In his welcoming remarks, KazISS Director Zhandos Shaimardanov expressed his gratitude to Mr. Iijima for Japan’s continued support and contribution to the development of expert diplomacy and the “second-track” dialogue format.

“Japan was the first country to launch the C5+ format with the Central Asian states back in 2004. We highly value Japan’s consistent, respectful, and strategic approach to engagement with the region, which significantly contributes to strengthening trust and developing a sustainable partnership,” Shaimardanov emphasized.

Particular attention was given to cooperation with leading think tanks, including the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), as well as the successful Central Asia–Japan Expert Dialogue Forum held on 6 March 2025 in Astana.

For his part, the Ambassador thanked KazISS for the productive dialogue and underlined that Japan considers Kazakhstan an important partner in Central Asia. He expressed his readiness to continue expert cooperation and support initiatives aimed at strengthening the regional “Central Asia – Japan” format.

Following the meeting, both sides reaffirmed their commitment to deepening expert dialogue and implementing joint initiatives aimed at long-term and mutually beneficial cooperation.

Сообщение Ambassador of Japan Visits KazISS появились сначала на KAZAKHSTAN INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
UNDER THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN.

In the global policy agenda, healthcare is increasingly regarded as a factor of national competitiveness. Nowadays, when countries strive to ensure the sustainability of their economies, human capital, and social systems, the primary healthcare (PHC) level plays a crucial role.

The accessibility of medical care, public trust, and the system’s ability to effectively respond to challenges, from chronic diseases to epidemics, are shaped at the level of clinics and family doctors, i.e., primary health care (PHC).

Analysis of the dynamics and structure of primary healthcare financing is becoming not only an industry-specific issue, but also a strategic one that directly affects quality of life, economic productivity, and fiscal sustainability.

Macroeconomic Context: Growth in Expenditure Amid Changes in its Structure

Between 2019 and 2024, current healthcare expenditures in Kazakhstan nearly tripled from 1.9 to over 5 trillion tenge demonstrating the sector’s priority status.

However, the structure of financing raises concerns:

• The share of government spending decreased by more than 6 percentage points (from 66% in 2023 to 59.2% in 2024);
• Out-of-pocket household expenditures reached 30.7% in 2024 (compared to 27.7% in 2023), exceeding the internationally recommended threshold for financial protection (20%).

The growth of out-of-pocket expenses indicates increasing financial pressure on households and the risk of reduced access to medical services.

PHC in Kazakhstan: Financing Principles and Practical Constraints

Primary healthcare in Kazakhstan is financed through a capitation principle, one of the most rational approaches globally. It allocates funds per enrolled patient, taking into account age, gender, and other risk factors.

This model is designed to promote efficient use of resources and control over service volumes. However, in practice, the per capita rate remains insufficient to cover all essential PHC functions, implement modern preventive programs, and retain qualified personnel at the primary level.

Financing PHC: Growth Without Prioritization of Prevention

Analysis shows that spending on primary healthcare increased from 1.1 to 2.8 trillion tenge over five years. However, the share of PHC in total healthcare expenditures remains stable or even declines. In other words, the increase in funding has been proportional to the general rise in healthcare spending, rather than reflecting a targeted strengthening of PHC priorities.

Kazakhstanis continue to pay considerably out of their own pockets, primarily for the purchase of medications (more than 50%). Total private spending on PHC in 2024 amounted to 1.55 trillion tenge, which is more than half of all spending on this level of care. This indicates low accessibility of PHC.

Preventive expenditures also remain relatively low. In 2019, preventive spending accounted for about 3.5% of total health expenditures in Kazakhstan, but by 2023 this figure had decreased to 2.1%.

In OECD countries, by contrast, preventive spending has been increasing, averaging 5%, and reaching 10-12% in countries such as the Netherlands, Austria, and the United Kingdom.

Thus, despite overall funding growth, a structural imbalance persists: the preventive component of PHC remains underfunded, while the financial burden is gradually shifting to the population. This highlights the need to revise priorities toward prevention and early intervention so that PHC truly becomes the foundation of a sustainable health system.

Effective PHC as A Strategic Tool for Cost Control and Improving the Sustainability of the Health System

Today, about 90% of medical cases can be effectively resolved at the PHC level, and this is precisely where the greatest return on every tenge invested is generated. The cost of care increases sharply when moving to specialized and inpatient services. Therefore, the priority lies not in simply increasing total healthcare spending but in rationally reallocating resources toward primary care. The more cases that can be addressed at the primary healthcare level through timely detection of diseases, high-quality care for chronic patients, effective prevention, and consultations, the less unnecessary hospital admissions, examinations, and costly interventions at higher levels will be required.

International experience confirms this approach: strengthening PHC reduces hospitalization rates, limits excessive prescriptions, and optimizes drug use. According to WHO and World Bank estimates, every dollar invested in PHC yields up to 10 dollars in economic benefit, and investments in vaccination yield up to 44 dollars. This means that financing primary health care is a way to reduce costs rather than increase them. It is a long-term investment that simultaneously improves the efficiency of the system, improves public health, and strengthens the country’s economic stability.

Along with the economic effect, a strong primary healthcare network has a direct impact on key population health indicators, contributes to reducing maternal and infant mortality, increases life expectancy, and builds human capital, which is the foundation of a country’s competitiveness.

To achieve this effect, the following systemic changes are necessary. Firstly, increasing the priority of primary care through a step-by-step increase in per capita standards, with due account for demographic, epidemiological, and regional factors. Funding should be based on the actual needs of the population, rather than historical limits. Secondly, revision of the expenditure structure is required, i.e., a gradual shift in emphasis from inpatient and high-tech care to prevention and comprehensive patient management at the primary care level, the introduction of pay-for-performance mechanisms, and the development of integrated doctor-nurse-social worker teams. And thirdly, strengthening the preventive function of primary care, expanding screening, improving the quality of care for patients with chronic diseases, and increasing the role of general practitioners and nurses in shaping healthy behavioral practices.

Thus, investing in PHC is a strategic choice in favor of a more effective, accessible, and sustainable healthcare system, where prevention and early intervention become the foundation of national health and economic stability.

Сообщение Primary Healthcare as a Strategic Priority: Why Investments in PHC Determine the Sustainability of the Health System появились сначала на KAZAKHSTAN INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
UNDER THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN.

From a sociological perspective, gender analysis should not be limited exclusively to women, it is equally important to consider the other half of the system, which is men. In one of the surveys, respondents were asked to evaluate the statement, “When there are not enough jobs, men should have more right to a job than women”. As a result, 52.5% of respondents agreed with this statement to some extent, while 44.9% disagreed^[1]. At the same time, while 55.5% of men agreed with this statement, the share among women was slightly lower, 50% of respondents.

The data reveal the internal contradictions within the society’s value framework. Even with notable progress in education and women’s employment, the idea of male priority in times of job scarcity still enjoys significant support, particularly among married, less educated, and economically vulnerable respondents. This reflects the dual nature of gender modernization, where the pursuit of equality coexists with persistent notions of men as the mainstay of the family and bearers of material responsibility.

What are the socio-demographic characteristics? The crosstabulations on gender, age, education, marital status, and income reveal significant patterns:

• Middle age as the zone of greatest tension. Men aged 30–45 show the strongest support for traditional attitudes, and this is quite natural. At this stage of life, such major social responsibilities as paying off a mortgage, raising children, or caring for elderly parents converge. Society places more demands on them while offering fewer guarantees. This imbalance gives rise to a defensive conservatism, a desire to cling to old norms as a way to preserve one’s identity in a rapidly changing world.
• Education and economic autonomy. A higher level of education reduces anxiety and leads to less patriarchal views, not because educated men are necessarily more enlightened, but because they are less dependent on an unstable labor market. They have more professional opportunities, feel greater control over their lives, and therefore can afford equality. Meanwhile, for those in low-income sectors, the sense of control is limited. For them, the idea that a man has a right to work is not an ideology but the last form of social security in an uncertain world.
• Profession and qualifications reduce dependence on patriarchal beliefs. Men with a stable position in the labor market are less in need of gender-based safeguards and are more likely to embrace the idea of equality. Here, patriarchy does not disappear, but it loses its protective function. Among men in unstable professional niches, however, patriarchal logic persists as a form of symbolic compensation for lost control, when success can no longer be guaranteed, maintaining the status of breadwinner becomes the last available form of stability.
• Family structures and the morality of duty. Married men are more likely to support the idea of male labor priority. However, this form of patriarchy is paternalistic in nature, it is rooted in care rather than dominance. A married man feels a moral duty to protect his family and therefore seeks to reinforce his right to work as a form of responsibility. At the same time, among single men, especially in cities, there is a clear trend toward rethinking, work and income are no longer seen as measures of worth, giving way to the idea of partnership.
• Material vulnerability and symbolic support. Cross-tabulations by income emphasize that patriarchal beliefs are strongest among economically vulnerable groups. A man with a low income lives in constant tension between the social norm that he must provide for his family and the market reality, where job stability is far from guaranteed. In this sense, patriarchal thinking becomes a form of psychological defense, restoring a sense of control in a world where rules change faster than one can adapt. Yet these attitudes are rooted in the historical inertia of the social contract, in which the man is the breadwinner and the woman keeps house. The collapse of this model without its moral rethinking leaves men in an identity vacuum. Therefore, the support for male priority should not be interpreted solely as an expression of power but rather as a sign of structural pressure. Until society offers men an alternative, positive model of self-worth, one based not on income, as it has been for decades, but on participation, partnership, and caregiving, they will continue to cling to the old one, because within it, at least, it is still clear who you are and what you live for.

Shift toward a new model of masculinity. Nevertheless, our data indicate an emerging shift. Among young men and women, especially those with higher education and urban socialization, the idea of mutual responsibility and shared family support is gaining strength. For them, equality does not threaten the male role; on the contrary, it relieves it of excessive pressure. This is no longer a battle of the sexes, but a gradual adaptation of the social system in which masculinity ceases to be synonymous with duty and becomes a form of participation. Among young people (18–29 years old), patriarchal views no longer dominate. They do not reject responsibility, they share it. Young men increasingly see the family as a partnership; for them, equality is not a threat but a liberation from the solitary burden of being everything for everyone.

The balance of meaning. As the data show, our society continues to revolve around the “man as a breadwinner” model. It is important to note that this role is shaped not only within the family, through upbringing, but also by the media, professional expectations, and even humor. A man is measured by his degree of responsibility, if the family lives well, it is his achievement; if family struggles, it is his, man, fault. This very cultural belief creates structural pressure on male identity, where the loss of income or employment is perceived as a moral failure.

I predict the objections from the first-generation feminists, who might view these ideas as biased, referring to male dominance in parliament, government, national campaigns, and even the media scene. Indeed, the Olympus remains male. However, the analysis presented here does not concern those at the top, but rather those men who sustain the system, the millions of ordinary men who do not make decisions, but live in their shadow.

Feminists of the second and third generations are known for their sensitivity to the language of softening; for them, patriarchy is not about personal anxiety but about a system of power. Yet it is important to acknowledge that both sides suffer from patriarchy, women from limitation, and men from pressure. The aim here is not to justify, but to describe mutual vulnerability.The new ethics: partnership instead of competition. The data show that a new generation of both men and women is beginning to form a different relationship with work and responsibility. Among young men, the share of supporters of gender equality is noticeably higher, while among young women there is a greater readiness for partnership rather than rivalry. This generational shift may become the starting point for moving beyond the old balance of fear, if society dares to speak honestly about both women and men. Equality does not mean that someone must fall silent. Women need access to power and recognition of their work, while men need the right to be vulnerable and to bear responsibility without guilt. Equality will not grow if society continues to expect iron resilience from men and self-sacrifice from women. The overload of expectations must be lifted from both sides. Success itself needs to be redefined. A strong man is not the one who provides for everyone, but the one who knows how to share responsibility. A strong woman is not the one who endures everything, but the one who stops pretending that it’s easy. And finally, the language must change. Instead of saying a man must and a woman should, we can begin to say WE can. It’s a simple, yet profoundly important shift.

^[1] The survey, commissioned by KazISS, was conducted from May 11 to June 22, 2024, and included 8,101 respondents. Participants were adults aged 18 and older from 17 regions of the country, as well as the cities of national significance — Astana, Almaty, and Shymkent.

Сообщение A Man Under Pressure, or how a New Model of Masculinity Emerging? появились сначала на KAZAKHSTAN INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
UNDER THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN.

Aigul Zabirova,
Chief Research Fellow
at the KazISS under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s 2025 Address sets the direction for reforms and outlines a nationwide path of change. However, the change requires more than programs and numbers, it also depends on people’s readiness. How is society meeting these challenges? And what can Nobel Prize winners teach us in this regard?

The President’s 2025 Address is not just a list of tasks, it is an invitation for society to change alongside the country. His central message is clear: the world is changing at an unprecedented pace, and Kazakhstan must not only adapt to this turbulence but make a decisive leap into the digital era. The President emphasized: “Our younger generation must live in happiness and prosperity. To achieve this, we, as one nation, must work diligently.” The idea is simple yet powerful: no reform will succeed unless people believe in change. The real question is, how ready are we?

What do KazISS Survey reveal?

The results of our spring survey are telling:

• 60.8% of citizens are confident that the country will see positive development over the next five years;
• 31.4% gave a neutral response, saying “nothing much will change”;

7.8% view the future in a negative light[i]

Today, Kazakhstan possesses a rare resource of public optimism. Two-thirds of citizens look to the future with hope, meaning that society is not starting from scratch. This very resource becomes the foundation for real action. And here, the ideas of behavioral economics come into play. We turn to the insights of three Nobel laureates who have profoundly influenced modern economics and demonstrated that meaningful change requires not only numbers, but also an understanding of human nature.

1. Richard Thaler’s “Nudge”[ii]: We can improve decision-making without taking away people’s freedom of choice.   

In his 2025 annual Address, the President appeals to a new tax mentality and to taxpayers’ honesty, which requires special effort, as it deals with habits, attitudes, and, ultimately, the very culture of behavior. This is precisely what Nobel laureate Richard Thaler, awarded in 2017, wrote about when he introduced the simple yet powerful concept of “nudges.” His idea is that people’s behavior changes not so much through orders and prohibitions, but through the smart design of choices. Thaler demonstrates how behavior can be guided by simple, convenient mechanisms and prompts. In Thaler’s logic, this means the need for online calculators and transparent digital services, where every citizen in Kazakhstan can clearly see how their taxes are returned in the form of schools, hospitals, and roads. When the choice to “pay taxes” becomes understandable, convenient, and even beneficial, people stop looking for ways  to bypass the system. Nudges make the right behavior natural and this becomes the step from intention to practice. 

2. Daniel Kahneman’s cognitive biases [iii]: We do not think in terms of logic, but rely on quick rules of thumb which often lead to mistakes.

In his annual Address, the President emphasizes the need for society’s readiness for change. Here it is useful to recall the discoveries of Daniel Kahneman and his colleague Amos Tversky, who showed that people do not assess the world rationally, but through cognitive biases. Their famous Prospect Theory demonstrated that losses are felt more acutely than gains. In other words, even if a reform brings long-term benefits, people tend to cling to the familiar because they fear losing what they already have. Kahneman’s “loss aversion” explains why part of society is cautious. People are not opposed to change, they simply want to be assured that they will not lose stability. This makes it crucial to provide guarantees and to explain reforms in clear, simple language: what exactly will change and why. Addressing this psychology, reducing anxiety, and offering transitional mechanisms will reinforce the President’s vision not only of decisive reforms, but of reforms that are psychologically comfortable for society. For example, the introduction of artificial intelligence into the labor market is often met with anxiety: “robots will take all the jobs.” But if people are shown what new professions will emerge, which retraining programs are already available, and how exactly the state will support them, fear can be transformed into readiness. Likewise, if society understands a new tax code only as “we will have to pay more,” people will naturally resist. But if it is explained that taxes guarantee that schools in their neighborhoods will remain open, doctors will receive fair salaries, and roads will be repaired on time, the perception changes. It is no longer about “loss,” but about the fear of losing the well-being that matters to everyone.

3. Robert Shiller’s Narrative Economics[iv]: Financial bubbles are born not on the stock exchange, but in people’s fears, hopes, and stories.

The President’s vision of a Digital Kazakhstan is not merely a technocratic program, it is a story, narrative. A story about a country that can become part of the new world, not fall behind, but break ahead. What matters is how this story is told to the people. Nobel laureate Robert Shiller introduced the concept of narrative economics. The essence of his idea is strikingly simple: economic processes are driven not only by numbers and laws, but also by the stories people believe in. People believe in narratives of growth, decline, and the future.

Shiller also emphasizes that the success of reforms depends largely on citizens’ personal experience. For Kazakhstan, this is especially significant: two-thirds of citizens believe the future will be better. Supporting a narrative means telling stories of success by showing new schools, new jobs, and new digital services. If digitalization is perceived as a guarantee of accessible healthcare, fair taxation, and the protection of children, it will resonate with the public and generate momentum for change. Shiller demonstrates that it is precisely such stories that create what sociologists call the “social glue.” In this sense, the President’s idea of happiness for future generations is itself a narrative that must be repeated and made concrete.

Thus, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s 2025 annual Address unites the nation around a course of change, while the ideas of behavioral economics broaden its meaning, turning society’s hope into concrete action. With reliance on both evidence and human nature, Kazakhstan is poised to step into the new world with confidence, as a country where change becomes a shared effort and a shared story.

[i] The sociological survey was commissioned by KISI and conducted between March 20 and April 20, 2025. The sample size included 8,001 respondents. Participants were citizens aged 18 and older from 17 regions and the three cities of national significance Astana, Almaty, and Shymkent.

[ii] Richard H. Taller. From Cashews to Nudges: The Evolution of behavioral Economics. www.nobelprize.org

[iii] Daniel Kahneman. Maps of bounded rationality. www.nobelprize.org

[iv] Robert Shiller. Speculative asset Prices. www.nobelprize.org

Сообщение Numbers and Destinies: Lessons from the 2025 Annual Address появились сначала на KAZAKHSTAN INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
UNDER THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN.

Aigul Zabirova,
Chief Research Fellow
at the KazISS under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan is developing a hybrid media environment where television continues to hold the lead in terms of public trust, despite increasing competition from social networks and online media.  According to KazISS data, 59% of Kazakhstanis trust television, while social networks and messengers receive 34.7%, and online media 30.3%. This dynamic shows that television remains the main channel of trust, but its position is no longer unconditional. In the new information hierarchy, TV channels must defend their status under growing pressure from digital platforms and online communities.

Television as the leader of trust

Today, Kazakhstan’s media environment is shaping into a hybrid model: television channels, digital media, and rapidly growing social networks with messengers.  At the top of this hierarchy remains television. According to KazISS’s spring survey, 59.7% of Kazakhstanis trust television[i].

When it comes to trust in television in Kazakhstan, the figure of 59.7% may seem high compared to the discussions about the “death of television.”  Looking beyond the country to its neighbours in the region, the picture surprisingly repeats itself. According to the Asian Barometer, in Mongolia[ii] 63.2% of the population trusts television, in Vietnam 62.0%[iii], in South Korea 59.3%[iv], and in Taiwan[v] 57.3%.  The spread between the maximum and minimum is 5.9 percentage points (63.2–57.3). It shows that all five countries fall within a corridor of moderately high trust in television.

This comparison demonstrates how television maintains a stable level of trust not only in Kazakhstan but across the Asian region.  The similarity of trust levels in different countries suggests that this is not about random fluctuations, but deeper foundations.

Two lenses of trust

Why does the screen continue to hold attention? The answer lies in two different dimensions: institutional and cultural.

Institutional lens. Froman institutional perspective, television is an official and stable institution.  In Kazakhstan, the country’s largest channels (“First Channel Eurasia,” “Qazaqstan,” “Khabar,” Channel 31, “KTK”) are integrated into the state infrastructure and therefore have unique access to official information.  Regular news broadcasts, recognizable news presenters create a sense of reliability. Unlike social networks and messengers, where information often remains unverified, television is perceived as the “proven word”[vi]. Scheduled newscasts, standardized delivery, and familiar news presenters reinforce the parameters of credibility[vii].

Cultural lens. Trust in television is also formed through habits and values. How does it work? Through socialization, values are “absorbed” via the dominant channel (in this case, TV) and then projected onto the evaluation of institutions[viii]. Several generations of Kazakhstanis were socialized through television, and this habit has become part of the collective experience. Moreover, for older age groups, where media literacy is lower, TV remains clearer and more reliable than a news feed on a phone.  Therefore, in Kazakhstan, television functions not merely as a device, but a part of everyday life, a symbol of family cohesion and social order.

Hybrid media environment and emerging players

However, in a hybrid media environment, television can no longer remain the only source of trust. 34.7% of Kazakhstanis trust social networks and messengers, which have become a “new space of trust” for personal contacts and online communities.  Social networks attract users with their speed and interactivity. Meanwhile, 30.3% of respondents trust online media, which are perceived as fast and modern, though not always as recognized.  In turn, the algorithms of digital platforms create a sense of personal closeness and belonging to one’s circle. All this means that television’s leadership must increasingly be defended rather than taken for granted.

In this competition, the essence of the hybrid model reveals itself. Namely, the combination of television’s institutional stability and cultural memory with the dynamism of digital platforms.  The key question in this clash is whether television can not only hold its position but also find new ways of engaging with society in a world where trust has become highly contested.

[i] The sociological survey was commissioned by KazISS and conducted from March 20 to April 20, 2025. The sample size was 8001 respondents. Participants included respondents over the age of 18 from 17 regions and 3 cities of national significance – Astana, Almaty, and Shymkent.

[ii] https://www.asianbarometer.org/datar?page=d10 SPSS file for Mongolia dated 23.12.2024.

[iii] https://www.asianbarometer.org/datar?page=d10 SPSS file on Vietnam dated 17.01.2025.

[iv] https://www.asianbarometer.org/datar?page=d10 SPSS file for South Korea on 20.12.2024.

[v] https://www.asianbarometer.org/datar?page=d10 SPSS file for Taiwan dated 02.04.2024.

[vi] Hovland, C.I., Janis, I.L., Kelley, H.H. Communication and Persuasion: Psychological Study of Opinion Change, Yale University, 1953; Mishler, W. & Rose R. What are the origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in post – Communist societies, Comparative Political Studies, vol.34, no.1, pp.30-62, 2001.

[vii] Gaziano, C., & McGrath, K. Measuring the Concept of Credibility, Journalism &Mass Communication Quarterly, vol63, pp.451-462, 1986.

[viii] Müller, J. Mechanisms of Trust: News Media in Democratic and Authoritarian Regimes. Verlag, 250pp.2013; Lee, T. Why they don’t trust the media. American Behavioral Scientist, vol.54, no.1, pp.8-21, 2010.

Сообщение Screen vs. Feed появились сначала на KAZAKHSTAN INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
UNDER THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN.

On 8 September 2025, Norway will hold elections to its unicameral parliament, the Storting. The outcome will reshape the political balance of power and result in the formation of a new parliamentary coalition and government.

For Kazakhstan, these elections are of particular interest, as monitoring and analyzing electoral processes in Europe makes it possible to take into account political shifts in the region, forecast new foreign policy and economic priorities of partners, and adapt engagement strategies in a timely manner.

The results of the Storting elections matter for the further strengthening of cooperation with Norway, one of Kazakhstan’s longstanding partners in Europe. Relations between Astana and Oslo continue to expand both bilaterally and within international organizations, including the United Nations. At the same time, mutual trade has maintained positive momentum, with turnover rising by more than 5 percent since 2022 reflecting the steady growth of economic and business ties.

Under the current circumstances, Kazakhstan and Norway are set to steadily advance their cooperation in such strategic areas as agriculture, digitalization, aquaculture, mineral extraction, transport, and logistics. At the same time, the new priorities of Norway’s future government could provide additional momentum for progress in these fields.

To understand the possible scenarios for the formation of Norway’s next government, it is important to take into account the specifics of the electoral system and the political experience of recent years. Thus, the 169 members of the Storting are elected every four years through a system of proportional representation based on party lists. In the last parliamentary elections, 10 parties entered the Storting, with the Labour Party emerging as the winner. Earlier, the Centre Party withdrew from the ruling coalition due to disagreements with the Labour Party over energy policy, an unprecedented move in 25 years that resulted in the formation of a single-party government.

According to polls conducted in early August this year, the Labour Party has a good chance of regaining its leading position. Despite a degree of social discontent, the return of former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to the post of Minister of Finance has significantly bolstered the party’s standing among voters. If the Labour Party wins, we can expect Norway ‘s further convergence with the European Union (of which the country is not a member).

At the same time, a victory by the Conservative Party or the Progress Party cannot be ruled out, as both continue to enjoy strong public support by centering their campaigns on migration and fiscal issues. Regardless of the eventual party configuration, the anticipated political changes in Norway are not expected to affect the momentum of Kazakhstan-Norway partnership.

In the event that a governing coalition is formed under the leadership of the Labour Party, new opportunities for Kazakhstan are likely to emerge in the fields of green energy and renewable resources. If the Conservatives or the Progress Party win, the focus may shift toward traditional energy sources.

Сообщение Parliamentary Elections in Norway: Implications for Relations with Kazakhstan появились сначала на KAZAKHSTAN INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
UNDER THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN.

In Kazakhstan, 36.7% of citizens live in rural areas. Over 7.4 million people[1] live in 6,100 villages and nearly 2,200 rural districts[2]. It is predicted that by 2027, the rural population will stabilize at 7.7 million people, and the number of villages will decrease to 5,900. Despite the active process of urbanization, the development of these rural areas will still be relevant for the country.

State policy in this area is aimed at improving the quality of life of rural residents and expanding the range of rendered services. Over the past five years, the government has issued strategic and program documents aimed at developing rural districts and villages, which contributes to regional progress and reduces development disparities.

However, the diversity in infrastructure development and, consequently, quality of life between villages and cities of national significance demands the development of tools for measuring and forecasting these factors. Today, the System of Regional Standards (SRS) is used to assess the state of regions, identify problem areas, and plan their development.

The system evaluates settlements and regions in 12 areas that are considered fundamental to ensuring a high quality of life.

In 2021, the provision of services and facilities under the SRS at the national level stood at 64.1%, and in 2024 it reached 66.1%. The availability of necessary infrastructure in villages increased by 10.4 percentage points compared to 2022 (from 55.3%) and amounted to 65.7%. In cities, infrastructure development was 87% in 2022 and 89% in 2024[3].

The SRS establishes a two-tier model for the development of rural areas based on mandatory and recommended facilities and services. Thus, rural district centers and key rural settlements are provided with expanded infrastructure: from vocational education and sports complexes to banking services and centralized water supply while other villages are provided with a basic set of services: shops, cultural and sports facilities, postal and telephone services, internet and mobile communications, a local police station, fire protection, and a household waste disposal system. In such settlements, emphasis is placed on mobile solutions ranging from mobile government services to block-module water supply systems. In this way, the availability of basic infrastructure is no longer an exception but a standard of comfortable living.

Another important strategic document in this area is the Concept for the Development of Rural Areas of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2023–2027, the implementation dynamics of which are measured through the SRS index. It is aimed at forming a comprehensive approach to the development of villages, which includes:

• improving the quality of life and creating comfortable living conditions for rural residents;
• developing social and engineering infrastructure;
• developing the agro-industrial complex, stimulating and supporting agricultural cooperation, as well as entrepreneurship in rural areas;
• strengthening local self-government and engaging citizens in territorial management;
• building a sustainable rural economy that takes into account regional specificities.

The Concept envisions the concentration of resources in key and promising villages, which will make it possible to ensure the necessary level of social benefits and public services there. At the same time, some small and remote settlements, on the contrary, will be gradually integrated into larger centers.

As a result of the Concept’s implementation, 3,500 key and satellite villages are expected to be fully provided with basic services. To achieve this, the government is currently implementing a number of incentive programs.

For example, the “Aul Amanaty” program helps residents of villages and small towns develop entrepreneurship with a focus on livestock and agriculture by providing concessional loans. The loan term is up to 5 years at an annual rate of 2.5%, and up to 7 years for livestock projects. The maximum loan amount reaches 2,500 Monthly Calculation Indices (MCI), and for agricultural cooperatives up to 8,000 MCI. This year, 50 billion tenge has been allocated for the program.

Over the period 2023-2024, more than 16,000 microloans were granted, which created about 18,000 new jobs. Since the launch of the program, more than 540 agricultural cooperatives have been established in the regions.

The “Aul – El Besigi” program has proven to be no less effective. Its goal is the modernization of social and engineering infrastructure. Since 2019, more than 6,600 projects have been implemented in 2,600 key and satellite villages. A total of 772 public utility facilities have been built or renovated, along with over 2,000 social facilities, including schools, medical stations, and cultural centers, as well as more than 3,000 intra-village roads. For 2025, 176.4 billion tenge has been allocated for the implementation of about 1,000 projects in 500 rural settlements across the country

It is obvious that the rural development is not limited to addressing infrastructure issues. Its strategic importance is linked to strengthening human capital, developing and reducing regional disparities, and creating decent living conditions for the country’s inhabitants in rural areas. The future of villages is linked to a sustainable economy, as well as active local self-government and a developed social environment, which will make them an attractive place to live and work.

[1] On the Demographic Situation for January-June 2025. https://stat.gov.kz/ru/news/o-demograficheskoy-situatsii-za-yanvar-iyun-2025-goda-/

[2] Administrative and Territorial Units of the Republic of Kazakhstan (as of January 1, 2025). https://stat.gov.kz/ru/industries/social-statistics/demography/publications/281169/

[3] Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated March 28, 2023 No. 270 “On the Approval of the Concept for the Development of Rural Areas of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2023–2027” https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P2300000270

Сообщение A Comfortable Living Environment: Rural Settlement Development Policy появились сначала на KAZAKHSTAN INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
UNDER THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN.

Doctor of Sociology, Professor,

Chief Research Fellow at the

 KazISS under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

After mapping out the main “islands” of Kazakhstan’s media archipelago in the previous article from national TV channels to bloggers and radio stations, the next questions arise: “How are media preferences distributed across social groups? Who chooses television, and who prefers Telegram channels? Are there any media that bring generations together, and are there any which divide them?” In this article, we examine the findings of KazISS’s spring survey through the lens of gender, age, education, income, and place of residence.

Every day, we sit down at an “information table.” For some, this is a hot dinner in front of the television; for others, it is fragmented news updates in messengers while some prefer morning coffee accompanied by online media. However, what determines this choice? Is it age, environment, education, or an inherited rhythm of life? In other words, if a young man starts his morning with Tengri News, scrolls through Telegram during the day, and ends the evening with Netflix, while his father does vice versa, what explains this difference? In this article, we will “zoom in” to observe who lives on each “island” of media consumption and why. Where do we find more young people? Where do we find the older generation? Who are the urban audiences and who are the rural ones? Who prefers Telegram, who chooses Kazakhstani television, and who turns to BBC? The answers to these questions hold an important key to understanding not only how society perceives news, but also why the same fact may resonate differently with different groups of people. As the well-known French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu has shown, even the most ordinary practices of consumption, whether food or media, reflect deep social distinctions, serving as expressions of enduring tastes and habits (habitus).

Therefore, a socio-demographic analysis of empirical data has revealed a number of noteworthy features in the media consumption of Kazakhstanis:

1. Gender lens of the media landscape. Men and women in Kazakhstan show similar, yet not identical, media profiles. Women tend to place greater trust in national television channels (63.7% compared to 54% of men) and in print media (10.2% versus 8.1%). Men, on the other hand, are more likely to turn to bloggers and opinion leaders (9.6% compared to 7.9%), as well as to foreign media outlets (4.7% versus 2%). One possible explanation is that women continue to follow more traditional media habits, particularly the older generation, which prefers established and “trusted” formats. Men, by contrast, appear more inclined to experiment and to search for information independently.

2. Generational divides and points of convergence. In this survey, age emerged as one of the strongest factors of stratification. The data show that television grows in importance with age, from 54.3% among the 30–45 group to 68.6% among those over 60. Social media, by contrast, lose trust sharply across generations: 44.9% among the youngest cohort versus just 20.8% among the oldest. Online news outlets display a similarly youthful profile: 38.3% of respondents aged 18-29 prefer them, while only 20.7% of the respondents in the 60+ group select this source of news. The fact that the print media (7.8% of 18–29-year-olds compared to 12.8% of the respondents over 60) becomes more meaningful with age, suggests the persistence of information habits formed before the digital era. Generational differences are least pronounced when it comes to national television channels. Following Bourdieu, we can say that the choice of one form of consumption over another is shaped not only by opportunities, but also by the deeply ingrained patterns of perception, taste, and orientation in the world embodied within individuals.

3. City and village: does a digital divide exist? In urban areas, the media landscape is more diverse and digitalized. For city residents, in general, social networks and messengers rank first, with significantly higher consumption of online media (33.6% versus 25% in rural areas) and social networks (37.2% of urban respondents versus 30.6% of rural ones). In villages, by contrast, television (62.7%) and print press (10.6%) continue to dominate. Another gap lies in the greater trust that city dwellers place in bloggers (10.1%) compared to rural dwellers (only 4%). Most likely, rural-urban differences are greater here than the issue of access to infrastructure; this is a manifestation of deeper differences in the scope of cultural capital. Based on the logic proposed by Pierre Bourdieu, city dwellers socialize in a more complex environment and therefore have the skills to interpret a wide variety of sources. Rural residents’ greater reliance on TV reflects a continuation of media practices that correspond to their life experiences.

In this sense, the media landscape reproduces the social structure of the society where the cities tend toward eclectic news consumption, while villages remain carriers of more institutionalized preferences. This pattern requires special attention considering not only the issue of access, but also the social meanings associated with media choice.

4. Educational stratification. The data show that education most clearly reproduces the overall hierarchy of trust in news sources, while at the same time producing quite predictable pattern of preferences. National television channels remain the leaders of media trust across all educational groups, but their dominance clearly declines as education rises, from 63.8% among respondents with incomplete secondary education to 37.2% among those holding a graduate degree. As far as individuals accumulate cultural capital, they increasingly turn to sources of information that offer reflection, analysis, and alternative perspectives. Media practices related to online news; for example, require more cognitive effort from the readers: they involve not just reading, but also comparing and navigating across platforms. Trust in online media also correlates with educational attainment: from 23.1% among people with incomplete secondary education to 46.5% among respondents with graduate degrees. Such users are often able to “read between the lines” and distinguish information from propaganda. What matters most here is that the educated are searching less for the news itself, and more for its interpretation. This represents an important shift.

Social networks and messengers, meanwhile, reflect the trajectory of collective experience. They are most popular among groups with secondary education (36.2%), though they also attract a considerable share of university graduates. Indeed, the social media today function as a hybrid media diet combining the official and the unofficial, the rational and the emotional.

Perhaps, the most interesting trend concerns bloggers. Trust in bloggers increases with education level (from 8.1% among respondents with incomplete schooling to 20.9% among those with graduate degrees) which challenges the stereotype that educated audiences consume media superficially. It appears that the blogosphere in Kazakhstan is turning into a zone of expertise, a media style where specialists engage with specialists, and where analysis, education, and politics intersect. The audience for foreign media, in turn, is strikingly diverse, ranging from vocational school graduates to holders of top universities’ diplomas.

To conclude this detailed look at education, and drawing on Bourdieu’s ideas, we might say that while choosing media we demonstrate the social layer we belong to, the symbols we value, and the cultural code we carry within us.

5. Media and social strata. In short, Republican TV channels are the most popular source of news among all social groups, but especially among people with limited financial means. Meanwhile, the popularity of social media and online media grows in line with income. Bloggers and opinion leaders are closer to the middle class, while radio and print media consumers are more common among less affluent segments of the population. When it comes to foreign TV channels, TV preferences vary depending on socioeconomic status. Thus, once again we see that media do not merely reflect social reality, but actively reproduce it, defining which topics gain prominence and which are pushed to the margins.

In the end, what we see is a multilayered yet fairly predictable media landscape. Media preferences in Kazakhstan follow a clear pattern of social stratification. The younger, more educated, and more “urban” a person is, the more likely they are to get information from social networks, online media, and blogs. The older the audience, the more stable their trust in television, print press, and radio. Viewed through the lens of Pierre Bourdieu, media consumption in Kazakhstan is not just a matter of choice, it is a reflection of deeply rooted life experience, of habitus. Some remain anchored on the familiar “islands” of television channels, while others have long set sail into the digital sea, placing their trust in Telegram. For some, online media are a safe harbor; for others, they are a search for new routes. Kazakhstan’s media archipelago is multilayered: each person has their own island, their own navigation. However, the course we choose to follow speaks volumes about WHO WE ARE, where we come from, and WHERE WE ARE headed.

Сообщение What Sociology Reveals About Kazakhstan’s Media Preferences появились сначала на KAZAKHSTAN INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
UNDER THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN.

Nowadays, we increasingly hear that people do not trust any news. But once a truly important topic arises, people still start looking for sources to read, watch, or figure it out. This choice reflects not so much taste, but rather a person’s social identity, generation, and even mood. Today, we will try to understand which news sources are in high demand in Kazakhstan – television, social media, online media, or something else?

In the KazISS[i] spring survey, respondents were asked the question “Which sources of information do you trust most when receiving news about politics, economics, and public life in Kazakhstan?” They were given the following list to select from:

1. National TV channels

2. Kazakhstani online media

3. Social networks and messengers

4. Foreign mass media

5. Printed newspapers and magazines

6. Bloggers and opinion leaders

7. Radio.  

The respondents could choose up to three news sources. Overall, we can conduct an analysis based on the first choice, when only the first source is taken into account, and a clear understanding is given of who leads the media space. Multiple-choice analysis could be done as well: a person could choose up to three trusted sources. This approach allows us to estimate the extent and structure of media consumption. Interestingly, our analysis showed that both approaches produced almost identical results which is a rare and significant finding:

Such consistency in estimates indicates a clear hierarchy of trust in news sources in the minds of Kazakhstani people, even if they use several sources at the same time. In other words, respondents are consistent in which media they trust; even when allowed to pick up several sources, they intuitively rank them in almost the same order. All this suggests to the stability of media trust and a fairly well-established information hierarchy in society, especially on issues of politics, economics, and public life. Secondly, despite the continued leadership of the national TV channels, Kazakhstan’s media environment clearly reflects a hybrid model, where alongside the television agenda, social networks, messengers, and digital platforms are playing a greater role. Such composition not only indicates hybridity, but also the nature of the national information landscape, where information navigation with trust is possible. A quality that, admittedly, has become rare in our time.

So, what does the media landscape of the country look like?  

1. National TV channels act as the key institutional media hub of the country (59.1%). Indeed, television in Kazakhstan remains the core of official communication. Despite digitalization, TV is still perceived as the main channel of official information by millions of Kazakhstani people, especially on issues of politics, economics, and public life.

2. At the same time, another domain is developing. That is, every third respondent (34.7%) indicates that they trust social networks, which act as alternative, sometimes complementary channels, especially among urban residents and youth. But most likely, these two spheres intersect. So, a person watches the news on TV in the evenings, and reads social networks in the morning.

3. The third place in the trust rating is occupied by Kazakhstani Internet mass media (30.3%), specifically news agencies. This is a significant finding, considering that we are talking about websites which combine traditional journalism with an online format. They work according to journalistic standards, receive government support, and publish high-quality content. Continuing the metaphorical series of the Kazakhstani media archipelago, Internet mass media is defined as the third island of the media field. Notably, this is a fairly diverse category which includes both government-supported resources and independent editorial offices. They deliberately combined publications of different origins and politics into one item to see how much the audience trusts the Internet as such.  

4. Printed newspapers and magazines take the fourth place. They are trusted by 9.2% of respondents in Kazakhstan, quite a modest figure, especially compared to television, social and online media. Newspapers and magazines are still read in the regions by the elderly who do not trust the “flashy” headlines of Internet media and prefer a structured, verified presentation. For them, printed publications continue to perceive as a reliable source proven over time, as they contain less emotions and more facts. In other words, the Kazakhstani media environment still retains its multilayered nature, in which the written word has its own audience and its own meaning.

5. Bloggers and opinion leaders were chosen by 8.7% of the respondents. At first glance, that may seem small, but it’s more than just a number. It is not just the fifth place in the trust rating, but a new force that plays by different rules and speaks to the audience in its own, living language. They have no editorial office, budget, or broadcasting license, but they do have the intonation of a “good old friend”, and this is something that traditional media find extremely difficult to reproduce. A blogger is often perceived as the “friend”; there is no distance, they speak a lively manner, and their texts can be replied to in the comments. Bloggers share not only news, but also their lives.

6. 8.5% of the respondents expressed confidence in foreign media. It should be highlighted that, symbolically, the presence of foreign media in the media space signals media pluralism where different views coexist without any dominance. Their low representation, in turn, is an indicator of Kazakhstan‘s media sovereignty. 

7. Being chosen by 5.4% of respondents, radio ranks seventh in the architecture of media consumption. It is not that significant, but not negligible either. Like newspapers, radio is part of our media memory, but it works differently. It does not need to be looked at, clicked on, scrolled through, or selected. One can listen to it on the way, in the car, kitchen, or in the background. And that is its strength; it does not impose itself, does not grab attention, but simply accompanies us. Perhaps, that is why it is perceived as a neutral, an “unobtrusive” source, allowing to keep up to date without overloading a person. Most likely, radio stays with those who value not the format itself, but the habit of listening.

Hence, the modern media space of Kazakhstan resembles an archipelago. The map clearly shows islands of different shapes and population densities, with different languages and habits, but united by public attention. National television is located on the largest island, which still retains mass trust. Nearby, there are social networks and messengers, which are mobile, noisy, and, crucially, fast-growing. Internet media (news agencies) looks like an island with a complex coastline; it connects the official and digital worlds, but is not yet able to outrun its neighbours. Further in the archipelago, we see newspapers, radio, bloggers, as well as foreign media. These are already niches, small forms, but their importance is undeniable; some preserve our cultural stability, the second is an individual opinion, and the third gives us a global view of what is happening.

Ultimately, what is important is that the structure of Kazakhstan’s media field is neither a self-elevating pyramid nor a straight line, but a map of islands where each user chooses their own route, occasionally crossing from one shore to another. And the more trust, diversity, and respect for the audience there is in this archipelago, the more stable Kazakhstan’s information ecosystem will be.

[i] The sociological survey was conducted by order of the KazISS in the period from March 20 to April 20, 2025. The sample size is 8,001 respondents. The survey involved respondents over the age of 18 from 17 regions and 3 cities of national significance – Astana, Almaty and Shymkent.

Сообщение Media Archipelago of Kazakhstan появились сначала на KAZAKHSTAN INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
UNDER THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN.

In the contemporary international system, India occupies a distinct position as one of the largest and most rapidly developing powers, playing an increasingly prominent role in global affairs. In its pursuit of greater influence on the world stage, India has been steadily advancing multilateral relations with regions of strategic significance. Among these, Central Asia holds particular importance for New Delhi. Endowed with abundant natural resources and a strategically advantageous geographic location, the region is emerging as a key arena for India’s active engagement in the domains of economics, security, culture, and energy.

Amid growing great power competition, the Central Asian vector in India’s foreign policy is emerging as a key priority. Collectively, India’s positions in Central Asia reflect a transition from declarative intentions to concrete actions that are shaping new political and economic realities both in the region and within the broader framework of global politics.

New Delhi’s aspiration to position itself as a major global actor constitutes a central pillar of India’s foreign policy strategy, particularly in relation to its neighboring and extended Asian partners – whether in the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, East Africa, or Central Asia. While projecting itself as an influential Asian center of power, India also demonstrates notable flexibility and dynamism, clearly evident in its approach toward Central Asia. In this region, New Delhi carefully navigates the competing interests and contradictions of other global powers present, while simultaneously advancing its own agenda across a broad spectrum of bilateral and multilateral initiatives. It is no coincidence that Central Asia is increasingly viewed by India’s political leadership and expert community as a region of growing economic potential and strategic significance.

At the same time, the trajectory of India’s foreign policy towards Central Asia is shaped under the influence of the existing balance of power and interests of Russia, China, the United States, and the European Union in the region. All the major phases of India’s foreign policy strategy toward Central Asia can be examined within this context.

Simultaneously, there are several factors that could intensify India’s policy toward Central Asia in the short term.

Firstly, in the sphere of security and cooperation, the intensification of Indian policy in this region is closely linked to its immediate proximity to Afghanistan and the security threats emanating from that country, including religious extremism, transnational terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal migration. It should be noted that any potential increase in security threats to India originating from Afghanistan constitutes a significant component of the country’s foreign policy agenda. Moreover, India does not discount the possibility of radicalization occurring in other Central Asian states. In such a scenario, New Delhi would be compelled to adjust its policies to address these challenges. Within Indian expert circles, it is widely acknowledged that the rise of religious extremism in Afghanistan and Central Asia could influence the Muslim population of India. At the same time, the impact of domestic politics within India on its foreign policy priorities cannot be overlooked.

For instance, the radical Hindu rhetoric among members of India’s political leadership may lead to a shift in approaches toward regional security issues, potentially resulting in a reduction in the intensity of India’s cooperation with Central Asian countries, not to mention the possible next escalation of Indo-Pakistani relations.

At the same time, it is important to understand that India’s political course concerning the countries of the region will to a considerable extent continue to be shaped by India’s historical narratives regarding the shared cultural-civilizational heritage with the Central Asian states. In the case of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, these narratives appear significantly less compelling compared to those related to the neighboring Tajikistan or Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, this does not preclude the continuation of India’s humanitarian cooperation policy with all countries in the region, ranging from the organization of cultural events and student exchange programs, and the establishment of Hindi language departments, to the provision of material assistance for disaster relief efforts.

Secondly, the significant shift in the balance of power and interests that has been established over the past three decades among Russia, China, and Western countries, coupled with the intensification of rivalry among them in Central Asia, compels India to activate its policies in the region, including in the realms of security and military cooperation. In this context, an intensification of India’s policy in Central Asia can be expected, aimed at balancing the increased influence of global powers in the region and safeguarding New Delhi’s strategic and economic interests. This is particularly relevant given the risk of certain countries in the region—namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan – falling into economic dependence on China, which today motivates India to pursue a more proactive presence in the area.

The promotion of regional self-sufficiency and equidistant diplomacy constitutes a crucial element of India’s Central Asian foreign policy. New Delhi assigns the countries of the region, particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, a pivotal role as key transit points for Indian goods and services destined for the region and beyond. It is no coincidence that India actively participates in the development of transport infrastructure in Central Asia, including the International North-South Transport Corridor, which passes through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and has the potential to connect India with Europe and other countries.

India places great hopes on the implementation of projects related to the North-South Transport Corridor through the Iranian ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar. Although the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas currently remains the primary port in use, the prospects for cargo delivery from India to Iran via this port remain problematic. In this regard, the other Iranian port – Chabahar, which is not subject to U.S. sanctions – is considered more promising for India. India’s interest in developing the infrastructure of the Chabahar port is thus evident. Utilizing it for organizing cargo flows along the North-South corridor enables India to gain access to the natural resources and markets of Afghanistan and Central Asia, as well as to facilitate the supply of goods to Eurasian markets via Kazakhstan’s territory.

India’s deepening engagement within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) should also be understood in this context – as part of broader efforts to expand trade and investment ties, enhance regional connectivity, and strengthen New Delhi’s role in regional security and stability.

Despite these efforts, several constraints continue to hinder India’s more active involvement in Central Asia. Chief among them are persistent transport and logistical challenges. Central Asia’s landlocked geography severely limits India’s direct access to the region’s resources and markets. Distance, underdeveloped infrastructure, and high tariffs remain major barriers to expanding trade and investment. Furthermore, Uzbekistan is the most vulnerable country in the world in terms of transportation and logistics, as it not only lacks direct access to the sea but is also surrounded exclusively by countries that similarly have no access to international seas or oceans. The international sanctions imposed on Iran, security challenges and border disputes with Pakistan, as well as the persistent instability in Afghanistan and the de facto lack of international recognition of the current Afghan government, along with unresolved relations between Kabul and Dushanbe, constitute major obstacles to the intensive advancement of India’s policy in the Central Asian countries.

These challenges will continue to hinder the establishment and maintenance of strong ties between India and the countries of the region in the future. Overcoming such obstacles will require sustained diplomatic efforts, regional cooperation, and strategic adjustments to India’s foreign policy framework. Additionally, addressing issues related to regional security, economic connectivity, and mutual trust will be essential for fostering a stable and mutually beneficial partnership in Central Asia.

Thus, India’s foreign policy strategy in Central Asia in the short- and medium-term perspectives is shaped by a multitude of factors influenced by the changing regional and global conditions. Consequently, India’s foreign policy will undergo continuous transformation in response to evolving global and regional challenges, as well as potential shifts in its domestic politics, leading to a significant intensification of New Delhi’s engagement in the Central Asian countries.

At the same time, India will continue to place strong emphasis on multilateralism in its foreign policy, as it seeks to play a more active role in shaping the global agenda and addressing regional and international security challenges.

In this context, the primary objectives of India’s foreign policy in the foreseeable future are expected to include the following: the continuation of building strong partnership relations with Central Asian countries within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the “India-Central Asia” format; the strengthening of trade, economic, and transport-logistics linkages between India and the countries of the region; and cooperation in the fields of security and defense.

Furthermore, an expansion of the legal and contractual basis for cooperation between India and Central Asian states, as well as an intensification of diplomatic dialogue aimed at resolving regional and international issues, should be anticipated.

Сообщение A view of the Central Asian vector in India’s foreign policy появились сначала на KAZAKHSTAN INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
UNDER THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN.