of the OSCE, strange as it may sound today, is not such a fantasy. Nazarbayev proposed at the first stage to hold a special international seminar under the auspices of a fiercely critical organization. In it, Nazarbayev suggests studying "the unique experience accumulated by Kazakhstan in strengthening peace and stability, inter-confessional accord in a society that has European features and Asian traditions". This experience, the Kazakh president believes, will help the OSCE "substantially enrich its understanding of the diversity of the modern world and various ways of building an open, democratic society".

The split of "united opposition"

The existing unique opportunity for consolidation of the opposition was almost lost. Splits and disassociations inside the opposition camp are explained by the oppositionists themselves, of course, the insidiousness of the writers from power. But, making such statements, the opposition signs in insolvency. In any country, the grouping in power is interested in keeping the power, and, of course, political technologists use for this purpose any permitted means, including the game "on someone else's field". The opposition, having a sufficient number of its own political strategists, once worked for the government, and even during the electoral campaigns, lost all the parties, which in principle were calculated to the smallest detail.

In the parliamentary elections, the liberal-democratic Ak Zhol considered it shameful to unite with potential allies. And the pre-election unification of the Communists and the liberal bourgeoisie duly presented by DCK looked more than ridiculous. It is clear that the opposition found itself without parliamentary seats on its own fault.

No less unique was the opposition in the period between the elections, when it became known that the presidential campaign will be held this year. The fate of the sole Ak Zhol party belonging to the parliamentary seat was decided in such a way that in the end they lost their open political platform and

quarreled until the party split. The squabble between the co-chairmen was conducted in the style of "the fool himself". And it was not in the quiet of the offices. "Open letters" to each other regularly poured into all the media. And it is understandable that as a result, the desired protest electorate parted among the disputants, and partly simply turned away from the previously attractive party.

Today the former co-chairman of the party, Alikhan Baimenov, dealing with organizational issues and local organizations, acts as an independent candidate; and the remaining supporters of the liberal idea are campaigning for Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, a candidate for the movement "For a Just Kazakhstan". In this camp, besides them, are gathered interesting politicians. From communist-internationalists, supporters of reprivatization, to well-known national radicals who see the solution of all problems in bringing routine to the ethnic principle.

Hence, a rather inconsistent set of slogans for the election campaign. There was an attempt to unite them in the draft of the new Constitution. Although the authors of the project understand perfectly well that it is impossible to combine in practice the wishes of the bearers of opposing ideas. On the other hand, who is interested in reading such a complex document as the Constitution, although in the draft? It's certainly not the representatives of the social environment, called the "protest electorate".

The opposition is promoting the thesis of illegal privatization. A Public Commission was established to study the process of forming a class of private owners of Kazakhstan. But here the ill luck. Active privatization in Kazakhstan was overseen by former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, who is now in emigration. Only him could act as the spiritual father of anti-Nazarbayev forces. Only these forces actively exploit the topic, directly related to the activities of the former prime minister, who, having the salary of a federal officer, for several years built up a capital capable of providing comfortable "political emigration" in the "advanced countries of the West".

The question arises: where was the single candidate for presidency, Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, who headed the Public Commission in those years? In investigative bodies and structures of the prosecutor's supervision, and not on the last roles.

Against this backdrop, Nazarbayev's social program seems to be winning, according to which budget money is distributed not per capita, but

targeted. And it is going to improve the living conditions of vulnerable groups of the population.

The proposal of the opposition to immediately move to a general election of akims - the governors of the country's regions - crumbles due to the need to first delimit the republican and local budgets, which, in fact, the government is now engaged in.

Special sympathy among the population was not caused by spontaneous rallies of "self-invaders" of the land, with which the opposition is actively working. Law-abiding citizens see in them representatives of the marginalized part of the nation, whose speeches do not promise anything good.

It is characteristic that the West did not help the Kazakh opposition. Condoleezza Rice reaffirmed Washington's readiness to strengthen its strategic partnership with Kazakhstan "as the universally recognized leader of the Central Asian region" and declared the United States' unconditional support for "the program of full-scale socio-political reforms announced by President Nursultan Nazarbayev, which is the best development model for other states of Central-Asian region". To the tirade of one of the active oppositionists regarding the numerous shortcomings of the Nazarbayev regime, she replied: "If the opposition politicians in the country have the opportunity to speak in the same room with the president and criticize him, then democracy exists."

Nazarbayev's opponents still have one tried and true method - the creation of conflict situations. But this is also a sign of weakness. Here the policy is not for the sympathy of the population, but rather for the attention of international observers, who this time in Kazakhstan will have a record number. Specificity of the moment is that any unauthorized rally can legally be designated as a meeting with voters. Probably, it is in this connection that personnel replacements were conducted in the power bloc of the country. It is possible that the authorities will have to "patronize" and behind the scenes guard the opposition activists from possible excesses in the pre-election period. After all, despite the inconsistency, the opposition in its current form is needed, at least for the reason that its availability is an indispensable attribute of the state, which intends to build a political system "in accordance with generally accepted democratic standards".

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WOMEN AND RELIGION IN POST-SOVIET KAZAKHSTAN – A VIEW FROM WITHIN*

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Abstract. The impact of the post-Soviet religious revival on women's status in society is transforming previously established patterns. The Soviet legacy of forced secularization, changing perceptions of Islam (from culture to religious doctrine), the phenomenon of 'pious Muslims', identity formation, and the difference from the mainstream 'Islamic world', all need to be taken into consideration when examining the influence of re-Islamisation on women. Kazakhstan demonstrates this case most strikingly, since it was affected more than any other Central Asian country by Soviet modernization which essentially was anti-religious. Nowadays, local Islam with its more relaxed and conformist attitude towards women is losing its position to 'global' Islam with its stricter and codified rules. However, this new trend coexists with mainstream secular gender roles in Kazakh society.

Key words: *Islam, woman, identity, Kazakhstan*

ПОСТКЕЦЕСТІК ҚАЗАҚСТАНДАҒЫ ӘЙЕЛДЕР ЖӘНЕ ДІН – БЕЙТАРАП КӨЗҚАРАС

Алма Сұлтанғалиева

Андатпа. Посткеңестік діни жаңару қоғамдағы әйелдердің мәртебесіне әсері бұрыннан қалыптасқан үлгілерді өзгертті. Дінді мемлекеттен мәжбүрлеп бөлу кеңестік заңы, исламды өзгеше қабылдау (мәдениеттен діни доктринаға), «діни мұсылмандардың» феномені, тұлғаның қалыптасуы және негізгі «ислам әлемі» бағытынан айырмашылығы қайта исламдастырудың әйелдерге әсерін зерделеу кезінде ескерілуі керек. Қазақстан бұл жағдайды айрықша түрде көрсетіп отыр, себебі бұл Орталық Азиядағы кез келген басқа елге қарағанда негізінде дінге қарсы болған кеңестік модернизациялаудың әсеріне әлдеқайда көп ілікті. Қазіргі уақытта жергілікті ислам өзінің әйелдерге қатысты әлдеқайда еркінрек және үйлесімді қарым-қатынасы ұстанымен «қатаң және кодталған» ережелері бар «жаһандық» исламмен қатынаста жоғалту үстінде. Дегенмен, бұл жаңа үрдіс қазақ қоғамында негізгі зайырлы гендерлік рөлдермен бірге өмір сүріп отыр.

Түйін сөздер: *ислам, әйел, тұлға, Қазақстан*

ЖЕНЩИНЫ И РЕЛИГИЯ В ПОСТСОВЕТСКОМ КАЗАХСТАНЕ – ВЗГЛЯД СО СТОРОНЫ

Алма Сұлтанғалиева

Аннотация. Влияние постсоветского религиозного возрождения на положение женщин в обществе трансформирует ранее сложившиеся закономерности. Советское наследие вынужденной секуляризации, изменение восприятия ислама

(от культуры к религиозной доктрине), феномен «благочестивых мусульман», формирование личности и отличие от основного направления «Исламский мир», все должно быть принято во внимание при изучении влияния ре-исламизации на женщин. Казахстан демонстрирует этот случай наиболее поразительно, поскольку он был затронут советской модерни-зацией больше, чем любая другая центральноазиатская страна, которая по сути была антирелигиозной. В настоящее время местный ислам с его более расслабленным и конформистским отношением к женщинам теряет свою позицию в отношении «глобального» ислама с его более строгими и кодифицированными правилами. Однако эта новая тенденция сосуществует с основными светскими гендерными ролями в казахском обществе.

Ключевые слова: *Ислам, женщина, личность, Казахстан*

Introduction

During the last twenty years, the issue of a revival of religion is routinely raised in discussions about the political and socio-cultural development of modern Central Asia, including Kazakhstan. It is noteworthy that in the last national census of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 2009, a question on religious affiliation was included. According to the census results, the vast majority of people in Kazakhstan (97 %) identify themselves with a particular religion, including Islam (70.1 %), Christianity (26.1 %), Judaism (0.03 %), Buddhism (0.09 %), and other religions (0.19 %). As non-believers identified themselves 2.8 % , and 0.5 % refused to give any affiliation (Itogi 2010). These figures, in my opinion, reflect not so much the degree of 'religiosity' of the population as much as 'ethno-religious identity'. The interweaving of religious and ethno-cultural identity is a phenomenon common to many post-socialist societies: "Their public space and social context which affects the religious experience is, in many ways, ethno-national" (Hann 2010, 15).

In the Kazakhstani society, the largest religious denominations, Islam and Orthodox Christianity, are mainly represented by the two largest ethnic groups, the Kazakhs and the Russians². In this case, ethno-religious identity does not necessarily reflect the extent and depth of religiosity. For example, Kazakhs do not refrain from considering themselves Muslims, even if they do not commonly follow basic Islamic rituals such as daily prayer and restrictions or abstinence of alcohol.

Stressing the importance of the gender dimension of religiosity, Janet Jacobs, the sociologist of religion points out that "the inclusion of gender as a category of analysis is a challenge to the established, generic, masculine bias, recognizing women as legitimate objects of study, and the gender dimension as important, in the light of which the meaning and symbolic system of religious culture is then interpreted" (Jacobs, 1998: 206). In this regard, the study of the relationship between women and religion in Kazakhstan did not get much attention yet³.

The purpose of this article is to show how the post-Soviet religious revival affects the status of women in Kazakh society, and what changes it brought into their lives. Because Islam is the religion of the majority of

the population, and the Kazakhs constitute the largest ethnic group (64.5 %) in its multi-cultural composition, the focus of the article is on Kazakh Muslim women who statistically determine the main trends of women's religiosity in Kazakhstan.

The paper examines how religion changes the social and cultural roles of women. In particular, a phenomenon of religious piety has emerged which became one of the ways of expressing religious identity. Thus, new interpretations of what is meant to be a Muslim appear, which are based on the scriptural Islam, not on local religious / cultural traditions. This new trend co-exists with mainstream secular traditions which have a strong impact on the perception of gender roles.

The research is based on statistical data, ethnographical materials on Central Asian religious traditions, and a range of sociological surveys, conducted by local and Western researchers. In addition, the author's in-depth interviews with female members of one of the Islamic movements provide unique source material for this study. Their social and economic status, age, education, etc., will be informative in defining the female participants of religious communities in Kazakhstan. Besides, the article reflects upon the author's personal life experience in Kazakhstan, as Kazakh by ethnicity and Muslim by religious affiliation.

The investigation of contemporary manifestations of the impact of religion on Kazakhstani women allows us to put forward the following theses:

- A new meaning of religiosity which is more than just a customary, self-described identity based on ethnic tradition is emerging in Kazakhstan (as well as to various degree in other Central Asian societies). For example, this phenomenon is well illustrated for Kyrgyzstan (McBrien 2010). New Islamic piety assumes a gender hierarchy and a return to the 'traditional' division of labour in which a woman is ascribed a subordinate role. This approach is seen as a reversal of the 'traditional' Soviet-inspired notion of gender equality.

- At the same time, the rehabilitation of religion has carved out new niches for women to express themselves in the religious space and to feel empowered. Therefore, emerging Islamic education has created a special need

² Ethnic minorities such as Uzbeks, Uighurs, Tatars also affiliate themselves with Islam. Slavic minorities (Ukrainians, Belarussians) traditionally identify themselves with Orthodox Christianity.

³ The study of female religiosity in modern Uzbekistan, by contrast, received much more attention. See Kamp (2006), Louw (2007), Kandiyoti / Azimova (2004).

* Book "Gender in Modern Central Asia" – ed. by Thomas Kruessmann, Lit Verlag, 2015, P.139-161. (182 P.)

for female teachers of religion and Arabic language for “women only” classes. Additionally, religious women create autonomous spaces for themselves to socialize with each other.

Nevertheless, the current impact of religion on the majority of Kazakhstani women has been limited as a whole. Social changes during the Soviet era contributed to the fact that in contemporary mainstream society, gender roles are based on secular rather than on religious values.

1. The Religiosity of Kazakhstani Society and the Status of Women

Certainly, the influence of religion on women in Kazakhstan should be considered in the context of their role in society at large. In comparing Kazakhstan to the neighboring former Soviet states of Central Asia it is useful to accentuate existing internal characteristics. A comparison with the countries of the Middle East and Southeast Asia where Islamic tradition, knowledge, and practice were not interrupted, will highlight further the position of Kazakhstan in the global ‘Islamic world’.

The main sources of information in this chapter are the sociological surveys of religiosity conducted in the Central Asian region, including both those conducted by local and by international experts during the past five years (Bell 2013; Religioznaya situatsiya 2013; Ro'i / Wainer 2009). These studies indicate a relatively low level of religiosity in Kazakhstan and an overwhelmingly secular orientation. In the hierarchy of identities of society in general, the first place is taken by ‘citizenship’ at 48.2 %, followed by ‘ethnic identity’ at 34.6 %. ‘Religious affiliation’ by contrast, is only third place at 10.6 %. Overall, the majority of the population of Kazakhstan (71.3 %) wants to see the country as a secular state, and only 3.3 % want a state which is fully religious (Religioznaya situatsiya 2013). The assessment of Kazakhstani society as predominantly secular was confirmed by sociological research conducted by the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life (Bell 2013).

More specifically, the imposition of Sharia, the Islamic body of law, as the official law of the state is supported by 10 % of Kazakhstani Muslims, several times less than in countries such as Malaysia (86 %) and Egypt (74 %) ⁴. The Muslims of Kazakhstan are the most tolerant in the list of those surveyed: they hold the lowest percentage of those who support the death penalty for renouncing Islam at 4 %, while in Egypt such support is shared by 86 % of Muslims. The percentage of Kazakhstani Muslims who would agree with the possibility of their son or daughter marrying to a Christian is twice as high in comparison to Uzbekistan Muslims (Bell 2013).

Kazakhstani Muslims also exhibit the greatest degree of respect for the rights of women. In comparison with other countries, Kazakhstan has the lowest percentage of those who would support the subordination of the wife to her husband (51 %), while in other countries we see Iraq at 92 %, Tajikistan at 89 %, and Uzbekistan at 84 %. Also, the majority (84 %) of Kazakhstani Muslims would not approve of killing a woman for having sex before marriage, while in Uzbekistan the rate is at 50 % and in Kyrgyzstan at 65.5 %. Other indicators also demonstrate that Kazakhstan has the highest degree of women’s freedoms. Most Kazakhstani population support the free choice of a woman on whether to veil her face (78 %). They also endorse the right of the wife to initiate divorce (80 %), while in other countries we see Uzbekistan at 59 % and Tajikistan at 30 % (Bell 2013).

It is concluded that Muslims supporting the establishment of sharia as the official law of the state are less likely to recognize the equality of women. They are more inclined to support traditional Muslim gender roles. In Kazakhstan, according to many indicators, Islam has the least impact on the society as compared to other countries with Muslim population (Bell 2013). And in this regard, Kazakhstani society demonstrates the highest level of secularization and emancipation of women in Central Asia and in the ‘Islamic world’ as a whole.

It is noteworthy that, according to yet another indicator of religiosity, the adherence to normative Islamic rituals, Kazakhstani Muslims are most likely the religious minimalists. Among the peoples of Central Asia, the five daily prayers are conducted by only 7.2 % of Kazakhs, 8.3 % of Kyrgyz, 32% of Uzbeks, and 41.3% of Tajiks (Ro'i / Wainer 2009, 307).

It can be argued that the weak impact of religion on the social status of Kazakhstani women is linked to the higher degree of secularization of the Kazakhstani society in general. Of course, the fact that officially family relations are governed by civil law, in itself makes a big difference. This is yet another legacy of the Soviet policy of the emancipation of women. In addition, there is the influence of the cultural and historical heritage. Traditionally, in Kazakh society family matters were regulated by both Sharia, and a set of pre-Islamic rules - the adat. Marriage was sanctified by a mullah, and polygamy was permitted according to Islamic norms. On the other hand, according to customary law, marriage between close relatives was prohibited up until the seventh generation ⁵. Adat also imposes limitations on women’s status by the custom of levirate when the widow must re-marry in her husband’s family, for example, his brother.

By way of comparison, in many contemporary Arab countries, discrimination against women is instilled into family law which in many ways is based on the

traditional interpretation of Islamic norms. So, a woman must “obtain permission from her father, husband, or other relative male guardian not only to marry but also to seek employment, start a business, travel, or open a bank account” (Moghadam / Roudi-Fahimi 2005, 2). Adherence to the Islamic norms, which were relevant in the past, in the modern period symbolizes the economic dependence of women on men and their economic and legal inequality. The influence of religion on the status of Arab women is so deep that attempts to overcome discrimination against women should take into account Islamic tradition, the sensitivity to which is very high in the Arab society, and in the Middle East in general.

Thus, a look at the level of religiosity in modern Kazakh society, including a comparison with other countries which have a Muslim majority, can lead us to conclude the following: The influence of religion on society and, in particular, on women is seen as limited and marginal. This phenomenon is a consequence of several factors, and the pre-Soviet nomadic cultural and historical heritage is one of them / (although its religious effect is manifested mainly as a cultural trait). The Soviet legacy of radical secularization, as well as the current course of the government to keep religion out of family law, have been the most important factors in this regard. Modern society in Kazakhstan as a whole is set up to ensure that gender roles are based on secular rather than on religious traditions.

2. What Influence does Contemporary Religiosity Have?

Understanding the peculiarities of the influence of religion on women in modern Kazakhstan is possible only within the general context, namely the place and the role of religion in society. It is clear that religiosity in society has increased during the last two post-Soviet decades when freedom of religion and religious choice were first experienced. During this period several factors affected its forms and content, including the legacy of Soviet modernization, the intertwining of ethnic and religious identity, the effects of socio-economic transition, government regulation of the religious sphere, and the formation of the religious marketplace of ideas.

The impact of the Soviet legacy is especially important for understanding the current stage of the development of religion in Kazakhstan. Needless to say, the neighboring countries of Central Asia have also been through an experience of radical secularism and Soviet modernization. But due to specific historical circumstances Soviet influence on Kazakhstani society was the most profound and long-lasting. By

the late Soviet stage Kazakhstan had become the most urbanised country in Central Asia because in the course of forced sedentarisation and collectivisation, the traditional Kazakh nomadic way of life was destroyed ⁶. This caused dramatic ethno-demographic changes in the middle of the last century: the number of Kazakhs, the titular group, sharply declined. At the same time, a massive labour influx of Russians from European parts of the Soviet Union to Kazakhstan occurred. As a result, their numbers and their share in Kazakhstan’s population significantly increased ⁷. Thus, the demographic and cultural landscape of the territory dramatically changed from the pre-Soviet predominantly Turk-Muslim representation to a Euro-Asian and Orthodox-Muslim duality. The impact of the Russian-speaking environment on Kazakhs, especially in the cities, has been the most profound when compared to neighboring Central Asian nations.

Soviet modernization with its social and cultural achievements (universal free education and health care, upward social mobility, rising life-expectancy comparable to West European levels, emancipation of women) drastically undermined the regulatory role of religion. Religious knowledge and the continuity of its transmission first of all within the family were destroyed together with the Muslim clergy who disappeared as a group ⁸. Islam was expelled from the public sphere, especially education, and lost its regulatory social function, but survived in people’s daily lives, especially in life-cycle rituals, such as circumcision, the veneration of ‘holy places’, and Muslim funeral passage.

Secular and rationalist discourse about universal humanity took the place of maxims on religious moral and ethical values. Religion was relegated to the role of ‘a relic of the past’ and an attribute of a backward society. The very meaning of ‘Islamic’ radically changed, along with the understanding of what it means to be a Muslim. The Soviet concept of ‘nationality’, according to which the national republics were established, also standardized a national language, a ‘fabricated’ national culture, and also influenced religion. The latter became just another national tradition and a marker of ethno-cultural identity.

Now, ‘being ‘Muslim’ came to mean belonging to a certain ethnic and cultural community, not to umma (the global Muslim community). No ‘Islamic countries’ outside the Soviet borders had such an experience. In isolation from the rest of the world, the Soviet Union cultivated a special ‘Soviet way of life’. Soviet Muslims saw themselves as representatives of their nationality and as the citizens of their country. Religious affiliation was not a criterion for being in a community. Therefore,

⁶ By 1989, the percentage of urban population in Kazakhstan was 57,2 % while in the remaining four Central Asia’s republics the median was lower - 40,8 % (Naselenie SSSR 1990, 16-19).

⁷ The percentage of Kazakhs declined from 87,7 % in 1897 to 39,7 % in 1989 while the proportion of Russians increased from 19,6 % to 42,6 % (Kazakhi 1995, 7).

⁸ Indeed, the impact of Soviet secularisation on Central Asia had steered them away from other parts of Muslim world. Aadeb Khalid (2007) even goes so far as to say that ‘de-islamization’ of the Central Asian societies occurred.

⁴ The survey’s authors stress that the views of Central Asian Muslims are close to Southern and Eastern European Muslims of role of Islam in society.

⁵ Meanwhile, in Arab society tradition of close kin marriage, such as cousin marriage, is widespread, as well as endogamous marriages within the same group, clan, community, see Barakat (1993, 109)

residents of neighboring Iran or Afghanistan, for example, although perceived as Muslim nations, were "non-Soviet" and therefore alien. However, socialist secularization was not absolute, as evidenced by the post-Soviet phenomenon of the revival of religion. Still, it began in Kazakhstan as one of the elements of a national revival, but not the most prominent one.

The transfer of family laws from the religious sphere to the sphere of civil law in the first Soviet decade was an important step towards the emancipation of Kazakh women. Marriage was no longer concluded by a mullah in a nikah, but instead recorded by a civil authority. Also, there was freedom of choice of marriage partners, and Muslim rituals such as the kalym (the dowry for the bride) were officially banned. It is noteworthy, however, that for Kazakh women, who traditionally do not cover their faces according to Islam provisions, the struggle against the paranja and chachvan (a set of women's outerwear hiding the body and face) dubbed the hudzjum in the Soviet period (Kamp 2006) was not an important campaign. Traditionally, Kazakh nomadic culture was more liberal in treating women. It differed in this regard from the neighboring settled and urban parts of Central Asia (modern day Uzbekistan and Tajikistan). Kazakh women did not practice face veiling, or covering their entire body. The exception to this was in areas densely populated by Uzbeks, such as in southern Kazakhstan (the Syr-Darya province). Therefore, distinctive anti-religious propaganda targeted women in this region such as the anti-paranja campaign. In 1929, the newspaper "Soviet Steppe," published in Alma-Ata city, stated: "The struggle for the emancipation of women reached our city of Shymkent (South Kazakhstan). One by one the Uzbek women there shed the paranja, and thus washed away the stigma of slavery." But, while considering all of the peculiarities that distinguish the Central Asian societies from each other, Islam, as part of their 'cultural heritage', became a symbol of ethno-cultural revival during the late Soviet period. Cultural identification with Islam continued in the following decades of independent nation-building.

The post-Soviet phase of a rapid transition to a market economy is characterized, among other things, by a general demoralization and disorientation, social anomia, and an erosion of social ties. Not surprisingly, sociological data show that among the reasons why people in Kazakhstan accept religion, the three primary ones are: the desire to attain spirituality (50.9%), the lack of prospects and confidence in the future (40.7%), and the hope to atone for sins (35.9%) (KISEIP 2012)⁹.

The social cost of transition for post-Soviet

societies, including those in Central Asia, has been very high. Deep social and economic inequalities, the destruction of upward social mobility and closed channels for public participation in the affairs of the state have led to the alienation of certain parts of society, especially that of young people from vulnerable sectors. It is hard not to agree with those scholars who say that the market boom in the Central Asian societies has not created a new moral foundation capable of overcoming social anomie (Hann 2010, 10). As will be shown later in the text, we have to admit that the revival of religion also has not consolidated society on the basis of its values.

The state policy with regard to Islam, or rather its attempt to control religious life, largely determines the status of religion in Kazakhstani society. The state supports religion as a national, cultural, and spiritual heritage, but at the same time separates it from actual religious doctrine. In this regard, the President of Kazakhstan's statement is quite illustrative: "during independence we again turned to the religion of our ancestors [which essentially means] love of neighbor and country, and this is a consolidating factor for our society" (Nazarbayev 2013). On the other hand, religion in a secular state actually becomes converted into a mobilization force for purposes of nation-building. In this case, the state takes on the role of religious authority. For example, it emphasizes that an adherence to Islam should not be considered "the latest fashion", and instructs an organized Muslim clergy on issuing fatwas (a legal opinion based on Islamic scripts proclaimed by theologians on various aspects of a Muslim community's life under Sharia law regarding current issues in society)¹⁰.

As evidence of freedom of religion, religious pluralism in society has increased during the last twenty years, and the number of denominations has grown from very few to forty three¹¹, mainly due to the emergence of neo-Protestantism as well as other new religious movements. Historically, on the territory of Kazakhstan by the beginning of the eighteenth century, Islam coexisted with the Orthodox Church, Baptism, Catholicism, and Judaism after the penetration of the Russian Empire into the Kazakh steppe, and further into Central Asia.

The modern situation in Kazakhstan is different in that not simply a religious diversity, but a 'market' of religious ideas has been formed. Despite the traditional close association between religion and ethnicity, it has become possible for an individual to adopt a new religion. It is a new situation when different religions 'are tried for one's taste' and then selected. The phenomenon of religious conversion appears as a consequence of the freedom of religious choice.

This means that cases of conversion, for example of Kazakhs who are ethnic Muslims, to Christian Orthodoxy or Krishnaism; or of Russians, who are ethnic Orthodox Christians, to Islam or Protestantism, has become part of the religious life in Kazakhstan, albeit not very common. In all fairness to this, it is necessary to note that during recent decades the percentage of people professing other religions except Islam, Orthodoxy, or Judaism in the total religious composition remains at a level below 1%.

The non-religious legacy is manifested by the fact that Kazakhstani society's attitude to the phenomenon of religious conversion is quite neutral which contrasts sharply with the situation in much of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. There, proselytism is not only condemned by the public, but is also considered a state crime (for example, in Pakistan, where it is also a violation of an apostasy law which can lead to death penalty).

3. The 'New Muslim' Woman: Shift from Equality to Hierarchy

In the course of the 'Islamic revival' in Kazakhstan, as in other post-Soviet Central Asian countries, the understanding of what it means "to be a Muslim" has become complicated. Now, it no longer fits into the framework of only the observance of the usual cultural ceremonies of life events, such as the rite of initiation through circumcision (sundet), burial according to Muslim rites (zhanaza), or giving alms to the mosque on Fridays (sadaqah). Although the majority of the population do not dispute the connection between Islam and ethnic identity (for example, to be a Kazakh means to be a Muslim), a new interpretation of 'Muslimness' has emerged. In its core it is the realization that religion is also a system of rules governing the behavior of a Muslim, for example, an understanding of what is allowed and what is forbidden, such as halal and haram.

A new form of religion appears which is different from the usual "religious minimalism" (Privratskii 2001), conducted within the framework of family rites. It is characterized by a 'serious' understanding of Islam which goes beyond ethnic custom. A category of Kazakhstani women appears for whom 'being Muslim' is more than the observation of life-cycle events, and in this way consider themselves devoted adherents of Islamic tradition.

Thus the idea of 'piety' becomes central, an idea which corrects the established understanding of the role of women as socially active in family and society. This carries with it the traditional division of gender roles to

which the woman has the place as 'keeper of the home', and the man takes on a public status. Accordingly, a gender hierarchy is recognized when the woman is submissive to the man.

Meetings and interviews with representatives of this new movement, the Kazakhstani pious Muslim women¹², held during 2011-2012 in Almaty, provide enough evidence to confirm the above-made assertions¹³. Almost all of these women, in their own words, 'came to Islam' and began to wear the hijab under the influence of their husbands or relatives. With the exception of only one woman interviewed, they all migrated to the metropolis of Almaty (Sultangaliyeva 2010) from smaller cities in Kazakhstan, rented housing, and now work in the informal sector of low-paid urban employment. For instance, one has a small shop selling Muslim clothing at a bazaar, another, her daughter, is a mid-level college student in humanities, a third sells cosmetics of one of the direct sales companies, a fourth is a cleaning lady at a bank, and a fifth is unemployed. Conversations with these and other Muslim women occurred during their ta'lims, a weekly meeting at one of their homes.

In these meetings women read and discuss "Selected Hadiths"¹⁴. During every meeting each person reads. According to them, the "Hadiths" can speak to everyone, regardless of age and status. The exchange of views on issues of Islam is accompanied by the usual 'girl talk' on themes of children, family, etc. After the ta'lim they are picked-up by one of their male relatives, and later on as a larger group, the members of the movement gather in one of their homes. There they organize a dinner at which men and women are seated separately. All the women members of the movement wear the hijab, and some of them are covered by the niqab (in Middle Eastern fashion) which completely hides one's face.

Here is the story of one of them, which is pretty typical for women who have chosen the way of religious 'piety'. The woman, M., is 25 years old, she does not work, and she has two children. In the recent past she was an emancipated and Westernised student at a university in Russia. She became a 'real' Muslim when she met her future husband, D., a member of Jamaati Tabligh¹⁵. He was quite a socialite and a businessman, but due to life circumstances his business went bankrupt. Technically, he is also unemployed, and periodically makes missionary trips (da'waat) proselytizing in various regions in Kazakhstan. During these trips the wife and her two young children are left in the care of their relatives who do not support their devotion, considering it 'fanaticism'

¹² Some researchers call it 'pious movement', for example Schwab (2011).

¹³ Practically all these five mostly young women under 30 at the time belonged to the Islamic missionary movement Tablighi Jamaat. Later on, the movement was accused of propagating extremist ideology and in February 2013 it was banned in Kazakhstan.

¹⁴ Translated into Russian the book by Mohammad Yousuf Kandhlavi, the founder of the Tablighi Jamaat.

¹⁵ Islamic missionary movement (Society on Spreading Faith) founded in South Asia in 1920, calls for strict abiding by textual religious norms. Its followers go on regular proselytizing tours (in total - 40 days a year) to encourage ordinary Muslims to maintain their faith. It distances itself from politics. See Metcalf (2002).

⁹ The sample comprised 1,400 interviewed in five regions of Kazakhstan. The data were kindly provided by Aiman Zhushupova.

¹⁰ The President's words addressed to local Muslim clergy on the occasion of appointing the new head of Kazakhstan's Muslim Administration (muftiyat) in March 2013. Available at <http://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/dumk-budet-izdavav-fetvyi-pozakonam-shariata-228802/>.

¹¹ In 2013, a number of denominations decreased to seventeen due to the strict requirements of the new law on religious associations (2011). As a consequence, not all religious organizations could meet them and were able to re-register.

and 'medieval'. In her own behavior M. tries dutifully to follow the Islamic norms which, in today's urban environment of Kazakhstan, make her isolated within the walls of the house, and sharply limit her mobility. She has dropped her university studies, and the four of them rent a room in the house of her husband's mother.

The new 'pious' Islamic life imposes restrictions on her daily life. For instance, she is not allowed to move around the city without being accompanied by a relative (mahram), and while on the street she wears the niqab, which usually attracts condemning and suspicious looks from passers-by, including fellow Kazakhs. In addition to this, M. has already given her husband the permission and is prepared for him to take a second wife. But there is a precondition, in accordance with Islam, to provide equally for all his wives, which includes individual housing. From the interview with M. we can see that she puts her husband above herself as 'according to the practice of Islam', so she willingly submits to him¹⁶.

However, in a mainstream Kazakh society dominated by secular rules putting religious 'piety' into practice is very difficult and sometimes impossible. For example, it is hard to find an available male relative (mahram) ready to accompany her around the city. She and her husband want to bring up their children 'according to Islamic tradition', which means not putting them into a regular municipal kindergarten, but into a Muslim one. But, they cannot afford it for economic reasons, as such kindergartens are rare and exclusively private, meaning they are expensive. It will also be unrealistic for her husband to be able to meet the religious provisions in order to take a second 'Islamic' wife, since he cannot provide even his current wife with basic resources¹⁷. It is noteworthy to mention the revival of the Islamic marriage ceremony (nikah) which is performed in a mosque. In local context it became a somewhat controversial issue since at the extreme end there are cases of its violation by some Muslim men. According to Kazakhstan's secular law, only civil marriage has legal force, and the religious ceremony is performed by choice, serving as an additional statement of etho-cultural belonging. Some 'pious' Muslim women who deliberately chose only religious marriage found out after the ceremony that they became the second, or even the third wife of their husbands. The cases involved mostly young unexperienced women. The men involved used such a marriage as an excuse for a religiously sanctioned sex exploitation. The number of such incidents was enough to get negative publicity in the local media. As a consequence, the Muslim clergy has become aware of the abuse of religious marriage. The muftiyat (Kazakhstani

Muslim administration body) clarified that the parents of the young bride and of the groom should be present at the religious marriage ceremony. At the same time, in the local context religious marriage can serve quite a unique social function. As in many societies (not only with Muslim culture), in Kazakhstan there is a perceived social pressure on women to perform their traditional gender roles as wife and mother. Since demographically women outnumber men, a certain percentage of women, especially middle aged, remain unmarried. Therefore, there are cases when secular-minded unmarried women deliberately perform the Islamic marriage ceremony to give a moral justification to their relationship with a married man, and consequently to their motherhood. As real life demonstrates, there are various ways how women interpret relationships between religious and secular, and this is unique for post-Soviet societies. This uniqueness is noted by the research on Muslim female religiosity in neighboring Kyrgyzstan where "Islamic, Soviet and Western notions meld and clash" (McBrien 2010, 40). The local 'pious' movement in this regard is different from the similar Islamic movement in other societies with Muslim majority which did not experience radical Soviet-type secularization.

Another woman interviewed, A., is 25 years old. Her husband also spends a certain amount of time in proselytizing Islamic missions around the country. She says that she has to work in order to survive with her family (two children) in a big city. She lives in a rented apartment and is involved in "home business" which is the direct selling cosmetics of one of many multi-level marketing companies. This is a popular type of work for self-employed women, however it is not stable or sufficiently profitable. Her husband's periodic missionary trips are an additional weight on her. During these trips she needs to ask for help from her mother who does not live in the city.

Another participant in the Jamaati Tabligh movement is D.. She is the oldest in the group of women interviewed, and compared to the rest she has the best livelihood. She owns an apartment and a small business which sells Muslim clothing. D. brought her daughter who is a 16 year-old college student into the movement.

Again we must emphasize that all these women surveyed became involved in the Tabligh movement due to their husbands, the movement's active members¹⁸. They are united by the awareness of belonging to a group of 'pious Muslim believers'. They strive to draw others into their faith, namely the 'not-yet believers' or nominal Muslims. With those who are not interested in becoming 'religious' persons, the

women don't make contact easily, and conversation with them is not an easy business. They are characterized by suspicion and wariness toward those Muslims who do not share their 'piety' which in itself is considered as a guarantee of the moral high ground. One of the females expressed reproach toward the author: "You've got to be like us, to come to Islam, then you will have the right to study Islam". The communication with this group of 'pious' women left a strong impression of them as being neophytes, this is reflected by their emotional devotion, self-righteousness, and so on. The 'pious' Muslims in the Kazakhstani environment bear ultra-orthodox features which set them apart from the mainstream Muslims, and overall society as well. This observation is confirmed by other researchers of the role of Islam in Kazakhstani society who point out that there is "dissonance between the lifestyles and Islamic ideology of members of the piety movement and most Kazakhs" (Shwab, 2011, 240).

Among 'pious' Kazakhstani Muslims there are those for whom religion is not associated with a particular group and who are more rationalist, and they might state, "If a man declares himself a Muslim, that does not make him infallible, for it too can be deceiving". For them, the main topic is spirituality, the desire to be morally better. Such is G., a 35 year-old widow with two children of school age. A few years ago she was in the Tabligh movement, into which her late husband brought her, but then she became disappointed with it. According to her, after her husband's death, Tablighi movement male members regularly suggested that she become a second or third wife, but without a prospective husband having any obligation to provide for her or support her children. G. looks at work not only as a source of income, but also as a virtue, accusing some Muslims of "talking too much about God instead of being engaged in work." She wears the Muslim headscarf. G. does not count on anyone's help and educates her children to be committed to their religion. She sends her daughter to a Muslim summer camp for girls, which is organized by a Muslim activist woman who conducts weekend courses on Islam for girls.

Without participating in any kind of Islamic group, G. tries to proselytize 'correct' Islamic behavior, such as promoting¹⁹ halal (permissible by Islam) activities (like halal parties among her circle of relatives). She is very sociable, friendly, not prone to being a mentor, and does not impose her own view of religion in conversation. Personal tragic experience (the loss of her husband) brought her not to seek comfort and solace in a group of co-religionists, but to find her own individual way of religiosity.

The personal life stories of these Muslim women

support the assumption that a tendency to isolation and gender segregation dominates the circle of the 'new pious'. In practice, this is manifested in the publicized demand for exclusively 'Muslim' spatial zones, for example, separate women's swimming pools, gyms, train cars, as well as segregated restaurant tables. Similar processes are also occurring among Kyrgyz 'piety movement' members (McBrien 2010).

The overall tendency of self-isolation by 'new Muslim women' adds to their detachment from forms of social activity that go beyond traditional female roles. They do not participate in civic non-governmental organizations, including those which are gender-oriented. Kazakhstani women who choose the path of religious 'piety' explain their choice in the following way: the desire for safety, the desire to become acquainted with faithful Muslims such as themselves, and the desire to adhere to obligations of husband and children (Dosanova 2010). Generally, this group of women does not belong to the middle or upper-middle urban economic class. They tend to have limited access to the financial and educational resources of today's competitive environment. Therefore, it is not surprising that women's religious 'piety' often represents only a symbolic capital which allows them to establish themselves in the community in the traditional status of wife and mother.

The post-socialist re-traditionalisation of gender roles has manifested itself in proclaimed opposition to Soviet emancipation goals (Kandiyoti 1991, 429). 'Pious' believers regard the emancipation of women as a violation of the 'natural' division of gender roles, in as much as emancipated women strive towards a professional career. In some of the countries of Central Asia the state took it upon itself to promote the idea of the glorification of the woman as mother. In this way women are celebrated as mothers in a patriotic light, for example, in Uzbekistan, a country with a more pronounced gender hierarchy than Kazakhstan. There, the Women's Committee of Uzbekistan organized a national contest for the title of 'the best daughter-in-law', highlighting the qualities of docility, maternal caring, and competent housekeeping. This represents both an affirmation of traditional Uzbek values and a distancing from Soviet images of emancipated womanhood (Kandiyoti / Azimova 2004, 346).

Such a trend is less visible in Kazakhstan. At least in the official rhetoric there is a secular approach to gender roles, such as "We should actively involve women in government and public administration, especially at the local level in the regions, as well as create favorable

¹⁶ For example, while she and her husband prayed in the house of her relatives the latter were sadly surprised to see her praying right behind her husband's back, and not next to him. By her own words, this symbolizes the woman's subordinate status.

¹⁷ As new converts / neophytes, they embrace the religious ideas with fervor and enthusiasm, trying to follow them meticulously even if some of them such as the practice of polygamy are not considered obligatory in Islam.

¹⁸ In Kazakhstan, the wives of the Jamaati Tabligh do not go on proselytizing trips, as it is done in some other countries, for example, in Malaysia.

¹⁹ It is important to note that in the beginning of year 2015, Kazakhstan's muftiyat announced that in Kazakhstan the word halal should be replaced with more familiar word adal (just in kaz.). This relates to the widespread industry of halal (products and services which should be made and performed according to the norms of Islam).

²⁰ Excerpt from an address by President Nazarbayev "Strategy Kazakhstan-2050": New Political Course of the Established State, available at <http://www.akorda.kz/en/page/page_poslanie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazakhstan-lidera-natsii-nursultana-nazarbaeva-narodu-kazakhstan-a-http://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/nazarbaev-nazval-jenschin-oporoy-gosudarstva-225242/>.

conditions for starting and running women's businesses"²⁰.

The ambiguity of opinion and interpretation on the role of Islam in Kazakhstan appeared namely because of the hijab. Young women began to dress in the hijab - the Middle Eastern fashion of Islamic dress with head scarves concealing hair, and clothing that covers the entire body except for the hands, ankles, and feet became the most visible symbol of the 'new piety'. This phenomenon has caused controversy in wider society, not so much regarding religious rituals, but regarding the role of religion and the boundaries between the religious and the secular²¹.

This was particularly true for the Kazakhs, asking such questions as "what should religion be?" and "what is the place of Islam in society and the state?" Opinion polls have indicated this ambiguity. For example, over twice as many Kazakhstani citizens (43.7 %) would not approve, compared with those who would approve (14.9 %) of a decision by their close female relations (such as a wife, daughter, or sister) to wear the hijab. The state is also wary of the public manifestations of individual religiosity. Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev has repeatedly and publicly condemned the wearing of the hijab by Kazakh women, emphasizing that it is Arab and Pakistani clothing, unusual for "nomads, and sends Kazakh women back into the Middle Ages". In his opinion, "Kazakh girls and women should dress appropriately according to the traditions of our nation."

The wearing of the hijab in educational institutions, especially in primary schools, is also markedly disapproved by the government officials. Officially, it is not prohibited, but the state has left the final decision to a given school administration which in turn are guided by internal dress-code regulations. School principals set the standards for school uniforms which include the prohibition of wearing any religious attributes.

State policy toward hijab does not look as strict as in neighboring Uzbekistan where wearing religious clothing by its citizens in public places is officially banned²². It should be noted that patriarchal tradition dominates in this Central Asian nation with a long history of sedentary and urban culture. It is characterized by the seclusion of women and their submission to men, in exchange for his material care. This culture has survived even under the pressure of the Soviet policy of women's emancipation. In the pre-Soviet era the veil was a symbol of female subordination to men (Kamp 2006). However, the success of the hudjum campaign did not entirely free the lives of women, especially in the rural areas of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, of domestic patriarchy. One of the forms of protest against it became a practice of self-immolation by

women which regularly occurred during Soviet period.

In Kazakhstani society patriarchal traditions were less strong which correlates with the historically predominant features of the nomadic way of life. Nomads were not predisposed to the strict adherence to religious practices, including those regulating the behavior of women. Among them there was no strict segregation of sexes in public, and Kazakh women enjoyed relative freedom (Michaels 1998) and did not veil their faces. Shared activities among youth of both sexes were common practice in traditional Kazakh society. Among them, for example, the still popular tradition of horse races named 'catch the girl' (kyz kuu), in which the young man must catch the girl. If the man failed in this attempt he was 'awarded' with blows of a horse-whip (kamcha); if he succeeded he had to kiss the girl in public. Another example is the practice of unmarried young men and women riding together on a swing in public. Among traditional poets and improvisational singers (akyns) who played a key role in nomadic Kazakh culture there have always been women who openly competed in oral singing competitions (aityses) with men.

In pre-Soviet Kazakh society, a mandatory part of the wedding ritual was not only the payment of the dowry by the groom (kalym), which is in accordance to Islam, but also the preparation of the dowry by the bride's family (zhasau). Moreover, the latter was not only equal to kalym, but could exceed it in size. The bride's family had to provide her with both goods and real estate which were considered her own property by right (Kazakhi, 1995, 307). This practice established a certain degree of independence for the married woman in her husband's family. Moreover, if the groom could not afford to pay the kalym as a price for the bride, he would live in her family and compensate for the dowry by working around the house²³.

Unmarried Kazakh girls did not wear the Muslim headscarf to hide their hair and neck. To the contrary, hair was considered an ornament, tied in braids, and decorated. And in modern Kazakhstani society the image of femininity is traditionally associated not with a religious piety and its manifestation, but with particular behavior such as modesty, hospitality, good manners. In particular, the tradition of showing respect for elders and relatives is valued.

Therefore the appearance of religious 'pious' Muslim women is viewed with suspicion and disapproval even on the part of their immediate family. At the extreme end are accusations of fanaticism and of not following local cultural traditions. This is how Kazakh young woman Qasim Amin describes her own experience: "I

am currently working among Muslims with whom I can safely wear my hijab and read prayers. I could not find a job. And many employers denied me because of the hijab, because they said that now everywhere they need their employees to have a presentable appearance"²⁴.

However, we must emphasize that the fact that in the past Kazakhs did not wear clothing in a Middle Eastern fashion does not serve as an argument for the 'new Muslim'. These pious Muslims follow Islam as a religious doctrine, not only, and less importantly, as a cultural tradition. One of them stated: "...we do not profess the national religion. We profess Islam and cover our bodies and faces as we need. And if we would not learn from the Arabs, then from whom?" (Dosanova, 2010). These words are in tune with the opinion of some local historians, emphasizing the civilizing mission of Islam for the Kazakhs, which transformed "...naive sons of nature 'nomad' into 'spiritually mature, nomad-Muslim'" (Nurtazina 2007).

It can be argued therefore that for those adhering to religious 'piety', the concept of the new 'Muslim woman' means something more than the observance of ritual purity, and other mandatory prescriptions of Islam (fard). For them favorable conditions must be created. In the predominantly secular local environment, these conditions become practically exclusive as they are based on the gender segregation when public place is separated between men and women, examples of which are listed above.

The hijab has become the most visible symbol of this exclusivity, and such an 'otherness' stands out against the backdrop of Soviet / Westernized urban culture. At the same time, the Islamic clothing in its Middle Eastern style is completely modern, and is one of the consequences and manifestations of globalization. Any attempts to persuade Kazakhstani Muslim women that this type of clothing is at odds with modernity, and alien "Arab" dress, are doomed to fail. The hijab has become as much as a symbol of urban cosmopolitanism as backpackers.

4. Female Religiosity - New Niches

The revival of religion has brought new opportunities for women in whose lives religion occupies an important place. First of all, new forms of socialization became possible, particularly, in groups of 'pious' Kazakh believers (jamaat) who call themselves the 'sisters'. In an environment of market individualism and desolidarization, such a socialization within the community of believers gives a sense of security and comfort, as well as moral and material support. Historically, in Kazakhstani society a social networking to reproduce Islamic identity did not develop. This differs from Uzbek and Tajik communities where the traditional institution of

the mahalla, or community of people living in the same quarter or street, has proved its viability and sustainability in both the Soviet era and today. Members of the mahalla regularly gather for informal meetings. There are men's gatherings (gap / gashtak), and women gather for their own informal meetings (Bibi Seshanbe - 'Holy Tuesday'), and conducting Islamic rituals is an important part of these events (Kandiyoti / Azimova 2004).

The revival of Islam in post-Soviet Kazakhstan has led to the emergence of religion-based social networks (known as Jamaat) for Kazakh 'pious' Muslim women. In fact, the first Muslim associations were organized by women. As early as 1990, Muslim women's groups were formed, such as "The League of Muslim Women," the "Association Fatima," and "Rifah," which promoted the revival of family values and the religious education of women. These groups were supported by outside, Islamic charities. For example, "The League of Muslim Women" sent young, Kazakh women to Turkish Islamic schools where they studied Islam, as well as the Turkish and Arabic languages²⁵.

Moreover, they exist not only in the boundaries of mosques and Muslim community education associations (such as the "Khalifa Fund Altai"), but in virtual spaces as well, in forums on the Kazakhstan's Islamic websites (for example, Minaret.kz). This type of networking provides opportunities which are not limited by religious subject per se. The women are able to search for a suitable partner, to help each other by giving advise on how to live a daily life in accordance with Islam (family matters, raising kids), etc.

The process of creating an autonomous space for the self-expression of Kazakhstani women who have chosen the way of religious 'piety' also exist in the realm of labor division. Increased interest in religion by the general population, including women, has created the need for religious enlightenment and education. As it is known, women have never held a 'professional' position in the organized Islamic hierarchy. Now, there are opportunities for female-dominated occupations within formal Islamic institutions. In the 20 years of the post-Soviet period a new sector of working women has been formed. For instance, women are employed as teachers of the basics of Islam and Arabic language in women's educational courses at mosques and at ethno-cultural community associations.

For another category of Muslim women the new areas of self-realization in informal or daily / folk Islam bring a partial or even full-time income. This so-called self-employed sector of Kazakhstan's Islamic life is not affiliated with organized mosque life. The majority of these women are engaged in the art of traditional healing. It should be noted that at the heart of Islamic healing in

²¹ On the role of Islam in post-Soviet Kazakhstan see Sultangaliyeva (2012).

²² According to Art 14 of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, a citizen who does not belong to clergy is not allowed to wear religious clothing in public places. See Uzbekistan: Islam, Communism, and Religious Liberty—An Appraisal of Uzbekistan's 1998 Law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations" (2000), available at <www.lawreview.byu.edu/archives/2000/3/bec.pdf c/1017>.

²³ Though this usually happened with poor families. Hence such a husband is scorned as kushik kuyeu (puppy husband).

²⁴ From the website of the Almaty Central Mosque, available at <http://meshet.kz/ru/islam_20.html>.

²⁵ Islam Shapagaty' March, 1991, p. 7.

Kazakhstan is the visitation of 'holy places' (ziyarat), especially those that are in Turkistan, the historical center of the religious life of the Kazakhs²⁶. The pilgrimage boom of recent years is directly linked to the growing popularity of traditional healing. The tradition of female Islamic healers using both Islamic symbols magic rituals, and communicating with the spirits goes back to ancient nomadic history. They are called baksy, shamans, emshi, kozha, molda kempir. Female reciters of the Koran in the last 20 years have become a distinctive group of Muslim 'professional' women. Historically, there are no differences between women-shamans and men-shamans, both have always been respected in society (Mustafina 1992, 139-141). This layer of Kazakh religious life has existed in parallel with the formal Muslim clergy (imams, mullah, kadi and others).

The modern revival of religion has led to the emergence of Islamic charity, particularly in the form of privately owned children's orphanages, or of summer camps for girls. They support compliance with the 'Muslim way of life', that is, religious belief and rituals. Typically, these institutions are supported by Muslim volunteer women with donations from individuals or organizations, including foreign Muslim charities. Another phenomenon, new to Kazakhstan, has also appeared: Women who are members of charismatic occult and mystical movements of a Muslim orientation (Ayat Allah, Ata Joly). The activities of Ata Joly women (called akku) are centered around bringing pilgrims (mostly women) to Islamic 'holy places' in the city of Turkistan. Akkushki represent themselves as mediums between the souls of saints / ancestors and pilgrims. Activities of this kind are also based on healing as well as on recruiting new members into the organization. The pilgrimage in itself became a profitable business in which tourist companies are engaged, too.

In the post-Soviet era, these rituals are increasingly criticized by 'pious' Muslims and organized Islam (by imams), as not being in accordance with Islam. Traditional healers are adapting to the new situation so that they and their patients appear as 'legitimate' Muslims in the eyes of the followers of normative Islam and society as a whole (Rasanayagam 2006). For instance, one of the famous contemporary Kazakh healers, Bifatima, who lives and practices near Almaty, considers herself the guardian of the nearby 'holy mountain' Ungurtas. While she worships the Sun and the Earth, at the same time she believes in God (Allah), and considers her faith that of Islam and regards herself as a faithful Muslim. In her healing practice she utilizes practices common for Kazakh shamans, such as blows with a stick, blessings with water, and wrapping

a patient in sheep skin while reading Muslim prayers in Kazakh and Arabic.

Conclusion

The Soviet legacy remains the most long-lived factor which determines the characteristics of the impact of Islam on the status of modern Kazakhstani women. It is manifested by the fact that society as a whole is still secularly oriented, and religion is only one of the many variants of female identity. The interruption of the continuity in the transmission of religious knowledge and experience during the Soviet period led to the fact that religion is primarily viewed as a personal choice. But, quite naturally there is an influence of family tradition ('religion of the ancestors'). By comparison, the impact of Kazakh pre-Soviet tradition is rather limited. The main reason is that the social and cultural foundations of religious tradition were destroyed during first two decades of Sovietization. Therefore, the transmission of religious knowledge from one generation to another was forcefully stopped (ban on religious books, even on non-religious literature written in Arabic script, prosecution of clergy, destruction of mosques, and so on) Thus, religious women borrow available models of Islamic religiosity imported from 'global Islam' and its movements. They are based on the idea of religious 'piety', which in itself limits the range of followers. It is difficult to voluntarily give up the established secular standards of behavior and lifestyle, particularly in urban environments. The 'new piety' assumes a re-traditionalisation of gender roles, accompanied by, for example, the subordination of women to men. However, transcendental values of religious 'salvation' and a strict obedience to the authoritative religious won't effectively compete with more attractive self-realization choices offered by modern, information-rich environments (for example, education, career). In this context, the influence of Islam as a set of rules and regulations for modern Kazakhstani women cannot be anything but limiting.

At the same time, a category of Kazakhstani women has already formed, the 'new Muslim women', for whom religious 'piety' gives a sense of security and comfort in a complicated and uncertain reality, even at the expense of limiting their opportunities and choices voluntarily. In this regard, new niches for the self-fulfillment of women are formed as part of the religious path. Over the past twenty years, the relationship between religion and women in Kazakh society has changed considerably. It can be argued that the female manifestation of religiosity, including its conservative form of 'religious piety', will continue to evolve, but its marginality will persist and continue as such for the foreseeable future.

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²⁶ Turkistan is a city in Southern Kazakhstan which was known in medieval ages as Yassy. On modern religious life in this city see Privratsky (2001).

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MASS CONSCIOUSNESS DURING THE PERIOD OF PUBLIC TRANSFORMATION IN KAZAKHSTAN*

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Abstract. This article is aimed at identifying problems in the mass consciousness of Kazakhstan people in the period of democratization. Highlighting the importance of mass consciousness in the political transformation process, the author lists the types of political cultures and their influence on the consciousness of society. The main trends of the political consciousness of Kazakhstan people are revealed based on the research works of the KISI researchers. Noting the most important factors that influenced the self-consciousness of the RoK citizens, the author analyses sociological research, revealing the peculiarities of Kazakhstan's political culture, and provides suggestions for further development of the mass consciousness of the Kazakh people.

Key words: Social Transformation, Mass Consciousness, Political Transformation, Self-Consciousness of Kazakhstan people

ҚАЗАҚСТАНДА ҚОҒАМДЫҚ ТРАНСФОРМАЦИЯ КЕЗЕҢІНДЕГІ БҰҚАРАЛЫҚ САНА

Ермұхамет Ертисбаев

Аңдатпа. Мақала демократияландыру кезеңіндегі қазақстандықтардың бұқаралық сана-сезіміндегі мәселелерді анықтауға бағытталған. Саяси трансформация процесінде халықтық сана-сезімнің маңыздылығын ескере отырып, автор саяси мәдениеттің түрлерін және олардың қоғам санасына әсері туралы жазады. Қазақстандықтардың саяси сана-сезімінің негізгі тенденциялары КИСИ зерттеушілерінің зерттеу жұмыстарының негізінде анықталады. Қазақстан азаматтарының сана-сезімдеріне әсер еткен ең маңызды факторларды атап өткен автор әлеуметтік зерттеулерді талдайды, қазақстандық саяси мәдениеттің ерекшеліктерін анықтайды және қазақ халқының халықтық сана-сезімін одан әрі дамыту жөнінде ұсыныстар береді.

Түйін сөздер: Әлеуметтік трансформация, халықтық сана-сезім, саяси трансформация, Қазақстандықтардың сана-сезімі

МАССОВОЕ СОЗНАНИЕ В ПЕРИОД ОБЩЕСТВЕННОЙ ТРАНСФОРМАЦИИ В КАЗАХСТАНЕ

Ермұхамет Ертисбаев

Аннотация. Данная статья нацелена на выявление проблем в массовом сознании казахстанцев в период демократизации. Отметив важность массового сознания в процессе политической трансформации, автор перечисляет виды политических культур и их влияние на сознание общества. Выявляются главные тренды политического сознания казахстанцев на основе исследовательских работ исследователей КИСИ. Отметив наиболее важные факторы, повлиявшие на самосознание граждан РК, автор проводит анализ социологических исследований, выявляя особенности

* *Kazakhstan-spectrum. Science journal. №4 (14) 2001.*

казахстанской политической культуры, и приводит предложения по дальнейшему развитию массового сознания казахского народа.

Ключевые слова: *Общественная трансформация, массовое сознание, политическая трансформация, самосознание Казахстанцев*

Mass consciousness is a specific kind of social consciousness which has been widely distributed and is quite important in modern societies [1]. Similar to class, national, professional and other group forms of social consciousness, the subject of which is classes, nations, etc., mass consciousness is distinguished primarily by the characteristics of its carrier, the subject. In the case of mass consciousness, such a subject is a special combination of individuals, called the mass.

The social and political reform of Kazakhstan's society; the democratization of politics; the emergence of politics in the sphere of public activity; the change in the nature of political participation; and the development of the institution of free elections all predetermined the emergence of the phenomenon of the mass political consciousness as a wide range of phenomena related to the attitude of society to the various aspects of political life. The subject-matter studied by politologists, sociologists and psychologists is the attitude of the population towards various political institutions, regimes and political values. In particular, there has been a focus on the evaluation of mass spirit; the identification of mechanisms of electoral behavior; the means of political participation; and various aspects of political culture and psychology.

In western philosophy and sociology, mass consciousness was dealt with from divergent perspectives: the explicitly anti-democratic, identifying the masses with the "crowd" and a "rabble" (J. Burkhardt, G. Le Bon, J. Ortega y Gasset); the socially critical, considering the mass as the negative generation of modern anti-human types of societies (E. Fromm, R. Mills, H. Marcuse); the positivist, relating the masses to scientific and technical progress and the activities of the modern media (H. Blumer, E. Shils, D. Martindale). In Soviet science, for decades, the positive study of mass consciousness was virtually prohibited due to the complete incompatibility of this problem with the ideological attitudes prevailing in that society; although some authors considered mass consciousness as an attribute of "mass society" and an alternative to class consciousness [2].

The transformation of society and the political system is impossible without the transformation of political culture; and the formation of a renewed value-system based on consent. It is the values that are the basis of those searches in conditions of political changes which always accompany the development of society. Political ideologies are drawn up on this ground, based on the features and the level of development of a society, its traditions, geographic location, geopolitical situation and the mentality of social community. Political values, being a phenomenon of the social spiritual plan, are deeply root-

ed in the consciousness, ethnopsychology and behavior of people; and express a basic worldview through which things are understood.

Despite the majority of the population's awareness of the objective need for change, the mentality of a society sensitive to the imposition of alien traditions may be a factor suppressing the processes of adaptation. Contemporary researchers express different views towards multi-level mass consciousness; the content and forms of the appearance of political culture; and aspects of political values in transitional societies [3].

The term "mass consciousness" is multi-valued. In practice, there are wide and narrow meanings of this term. Mass consciousness is the consciousness of large masses, people and the population in its broadest sense. In a narrow sense, mass consciousness is that special form of the ordinary consciousness that appears due to the influence of certain means, and, above all, the media [4]. Ordinary mass consciousness appears in the process of the spiritual assimilation of reality within the context of everyday practical activities. Its specific features are the norms, customs, evaluating representations and needs that express the real values and norms of society.

Ordinary mass consciousness, on the one hand, is formed voluntarily and spontaneously; and, on the other, relies on historical and theoretical prerequisites and organized spiritual labor. In "spontaneous" and "directed" processes of change of the mass consciousness, it is possible to highlight the various roles of organized and non-organized social communities.

In a non-organized social community, a functional element of public consciousness such as belief is formed, which then becomes a regulator of mass behavior and transforms itself into the general mood. In an organized social community, a qualitatively new super-individual education, public opinion, is formed. The first is connected with the spontaneous process of normalizing interpersonal interaction and communication; and the second with the activity of specialized regulatory social subsystems. The first is carried out by a mutual change in mental states of the individual; the personification of ideas; their acceptance as the individual's "own"; and the formation of personal conviction, which is the most powerful regulator of behavior, as an "inner" one is more important to the individual than any external, institutionalized one. In the second case, it is necessary to take into account the specifics of the social and institutional ways in which ideas are fulfilled. It consists of the mediation and functionality of interactions between individuals and the community as a whole [5]. The large-scale changes experienced within a decade have had a significant impact

on the mass consciousness. The most important problem of how to form a system of new social values confronts a transitional society.

In a period of social transformation, close attention is paid to mass consciousness by the President of Kazakhstan, N.A. Nazarbayev, who has pointed out: "... despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of Kazakhstanis support a reforming course, we should realize that many of those who perceived the need for change in their hearts have not yet comprehended its essence in their minds; and they feel uncertain, not quite clearly imagining their future. The state of some internal discomfort is strengthened by the economic crisis which, for the average person, has primarily expressed itself in the unrestrained growth of prices; a decrease in living standards; and uncertainty caused by many social problems. People are often disoriented by the extremes of the political struggle. Sometimes the most unexpected political speculation finds niches in the public consciousness"[6].

Particular experience has been gained during the study of the Kazakhstani national consciousness; and its structural components have been identified with greater or lesser precision. Most of the work in this area has been carried out by the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan – the Center for Strategic Elaboration and Analysis of the Administration of the President of the RoK [7].

Those who study Kazakhstan consider the process of formation and manifestation of the mass consciousness from different positions at the present critical time. According to T. Asanov and G. Sheryazdanova, the most important feature of Kazakh people is the authoritarianism of thinking which acts here as a defining characteristic of the deep understanding of the moral source of power among the nomads and authority as the only source of power. Analyzing the typology of political cultures, the authors come to the conclusion that Kazakhstan as a country experiencing radical modernization is in a state of changing political values and political culture [8]. Out of the three existing types of political culture, patril, patriarchal and activist, the patriarchal-patril type best fits Kazakhstan (the unconditional subordination of people to the existing order of things in the field of power relations, with minimal participation in the political life of society). This type of culture is typical of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. In the period of "developed socialism", this type of the political culture prevailed, since it most of all corresponded to the ideology of opportunism, the conformism of that time. A patriarchal culture is peculiar to traditional, pre-industrial societies with a low level of political consciousness in general and political knowledge in particular. This type is characterized by political apathy, political ignorance and illiteracy. An activist type of political culture is distinguished by developed civic self-awareness; individualism; knowledge of one's rights; political awareness; and involvement in the political life of society [9].

In conditions of market modernization and political transformation in the direction of democracy, the reverse

process of the patriarchalization of the political culture is occurring in Kazakhstan. This is confirmed by the sociological data. For while there an external, official orientation towards the democratization of our society, there is an intensification of political indifference, apathy, unbelief and ignorance. The reasons for this may be found in the legacy of the totalitarian past – a conformist and passive ideology of "the small screw" in social relations.

L. Adilova links significant differences in the value orientations of citizens in the political life with the specificity of eastern norms and traditions. Kazakhstani society, in her opinion, is characterized by a recognition of a dominant role in the politics of elites and the state, the preference of patronage of the state over the individual, the dominance of values of the corporatism, the attraction to an authoritarian type of the government, the search for a charismatic leader, the sacralization (deification) of rulers and their activity in governing the society [10].

Modern political illiteracy can also be considered as a weakness of political education. Political passivity, lack of civic activity and lack of belief in authorities all testify to the lack of political mobilization; skill; the habit of self-organization; and ignorance of ways of expressing social interests. It is commonly known that social interests are the engine of political relations. The inability and the objective absence of methods promoting the formation of mechanisms for expressing one's interests through political parties, public organizations and movements are the main obstacles to the democratization of our society. In the event of the tendency towards the patriarchalization of political culture, the formation of grounds for democracy and the further democratization of society will remain problematic. The key to the stimulation of political life, individualism and civic initiative are fundamental changes in the economy; and the introduction and expansion of the institution of private property.

J. Dzhusunova believes that ideas about an absent or basic political culture is incorrect. A political culture is always present in society; it is only important to find out the prevailing type. For the native ethnops of Kazakhs, traditional political culture has been typical in many ways, where there are no specialized political roles. Members of society are aware of the existence of political institutions (state, law, political movements); and even have particular feelings towards them - hostility, pride and so on – and can assess them as legitimate or illegal; but the attitude to the political system as a whole is passive. This type of political culture has existed since the colonization period and has been convenient to the authorities for all subsequent decades [11].

The famous scholar N. Amrekulov suggests taking into account the civilizational and cultural peculiarity of the Kazakhs: their post-nomadic mentality as individuals who have not had long traditions of organized (agricultural or industrial) labor, the developed culture of entrepreneurship and the ethics of selfless capitalization of the accumulated wealth and its productive use. In addition, Kazakhs inherit the traditional tolerant mentality of nomads who, in disputed and severe cases, have typically

resorted not to violence or a blood feud, but to the peaceful, consensual forms of charges through the bey courts and other traditional institutions [12].

Indeed, in political and social actions aimed at the mass of people, consideration of mentality becomes absolutely necessary. Under mentality, in our opinion, it is necessary to understand the complex of formal and informal norms, stereotypes of the consciousness, behavior and communication, the individual's way of thinking and self-consciousness, reflecting the system of values, traditions and habits, national and other characteristics inherent in general to a certain social and demographic group of people or residents of a particular location. As a matter of fact, mentality is a regularly reproducible and internally consistent way of perceiving the surrounding reality that has developed in a certain part of the population and is accepted by this part of the population as true and correct.

The type of political culture directly affects the type of political consciousness and degree of the civil self-identification. According to Kazakh researchers, there are two main types of the political consciousness in our society - liberal and neo-communist. The current process of the capitalization of relations creates a conflict of values resulting from the contradiction between the political present and past. The basis for the contradiction between the liberal and neo-communist positions, in their opinion, lies in the difference of attitude towards the key concept in politics - power. The following features are inherent to the liberal-democratic type of the political consciousness mediated through an attitude towards power:

1. Activist political culture.
2. Egalitarianism is a trait that determines the equality of starting conditions for the growth.
3. Individualism, strict pragmatism [13].

Patril political culture is based on the alienation of oneself from power, considering oneself not as a subject but as the object of power relations. Patriality also determines the following traits: paternalism; escape from participation in power relations; and the imposition of responsibility on a strong state. Patriarchalization also results from the alienation of power and the unwillingness to interfere in power relations. The alienation of power occurs when we consider ourselves as a part of the dominating general interest, i.e. the collectivism. The conclusion of this analysis on comparison of types of the political culture is that for the formation of an active civil position, civil self-identification, it is necessary to change the attitude towards the key concept in politics – the power.

The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, N.A. Nazarbayev, stressed that during the transitional period: "all social transformations shall be carried out in accordance with the existing psychology and traditions of people, the obligatory consideration of rudiments left in our minds and actions form the former totalitarian regime which we cannot quickly free from, no matter how much we want to" [14].

Based on the results of a republican sociological survey conducted by the Kazakhstan Development Institute

("Is the development of Kazakhstan sustainable?"), the authors come to a conclusion about the level of politicization in our society [15]. Among those issues considered priorities by citizens, the primary concern to be stressed is the expansion of crime in society; problems of the economy and social security; and only then issues of politics and problems of national relations. Respondents note a high level of passivity and authoritarian political thinking, which is confirmed by our thesis about the existence of our patriarchal-patril political culture. Only 31.3% of citizens agree to visit the protest meetings and even then only with local authorities. The percentage of permanent participants in political speeches is 11.6%; and 5.4% of them are the most active. Other citizens are not ready to take an active part in political activities. Out of this, we can draw conclusions about the low political mobilization, the aggregation of social interests of the citizens and the weak structure of social interests. Thus, among Kazakhstani, to a far degree, there is not "interest in politics, but rather only the concern for it".

The decrease of interest in politics, the unwillingness to identify oneself with certain political forces, understand their arrangement, participate in the political life, while maintaining statist attitudes, may, in our view, be considered not only as a sign of a poor political culture and an underdeveloped political consciousness, but also as a tendency to demonstrate a protective instinct.

The attractive conclusions are those drawn on the basis of sociological studies on analysis of the structure of the mass political consciousness in Kazakhstan, where the issue of the prevalence of the type of political consciousness in Kazakhstan has been considered [16]. The analysis was conducted on the basis of five hypothetical types of political thought: liberal, democratic, communist, right-wing authoritarian and national. The result of sociological analysis was the identification of two main types of political consciousness: liberal-democratic and left-wing authoritarian, where the left-wing authoritarian (neo-communist type) one is more widespread. Left-wing authoritarianism is understood as a policy of the state's control of economy, the return to the statist-egalitarian model with certain attributes of democracy in the form of freedom of speech, conscience and other liberal rights. Particularly important is the study of political activity, political sentiments and the political consciousness of the population of Kazakhstan. Y. Babakumarov points out that the interests in relation to the political system have been structured in three levels in Kazakh society:

Firstly, the correction of a course of rendered reforms towards its greater socialization.

Secondly, the strengthening of the liberal orientation of reforms and the modernization of the country.

Thirdly, the stabilization of an existing political regime [17].

In March 1996, the Kazakhstan Development Institute conducted a common republican sociological survey for the adult population in all regions of the country and Almaty city with a representative sample of 3000 respondents. The questions were drawn up in such a way as to

cover the main types of political consciousness inherent in Kazakhstani society. As shown by the survey, there is a contradiction in the structure of mass consciousness, expressed in a vivid imbalance of its economic and political components. If the communist approach dominates in economic issues, then the democratic one dominates in politics.

42% of the respondents believe that the state should manage the entire economy in favor of maintaining the common social equality. Except for 3% of liberals and 14% of those who have found it difficult to answer, the absolute majority of the population approves the government's intervention in the economy in various forms. 33% of the respondents supported the dominance of private initiative with various versions of statism or without it. 53% of the respondents spoke from an anti-marketing position. Thus, a significant part of the population of Kazakhstan is not ready to move away from the active regulatory role of the government in the economy.

When choosing the optimal type of property, the communist approach still has the greatest support (37%). At the same time, 11% of the respondents believe that private property will lead the country to prosperity, and 31% of respondents favor the predominance of private property combined with state property. Based on this data, it may be stated that in the republic there is an approximate parity of forces of supporters of private and state property.

29% of the population clearly disagrees with the establishment of "a firm-hand" regime. However the same number of respondents agree with it provided that human rights are respected to prevent the real risk of mass bloodshed. The idea of establishing an "iron" order to return to the past is popular among 12% of respondents, for purposes of the support of market transformations - 11%, for purposes of the support of nation - 8%. Therefore, the support of liberal and democratic requirements for the respect of human rights can be provided depending on the circumstances of 30-60% of the republican population, and the basis for establishing "the iron order" is at least 8%, and at most 60%.

On the issue of the need for plurality and political freedoms, the liberal-democratic course is supported by the overwhelming majority of respondents (67%). 2% of the respondents are hostile to democratic freedoms, as "they threaten the prospect of marketing transformations" (right-wing authoritarianism) and 7% are also hostile to them as "there is the pressure of common people's will on parts" (communistic type of the consciousness). It follows therefore that the policy of the elimination of democratic transformations and threatening human rights will get a negative response in the majority of population.

Regarding the process of deepening social inequality, 33% of the respondents consider it necessary to return to the communist model of state revenue regulation, 12% are hostile to the social differentiation due to the split of their ethnicity into rich and poor, 20% regard the stratification as a natural process, and 24% support the state's creation of equal starting opportunities without guaranteeing an equality of results. Thus, the models of the state

as "night watchman" and as a provider of "general welfare" get approximately equal support from the population.

The comparatively low proportion of people who haven't defined their attitude towards the deepening of social inequality and the establishment of "an iron order" is indirect evidence of the relevance of these problems and the sharpening of their perception by the mass consciousness. This factor considerably reduces the field for maneuver in these issues, since the overwhelming majority of the population has already defined their opinions.

The study has shown the existence of the strong attitude towards "backward authoritarianism", i.e. towards the free political sphere with the non-free economic one, in other words – towards the neo-communism. The electorate of neo-communist forces can be 37-42% and orthodox communist forces – 7-12%. Upon approximately equal share of supporters of the right-wing, left-wing and national "iron order", the neo-communist scenario of development of the political process has certain prospects.

The most emphatic lines of the differentiation of a structure of the political consciousness are at the level of education, age and occupation. The neo-communist variant of development is preferred mainly by people over 50 years old, with primary and secondary education and working professions. These categories of the population constitute the potential electorate of neo-communists. On the contrary, the course of reforms finds the greatest support among the more educated and younger population.

The above contradiction between the economic and political components of the mass consciousness determines the structure of the emerging opposition towards the course of reforms. In the political sphere, the main criticism will originate from "the right wing" under democratic slogans and the respect of human rights; and in the economic sphere from "the left-wing" under the slogans of return to the communist model of the economy and social stratification. All this may lead to the multivariant development of the political process in Kazakhstan in the context of its legitimization in the court of public opinion, as well as the formation of a bilateral structure of the opposition to the course of reforms as well as the strengthening of neo-communist wing of the opposition.

In 1999, the presidential and parliamentary elections were held in Kazakhstan. The expert group VIP identified the most acute problems of Kazakhstani society which prevent mobilization of the electorate during elections. According to an expert survey, these include:

- 1) poverty (92% of the respondents);
- 2) unemployment (78%);
- 3) high levels of crime (62%);
- 4) degradation of small towns and villages (60%);
- 5) the environment (51%);
- 6) reduction of the cultural level of the population, its marginalization (48%);
- 7) problems of the democratization of social processes (16%) [18].

M. Mashan believes "it can be clearly seen that this list is more beneficial to the opposition which can accuse

the ruling elite and the loyal political parties of incompetent administration" [19]. We agree with this point of view; although the structure of mass political consciousness is characterized by disruptiveness, inconsistency, a tendency to rapid, unexpected change, which is especially acute during the period of election campaigns.

Representing a system of value orientations in relation to power, political experience and traditions, the political culture of Kazakhstani society is of a mixed type with the predominance of elements of a partial type at the moment. It is characterized by the personification of power; and monistic rather than pluralistic ideas about the shape that nationhood should take. At the domestic level, preferences more often include a state leader with "strong personality" and a "strong hand" etc.

Today, it is necessary to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the main components and the factors for the formation and expression of the mass consciousness of the Kazakhstani people. In our opinion, the following are the most important dominant factors that have previously had and continue to have a decisive impact on the destiny of the consciousness of our people:

- 1) historical (historical memory of the people, the idea of common origin and common historical destinies);
- 2) political (related to the formation of the Kazakhstani nationhood);
- 3) cultural (the Kazakhstani culture in all its structural elements);
- 4) social (the social self-consciousness is contradictory as it reflects the interests and self-consciousness of different social strata and classes);
- 5) moral and psychological (national psychology);
- 6) ethnic (related to the attitude to other people and nations, other ethnic groups).

The main contradiction of the current stage of the development of Kazakhstani society is the contradiction between traditional values and forming values adequate to the market and social democracy. The reality is that mutually exclusive social subcultures often coexist in a transitional society; for example, among young people there are legitimate and non-conventional forms of political activity, peaceful and violent forms of political participation. It is necessary to take into account the level of political culture in its national and ethnic dimension; psychological factors in the consciousness and behavior of individuals and social groups; the existence of an alternative political culture; great difficulties of political socialization; and, in general, the entry of the younger generation into society.

In recent years, there has been a steady shift in the erosion of values which are traditional for Kazakhs; the values which have remained stable in the new society for so long that they seemed to be invariant with respect to it. However, the stability of value systems was rather associated with their inertia and the population seeing the ongoing changes as a temporary phenomenon. The awareness of the long-term nature of the latter led to the beginning of serious shifts in the value systems of Kazakhstanis which are just beginning to unfold. The most noticeable

shift in value systems has developed in those values associated with material factors. In recent years, such factors as the attitude to various forms of the property, including the one mediated by hiring, have begun to work quite actively, so that those people who have an outlook most typical within Kazakhstan are more disadvantaged during this stratification in comparison with those who have a more western individualistic mentality.

Until the new regime is embodied in the values and ideals which the population is accustomed to, the institutional reorganization of the post-communist state cannot be considered as complete. If democratic institutions and economic resources can be "transplanted" from the outside (or their introduction is facilitated and their sustainability is ensured by the positive and negative sanctions designed to maintain and strengthen new democratic regimes), then "the spirit of people" or "the mental programming" of the society necessary to activate the mechanisms of new institutions, are not so easily amenable to the external intervention"[20].

The establishment of a sustainable civil society cannot be initiated from the outside. It is obvious that the formation of a political and cultural model of the civil confidence and self-determination in a multinational state can be accelerated to some extent within the frameworks of the legal regulation. However, legal regulations cannot eventually create such models, the moral and cultural components of which have not been borrowed.

Analysis of sociological research makes it possible to distinguish the following features of the Kazakhstani political culture:

- 1) significant political, ideological and cultural differences between the regions of the country and the city of Almaty. They are determined by political, economic and ethnic differences between the largest southern, northern, western, central and eastern regions of Kazakhstan;
- 2) in the situation of post-soviet Kazakhstan with the presence of a huge Russian diaspora, ethnic factors play an essential role. Today, ethnicity, in addition to its cultural function, also plays the role of a mechanism for the political mobilization of citizens for objective reasons. On the basis of ethnic factors, social and political organizations are being formed, social and cultural policies are being implemented, and there is a latent inter-civil confrontation. In the mass consciousness, holding the state or other appointments is often associated with the ethnicity of persons who hold them, but not with their business qualities;

3) there is the absence of a solidary public opinion, when political groups are formed not according to the social and class principle, but according to the clan-corporate nature of political relations. The consequence of traditional political culture is a situation when its bearers latently turn to a more limited political subsystem: ethnoses, location, confession, etc.;

4) the lack of traditions for the harmonization of interests as a consequence of the subordination subculture; and the low level of political activity on the part of the population.

The differentiation of social and psychological tension is traced in various regions of Kazakhstan. Thus, the situation in regions bordering with Russia is not only different from the situation in other regions of the country as a whole, but it is also internally differentiated. This can be seen from the analysis of the sociological survey data in the context of individual regions conducted by the Information and Analytical Center of the Administration of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the mid-1990s (the data for Almaty are also given for the comparison).

The general psychological background in the regions makes it possible to differentiate them according to the degree of social tension (see the Table 1). Optimism as the most positive social attitude is more typical for the residents of the Semipalatinsk and Pavlodar regions. This tendency becomes clearer if we take the summary of responses of the respondents stating that the prevailing attitude is optimistic and calm. In Pavlodar region, the figure is 40.8%; and in the Semipalatinsk region it is 35.1%. The least optimistic and calm respondents are those who live in the North Kazakhstan region, where the figure is 21.2%; in East Kazakhstan (21.4%); and Kostanay (23.1%). Anxiety and uncertainty are inherent to the respondents of these regions to a great extent. East Kazakhstan stands out there: 61.3% of its residents are concerned about their current position [21].

The dynamics of the social well-being of respondents in this region is presented in the Table 2. These tables show that since 1993 there has been a decrease in the share of people being at the borderline of anger and despair, and an increase of those who feel that anxiety and uncertainty has become the predominant attitude of the majority of residents of their region.

Monitoring of the development of social and political situation in the Republic of Kazakhstan (April 1999) shows a rather high level of social tension. The dynamics of the situation in the first quarter of 1999 were determined by financial and economic events: the revision of the budget for 1999 and the devaluation of the national currency. The main factor responsible for raising the level of social tension is the non-payment of salaries and pensions. However, the development of the social and political situation is in general based on a number of factors: political (the completion of the presidential elections, the expectation of changes, the change of government, the correction of the course of reforms, global domestic and foreign policy initiatives); economic and social (the budget crisis, the aggravation of situation in terms of the payment of pensions, the reduction of staff in budget organizations, the reorganization in a health care system, etc.); ethnic (the destabilizing impact of protest actions of Kurdish population, the growth of ethno-conflict potential among activists of Uyghur national cultural center, etc.) [23].

The differentiation of political activity of the population deserves attention. The social and psychological tension caused by the low level of incomes and the untimely payment of salaries is channeled along three main directions:

- 1) support of the activity of opposition political parties and movements;
- 2) readiness for political protest;
- 3) readiness for emigration.

In regions with a critical social and psychological background, the support for opposition parties and movements is higher than support for those loyal to the government. In North Kazakhstan, the Communist Party is supported by 13.2% of the respondents; the Kazakh "Azat" by 3.9%; the Slavic "Lad" by 3.1%; and the Social Party by 2.3%, totalling 22.5%. On the other hand, the pro-presidential PNEK is supported by 9.3%; and the pro-presidential Democratic Party by 2.3%: 11.6% in total. In the same region, the rating of Cossack organizations is notably low and amounts to 0.8%, as well as the rating of the Labor Movement, also at 0.8%. In Kostanay region, the Communists also take first place with 9.5%. However PNEK gets 7.1% support. At the same time, the opposition parties (the Communist Party; "Lad"; "Azat"; the Cossack organizations; the Social Party; and the Labor Movement) gather 21.5% in total; and the pro-government parties (the Democratic Party, Pnek) 10.7%. In East Kazakhstan, the Communists have almost identical support of 9.3%, PNEK 9.3% and "Lad" 8.7%. The population of West Kazakhstan region is most critical towards the authorities and most supportive of the opposition parties: the Communist Party has 16.2% support, the Cossacks 6.9% (the highest indicators for the region), and "Lad" 5.4%. If one adds the rating of the Social Party at 2.3% and "Azat" at 2.3%, then the opposition has the support of 33.1% in total; which is a third of the population.

Almost the same situation exists in Almaty, where the sympathies of the respondents are divided between the Communists (15.6%) and "Azamat" (14.4%); another 40% feel negatively towards all parties; and 27.8% found it difficult to answer. Only PNEK has 3.3% out of the number of loyal parties. In Kokshetau region, the largest support is given to the Communists (14.2%) and PNEK (8.7%).

Of favorable regions, Pavlodar and Semipalatinsk stand out by the degree of support for the opposition and pro-government parties. In Pavlodar region, the uniqueness of the situation is in the high political activity of the population - many parties have a quite high rating here. Although the Communists have 14.5% of support here, "Lad" records 5.9%; and at the same time the Democratic Party has 7.2%, PNEK 6.6% and NKK (the People's Congress of Kazakhstan) 5.3% (NKK traditionally refers to a moderate opposition, but it is associated with the authorities in a strategic course). In total, the main opposition parties have 20.4% and the pro-government parties 19%, i.e. approximately equal numbers of supporters.

The situation is even more prominent in Semipalatinsk region. Here, PNEK has 19.4% of the support (an absolutely high indicator among all parties and regions), NKK 6.7% and the Democratic Party 5.2%. The communist party enjoys the support of 8.2% of the population, while "Lad" and "Azat" record only 0.7%. These moni-

toring studies convince one that, even if the social and economic situation worsens, the current opposition organizations are not able to meet the expectations of change among the population.

Another indicator of the level of social tension is willingness to participate in protest action. Analyzing the data of a sociological survey on this issue, it is possible to come to two conclusions: the most critical regions in terms of the degree of tension are North Kazakhstan, East Kazakhstan and West Kazakhstan, as well as the Kokshetau regions. In addition, the most acute problem is the problem of delays in the payment of salaries and pensions. More than 50% of respondents in these regions are ready to engage in protest action due to delays in payments.

In North Kazakhstan, West Kazakhstan, Kokshetau and Kostanay, the problem of the uninterrupted supply of electricity, water, gas and heating is the second reason for the possible participation of the population in protests. Here, every third person expressed his/her readiness to participate in protest action if this problem is not solved. In the Kokshetau region, almost half of the residents (44.9%), the majority of whom are residents of villages and small towns (52-57%), are dissatisfied with the electricity supply and this problem is permanent and significant as a source of potential conflict. In Pavlodar, Semipalatinsk and East Kazakhstan (regions having their own electricity sources), this problem is not so acute.

In the prosperous Semipalatinsk and Pavlodar regions, the situation is different. In these regions, the second-most important problem has been the infringement of civil rights: 33.6% and 28.9% respectively (the first one being the delay in salaries).

The infringement of the national interests of the respondents may also increase the tendency to favour participation in political action. Thus, in the Semipalatinsk (20.9%), Kokshetau (15.0%) and East Kazakhstan (13.3%) regions, respondents have placed this option in third place [24].

An important indicator of the social and psychological state of the population is the issue of citizenship and the desire to leave and change citizenship. The opinions of representatives of different nationalities on the reasons for citizens leaving for permanent residence abroad differ significantly. Kazakhs consider that the reasons for the departure of their fellow citizens are the following: low level of salaries; departure to one's homeland; and the search for work. Russians record the following reasons for leaving: uncertainty regarding the future of children; the absence of social prospects; and the infringement of national rights [25].

The conduct of large-scale and radical transformations in society is accompanied by an increase in social tension. This is a kind of indicator of social crisis. The current complex social and economic situation, which consists of the growth of mass unemployment, the persistence of significant inflation rates, the crisis of non-payments and the existence of huge overdue amounts of salaries and pensions affects the assessment of the prog-

ress of reform by the population (see the Table 3).

The majority of the population does not see any real tangible results of reform, both on the scale of the republic and the region. According to the Table 1, 48.9% of respondents believe that economic reforms in Kazakhstan do not give anything. A similar assessment is given to the progress of reforms in the regions (48.7%). More than a quarter of the population believe that reform in the republic and the region give negative results (respectively, 25.9% and 28.1%). The largest percentage of respondents who assess the progress of reforms in the republic as negative is in the Semipalatinsk region (34.8%), Almaty (33.7%) and the Kostanay region (28.2%). Regarding the assessment of the progress of reforms at the regional level, they are extremely negative in the Semipalatinsk region (53.8%), which is almost two times higher than the republican indicator.

The study of mass consciousness in the transitional period convinces one that the most difficult and long-term miscalculation in the course of reforming is the distortion of the social order caused by power actions or inactions. The low social output of conducted transformations undermines the faith of the population in the ability of government bodies to solve the most important social and economic problems. This is directly related to the assessment of activities of the Government, the Parliament and local authorities for the improvement of economic situation in the country.

Almost half of the respondents believe that the Government's activities (45.5%), Parliament's activities (43.5%) and local authorities' activities (41.2%) do not contribute to improving the economic situation in the country. Of the Government's activities in Kostanay region (51.7%) and Almaty (51%); the Parliament's activities in Almaty (59.2%) and Semipalatinsk region (47.8%); and the local authorities' activities in Semipalatinsk region (63.0%), Almaty (52.0%), and Akmola region (45.7%), 26 are more negatively assessed in terms of regions.

The success of social reform depends to a large extent on how painlessly the population is able to adapt to the new social and economic conditions. As shown by the survey data, the population is divided into three categories according to the degree of adaptation to new economic relations.

The most numerous category of the population is the one characterized by an average degree of adaptation. It is more critical in assessing the impact of reforms on the live in comparison with the adapted category. But its criticality is moderate. Unlike individuals with the low adaptation this category is more optimistic and marks the positive changes along with the difficulties.

According to the survey, this category is about 40-45% of respondents. Every tenth respondent changed their place of work and job; almost 8% of the respondents are engaged in small business; the same portion consists of people who have changed their place of work and retained their speciality; and 4% of the respondents were beginning study and took additional work linked to their speciality. A small percentage is people with a high de-

gree of adaptation, who have taken actions that require additional material costs and moral efforts. This group includes those who started up new businesses (3.9%) or began to learn a new job (3.3%) within the last 2-3 years. A low degree of adaptation is noted in more than 36% of the respondents. This group of respondents stated that they had done nothing to improve their living conditions over the past 2-3 years.

Regarding socially mobile people who are younger than 30, since they are less dependent on an existing way of life, profession or position, a significant part of these people still live with their parents. Adaptation of individuals who are older than 50 is greatly facilitated for them and their children by the availability of certain material (apartment, furniture, car, etc.) and non-material (profession, qualification) benefits with which they enter the market. Among those who have done nothing to solve their life problems for the past 2-3 years are people over 55 years old, mainly pensioners (55.6%) and government employees (49.1%).

Low adaptation was most often diagnosed in surveyed workers, engineering and technical employees, engaged primarily in industry. The degree of adaptation is positively influenced by the level of education - the higher it is, the higher the degree of adaptation. Although there are peculiarities here. The psychological mechanism of adaptation of the intelligentsia (doctors, teachers) is complicated by two tendencies: on the one hand, they are satisfied with democratic reforms; and on the other, they are in a state of discomfort as they have found themselves on the periphery of attention of the state's social policy.

Economic difficulties are one of the factors influencing potential migration. The decision to leave the republic was taken by 10% of the respondents. In total, this group comprises 3.2% of Kazakhs, 14.5% of Russians and 20% of the representatives of other nationalities. Socially and professionally, this category includes 13.4% of employees, 12.5% of rural farms workers, 12.5% of unemployed people, 12.2% of the industrial workers and 6.8% of pensioners.

The level of social adaptation is directly related to the mood and psychological state of the respondent. The state of constant discomfort is more indicative for the psychological state of the majority of population. Almost 50% of the respondents have experienced stress or irritation; and 21.5% fear or depression for the last three months. Positive emotions are peculiar only for a small part of the respondents. About 16% of respondents stated that they have a normal and even mood at present; and only 2.1% stated that they have a happy mood.

The results of the survey show that a high degree of discomfort is observed in groups with the low social and status positions. Thus, more than 57.6% of pensioners, 56.5% of industrial workers and 55.1% of employees are constantly in a state of tension or irritation. The largest number of respondents experiencing fear and longing is among employees of the state administration (29.8%), engineering and technical employees (26,5%) and unemployed people (26.3%).

Satisfaction with one's position is primarily inherent in those groups that are actively involved in ongoing reforms: entrepreneurs; and students who are self-employed. The indicator of psychological comfort among them is 35-45% on average [28].

In the analysis of the mass consciousness, the ethnic factor has substantial significance. For all ethnic groups, peace and tranquility in the republic is the main value. The study of a set of value orientations demonstrates the existence of a number of trends. If Kazakhs continue the process of national consolidation (high indicators of trust in the authorities, general psychological perception of the situation, certain support of the political course for the formation of a national state), then the differentiation of moods and orientations significantly increase among the Russians depending on the assessment of their prospects. The higher the social potential of an individual is (the resources of youth, education, initiative and activity, mobility), the more often it is characterized by positive assessments of the state of things and democratic orientations. And, on the contrary, the deterioration of the former high position and the subjective understanding of the impossibility of adapting to the new conditions of existence in the national state leads to the strengthening of nostalgic feelings towards the old order and life in the USSR, pro-Russian orientations, the support of Russian and separatist movements and distrust of the policy of the republican authorities.

According to the results of studies conducted by the Center for the Study of Russian Minorities in CIS Countries, the potential for self-organization, that is the real resources for the political action of the Russians in Kazakhstan, is extremely low. Only 7% ("the Russians themselves") and 3% of Slavic republican social and political organizations hope for "themselves". Firstly, various appeals, inquiries to the republican (31%) or Russian authorities (22%), international organizations (9%), press and television campaigns (17%) are seen as the main forms of struggle for their interests. Dynamic actions like meetings, pickets and demonstrations, especially strikes or open resistance to the authorities, seem too radical to respondents (they were noted by 9% and 3% of the respondents, respectively). Actually, political activities (combination into parties and public organizations that are able to put the representatives of their interests into the legislative bodies, the creation of communities, etc.) was given by a smaller number of respondents (18%). On the other hand, 22% of the respondents believe that "no actions and measures will succeed" [29].

According to B. Abdygaliyev, the real rallying of Russians is prevented by the culture of soviet political paternalism, the weakness of civic awareness of the need to participate in the political life, the general distrust to political leaders, except for the President of Kazakhstan, still retaining the personal authority, the apathy and sense of individual helplessness in front of the social forces. Therefore, with the growing discontent, the current support of Russian social and political organizations is rather weak and it is unlikely that it will take large-scale forms

(if the authorities do not launch a mass active power policy against Russian and Cossack organizations and movements). If the Russians (in addition to the general concern with the decrease of level and quality of the life, the security, the uncertainty of the future, experienced by the Kazakhs as well) are concerned about the loss of their former status, then the Kazakhs are more concerned with the living conditions of the nation and the circumstances of the forming national state than the Russians (moral and legal state of the society and its political institutions, the development of national culture, the destruction of natural environment, the maintenance of a necessary level of the health care, the education of younger generation, etc.). Overall assessments of the satisfaction with the conditions of life for the Russians and the Kazakhs differ significantly: 23% and 41%, respectively. B. Abdigaliyev makes the following conclusion: "In my opinion, the nature of differences is attributable to two circumstances: a higher assessment of the former social status of the Russians, their higher level of inquiries and a negative assessment of the current situation, as well as the substantially greater concern for their future" [30].

This analysis allows us to make some conclusions and suggestions.

1. Investigations of value orientations should be conducted within the frameworks of the civilizational approach and take into account both the specifics of the mentality of representatives of different civilizational areas and the peculiarities of the development stage experienced by this society, especially if this society is in the process of transformation.

2. There is no crisis of values associated with the transformation processes in Kazakhstan; but there are two different coexisting models of value systems, one of which tends towards the post-industrial western model of values, and the other one towards the patriarchal and collectivist model of values. This is to a large extent connected with the status of the country's social and economic development. Therefore, the crisis that Kazakhstan is experiencing now is not a crisis of values within each individual, but a collision of different paradigms of thinking in the matter of choice of the ways for the country's further development; a choice between traditional society and the society where the individual is at the center of attention rather than the community.

3. As the presidential elections showed, even in conditions of hardly taken consequences of the reforms, the majority of population has decided on a modern type of society that has prospects in a dynamically changing world. However, as the elections have once again confirmed, the population of the country is far from being homogeneous in its value orientations. In different regions and different age groups, its deep psychological readiness to live in conditions of the real transformation and modernization of the society is quite various, which risks the serious conflicts if the problem is not taken into consideration by the authorities.

It is impossible to conduct a direct connection between the improvement (deterioration) of the economy and the

public mood. The consciousness inadequately and asynchronously reacts to objective changes. The well-being and the satisfaction of people often do not coincide. Here we are faced with another paradox of the transitivity: the well-being of people starts growing at some stage, and the satisfaction with existing position starts declining, which affect the unpredictable results of elections.

4. The historical changes cause the huge psychic tension among the people. And, nevertheless, the analysis of the presidential election shows that the mass and steroid reactions at rallies and demonstrations, in the media, the constant search for new ideals are not typical for Kazakhstan. If the uncertainty has become one of the most perceptible pain points for many CIS countries, which is perceived as the disaster, the Kazakhstanis perceived this uncertainty as a step for their own choice. The social instinct of people tells them that any sharp 180-degree changes will create new ones if the old problems haven't been solved.

The defeat of the communist leader S. Abdildin was predetermined for many objective reasons, the main of which was that the people did not accept the program of "idealizing the past", the program settings of ultimate promises. In the course of the election campaign, even for a significant part of the communist electorate it has become apparent that the communist leader has no clear answers to the direct question "how?"

The voters turned out to be deaf even to a type of the leader of direct action, who has presupposed the establishment of decisive and speedy removal of the most painful problems of the majority's life. This role was very well played by Gani Kasymov at the presidential election and the option of "direct action" was quite attractive at the first appearance. But during the election campaign, people began to understand that simple solutions are impractical, and their promises are suspicious. They were more perceived as manipulations for getting voices rather than a program. The people did not support the tendency to find simple solutions for complex problems, to bypass the inevitable difficulties, to shorten the time for achieving the desired condition [31].

4. It can be stated with the certain assurance that a stage of the primary adaptation of Kazakhstani society to new realities has been passed. The majority of citizens realize that the initiated reforms, including the crisis phenomena accompanying them, are not a temporary phenomenon, that everything is serious and here to stay, and that, accordingly, it is necessary to search for own place in the new system of relations. This seems to be the source of preservation of the social and political stability, which have failed to shake the permanently present social tension in the society, various social and intra-state conflicts. But the fact that this adaptation is not based on a solid economic foundation and it is rather a social and psychological phenomenon does not provide guarantees that other forms of the organization of public life cannot be solicited by society.

Hence, the presence of two dominants of the public mood – the dissatisfaction with the situation in the coun-

try and the actions of the authorities and, accordingly, the desire for change. However, this desire is blocked by no smaller, and perhaps an even bigger, hankering for the stability, in order to avoid even a worse scenario. The conjuncture of the election campaign only strengthened this mood, giving it a personalized character. The figure of the President personified social stability. Thus, the tendency to radical change is indicative for mass consciousness rather than the ordering of the existing social and economic and political system, giving the more fair nature to it with the help of methods and means that do not require the new adaptation.

5. Mass consciousness in Kazakhstani society is characterized by an eclectic combination of contradictory ideas. The absence of a political and ideological complex, capable to structure and rationally interpret the reality is peculiar for this and it creates the need for the

formation of a new ideological paradigm being a condition for maintaining the state identity and the stability of a system.

Mistrust of the communist ideology, formed as a result of its dogmatism and ineffectiveness in the context of the new social and political needs of the social development, does not mean the complete displacement of its basic explanatory principles, continuing to exist in combination with the orientation towards liberal, national and other values, from the public consciousness.

6. The study of mass consciousness, public preferences on the eve and during the election campaigns shows that Kazakhstan belongs to a true syncretic society where the value of a person is determined by his/her belonging to a specific social aggregate: profession, ethnic group, class, organization - rather than its qualities.

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ON THE ISSUE OF THE BASIC POLITICAL TRANSIT MODELS*

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(headed the KazISS from May 2000 to May 2005)

Abstract. In this article, the author aims to identify effective and most relevant mechanisms of democratization for Kazakhstan. After reviewing and analyzing the processes of democratization, the author outlines the general transformation patterns of the political system, highlighting and characterizing the stages of democratization of Kazakhstan. In conclusion, the author makes a number of recommendations for the further adaptation of adequate democratization mechanisms in the RoK.

Key words: Democratization, political transit, democratization models, Kazakhstan, democratization of Kazakhstan

САЯСИ ТРАНЗИТТИҢ НЕГІЗГІ МОДЕЛЬДЕРІ

Мәулен Әшімбаев

Аңдатпа. Мақалада автор Қазақстан үшін демократияландырудың тиімді және ең маңызды тетіктерін анықтауды мақсат етеді. Демократияландыру үдерістерін қарастырып, талдағаннан кейін, автор Қазақстанның демократияландыру кезеңдерін айқындай және сипаттай отырып саяси жүйені трансформациялаудың жалпы үлгісін ерекшелейді. Қорытындылай келе, Қазақстандағы демократияландырудың тиісті тетіктерін одан әрі бейімдеуге қатысты бірқатар ұсыныстар жасайды.

Түйін сөздер: Демократияландыру, саяси транзит, демократияландыру модельдері, Қазақстан, Қазақстанның демократизациясы

К ВОПРОСУ ОБ ОСНОВНЫХ МОДЕЛЯХ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО ТРАНЗИТА

Маулен Ашимбаев

Аннотация. В данной статье автор ставит целью выявление эффективных и наиболее релевантных для Казахстана механизмов демократизации. Рассмотрев и проанализировав процессы демократизации, автор выделяет общие закономерности трансформации политической системы, выделяя и характеризуя этапы демократизации Казахстана. В заключении автор выводит ряд рекомендаций для дальнейшей адаптации в РК подходящих механизмов демократизации.

Ключевые слова: Демократизация, политический транзит, модели демократизации, Казахстан, демократизация Казахстана

The challenges of the transition from totalitarianism to democracy can be described by the fact that the establishment of a democratic state is not so much a revival of something lost, but an entirely new phenomenon in the history of Kazakhstan. Therefore, in order to find effective mechanisms for implementing this political reform, it is necessary to actively use the experience accumulated by those countries that have already experienced or, like

us, are still experiencing the transit process.

This approach to implementing political reform in Kazakhstan is in line with the adopted long-term conceptual state documents. Thus, the "Kazakhstan -2030" Strategy emphasizes that "... our model should reflect the convergence of different models of social development. Our model will determine our own path of development, combining the elements of other models, but relying

* *Kazakhstan-spectrum. Science journal. №1 (15) 2001.*

mainly on our specific conditions, history, new citizenship and intentions, taking into account the specificity of the stages of development" [1].

At the end of the 20th century, the process of democratization became widespread in many countries and became a global phenomenon. In the mid-1970s, about 40 countries were counted as democracies; and by the end of the century more than 100 states had democratic political systems.

It should be borne in mind that the process of democratization in most states of Latin America, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe and the former USSR is still far from its completion. However, the accumulated experience of these countries regarding the transformation of political systems is of great practical value, making it possible to trace the dynamics of democratic processes, and to determine the specific features of the transformation of political regimes in different countries.

In order to reveal the general patterns of the processes of transition to democracy in various countries, it is advisable to make a conditional classification of states that are transforming their political systems, according to six criteria:

- 1) by the pace of democratic transformation;
- 2) by the content of the transition process;
- 3) by forms of democratic process;
- 4) by the determinants of democratic transit;
- 5) by the extent of citizen involvement in the democratic process;
- 6) The availability of institutional prerequisites for the processes of democratization processes in these countries.

In terms of the pace of democratic transformation, all countries that are implementing or have implemented political reforms can be divided into four groups:

1. Countries in which the process of transition to democracy has accelerated. This includes most of the countries of Eastern Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) and the Baltic States. The success of democratic reforms in these countries was due to the existence of the necessary economic and socio-cultural prerequisites; and the existence of an historical experience of the existence of democratic institutions.

By the early 1990s, these states managed to lay the foundations for new democracies by holding free elections; adopting "pre-socialist" constitutions; and recreating the institutions of parliamentary democracy.

Now, in these countries, there are definite signs of the stabilization of new democratic institutions and relations. This is manifested in the regular holding of free elections; alternation of the largest parties being in control; and a positive perception by voters of the democratic principles of the functions of management.

2. Russia and the majority of the CIS countries (Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, etc.) have chosen a gradual pace at which to reform the political system. Georgia and Azerbaijan returned to this path after the fall of the first " democratic regimes".

In general, the choice of this pace of reform of political systems has been predetermined by the need to solve acute social and economic problems, creating the appropriate conditions for the development of democracy.

3. In a number of countries, the so-called variable rate of democratic transformations is observed: i.e. the periods of forced changes alternate with stops, "slips" and rollbacks. This group of countries includes a number of states in Latin America, in which the activities of the democratically elected governments have been interwoven with the establishment of military and authoritarian regimes.

4. A continuous pace of political transformation, conditioned by the existence of "enlightened" authoritarian regimes, was chosen by some states of the former "socialist block " and some Asian countries (e.g. Indonesia in the time of Suharto and others).

Most of these countries have weak socioeconomic and political prerequisites for democratizing the political system. Therefore, for the rapid and successful implementation of market transformations in these countries, it was necessary to establish an "enlightened" authoritarian regime. In the difficult conditions of the transition period, the levers of rigid state administration turned out to be a mobilizing mechanism and the most suitable way in which market reforms can be implemented consistently.

The "enlightened" authoritarian power in such countries formally, but quite positively, refers to democratic traditions. The experience of the countries of "enlightened" authoritarianism shows that tough state power in countries with transitional economies has the capacity to bring about reform.

However the examples of some countries testify that there are limits to such a reform. Where a regime of "enlightened " authoritarianism does not objectively seek to build a model of society in which, along with developed market relations , democratic institutions begin to develop more and more, it does not lose its reformatory essence, which leads to a political impasse and the crisis of the entire political system. A good example of this is the events in Indonesia in the aftermath of the time of Suharto.

According to the internal content of the course of political reforms, the transit countries can be combined into the following groups:

1. These are the countries that have simultaneously carried out economic and political reforms and created their own independent statehood, i.e. carried out a complex transformation. These are almost all CIS countries (except Russia), Slovakia, the countries of Eastern Europe, formed after the break-up of Yugoslavia (Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia).

2. The second group of countries carried out **political and economic reforms**. These include most of the countries of Eastern Europe; and the countries of Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile).

3. The third group of countries includes those in

which **only the political system** has changed. These are the countries of Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, and Greece). The process of political change in these countries has been rather rapid but also smooth. After political reforms, certain economic changes can take place in some countries.

According to the majority of researchers, the strategy of successful democratic transition in these countries has been characterized by the fact that they consistently carry out political democratization; build and consolidate effective democratic institutions; and then create what X. Linz and A. Stepan have called "economic society", i.e. a system of social guarantees and intermediary institutions between the state and the market; and only after that painful economic transformations have been performed [2].

1. The fourth group includes a number of States in East and South-East Asia (for example, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore), where the emphasis has been on **exclusively economic reforms**. These countries developed according to the so-called "catch-up model" of modernization; and achieved successful results of reforms in the economy without forcing changes in the political sphere. China can also be attributed to this group of countries, where, in the opinion of Russian researcher A. Yu. Melville, economic reforms not only precede, but also actually replace, political reforms [3].

At the very beginning of the transition period, these countries chose a course of intensive economic development that preceded the democratization of the political system. Such a strategy allowed these countries to avoid socio-political destabilization; and to prepare the necessary social and economic prerequisites for the gradual implementation of democratic reforms at a later stage.

In the course of transition to democracy, transit countries can be conditionally grouped as follows:

1. In a number of countries, the process of transforming the political regime was carried out peacefully. These countries include the countries of Eastern Europe, in which the so-called "velvet revolutions" took place - the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and most of the CIS countries.

2. In some countries, the transition to democratic regime was the result of an acute **internal confrontation and the struggle of elites**. These countries include Russia and Indonesia.

3. **The revolutionary form of transition** to democracy was inherent in Romania and some countries of Central and Latin America.

The process of transition to democracy in the different countries was **determined in different ways**, i.e. the impulse for democratization has been either an external or an internal factor; or both external and internal at the same time.

1. **External factors** for carrying out democratic transformations played a major role in the countries of **Eastern and Central Europe**. In these countries, the democratic transformation began mostly under the pow-

erful influence of an external factor - perestroika in the former USSR.

External factors played a special role in the political development of a number of countries in South-East Asia. The course of the political process in these states was significantly influenced by so-called "locomotive" countries. The economic, political and military presence of the United States, Great Britain, Japan, Australia and other Western countries in the region served as a powerful factor that catalyzed the establishment of democratic traditions in a number of southeastern countries.

2. A good example of a situation where **internal factors** played a decisive role in the process of democratization of the political system is the experience of **Indonesia** and of several **countries in Latin America**. In these countries, as a result of the growth of internal anti-regime groups and the political activity of citizens, the existing forms of government were liquidated. In these countries, the course of democratization of the political system was proclaimed.

3. For democratic reforms in a number of CIS countries, primarily **Russia**, external and internal factors played approximately equal roles. Democratization in these countries has been influenced approximately equally by the goal-oriented policies of individual countries on the one hand, and, on the other, the internal economic, political, social and national contradictions of the regime, as well as the growth of antitotalitarian and dissident groups within states.

The processes of democratization in every society differ also **in the scale of the involvement of certain social forces**. Conventionally, in terms of participation, democratic transformations in different transition countries occur at three main levels:

4. Large segments of the population can participate **in the transition to a democratic system**. In its pure form, such a scale of democratic transformation was observed in Romania, in some countries of Southern Europe and in Central and Latin America, where the previous totalitarian system was demolished "from the bottom", under the pressure of a large mass of the population.

One of the classic examples of such a scenario of political transit may be post-war Italy, where the transition from the totalitarian system to democracy began immediately after the overthrow of the fascist dictatorship, "from the bottom" - during the popular resistance movement. The ideology of the Resistance was marked by the emergence on the political arena of broad social strata, at which ordinary citizens began to feel their personal responsibility for the destiny of the country [4].

5. The transition to democracy can occur with the **only with the participation of political elites**. In a number of CIS countries, political transformations were determined by the political elite.

In addition to the post-Soviet countries, a very indicative example of a rather successful political transformation in this scenario can also be seen at the end of the

1970s. The main distinguishing feature of the Spanish scenario of political transit is that its implementation became possible thanks to the national consensus reached in the late 1970s. The merit in the establishment of national consensus belonged to a large extent to the political elite of Spain, whose representatives in October 1977 concluded an agreement that left its mark in history as the "Moncloa Pact" [5].

6. Democratic transformation can occur under the influence of competition and the struggle of **several political groups**. In particular, within several years in several CIS countries, political transformations were accompanied by periodic confrontation and internal competition between various political groups.

Different countries that have embarked on a course of democratic transit have different **institutional preconditions** for this. According to this criterion, the "new democracies" can be divided into three main groups:

1. In a number of countries that did not previously have the experience of establishing classical democratic institutions, **political reforms were started practically from scratch**. This group includes almost all the CIS countries with the exception of Russia.

2. In countries where the elements or rudiments of democratic institutions were introduced in their historical past, the transition to democracy has been carried out under the banner of a **"return to a once-lost democratic tradition"**. A number of countries in **Southern, Eastern and Central Europe**, as well as the Baltic States can be included in this group.

3. In some countries, the transition to democracy is complex, because it represents a process of returning to lost democratic traditions, but at a more sophisticated level level. Here, **Russia is a case in point**, in which the revival of former democratic institutions takes place in more civilized and modernized forms.

This analysis allows us to single out the following **patterns**, which are traceable during the transformation of the political system in most countries of the "new" democracies:

First. Rapid rates of political change are characteristic of those countries in which the processes of democratization were caused by both internal and external causes, mass demand and participation of broad segments of the population in these processes. At the same time, the process of democratization were most successful in those countries that had institutional preconditions; and returned to pre-existing democratic institutions.

Second. In those countries that simultaneously carried out economic and political transformations and created their national statehood, the process of democratization took a more gradual, systematic character.

Third. The lack of serious results in political reform is characteristic for countries which are lacking the necessary economic and socio-cultural conditions, and where the process of democratization is only a consequence of the struggle for power of individual elites and political groups.

Fourth. As world experience shows, the purely mechanical transfer of those methods that played a central role in the democratization of the political system of one country turns out to be useless and even harmful in another country carrying out similar processes. Therefore, the process of democratization for most countries should be individualized.

Fifth. History does not know an examples of the existence of democracy in a state without a market and private property. The market economy ensures the autonomy of the individual; prevents total state control; and stimulates the development of such qualities necessary for democracy as the pursuit of freedom, responsibility, and enterprise. This is one of the basic conditions for democratization.

Sixth. The geopolitical location of the country is of great importance for democratic transformations. Location "in the areas of traditional democracies" is essential for accelerating political reforms. At the same time, a complex geopolitical situation can restrain the processes of political reform.

Seventh. The level of democratization process depends the factors, as variety of the social structure of the population, the presence not of a non-homogeneous, amorphous mass, but clearly shaped social groups, expressing someone's interests and having the ability to form state-independent parties and public organizations. The level of well-being of the majority of citizens is also a determining factor for the degree of support for political and economic transformations. At the same time, the middle class, which is characterized by a higher level of education, self-awareness, political judgments and activity, is the main interested group (social base) and a support in the process of strengthening democracy. A high degree of urbanization and education of the population also speeds up the pace of democratic change.

Thus, in Kazakhstan, we must take into account these global features of political transit, which will enable us to build effective mechanisms for implementing political reforms.

Now, we will try to position Kazakhstan in this system taking into account the typologization of political transit.

The pace of democratic transformation links Kazakhstan to states that are characterized by an incremental pace of political reform.

In general, if one analyzes the course of political reforms in Kazakhstan, it is possible to designate several stages in this process.

During the first stage (1990 - 1993) - let us call it provisionally "the period of fighting" - the main changes were directed not so much at the creation of a new system as to the destruction of the existing one.

At that time, a complete dismantling of the party-soviet system of governance took place, the political monopoly of one party was liquidated, and a multi-party system was introduced. The rights and freedoms of citizens

were significantly expanded. At this stage, the formation of a parliamentary-presidential form of government took place in the country, in which the status of the head of the executive power was fixed in the president.

During the second stage (1993 - 1995) - the "period of searching" - the process of searching, by trial and error, for a model for the political system of Kazakhstan was conducted, taking into account the political, economic, socio-cultural, psychological, geopolitical, elite and national characteristics of the country.

Changes in the political system of society were formalized in the first Constitution of 1993.

During this period, the principle of separation of powers was established in the country. Legislative, executive and judicial bodies were first defined as independent branches of state power. For the first time, alternative elections to the Parliament of the country were held; and new bodies of representative power in the localities - maslikhats were formed.

During the third stage (1995 - 1998) - the "period of crystallization", the process of creating the core of the political system of the country was followed through.

The development of Kazakhstan's political system was determined by the provisions of the Constitution of 1995 adopted in the referendum, which legally consolidated the transition to a presidential form of government. The country created a professional two-chamber Parliament and other foundations of the political system.

A new stage of development (since September 1998) - the "period of evolution" - is characterized by an increase in the mass of democratic elements in the political system of the country.

This period begins with the introduction of significant changes in the Constitution and other legislative acts in autumn 1998, expanding the power of Parliament and changing electoral legislation. The reform of the electoral system was carried out.

On this basis in 1999, direct and general elections of the President of Kazakhstan were held, and then elections to the Parliament were performed using a mixed system, which provided for voting on party lists.

Under the internal content of reforms, Kazakhstan links to countries that carry out complex transformation.

The Republic carried out transformations simultaneously in three directions:

- creation of the foundations of an independent state;
- market reforms;
- political reforms.

By the form of transition to democracy, the Republic links to countries where this process is conducted smoothly.

In many respects, Kazakhstan's independence is connected with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was promoted by internal contradictions, objective and subjective external and internal factors.

According to the determinism of the democratic process, one can say that in the Republic of Kazakhstan

the political reforms in the late 80's and early 90's were mainly due to external influence. To date, internal-reform factors have come to the forefront. Internal factors include the interests of the middle class of the population, regional elites, and organized political groups.

This kind of determinism of democratic reform in Kazakhstan to a certain extent echoes the triad of dominant paradigms of the development of the political process in Kazakhstan, proposed by the Kazakh researcher M.S. Mashan. According to Mashin, if the first stage (1985 -1991) of the post-totalitarian transformation in our country was marked by the dominance of the national paradigm, then the second stage (1992-2002) is determined by the paradigm of state-political development on which the search for the optimal state and political structure of Kazakhstan began to determine the content, logic and direction of the development of our state. The next, third, stage of the political transition will be dominated by the social and economic paradigm and will begin at approximately the level of 2003-2005. [6].

By the scale of the involvement of various social forces, Kazakhstan can be linked to countries where political reforms are largely started by the political elite.

Today, as the middle class appears in the political-reform process, this class of the population is increasingly important.

According to the institutional preconditions, the **republic belongs to the countries where the reforms began practically from scratch**.

In the late 1980s, we did not have sufficient economic, sociocultural prerequisites for democratic reforms.

Based on this classification, the following conclusions can be drawn about Kazakhstan:

First. In Kazakhstan, attempts to speed up the process of political reforms without creating the necessary economic and socio-cultural prerequisites are doubtful. Therefore, reform should be introduced in a step-by-step way. The main objectives for the normal development of democratic processes is the formation of a middle class; an effective party system that embraces the interests of different social groups; the formation of sustainable democratic traditions; the democratic culture of the population; and the overcoming of legal nihilism

Second. At the same time, it is impossible today to try to impede in any way the process of political liberalization. This is fraught with serious political consequences. Today we have a real basis for democratic reforms. If earlier political reforms were demanded by some political groups, today the reforms are carried out with a certain social base

Ten years of market reforms today have significantly changed the social structure of society. According to experts, today about 500 thousand people in the country can be attributed to the middle class. These are groups of people in whom certain political interests are crystallized and who need civilized channels for the realization of these interests.

Third. Kazakhstan needs to have its own model of political transformation, which should not copy other's experience. It is necessary to take into account the mentality of the population, existing traditions, geopolitical peculiarities of the country.

In any case, the political system of Kazakhstan may be characterized by a strong central authority with sufficient powers. Due to a number of circumstances, primarily geopolitical, we must have strong state institutions.

This imposes its own specificity on the processes of democratization in Kazakhstan.

Thus, when implementing political reform in Kazakhstan, it is necessary to take into account a number of features of the country, as well as world experience. This will allow Kazakhstan to pass through political transit more smoothly and for an effective political system to be created that is able to adequately respond to the challenges of the new century.

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KAZAKHSTAN AND THE EAEU: CURRENT STATE AND TRENDS

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Abstract. January 1, 2018, marked three years since the founding of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The Customs Code of the EAEU entered into effect the same day. This article considers major changes which took place in and around the EAEU during the same period, as well as the prospects for Eurasian economic integration in the coming years.

Key words: Eurasian Economic Union, integration, prospects, interregional cooperation, Economic belt of the Silk Road, "Nurly Zhol".

ҚАЗАҚСТАН ЖӘНЕ ЕАЭО: ЖАҒДАЙЫ ЖӘНЕ ПЕРСПЕКТИВАЛАРЫ

Болат Сұлтанов

Аңдатпа. 2018 жылдың 1 қаңтарында Еуразиялық экономикалық одақтың (ЕАЭО) құрылғанына 3 жыл болды. Сол күні ЕАЭО Кеден кодексі күшіне енді. Бұл мақалада осы кезең ішінде ЕАЭО-ғы және оның айналасында орын алған маңызды өзгерістер, және таяу болашақтағы еуразиялық экономикалық интеграцияның перспективалары қарастырылады.

Түйін сөздер: Еуразиялық экономикалық одақ, интеграция, перспективалар, аймақаралық ынтымақтастық, Жібек жолының экономикалық белдеуі, «Нұрлы жол».

КАЗАХСТАН И ЕАЭС: СОСТОЯНИЕ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ

Болат Сұлтанов

Аннотация. 1 января 2018 года исполнилось 3 года существования Евразийского экономического союза (ЕАЭС). И в этот же день вступил в силу Таможенный кодекс ЕАЭС. В данной статье рассматриваются важные изменения, произошедшие за этот период в ЕАЭС и вокруг него, а перспективы евразийской экономической интеграции в ближайшей перспективе.

Ключевые слова: Евразийский экономический союз, интеграция, перспективы, межрегиональное сотрудничество, Экономический пояс Шелкового пути, «Нурлы жол».

Prospects for Interregional Cooperation

In our opinion, there is an alternative to the revival of a world divided into hostile blocks and a slide towards a new Cold War. The alternative is the creation of a common economic and humanitarian space; a security space from Lisbon to Vladivostok, including free trade spaces between the EAEU and the European Union (EU); and Eurasian security in accordance with the Astana Declaration of the OSCE. (Astana, 2 December 2010).

Many European politicians support this project.

Thus, in the Declaration of the leaders of Germany, Russia, Ukraine and France, in support of a complex of measures executing the Minsk Agreements, adopted on February 12, 2015, the following was underlined: "The leaders are still committed to the creation of a common humanitarian and economic space from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans based on full respect for international law and the principles of the OSCE". (Declaration in support

of the complex of measures in execution of the Minsk Agreements, adopted on February 12, 2015. Minsk, February 12, 2015.- <http://www.kremlin.ru>).

On January 19, the head of European diplomacy, Federica Mogherini, spoke out in favor of a dialogue between the EAEU and the EU, stating that she considered it important for the EU to create a free-trade zone from Lisbon to Vladivostok; and to develop trade and economic cooperation between the EU and the EAEU [1].

In 2016, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, N.A. Nazarbayev, agreed with the chairman of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, to hold a joint forum on the topic of "Eurasian Economic Union - European Union" in the autumn of the same year [2]. This meeting was later postponed for an indefinite period of time.

Unfortunately, the aggravation of relations between Russian and West has frozen the idea of Eurasian cooperation and security.

Nevertheless, given that the Eurasian region is an important geopolitical and geoeconomic factor in world politics, at the intersection of the interests of both global and regional players, Kazakhstan has been consistently advocating constructivization of the processes in the Eurasian space and the reduction of potential conflict through deepening cooperation and integration. In this connection, on April 1, 2016, in Washington, the President of Kazakhstan, N.A. Nazarbayev, put forward his next initiative - the creation of the Common Eurasian Economic Space [3].

The Russian President, Vladimir Putin, developed this initiative by proposing the creation of the Great Eurasian Space at the International Forum "One Belt and One Road" (Beijing, May 14, 2017) by adding the potential of the EAEU, the "One Belt and One Road" project, the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, with the participation of the states of the European Union. In this case, Vladimir Putin believes, it will be possible, for the first time in history, to create a harmonious, balanced and comprehensive common space of cooperation from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean [4].

However, today the prospects for establishing cooperation between the EAEU and the European Union need to be considered through the prism of US global interests. This was recalled by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, S.V. Lavrov, speaking at the "Government Hour" in the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Moscow, December 15, 2017). According to Sergey Lavrov, the key to establishing cooperation with the EU is not at all in Europe, but in the US, as "the prospects for relations with the European Union remain hostage to the anti-Russian line of a narrow group of countries within the EU, virtually, acting in the interests of the US, but not Europe. Meanwhile, promoted by the Brussels bureaucracy - on direct orders from overseas - the sanction spiral caused serious damage to European

business (primarily German business), which lost some of its positions in the Russian market" [5].

This position of the Brussels bureaucracy was explicitly expressed by the Ambassador of the EU in Russia, Markus Ederer, who stated on February 15 of this year in an interview with the newspaper "Kommersant" that the current state of affairs between West and Russia is even more dangerous than during the Cold War [6].

European entrepreneurs have a slightly different position on the issue of cooperation with Russia and the EAEU, who are trying to split economic feasibility and political ambitions into different "baskets".

Thus, on January 18 of this year, at the opening of Berlin International Agricultural Fair "Green Week", the Minister of Agriculture and Food of the FRG, Christian Schmidt, urged the European Union to resume food trade with Russia. According to C. Schmidt, it is good time to restore relations in the field of agricultural supplies.

In his turn, the president of the German Farmers' Association (DVB), Joachim Rukvid, also advocating the abolition of trade restrictions, recalled that prior to the sanctions, Russia, along with the United States and Switzerland, was one of the three largest export markets from the EU. At that time, Russia annually bought in the European Union's meat, fruit and vegetables for about 1.6 billion euros. "We have been building this market for many years. It will take years to rebuild it", J. Rukvid underlined [7].

Indeed, the holy place is never empty. The niches liberated in the markets of the EAEU by European businessmen are being actively pursued by their more enterprising counterparts from China, India and other Asian countries. The documents of the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) note that in 2017 the growth of imports from the countries of the Asia-Pacific region exceeded the growth of imports from the European Union. So, for the first 4 months of 2017, the trade growth of the EAEU with China, compared to the same period in 2016, was 34%; and with Vietnam it was 22.5%. In fact, trade with the United States grew by 28.4% over the same period.

This scenario causes growing concern in European think tanks. Thus, in its expert forecast, the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) report pointed out that it was not Russia but China that represented the greatest long-term threat to the interests of Europe. According to German experts, Greece, the Czech Republic and Hungary are actively using Chinese investments and are the main customers of China in Europe. In its turn, China directs its investments to buy up key sectors of the economies of the small countries of the European Union [8].

In this regard, it should be recalled that in November 2017 in Budapest, the 6th meeting of the heads of government of China and Central and Eastern Europe ("16+1") was held, which was tasked to bring cooperation between China and 16 countries in Central and Eastern Europe to a higher level.

On March 5 of this year, the ex-Chairman of the Bulgarian National Assembly, Mikhail Mikov, told the Xinhua news agency about the need for Bulgaria, as the country presiding in the EU, to promote the active participation of European states in the construction of the Chinese project "The Belt and the Road" [9].

Relationship of the EAEU and the Economic Belt of the Silk Road

As readers will be aware, on May 8, 2015, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping discussed during talks in Moscow the relationship of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Chinese project of the Economic belt of the Silk Road (EBSR), which implies the creation of a common economic space in Eurasia [10].

Over the years, much work has been done in this direction. To date, the PRC has invested \$26 billion in the economy of the EAEU states. The Chinese side plans to allocate at least \$40 billion for the implementation of this project.

According to the Minister of the EEC, D. Ibrayev, "now there is no longer a question as to whether there will be a pairing of two integration projects: the Chinese Silk Road and the EAEU. We have the task to determine in which areas and on what projects it is possible to establish cooperation". According to D. Ibrayev, at present the priority for the EEC is the development of regulatory mechanisms and the development of criteria for projects, which the project participants are interested in [11].

Kazakhstan supports the integration of the EBSR project with the EAEU, hoping to turn our country into a link between East and West.

Conjugation of the Kazakhstani "Nurly Zhol" Project and the Economic Belt of the Silk Road

The leadership of Russia and the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) of the EAEU considers the interface between the interests of the EAEU and the EBSR, primarily through the prism of implementing infrastructure projects in the Eurasian space. At the same time, the EEC reasonably believes that European countries are actively seeking access to the markets of China and Asia. In its turn, China, being afraid of a possible naval blockade by the US and its allies, is interested in land routes to enter the markets of European countries.

The leadership of Kazakhstan, supporting in general the interface of the EAEU and the EBSR, put forward its own version of the interface. Namely the plan of integrating the "Nurly Zhol" program with the EBSR, in which several other priorities are placed.

The first "Nurly Zhol" conjunctions with the EBSR were agreed during the visit of the Head of Kazakhstan to China in September 2015, within the framework of which a number of relevant intergovernmental agreements were signed.

The need to deepen bilateral cooperation was confirmed at the talks of N.A. Nazarbayev and Xi Jinping

in Astana on June 8, 2017. At the talks, it was noted that over 25 years of Kazakhstan's independence China has invested \$43 billion in the Kazakhstani economy. Within the framework of this visit, the Development Bank of the People's Republic of China concluded agreements with Kazakhstan partners for a total of \$6 billion [12]. The leaders of the two countries spoke in favor of speeding up the conjugation of Kazakhstan's development program "Nurly Zhol" with the "The Belt and the Road" initiative in order to "deepen the integration of the development strategies of the two states" [13].

In January-December 2017, the volume of trade between Kazakhstan and China (according to the data of the Chinese side) was \$18 billion, an increase of 37.4% compared to 2016. At the same time, the volume of exports from the PRC to the RoK was \$11.64 billion, the volume of imports from the RoK to the PRC was \$6.36 billion [14].

In the field of transit transport, the emphasis is made on the development of the transport corridor "Western China - Western Europe", which provides for the construction of automobile and railway corridors, the creation of transport and logistics centers. In this regard, the transition of the Trans-Eurasian railway Chongqing - Xian - Lanzhou - Urumqi - Kazakhstan - Russia - Belarus - Poland - Duisburg (Germany) into operational mode becomes important. The total length of this railway is 11,179 kilometers. Travel time is 14-16 days, while freight transportation by sea takes 45-50 days.

In 2016, the number of container trains in the China - Europe - China direction has more than doubled (from 581 to 1,212 trains) [15]. In 2017, their number reached 3,673. According to the Director General of the German Foreign Trade and Investment Agency, J. Friedrich, over the several years container trains have taken their place in the field of goods transportation between China and Europe due to "increased speed, efficiency and reliability", and strengthened the ties of German Duisburg and Hamburg with China, Europe and Central Asia [16].

Currently, after preliminary negotiations between the Russian Railways and the leadership of the Kazakh and Chinese railways, a project to build a high-speed railway called "Eurasia" along the Beijing-Astana-Moscow-Berlin route is being worked out. The length of the main route is 9.5000 km. According to forecasts, the total cost of the project is 7.84 trillion rubles; and the Russian site will cost 3.58 trillion rubles. In general, the main route can be built in 8-10 years, and will be paid off after 16 years of operation. By 2050, passenger traffic may reach 36.9 million people and the volume of traffic will be 12.6-20 million tons. The maximum speed will be 350 km/h and the average speed 250 km/h. Thus, a passenger can travel from Beijing to Berlin in 40 hours.

The Chinese side supports the early opening of transit cargo shipments along the road towards China - Kazakhstan - Russia, as well as automobile routes between

the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of the PRC, the East Kazakhstan Region of the RoK and the Omsk Region of the Russian Federation. [17]

The creation in 2017-2020 of joint industrial projects in metallurgy, chemistry, fertilizer manufacturing, and machine building is an equally important priority of the Kazakh-Chinese economic cooperation. On April 2017, at the 8th meeting of the Kazakhstan-China Cooperation Committee in Astana, it was noted that currently 51 projects in the field of industry, innovation, transport and logistics for a total of \$27 billion were being implemented [18].

As a result of the Fourth meeting of the Kazakhstan-China Business Council (Astana, June 8, 2017), 22 commercial and framework agreements were signed for a total of about \$7 billion. Bilateral agreements were reached on the implementation of investment projects for the production of methanol and ammonia on the territory of the SEZ in the Atyrau region, as well as the launch of the production of caustic soda on the territory of the SEZ in the Zhambyl region. A memorandum on the implementation of projects for the construction of wind power stations in the Shelek corridor of the Almaty region and a memorandum on the expansion of the wind park in the area of the town of Ereymentau were also signed [19].

In the area of cultural and humanitarian cooperation, cooperation in the field of education and science is a priority. There are 5 Confucius universities in Kazakhstan, including 2 in Almaty. Currently, about 14 thousand Kazakhstani students study in China. In 2017-2022, the Chinese side will allocate an additional 200 grants for Kazakhstani students. In turn, about one thousand students from China study in Kazakhstan, most of whom are ethnic Kazakhs from Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In 2016, the Government of the People's Republic of China directed 85 Chinese students to study in Kazakhstan, all of whom study in Almaty.

Kazakhstan-EAEU

Taking into account incessant criticism from the national populists, the leadership of Kazakhstan regards the EAEU as an economic association with uniform rules for the movement of goods, services of capital, labor resources. At the same time, while reassuring the Western alliance, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, N.A. Nazarbayev, repeatedly stressed that there was no question of any re-establishment of the USSR. At the same time, Western partners' attention was drawn to the need to eradicate the stereotypes of the Cold War, which prevented them from looking to the future [20].

Despite the West's aversion to the Eurasian integration in general, the majority of the population of Kazakhstan nevertheless supports integrated cooperation with Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Russia, with whose peoples we have been connected for centuries through economic, historical, cultural and humanitarian ties of cooperation.

Tellingly, the integration feelings in Kazakhstan are supported not only by representatives of older generations, most of whose lives were coincided with the USSR, but also by young people.

On January 1, 2018, the new Customs Code of the EAEU entered into force. In Kazakhstan, with the participation of representatives of government bodies and the business community, the necessary explanatory and organizational and preparatory work was conducted in a timely manner. In particular, Kazakhstan submitted 552 amendments (38% of all amendments), 65% of amendments were accepted. The new Customs Code was synchronized with a number of laws of Kazakhstan: amendments were made to the Tax Code, the Environmental Code, the Code of Administrative Offenses, etc.

The results of the economic development of the EAEU in 2017 indicate an increase in industrial production by 1.7%; agricultural products by 2.5%; freight turnover by 5.6%; and passenger turnover by 6.8% [21].

Foreign trade turnover of the Republic of Kazakhstan in January-December 2017 amounted to \$77,646.8 million, an increase of 25.0% as compared to the same period in 2016. This included exports \$48,342.1 million (an increase of 31.6%); and imports of \$29,304.7 million (an increase of 15.5%).

At the same time, mutual trade between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the EAEU states amounted to \$17,359.6 million, i.e. 22.36% of the total foreign trade turnover of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The growth in trade with the EAEU states in January-December 2017 compared to the same period in 2016 amounted to 25.9%. This included exports \$5,118.3 million (30.2% more); and imports of \$12,241.3 million (24.1% more).

Trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Russia in January-December 2017 amounted to \$15,988.1 million, i.e. 20.59% of the total foreign trade turnover of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

This included exports to the Russian Federation in January-December 2017 of \$4,515.2 million (31.1% more compared to January-December 2016); and imports of \$11,472.9 million (23.5% more) [22].

Since 1991, the volume of Russian investments in Kazakhstan has exceeded \$10 billion, and Kazakhstan's to Russia \$3 billion. 93 joint investment projects worth over \$20 billion have been implemented in various fields of the economy, in particular, in energy and transport, mining and metallurgy complex, machine building, shipbuilding, chemical industry, agriculture, etc. [23].

The level of trade with other members of the EAEU is much lower. For example, Kazakhstan's trade with Kyrgyzstan in January-December 2017 was \$758.4 million; with Belarus \$604.1 million; and with Armenia \$9 million.

For comparison, the trade turnover between Kazakhstan and all the EU states in 2017 was about \$30 billion. But, for example, our country's trade with one of the

leading EU's locomotives, France, was only \$3.39 billion (exports of \$2.86 billion and imports of \$535 million) in 2017.

The above statistics somewhat cooled the hot heads of the "Eurasian-pessimists" who tried to prove the hopelessness of Eurasian economic integration, based on data on the decline in the trade between Kazakhstan and the members of the EAEU in 2015-2016, including with Russia. At the same time, they ignored the true reasons for the fall in mutual trade, caused mainly by the global fall in prices for energy carriers and commodities, i.e. external factors.

It is also necessary to take into account such an important external factor as the consequences of the neo-Islamic direction of development of Turkey, recently selected by the president of this country, Erdogan. This led, on the one hand, to Ankara's tense relations with the West, and, on the other, to the weakening of the support for the project of the so-called non-ottoman (Turkish) integration that was carried out by Turkey but directed by Washington - in order to discredit the EAEU's project.

However even today we observe such agitational "outbreaks", which are a reflection of the struggle among the political elite of Kazakhstan. It is alarming that such information attacks occur regularly and increasingly. For example, on February 1, 2018, an information outburst occurred in Kazakhstani media that "Russian officials are discussing the possibility of receiving compensation from manufacturers of flat rolled products from Kazakhstan" to a total of \$800 million [24].

It is comforting that the country's top leadership adheres to a clear position on the issue of cooperation within the framework of the EAEU. In particular, the President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, at a meeting with Russian President, Vladimir Putin, (Moscow, December 27, 2017) said: "Today, cooperation within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union shows that it is a necessary and opportune thing". Our attention was drawn to the following thesis of the Head of Kazakhstan, oriented to the future: "I consider it my task to strengthen our relations and continue, and then forward it up the chain" [25].

This position is shared by top Kazakhstani officials, who really assess the situation, and do not go against some anti-Russian publicists. For example, the chairman of the Majilis of the Parliament of the RoK, N. Nigmatulin, at a meeting on February 7, 2018, responding to deputy inquiries and appeals to the Parliament from representatives of the domestic business, sectoral business associations, stated that Kazakhstani officials did not fully protect the rights and legitimate interests of domestic commodity producers within the framework of the EAEU. As an example, N. Nigmatulin cited the situation around the supply of Kazakhstani cement to Russia. According to him, Russian producers annually export to Kazakhstan about 700 thousand tons of cement without restriction, and Kazakhstan enterprises experience seri-

ous difficulties in supplying the same cement to Russia. The reason for this N. Nigmatulin sees not in the machinations of Russia, but in the fact that Kazakhstani representatives in the integration bodies did not respond in a timely manner to the introduction of new standards and new certification rules in the Russian Federation, thereby placing domestic producers in unfavorable conditions.

Conclusions

Given the continuing global financial instability and growing geopolitical tensions, not one state in the world, even the largest and most successful, can develop on its own. Therefore, the world community shows interest in the activities of the EAEU and consider it as a well-established, successfully operating international economic association. Moreover, there is already a positive experience of such cooperation. Thus, Vietnam, which created the first free trade zone (FTZ) with the EAEU, for the first 9 months of 2017 increased exports and imports by 30%. Currently, work is under way to prepare an agreement on the FTZ with Iran, the agreements are under discussion on the establishment of the FTZs with Singapore, Israel, India, Egypt and Serbia.

In the face of the changing situation in the world, the economic and geopolitical importance of membership in the EAEU increases for Kazakhstan. Objectively, for Kazakhstan, which does not have access to the world's oceans and, therefore, to international trade routes, the most optimal option is to create integration alliances with countries that have such opportunities, since 80% of the world industrial potential is concentrated in coastal zones.

Thanks to the EAEU, Kazakhstan will be able to use its transit potential with unified transport tariffs in a common customs space. It is the developed transport infrastructure that will have a positive impact on the expansion of industrial production within the country, and thus on the raising the material well-being of the population.

If one is to speak about concrete results achieved by the EAEU activities after three years, one can look at the following examples.

The Agreement on the Customs Code of the EAEU entered into force. Many processes are transferred into electronic form, which will significantly improve the business climate in the EAEU, and communication between entrepreneurs and customs will be reduced to a minimum.

Since January 1, 2015, a common market operates for services in 43 sectors of the economy. A unified labor market is formed for citizens of all states that are members of the EAEU: now you can get a job without additional licensing procedures.

Unified requirements and conditions for income and taxation of individuals are established. Social conditions and medical care are common across all five countries.

Since January 1, 2016, the diplomas of all universities issued in Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan

and Russia are recognized. Exceptions: medicine, pharmaceuticals, jurisprudence, education. These sectors still require negotiations.

In May 2017 a general market for medicines and medical products was launched.

The concepts of forming a common electricity market, a common market for oil and oil products and a common gas market were approved.

As you can see, a lot has been done. But even more needs to be done, first of all, to allow ordinary people to feel the advantages of the EAEU. We need to form as soon as possible a truly unified “barrier-free” economic space of the EAEU, i.e. overcome “non-integration”.

In our opinion, the emergence in Germany of a movement of entrepreneurs and experts who are in favor of establishing strong contacts between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union deserves special attention. In particular, in Berlin, a Working Group has been created with the remarkable title “Common Economic Space from Lisbon to Vladivostok”, headed by the famous German businessman, Ulf Schneider, founder of the Schneider Group and owner of the economic magazine OstContact, as well as one of the leading German experts, Alexander Rahr. The seventh meeting of the Working Group was held in January this year in Almaty, on February 8 in Moscow (with the participation of the EEC representatives), the ninth is planned to be held in Brussels (with the participation of representatives of the European Commission) in March-April this year.

German businessmen turn to European politicians in Brussels with a persistent request: initiate an official dialog with the EAEU on the harmonization of rules and regulations governing international business and trade and economic activities, taking into account the interests of all trading partners of both economic zones. Pragmatic

Germans say: “Let's divide politics and economy. Let's leave political slogans to politicians and give business people the opportunity to create a common market of the EU and the EAEU with a population of 700 million people”. In this regard, representatives of business circles recall the Astana Declaration of the OSCE, signed in the capital of Kazakhstan on December 2, 2010. Then, as is known, for the first time the President N.A. Nazarbayev's idea of implementing Euro-Asian security was supported.

Proceeding from this, German businessmen believe that it is the Head of Kazakhstan, N.A. Nazarbayev, who could become the coordinator of the negotiations on the creation of the “Common Economic Space from Lisbon to Vladivostok”. Therefore, they appealed to the leader of our country with an official letter, in which they ask him to start practical work in this direction. This initiative was supported by the leading German concerns, such as Siemens, Bosch and others.

This initiative is receiving increasing support in the FRG. Thus, recently, the Chairman of the Eastern Committee of the German Economy, Wolfgang Büchele, stated that Germany continues to regard Russia as a “strategic partner” and strives to establish a common economic space “from Lisbon to Vladivostok” [26].

Moreover, German businessmen believe that it is possible to extend this bridge of cooperation to China. Then the formula becomes wholly universal: “EU + EAEU + Economic belt of the Silk road”. In this super market, Kazakhstan will own one of the leading places, given its transit opportunities.

We are only at the beginning of a long journey. In this situation, to our opinion, the Chinese proverb is quite appropriate, which states: “A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step”

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CENTRAL ASIA: FACING RADICAL ISLAM*

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Abstract. This article examines the global, regional and internal threats and challenges currently faced by Central Asian republics. The author sets out a number of complex security dilemmas in the region which have been caused by a whole set of domestic and external factors. Having analyzed the geopolitical situation of the Central Asian republics, their domestic political make-up and current trends, he sets out various strategies for developing the region as part of the so-called "Great" and "Small" games. Particular attention is paid to the ongoing situation in Syria, which is having a significant effect on the regional security system. As the boundaries of the Syrian conflict have expanded, Central Asian countries have faced a threat from their own citizens, who, having gone to fight in Syria and Iraq, are forming new radical cells on these countries' territories. Guaranteeing stability and security in Central Asia involves stepping up cooperation on both regional and global scales.

Key words: Central Asia, Terrorism, Extremism, Security

ОРТАЛЫҚ АЗИЯ: РАДИКАЛДЫ ИСЛАМ ҚАТЕРЛЕРІ

Ерлан Карин

Аңдатпа. Мақалада Орталық Азия республикалары алдында тұрған жаһандық, аймақтық және ішкі қауіптер мен проблемалар қарастырылады. Автор аймақтағы ішкі және сыртқы факторлардың жиынтығымен туындаған бірқатар күрделі қауіпсіздік дилеммаларын анықтайды. Орталық Азия республикаларының геосаяси жағдайын, олардың ішкі саяси тұрақтылығын және ағымдағы үрдістерін талдай отырып, ол «Ұлы» және «Кіші» деп аталатын ойындардың бір бөлігі ретінде аймақты дамытудың әртүрлі стратегияларын белгілейді. Аймақтық қауіпсіздік жүйесіне елеулі әсер ететін Сирияда болып жатқан жағдайға ерекше көңіл бөлінеді. Сириядағы қақтығыстардың шекарасы кеңейген сайын, Орталық Азия елдеріне қауіп Сирия мен Иракқа соғысқа барған, бұл елдердің аумағында жаңа радикалды ұяшықтар қалыптастырып жатқан өз азаматтарынан туындауда. Орталық Азиядағы тұрақтылық пен қауіпсіздікті қамтамасыз ету аймақтық және ғаламдық ауқымда ынтымақтастықты күшейтуді көздейді.

Түйін сөздер: Орталық Азия, терроризм, экстремизм, қауіпсіздік

ЦЕНТРАЛЬНАЯ АЗИЯ: ВЫЗОВЫ РАДИКАЛЬНОГО ИСЛАМА

Ерлан Карин

Аннотация. В этой статье рассматриваются глобальные, региональные и внутренние угрозы и вызовы, с которыми в настоящее время сталкиваются республики Центральной Азии. Автор устанавливает ряд комплексных дилемм безопасности в регионе, которые были вызваны целым набором внутренних и внешних факторов. Проанализировав геополитическое положение центральноазиатских республик, их внутреннюю политическую составляющую и текущие тенденции, он излагает различные стратегии развития региона как части так называемых «великих» и «малых» игр. Особое внимание уделяется текущей ситуации в Сирии, которая оказывает значительное влияние на региональную систему безопасности. По мере расширения границ сирийского конфликта страны Центральной Азии столкнулись с угрозой со стороны своих собственных граждан, которые, отправившись на борьбу в Сирии и Ираке, формируют новые радикальные ячейки на территориях этих стран. Обеспечение стабильности и безопасности в Центральной Азии предполагает активизацию сотрудничества как в региональном, так и в глобальном масштабах.

Ключевые слова: Центральная Азия, терроризм, экстремизм, безопасность

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Introduction

Twenty-five years after the fall of the Soviet Union and the declaration of independence by the republics of Central Asia, the issue of guaranteeing stability and security still looms large on Central Asia's agenda.

In the post-Soviet period, Central Asia has always been regarded as significant from a security point of view. The Central Asian states played along with this perception and turned it to their advantage, putting forward various proposals to safeguard stability and security. External players also concealed their interests in the region in the language of guaranteeing security and, while suggesting that the region unite in various security structures, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), spoke out from time to time about the need for joint action to repel new threats.

Attempts to seek out and assign the region a new meaning beyond simply being a "buffer zone" between different geopolitical forces or an outpost on the road of threats from Afghanistan have not been particularly successful. Central Asia therefore continues to be regarded as a potentially unstable region [1]. Various unresolved problems—from inter-ethnic clashes to territorial and water disputes—have also built up over this period and could grow into domestic, or even regional, conflicts.

For a long time, terrorism and extremism were not seen as serious threats to regional security. For a time, Central Asian governments even denied that the threat of terrorism existed because they did not want to indirectly acknowledge that some of the preconditions for terrorism were present in the region. If radicalism, extremism and terrorism were discussed, it was only in the context of external threats, while the idea of terrorist threats originating from Afghanistan was more common. Therefore it came as something of a surprise to local societies and to Central Asian governments themselves when they began to notice that radical groups were operating in the region. It is no coincidence that in a number of countries, the people sometimes criticise the authorities for their delayed reaction to new threats and the inability of Central Asian states to combat the radicals.

The danger now, though, is that the first wave of poorly trained radicals may be replaced by fighters who have experienced war in Afghanistan and Syria, and acquired considerable military experience there. No evidence has yet come to light of terrorist organisations like "Al Qaeda" and the "Islamic State of Iraq and Syria" (ISIS) being present in the region. Or at least, there is no direct link between the recent terrorist attacks and these groups' activities. Nevertheless, what they are doing in Syria and Afghanistan is likely to inspire radicals in Central Asia.

Increasing geopolitical tension, ongoing instability in neighbouring Afghanistan, the war in Syria and the appearance of new radical cells in Central Asia all serve to amplify threats and risks to the regional security system. What is more, the geopolitical situation is deteriorating

against a background of growing domestic instability in Central Asian countries. A transition of power is taking place in Uzbekistan and, consequently, political elites are inevitably being replaced. In Kyrgyzstan, a political struggle is underway between the current authorities and the opposition in the run-up to the 2017 presidential elections. Consequently, new dividing lines are appearing within the elites and society, and domestic turbulence is growing. We are therefore seeing a new focus in security policy, with domestic political problems coming to the fore. Again, less attention is now being paid to the new threats and challenges presented by radicals.

All of this generates new dilemmas for Central Asian security. Both societies and elites face new questions. What is more important, internal or external threats? How to respond to the emerging threats? Is it better to take decisive action now or take the long view and focus on neutralizing those factors which cause radicalization? Not only the security and stability of the region but also the prospects of the states themselves depend on resolving these dilemmas.

The rise of terrorist threats in the region

Some phenomena revealing the increased activity Central Asian terrorist groups are extremely worrying.

Firstly, the mere fact that Central Asian citizens are fighting for Al Qaeda or ISIS in Syria and Iraq can reinforce the interest of the major terrorist groups for the opportunities that the region may present.

Secondly, to achieve recognition and legitimacy in the eyes of the terrorist groups' leaders, Central Asian fighters are striving to excel themselves in combat and resorting to the most brutal of methods. The children of Central Asian fighters have been used in a series of ISIS videos to carry out demonstrative public executions.

Thirdly, given the potential for Central Asian fighters to reinforce their positions in the Al Qaeda or ISIS hierarchy, we could see a gradual changing of the guard as Central Asians take up crucial positions in the major terrorist groups. In future, therefore, there is a threat that these groups may redirect some of their activity towards Central Asia.

Finally, the possible heightening of the terrorist threat in Central Asia is linked to the return of home-grown fighters. Cases have already been reported of people who, having received military training in Syria, intended to carry out terrorist attacks in their home countries.

The processes underway in the Middle East and Afghanistan are exerting increasing influence on the geopolitical space of Central Asia.

Central Asian armed groups in Afghanistan and Syria are closely linked to Afghanistan in general and the Taliban in particular. History, religion and the proximity of the Afghan border all played their part, as did the changing political landscape to an even greater extent. In Afghanistan, these groups received sanctuary, experience

of combat and the opportunity to gain a foothold in the so-called “global jihad”.

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

For twenty years, IMU was one of the major, combat-ready, terrorist groups in Central Asia and it had contacts not only with the Taliban but also with Al Qaeda. Initially, it sought to overthrow Islam Karimov's government and establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan. However, having participated in the Afghan conflict, IMU members began to espouse cosmopolitan (as opposed to national) values [2]. The Syrian crisis changed the group's activity and its future existence. In 2015, the leader of IMU, Usman Ghazi, swore loyalty to ISIS and criticised the Taliban, noting that the movement's leader, Mullah Omar, had died fourteen years previously and accusing the Taliban's leadership of “lies, Afghan-isation and nepotism” [3]. These statements led to a schism within IMU and a showdown of a faction of it with the Taliban. In December 2015, internet sites affiliated to the Taliban announced that IMU's leader, and several of its members, had been killed in a clash with Taliban fighters. It marked the destruction of IMU's most important unit. In June 2016, however, several IMU fighters announced that IMU was still in existence and that they remained loyal to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Nevertheless, the group is not as influential or broadly-based as it was when it first appeared.

The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)

The IJU is made up of another group of fighters who broke away from the IMU. Information about this radical cell is highly contradictory. Indeed, such were the doubts about the existence of the group that many regarded it as all but the brainchild of the Uzbek secret services. IJU claimed responsibility for a series of terrorist attacks in Tashkent in 2004, however, thereby demonstrating its seriousness of purpose. According to experts, it was the first terrorist group in Central Asia to use suicide bombing as a tactic [4]. For a long time, IJU developed in an Afghan mould and its ideology gelled over time with Al Qaeda's strategy. For a time, it is believed, IJU's chief strategist was Abu Leith al-Libi, one of Usama's bin Laden's main field commanders [5]. It is not surprising, therefore, that the group tried to operate on a global scale. In 2007, members of IJU were arrested in Germany: they had been planning an attack on the Ramstein airbase, a US military facility in the state of Rhineland Palatinate. The fighters who returned from Syria to Kyrgyzstan in autumn 2013 were also members of IJU, suggesting that the group, which had earlier been deployed in Afghanistan and Pakistan, was now actively engaged in transferring fighters. Several members of another group—Jund al-Khalifat—who were connected to IJU, were arrested in Turkey as they tried to reach Syria. Thus, to this day, IJU represents a serious problem for Central Asian states.

Jamaat Ansarullah

Reports suggest that Jamaat Ansarullah (the Society of Allah's Soldiers) was founded in 2006 by Tajik fighters who had split off from the IMU [6]. The group made itself known in 2010 when it claimed responsibility for an explosion in Khujand, the capital of Sughd province in September that year. The Tajik authorities also accuse the group of taking part in an ambush in the Rasht valley, which resulted in the death of 20 soldiers. In 2011, a video was published in the group's name appealing to the Muslims of Tajikistan to take up jihad against state policy. Despite all this, doubts were raised about whether Jamaat Ansarullah really existed but these were undermined by the official position of the Tajik authorities. In May 2012, the country's high court ruled that Jamaat Ansarullah was banned on the territory of Tajikistan [7]. Open sources indicate that the group is active in Afghanistan. Currently, the 50-60-strong group is most active in the Afghan province of Badakhshan and maintains links with the Taliban.[8] Reports also suggest that some members of Jamaat Ansarullah have joined the ‘international jihad’ in Syria [9].

Central Asian fighters go to Syria establish their own ethnic detachments, or jamaats. Due to a dearth of funds and weapons, however, the Central Asian jamaats are forced to act under the auspices of large terrorist groups. We now know about several of these military formations.

Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad (Jannat Oshiqdari)

The group was formed relatively recently, in 2014, by an ethnic Uyghur and citizen of Kyrgyzstan, Sirojiddin Mukhtarov [10] (also known as Abu Saloh). It is known that the group is very active in Kyrgyzstan where it recruits and sends fighters off to Syria. Thirty-five people left for Syria from Osh province alone in 2014-2015 to join Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad. Current data suggests that the group is 180-200 people strong [11], with most of them hailing from the Osh, Batken (Kyrgyzstan) and Jalal-Abad (Pakistan) regions, as well as China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. In September 2015, the group was incorporated into Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly the Al-Nusra Front, which had been allied to Al Qaeda in Syria), and together they took part in operations against Russian forces in Syria. In September 2015 for instance, the group claimed responsibility for an attack on Russian forces in Syria.[12] And although this Central Asian group is now one of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham's main operational formations, the group has not abandoned its goal of organising jihad in Central Asia. In August 2016, the State National Security Committee of Kyrgyzstan announced that the group was implicated in the car bombing of the Chinese embassy in Bishkek [13].

Imam Bukhari Battalion (KIB)

Currently, the Uzbek Iman Bukhari Battalion (Kateebat Imaam Al-Bukhari, KIB) is the largest Central Asian

military formation in Syria and it is made up mainly of citizens from Central Asian states. Up to 400 Uzbek citizens are fighting in KIB's ranks [14], according to the Turkish media, and most of them have experience of military operations in Afghanistan. The founder of KIB, Salahuddin, “fought alongside [Uzbek radical Islamists Juma] Namangani and [Tahir] Yuldashev and joined IMU in 1999”[15], suggesting that KIB has its roots in IMU. Salahuddin moved to Syria in 2011 and within three years, he had formed his own detachment, Imam Bukhari Battalion. Media reports from November 2014 indicate that KIB was fighting in ISIS's ranks. In September 2015, however, it became clear that KIB had joined Jabhat Fateh al-Sham.[16] Nevertheless, some claim that the group, which first made a name for itself in Syria, is in contact with the Taliban.

Sabri Jamaat

Early in 2014, Sabri Jamaat, a Tajik-Uzbek military formation in Syria, led by Khalid ad-Dagestani, released a video stating that it had joined ISIS.[17] The decision to join ISIS was taken after Jabhat Fateh al-Sham tried to take Sabri Jamaat's anti-aircraft weapons. Later, however, the group gave no public sign that it was active in Syria.

Central Asians are also fighting in other groups dominated by Russian-speakers, such as the so-called Crimean Jamaat, as well as the Chechen group Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar.

Online propaganda

Widespread propaganda on the internet is crucial in contributing to the successful recruitment of Central Asian fighters. On the popular video-sharing platform YouTube, one can freely search for and view a huge number of professional and amateur videos about the activities of different terrorist groups. These propaganda clips are very popular and have been watched more than 100,000 times.

Virtual recruitment is therefore becoming a powerful tool of manipulation and it is more and more difficult to track. Whereas state security services used to be able to block resources containing terrorist or extremist content, they do not always succeed now in taking countermeasures because most terrorist groups have shifted their focus to social networks such as Twitter, where they propagate an ideology of war and jihad.

Moreover, fighters are becoming less active in the Russian portion of the internet, including on the social networks Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki. One reason could be that the account holders have died, another might be greater monitoring of social networks by the Russian law enforcement agencies. In recent months, therefore, ISIS has shifted “some of its propaganda and recruitment work to the crypted mobile messaging service Telegram”.[18]

Terrorist groups are widely and actively taking advan-

tage of the opportunities that the internet affords: they are nimble and professional in their use of information technologies and know how to turn “public relations” to their own ends. In 2015, special structures within the Collective Security Treaty Organisation intercepted more than 57,000 websites that were being used to recruit Central Asian citizens.[19]

Terrorist attacks in 2016 (Aktobe, Bishkek)

Predictions around the activation of sleeping cells and the negative influence of internet propaganda have started to come true, as the recent terrorist attacks in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan graphically demonstrate.

On 5 June 2016, in the Kazakh city of Aktobe, a group of radicals carried out a series of attacks which resulted in the deaths of civilians and soldiers, as well as the attackers themselves. Radical internet propaganda was the main catalyst for the attack. The Kazakh secret services revealed that the group's members had earlier listened to a speech, supposedly by an official member of ISIS, Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, calling for jihad. Afterwards, the radicals decided to organise “jihad” in their country.

This terrorist attack was carried out by a group that was neither part of, nor affiliated to, any of the major terrorist groups. They acted without orders from any centre and had only indirect links with radical groups abroad. They listened to sermons by an ISIS ideologue, for instance.

It was an attack by a sleeping cell and the terrorist threat came from within. These conspiratorial cells present a very serious threat because they act spontaneously, without a definite plan. It is extremely difficult to anticipate their strategic goals and possible course of action. Sleeping cells can take us by surprise by coming alive at any moment.

The attack on the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in August 2016 showed just how serious is the threat of terrorism from without. It showed that Central Asian radical groups deployed in Syria are both willing and capable of operating on their own states' territory. What is more, the attack in Bishkek brought home the possibility that internal and external threats could merge together. If this happened, the outcome would be serious and unpredictable. Central Asian fighters see the region as part of a single Islamic caliphate. The countries of Central Asia must therefore extend regional cooperation in counter-terrorism.

Current world trends mean that in the short term, Central Asian countries will likely strive to maintain the existing strategic balance of power. International and regional players with a stake in the region will safeguard its security, as far as they are able, in order to advance their own security interests.

In the medium term, the Central Asian republics will have to reckon with the influence of global political transformations. The way in which Central Asian political

systems function is deeply ingrained and will hinder the formulation of adequate response to new problems. This inadequacy is primarily linked to domestic challenges. The five state of Central Asia must therefore focus their efforts on achieving certain goals, such as creating the conditions for further political and social modernisation.

Reducing radicalisation must remain one of the main priorities in guaranteeing regional security. This can only be helped by resolving acute social and economic problems, reining in corruption, reforming education policy,

spreading counter-narratives more widely and blocking radical content in a timely manner. Other prophylactic measures might include tightening controls over the routes that citizens use to reach, and return from, combat zones. It is also important to take steps to monitor [...] the financing of terrorist groups by bodies which appear to perform charitable or other work not directly connected to the radical groups. It is crucial for Central Asian states to prevent terrorist activity from moving into their own countries.

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25 YEARS OF KAZAKHSTAN'S INDEPENDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL/POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS *

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Abstract. The author examines the philosophical and political dimensions of the social and humanitarian processes that have taken place in Kazakh society during the period of independence and conceptualizes the idea of independence as the idea of the integration of Kazakhstan into the global historical process.

Key words: *philosophy, political science, independence, integration, strategy.*

ҚАЗАҚСТАН ТӘУЕЛСІЗДІГІНІҢ 25 ЖЫЛЫ:
ФИЛОСОФИЯЛЫҚ / САЯСИ БАҚЫЛАУЛАР

Зарема Шаукенова

Аңдатпа. Автор тәуелсіздік кезеңінде қазақ қоғамында орын алған әлеуметтік және гуманитарлық процестердің философиялық және саяси аспектілерін зерттеп, тәуелсіздік идеясын Қазақстанның жаһандық тарихи үдерісіне интеграциялау идеясы ретінде тұжырымдамалық түрде түсіндіреді.

Түйін сөздер: *философия, саясаттану, тәуелсіздік, интеграция, стратегия.*

25 ЛЕТ НЕЗАВИСИМОСТИ КАЗАХСТАНА
В ФИЛОСОФСКО-ПОЛИТОЛОГИЧЕСКОМ ИЗМЕРЕНИИ

Зарема Шаукенова

Аннотация. В статье автор осуществляет философско-политологическое измерение общественных и гуманитарных процессов, произошедших в казахстанском обществе в период Независимости и концептуализирует идею независимости как идею интеграции Казахстана в мировой исторический процесс.

Ключевые слова: *философия, политология, Независимость, интеграция, стратегия.*

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The 25th anniversary of the Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan is the main topic of the current congress.

For a quarter of a century, since the proclamation of the state sovereignty of the Republic of Kazakhstan, a new generation of Kazakhstanis has grown up and steadily stood on its feet. Those who came of age during independence acquired professions demanded by the modern system of economic activity of the country; many having graduated from colleges and universities; and some who have already created their own families. At the same time, the Independence Generation's identity has been shaped by being citizens of a sovereign state that independently solves all the issues of its own development. Therefore, socially and psychologically, today's youth is a generation with a qualitatively new type of social identity. One of the main achievements of independence is what young people take for granted, as a matter of course: the fact that they live in a free country with open borders; in a country where the basic human and citizen rights are constitutionally formalized and legally protected; where democracy is declared; and in fact has become the basis for the functioning of political institutions.

Today, by celebrating the 25th anniversary of independence and assessing its results, we should at the same time look to the future. The transformations experienced by Kazakhstan over the 25 years of independence have led the country to the point where it has been possible to set and solve fundamentally new challenges in terms of economic, scientific, technological, civil-political, social, and cultural development. In recent years, the Government and personally the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the leader of the nation, N.A. Nazarbaev, has put forward a number of strategic initiatives, programs and concepts, the keynote of which is the idea of improving the welfare of Kazakhstanis as the goal and the absolute priority of a new stage in the development of the Republic of Kazakhstan as a state.

Over the years of independence, Kazakhstan's economic development was based primarily on the extensive use of resources. Relying on the oil and gas industry, we formed a new level of citizens' welfare, simultaneously creating innovations and new industries, attracting technologies and investments. Meanwhile, the resource-base of world economic development has undergone fundamental changes. It is now primarily the products of the digital revolution, such as nanotechnology, advanced space technologies, the rapid introduction of robotics, electronic money, Internet banking, and the transition to renewable energy sources, which have created this competitive base worldwide.

Smart cities will largely determine the competitiveness of countries in the future, because they will become the place of concentration of the future economy (e.g. digital technologies and services). Cities will act as hubs for the distribution of services and goods across the

territories by high-speed transport. According to Juniper Research, only the introduction of

'Smart' traffic management and urban transport parking by 2021 will save 4.2 billion man-hours per year across the world, which is equivalent to one working day per driver.

It should be emphasized that the projects contained in the Plan of the Nation proposed by the President of the RoK largely involve a step of the country into the post-industrial world. This applies, for example, to the project of creating the International Financial Center in Astana. The target values of the AIFC are well known. This is a \$40 billion contribution to GDP and an additional 2,300 highly professional jobs by 2025.

Along with the creation of a multimodal Eurasian transport corridor, Kazakhstan will have the opportunity to provide higher-class transport services – combined; mixed transport; and using different types of transport: land/air/water. As a result, it is predicted that the volume of transit traffic by all types of transport will increase from the current 18 million tons to 50 million tons in 2030; GDP will increase by one percent; 15,000 new logistics jobs will be created; and the country's LPI rating will improve from 88th to 40th place.

Following the experience of leading countries such as Canada and Australia, we are creating a single provider of government services: the State Corporation for Citizens' Government.

For example, Canada Service and Australian Centrelink have a wide range of services for citizens in electronic format. Services cover almost the entire life cycle of a person, across birth, education, employment, naturalization and obtaining information.

The establishment of a visa-free regime; the simplification of customs procedures; universal declaration; and the transfer of tax and customs clearance into the electronic system, etc. all contribute to the adaptation of Kazakhstan to qualitatively new conditions in the functioning of the world market for goods and services.

This will enable the country to adequately respond to emerging challenges and to make a step from the third world to the first, as Singapore did in its time.

Such new steps are being taken by the developed countries today. For example, in France under President Sarkozy, the '300 applications to change France' program has been adopted. One of the conceptual ideas of the current French President F. Hollande is the creation of a 'positive economy'. This means the transition from an individualistic economy to an economy of universal interests and future generations; from an economy based on wealth and maximizing profits, to a commitment economy.

In the same way, we have adopted a 100-step institutional reform plan, which is a **new program for Kazakhstan's transition from a catch-up development model to an economic-growth model.**

Indeed, in the 21st century, the criterion for the development of countries and the indicator of the effectiveness of public administration is no longer the level of income, material well-being, dynamics of GDP growth and other macroeconomic indicators; but the creation of a set of conditions for the creative, free, comprehensive self-realization of the individual; and for the fullest satisfaction of the material, cultural and the spiritual needs of the citizens. Kazakhstan is actively and in many ways successfully connecting to this megatrend of post-industrial civilization.

An integral concept is that of 'improving welfare' as applied to the conditions of development of modern Kazakhstan. This has been introduced through a number of socio-philosophical, political and cultural concepts, formulated in the program speeches of the Head of State and revealing the boundaries of the new image of Kazakhstan society emerging here and now. Let us dwell on the most important of these concepts, which are not only theoretical constructs, but also contain a powerful emotional and intellectual potential for mobilizing citizens to fulfill inspiring tasks to promote Kazakhstan society to a qualitatively new state.

1) Society of Equal Opportunities. In Kazakhstan, as underlined by President N.A. Nazarbaev, social policy is aimed at creating equal starting opportunities for all citizens, regardless of gender, race, national or religious affiliation, etc. At the same time, the realization of these opportunities implies the active formation, multiplication and use by each citizen of their creative potential. In the society of equal opportunities, as the President noted in his lecture, 'Kazakhstan on the way to the knowledge society', the state is not an endless donor, but a partner creating conditions for the growth of citizens' welfare [1].

2) Society of Universal Labor. In N.A. Nazarbaev's concept of the Society of Universal Labor [2] a major trend of changing the nature of work in the modern conditions of the permanent scientific and technological revolution is noted: the transition from the 'commodity economy' to the 'economy of human abilities'. In the economy of a new type, the intellectual potential of society, the accumulated 'human capital', forms the basis of productive labor. In the strategy entitled 'Kazakhstan-2050: The new political course of the state', N.A. Nazarbaev underlines the idea that: 'our goal is to form a fundamentally new model of labor relations, combining the support of entrepreneurship with the interests of the workers' [3]. At the same time, the successful functioning of this model is conditioned by the post-industrial type of motivation of labor activity. In the society of universal labor, the individual is no longer forced to work by the economic form of organizing social production, but labor itself acts as a free associated creativity, as a way of producing one's own creative forces and self-realization of the individual.

3) Society of Progressive Ideals. Presidential Strategy

'Kazakhstan-2050' offers Kazakhstanis an optimistic and at the same time a strictly realistic view of the future of the country through the prism of progressive social ideals and scientifically verified mechanisms for their implementation. This is fundamentally important, since, in modern socio-philosophical, political discourse, the idea of social progress, the idea of social development as a fundamentally unpredictable process, devoid of a historical perspective and without rationally known landmarks and goals, is almost the norm.

4) The Kazakhstan model of inter-ethnic and inter-religious harmony. The irreversibility of the process of strengthening inter-ethnic and inter-religious harmony is one of the main achievements and the most impressive results of the 25-year history of the independent development of the Republic of Kazakhstan. In the Strategy 'Kazakhstan-2050' the President notes: 'Peace and harmony and the dialogue of cultures and religions in our multinational country are rightly recognized as a **world standard**' [4]. The example of our country is even more important in the light of the recent events in the world, demonstrating the growing general instability and conflict in inter-state, inter-ethnic and inter-faith interactions; the growth of extremism and xenophobic sentiments; and the radicalization of religious and political groups, etc.

It should be noted that the Kazakhstani model of inter-ethnic and inter-religious accord overcomes the narrow framework of tolerance and political correctness which has led to the dead-end European models of multiculturalism. The national unity achieved in our country during the years of independence is based on the formation in the public consciousness of a system of values and principles common to all citizens of Kazakhstan. As such principles, the following provisions are formulated in the **Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan: 'One country is one destiny'**.

'Different origins - equal opportunities'. 'Development of the national spirit'. One cannot fail to see the outstanding role in the strengthening and qualitative improvement of the inter-ethnic and inter-religious accord of such an institution of civil society as the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Leader of the Nation, N.A. Nazarbaev.

5) Model for the Future of the Country. A complex of ideological values, social ideals, goals and tasks of the country's development forms a **futureological image, or model of the future of the country.** The President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev, said: 'We need to form a mental model, the image of the future of the country on the basis of a new political course, 'Kazakhstan-2050'. This image must be real, attractive and inspiring' [5].

A realistic and at the same time rather ambitious Future Country Model adopted and shared by the broad mass of the population is an important part of the formation of a positive image of the country. The image of modern Kazakhstan and the Model of the Future of the Country among our compatriots is firmly associated with the image and activities of the President, NA. Nazarbaev, as a recognized leader of the nation. Within the information society, where an understanding has been established of the role of information and its exchange as key resources for development, the country's positive image is now positioned as a tangible instrument for promoting national and group interests and improving the country's competitiveness in the global world.

The President himself pays a great deal of attention to the problem of shaping an attractive image and model of the future of the country, with the main emphasis being placed on the values and world-view of the future model. Therefore, it is natural that the national intelligentsia should play a key role in the design of the world-view of the model of the future of the country, according to the President. Our forum, without a doubt, will make its significant contribution to the solution of the task set by the President.

At present, the potential of the state is determined not only by the economic resources and technologies that they manage. The centuries-old cultural codes, meanings and values of social life; a clear vision of the historical perspective; and a 'competitive national identity'

become, along with economic innovation and efficiency, the most important resource for the sustainable development of the country in the modern world and its transition to a qualitatively new state. 'In conditions of global challenges, an adequate response can be given only if our cultural code - language, traditions and values - is preserved. Of particular importance to all Kazakhstanis are love for their homeland, for the whole land' [6], the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan has emphasized.

Preservation, reproduction and enrichment within the new historical conditions of the cultural code of the nation is a strategic task of the national idea of Mangilik El, as proclaimed in the patriotic act of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the leader of the nation, NA. Nazarbaev. Obviously, one of the main lines of philosophical and political enquiry to be followed by our national scholars will be a comprehensive development of the essence, content and values of the national idea '**Mangilik El**', which clearly expresses the idea of the growth of national self-consciousness; unity; and the high spirituality of the nation which are the core of the new Kazakhstan patriotism. New ideological orientations and perspectives of spiritual development, the creation of a highly intellectual creative atmosphere in Kazakhstan science and society are being initiated and developed by the philosophers, political scientists and sociologists of Kazakhstan. This has opened up ontological opportunities for Kazakhstan's humanitarian sciences to be relevant and in demand as part of the world's humanitarian discourse.

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