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the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

**OSCE ASTANA DECLARATION:
TOWARDS A SECURITY COMMUNITY**

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On 23 October 2012 in Almaty, the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation's Centre in Astana held an international conference entitled the OSCE Astana Declaration: Towards a Security Community.

This compendium, which includes presentations given at the conference by both Kazakhstan's and foreign participants, explores a broad range of topics related to the OSCE's main areas of focus, as well as current international security and regional co-operation issues.

The edition will be of interest to political scientists, international relations experts, civil servants, scholars, educators, university-level students, and broad sections of the public interested in the contemporary development of the OSCE.

Any opinions and recommendations expressed in the materials arising from the conference are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the conference organizers.

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CONTENT

Welcoming speech by Bulat Sultanov	5
Welcoming speech by Natalia Zarudna	8

PLENARY SESSION

Adam Kobieracki	13
Adil Akhmetov	19
Yevhenii Tsymbaliuk	25

FIRST SESSION

THE OSCE'S POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION: THE BUILDING OF EURO-ATLANTIC AND EURASIAN SECURITY COMMUNITY

Serzhan Abdykarimov OSCE Astana Declaration: Towards Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security	29
Ulrich Kuhn The Initiative for the Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Committee (IDEAS): Report Findings	34
Murat Laumulin The OSCE Astana Declaration and safeguarding security in Eurasia	39
Arne Seifert Rethinking the Eurasian space – theses for thought	53

SECOND SESSION ECONOMIC AND ECOLOGICAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

Toktobiubiu Dyikanbaeva Poverty and inequality in the security discourse.....	58
Kaisha Atakhanova On urgent environmental security challenges in Central Asia: public opinion within the post-Rio and OSCE Astana Declaration context	63

Leila Muzaparova Kazakhstan's economic security: main threats	72
Anar Rakhimzhanova The impact of modern threats on economic integration in the OSCE area.....	81

**THIRD SESSION
CO-OPERATION ON HUMAN DIMENSION TOPICS**

Zhanat Zakiyeva Human dimension of Eurasian security	89
Murat Bakhadirov International co-operation of Uzbekistan and the OSCE in the humanitarian domain	97
Tamara Kaleyeva Freedom of speech in Central Asia: declarations and reality.....	104
Andrei Chebotaryev The state of civil society and its institutes in Kazakhstan in light of their compliance with the principles of the OSCE Astana Declaration.....	109
IDEAS Report: Towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community	118
Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security Community	162
Authors	181
About the KazISS	183
About the OSCE Centre in Astana	185

**Welcoming Speech by Bulat Sultanov,
Director of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies
under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan**

(unofficial translation from Russian)

Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,
Distinguished Colleagues,

On December 2, 2010, at the OSCE Summit held in the capital of Kazakhstan after an eleven-year interval, the Astana Commemorative Declaration was adopted: “Towards a Security Community.” As we all know, in 2011 the chairmanship of this most important international organization passed to the Republic of Lithuania. In the current year the organization is chaired by Ireland, and in 2013 the chairmanship of the organization will pass to the Republic of Ukraine.

Without doubt, the OSCE Secretariat and the structural units of this organization accomplish significant work. And the 2011 OSCE Annual Report is the evidence of that fact.

At the same time, the presence of “frozen conflicts” and a lack of readiness among participating States to dialogue have combined with an inability to develop consensus-based approaches in major OSCE development domains, and the predominance of the human dimension of security in OSCE activities to strengthen criticism of the OSCE’s future prospects. Voices still abound that claim the OSCE, which was created during the Cold War, is not able to adapt to new geopolitical realities.

In this regard Kazakhstan, when it was chairing the OSCE in 2010, clearly and explicitly announced its strong and principal position in favor of the OSCE, believing that no other organization could replace it. According to President N.A. Nazarbayev,

such a position is explained not only due to the unique geographic composition comprising 56 countries, but also the accumulated experience of political interaction and economic cooperation following the 1975 Helsinki Summit. OSCE stagnation, or its disappearance, may create a hazardous vacuum in the territory spreading from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

Within the framework of the Kazakhstan chairmanship the priority was to add “new life” to the OSCE through establishing interaction with Eurasian regional structures, as it is not possible to ensure European security today without taking into consideration the Asian security domain.

Therefore, our country appreciated the provision of the Astana Declaration on a common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community free of dividing lines; one that should be aimed at seeking answers to the challenges of the 21st century.

Afghanistan plays a critical role in regional and global security. We stand for providing, including within the OSCE framework, all possible assistance to the recovery of this long-suffering country’s economy.

In the current complicated and interconnected world, Kazakhstan advocates joint action in combating transnational threats such as international terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking, illicit migration, organized crime, cyber threats, and others still emerging.

At the same time, we still hope that the OSCE will turn into an efficient platform for developing ways to deal with the complicated global economic and financial situation, as well as for resolving the economic security and military domain issues.

As the OSCE pays special attention in its activities to the humanitarian and legal domains, the following point should be stressed. Within the framework of the governmental program “Path to Europe,” Kazakhstan is consistently modernizing its legal system as well as its public and political institutes based

on European political, legal, philosophical and moral values that comprise the achievements of a global civilization. In this regard, Kazakhstan is, in practical terms, interested primarily in the accumulated expertise of European legal institutes in improving social laws and ensuring high standards for human rights and freedoms. But, at the same time, we are certain that the process of entering a common European civilized space should take into account the necessity of maintaining one’s own national and cultural identity.

Of course it would be good to accelerate to the maximum extent possible the process of political and democratic reform in Kazakhstan. But revolutionary haste and attempts to enact societal reforms without taking into account social and economic conditions lead, as a rule, to the discrediting of the brightest ideas and best intentions. That was clearly demonstrated by the so-called “color” revolutions in the post-Soviet space, and more recently by dramatic events in the Middle East.

In conclusion, let me wish all participants of today’s international forum successful work and fruitful discussions that lead to the development of specific proposals on how to improve OSCE activities, always taking into consideration new geopolitical realities.

* * *

**Welcoming Speech by Ambassador Natalia Zarudna,
Head of the OSCE Centre in Astana**

(unofficial translation from Russian)

Dear ladies and gentlemen,

I am pleased that our proposal to hold an international conference on the implementation of the commemorative Astana Declaration, one of the basic documents of the OSCE, was supported by the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies and our colleagues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan.

We are glad today to welcome such a representative and authoritative audience. Above all, we welcome international experts, the Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre Adam Kobieracki, and a representative of Ukraine's forthcoming chairmanship of the OSCE, who will share with us their vision on the topicality of the Astana Declaration in the context of the present and future priorities of the OSCE.

We also hope that discussion at the conference will help us better understand the opportunities for the wider use of both the potential and the rich experience of the OSCE in strengthening security through cooperation in the entire Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space, especially in the Central Asian region, which is now facing serious challenges and threats.

We also eagerly await a presentation by the representative of the Centre for OSCE Research on a report prepared by a working group on problems of and prospects for Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security. Remarkably, because of the time difference, we will learn about the results of the study earlier than representatives of other participating States because the report will be presented in Vienna today.

Unfortunately, not all of the invitees could attend our conference. For example, the Irish chairmanship is experiencing a busy time due to preparations for a ministerial meeting in Dublin, while the leading expert on issues regarding this region at the Centre for OSCE Research in Hamburg, Arne Seifert, cancelled his journey to Kazakhstan because of illness. However, he sent his address, which we hope you will hear today.

I would like to start my address on the essence of the conference's topic with the well-established thesis that arose from debate only 40 years ago that international security – the pursuit of which is the OSCE's ultimate goal – is based on the key element of cooperation among states, which means security through cooperation.

The concept of *cooperative security*, proposed by former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, was not immediately accepted and approved by everyone. However, it is precisely this principle of security through cooperation and consensus, without which we could hardly talk about strengthening confidence between states with often absolutely opposite points of view and interests, that has become the OSCE's trademark and has enabled it to find its important niche among other security organisations.

Like any other organisation, the OSCE has developed and transformed into new forms and institutions over time. New challenges and threats requiring appropriate answers have emerged, and radical changes on the map of the OSCE area have taken place, while political priorities have changed in the international arena.

However, the very foundation on which this organisation was built during thaws in the Cold War has remained unchanged. The realisation of the basic need to strengthen its role in the interests of regional and international security has remained unchanged.

The commemorative Astana Declaration was adopted during a difficult developmental stage of the OSCE, and in the spirit of

the best traditions of the organisation, as a result of the political will shown by members, as well as the diplomatic skill and dedicated efforts of the Kazakhstan chairmanship. In this declaration, not only did members acknowledge the existence of serious challenges and threats that require attention, but also reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of the OSCE, which remains an efficient forum for finding solutions and an effective mechanism for preventing and resolving conflicts.

By adopting the Astana Declaration, “Towards a Security Community,” leaders of participating States have shown unity in their commitment to OSCE obligations in all dimensions, have spoken in favour of increasing confidence among members, and have reached an accord on ways of developing appropriate responses to modern challenges and threats.

The declaration calls for advancing new ideas and drafting plans for the future work of the OSCE in order to improve its viability and provide a new impetus for ensuring security and cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region.

It is also worth noting that the declaration set the tone for the work of future chairs of the OSCE, and for the organisation as a whole, on the three traditional dimensions of security, the potential of which has not yet fully been discovered and exhausted. This document has also become a set of guidelines for action in OSCE field missions, including our centre in Astana.

It is also worth stressing that the Astana summit reiterated the need to further enhance the effectiveness of the OSCE’s activities and to devise new mechanisms to fight modern challenges and threats. It also concerned the role of field missions, which has changed with time to meet the needs and challenges faced by members.

As a result, the OSCE and its representative office in Astana have helped, and are continuing to help, Kazakhstan on the path of political, economic and social modernisation, assisting in the

implementation of its long-term programmes in line with OSCE principles and obligations. As part of its mandate, our centre cooperates with government agencies and civil society in capitals and in provinces based on trusted partnership and mutual respect.

Approaches to addressing security issues within the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space include both new challenges and new opportunities for the OSCE and its member countries, and the organisation faces many problems – above all, surrounding the forthcoming withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014.

Protracted and “frozen” conflicts remain unresolved, and there is an acute need to strengthen the fight against violent extremism and radicalisation, which lead to terrorism. This includes the fight against terrorist funding, human trafficking, drug dealing, and the illegal weapons trade. New threats and challenges have also emerged, for example, in the context of cyber security.

Environmental problems have become acute, while economic and financial crises have not subsided. There is a clear need to cooperate in the management of water, energy and other natural resources, and the struggle to access them is not abating. We also need to increase tolerance towards other cultures, religions and ethnic groups in our entire region.

As I have already mentioned, all this raises the issue of the OSCE’s adaptation to the changing reality, and of increasing the efficiency of its activities. The Helsinki Plus 40 process, proposed by the Irish chairmanship, will help in these areas.

At the same time, the realisation of the fundamental need to preserve and develop the OSCE in the interest of ensuring regional and international security, and of a commitment to the fundamental principles of international relations, democracy and the protection of human rights, which unite member countries, remains an undisputed fact.

I hope this conference will make a valuable contribution to further tapping the potential of the Astana Declaration and will strengthen the work of the organisation as a whole.

In conclusion, I would like to thank our partners – Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the Kazakh president, especially its Director B.K. Sultanov, for initiating and supporting this event.

I wish all of us a heated and, most importantly, a constructive and effective, discussion.

Thank you very much.

* * *

PLENARY SESSION

Address by Ambassador Adam Kobieracki, Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre

Dear Director Sultanov,
Ambassador Zarudna,
Distinguished audience,

Allow me first of all to thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Centre for Strategic Studies and the OSCE Centre in Astana for organizing this timely event.

In Vienna, discussions have just started on the draft decisions to be tabled at the Dublin Ministerial Council in December. The key draft document being discussed ahead of Dublin is a draft declaration on advancing the work towards a security community within the “Helsinki +40” process.

The “Helsinki +40” process, launched by the Irish Chairmanship, brings together the current Troika and the incoming Swiss and Serbian Chairmanships in an inclusive effort of all 56 participating States to continue to provide strong political impetus to further strengthen the OSCE towards 2015 – a year that marks four decades since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.

But as has been rightly mentioned by some, 2015 is not only “Helsinki +40”, it is also “Astana +5.” The vision reflected in the 2010 Astana Commemorative Declaration – “*a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, rooted in agreed principles shared commitments and common goals*” – is the tasking that underpins the “Helsinki +40” process.

The strong leadership exercised by the 2010 OSCE Chairmanship of Kazakhstan in convening the first OSCE Summit over a

decade and the first in Central Asia has to be recognized as a key catalyst for coming to an agreement on a document laying down the commitment to a security community. The Lithuanian Chairmanship 2011 through the V-to-V dialogues and the decisions taken at the Vilnius Ministerial Council and the Irish Chairmanships through the initiation of the “Helsinki +40” process have taken on this momentum and provided us with the first stepping stones on our way forward.

Building on the Corfu process, the Astana Commemorative Declaration has outlined a vision which provides the OSCE strategic direction. It entails a commitment to a concept of multi-lateral security in which no State will strengthen its security at the expense of the security of other States. Working towards this vision of a security community would mean putting an end to zero-sum games.

Allow me to reflect a little bit further on the concept of a security community. The idea is not new. The term was first coined in 1957 by Karl Deutsch, a prominent political scientist. He defined a security community as a group of people who have come to an agreement on at least this one point: common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of ‘peaceful change’. He espoused that people in a security community were bound by the ‘sense of community’ based on mutual sympathy, trust, and common interests. After the end of the Cold War, the concept was adapted by scholars who redefined the security community as one with shared identities, values and meanings, many-sided direct interactions, and reciprocal long-term interest.

It is striking that until a few years ago this concept never took off in international security conceptual thinking. At the same time, the reasons why it has now gained prominence are understandable. Globalization is increasing, technology is advancing, and communication is becoming more sophisticated, as evidenced by social networking. Global developments coupled with new

threats and challenges, such as the current financial climate are forcing many to re-think their priorities. With regard to the OSCE area, I think we have started to develop a better understanding of what unites rather than what divides us in the light of the common challenges we face from within and outside the OSCE area. “Afghanistan post-2014” is just one buzz-word in this respect, but certainly one which has a special resonance in Central Asia.

Yet, developing a security community remains a tremendous challenge. Putting the vision from Astana into reality will require continued dialogue and engagement, based on inclusivity, mutual respect, tolerance, flexibility and patience.

This is what the “Helsinki +40 process” is all about. The multi-year approach proposed by the Irish Chairmanship and fully supported by the Secretary General is also recognition that the actual building of a security community is long term in nature. It entails an incremental and pragmatic approach and requires changing minds and creating trust.

Thus, while we agree that we are not there yet, the main question remains: are we on the right track?

On a positive note, the Astana Summit opened a new chapter for the OSCE. It reaffirmed the common vision of a security community and reconfirmed the OSCE norms, principles and commitments at the highest political level. It broadly outlined the areas where the Organization was expected to move ahead and tasked the incoming Chairmanships to develop a concrete plan of action to guide the OSCE’s activities.

While building a security community needs further work with regard to a wide range of issues stretching over all three dimensions, allow me to highlight just some of them which are predominantly in my domain as Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre.

The work that has been undertaken over the past two years under the Lithuanian and Irish Chairmanships to strengthen OSCE

capabilities with regard to early warning, early action, mediation and mediation support as well as post-conflict rehabilitation has demonstrated that participating States are fully cognizant of the need to effectively address conflict and crisis situations in the OSCE area. I would say that in following up to Vilnius Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/11 on Elements of the Conflict Cycle, we have made good headway in strengthening our tools for early warning and early action. However, at the same time we have to concede that the unresolved protracted conflicts in the OSCE area remain a heavy burden on our way towards a security community.

Effective conflict prevention and conflict settlement is one aspect requiring our continued efforts, another related one is reconciliation. The protracted conflicts remain a main source of tension and mistrust among participating States, but divisive historical memories and feelings of alienation continue to exist also in many other cases.

During the 2012 OSCE Security Days, the importance of reconciliation for post-conflict rehabilitation as well as conflict prevention and conflict resolution was stressed on several occasions. Successful reconciliation, including the establishment of transitional justice, was identified as being fundamental to durable peace. We believe that the OSCE can and should play a role in supporting and fostering ongoing reconciliation processes as well as assist in starting new ones. To reflect further of what the OSCE has and further could do in this respect, the CPC will organize a workshop on reconciliation on 18 December in Vienna.

Arms control issues and military transparency remain another matter to be addressed on the way towards a security community. We are at a difficult juncture with regard to the conventional arms control regime that was developed in the then CSCE framework. While we all feel the need to modernize and to adapt it to today's realities, we continue to face multiple challenges and diverging perceptions on a range of arms control issues, including those

that either were traditionally outside the OSCE framework such as missile defence and tactical nuclear weapons, or are outside of that framework for obvious, strategic reasons.

These few examples alone, illustrate why we speak about "developing" a security community and why the "Helsinki +40" process is about "advancing the work towards" it. We have a long way ahead and cannot realistically believe the process will be completed by the time we reach "Astana +5". However, we are aware of the fact that we must constantly work on these issues and remain committed towards the goal as such.

Building on the Astana Commemorative Declaration, the 40th Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, provides an excellent opportunity to consolidate trust and bridge differences with a view to strengthening the OSCE's contribution towards developing a security community by 2015. This journey toward a security community also prompts the Organization to sharpen its working processes, and refocus its agenda and activities to elicit further engagement and ownership among all participating States. We count fully on your contribution and support on the way.

Thank you for your attention.

* * *

Address by Senator Adil Akhmetov, Secretary of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security of the Senate of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Combating Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims

Mr. Moderator,
Your Excellences,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Introduction

First of all I would like to express my gratitude to Madam Natalia Zarudna, the Head of the OSCE Centre in Astana for the invitation to address this high level conference in conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan and the Kazakh Institute of Strategic Studies.

Ladies and Gentlemen! First of all, I would like to draw your attention to an unavoidable common concern related with the state of intercultural, interreligious, and international PEACE and security on the planet as well as on the OSCE Region. There is no doubt that today this Peace and security are extremely fragile. The latest worldwide Muslim anger and violent protests inspired by a You Tube brutal cyber crime mocking Prophet Muhammad is a strong proof of what I have just said. Moreover this is not a single case of scoffing at sacred feelings of Muslims on the planet, and the mankind has not yet forgotten those malicious and unforgivable ridicules thrown at Islam in the past. I mean the cartoon films humiliating Prophet Muhammad and several other cases of vandalism committed by extremists against Koran in the OSCE region and elsewhere. This type of internet hate crimes and provocative behaviour purposely insulting Islam should not

be ever justified by freedom of expression. Instead such harmful inhuman and stereotyped mindset ought to be severely condemned and rejected by the OSCE member states.

At the same time I have to emphasize that nothing, including the abuse of freedom of expression in order to insult Muslims and Islam, can justify the killing of innocent people.

OSCE Commitments to Combat Intolerance against Muslims

Acknowledging this challenge, Astana Declaration towards a Security Society calls for the OSCE participating States to make greater efforts to promote freedom of religion and belief and combat any kind of intolerance and discrimination including countering the manifestations humiliating the Muslims.

In addition to the previous OSCE commitments, this specific form of racism and xenophobia was already elaborated in the Declaration adopted by the Kazakh Chairperson in Office in relation with the High Level Conference on Tolerance and Non-Discrimination.

The Astana Declaration on Tolerance and Non-Discrimination highlights the importance of raising awareness of intolerance against Muslims and calls for the participating States to challenge anti-Muslim stereotyping.

Moreover, it firmly rejects the attempts to associate terrorism and extremism with Islam and Muslims and declares that international developments and political issues cannot justify any forms of intolerance and discrimination against Muslims.

It also calls on full respect of international human rights standards, while fighting terrorism, and acknowledges that building trust, mutual understanding and respect among different communities and government authorities strengthens the efforts to counter extremism that may lead to violence.

At the Fall session of the OSCE PA held this year in Tirana, Albania I strongly encouraged the parliamentarians of the partici-

pating States to incorporate these statements into the next Ministerial Council Decision on the issues concerning racism, xenophobia and other forms of intolerance.

Reference to the Conference on Countering Intolerance against Muslims in Public Discourse

Additionally, I would like to draw your attention to the OSCE High Level Conference on Countering Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims in Public Discourse, which took place on 27-28 October 2012, in Vienna.

At this high level conference, while freedom of expression was recognized as a corner stone of democratic societies, the participants raised concerns over the lack of awareness of the impact of anti-Muslim public discourse on the security of both the society, in general, and minorities, in particular.

They called ODIHR to increase its efforts in the field of education and awareness-raising to counter anti-Muslim stereotyping.

Tolerance Education

That's why I believe that the Guidelines for Educators on Countering Intolerance against Muslims, which were published by ODIHR, UNESCO and the Council of Europe, are a very timely initiative. I am pleased to announce that this publication is now available in five languages, including French, German, Russian and Spanish.

Currently, ODIHR, in co-operation with its partner organization, is organizing roundtable meetings to introduce the Guidelines to Educators. The first roundtable meeting which took place on 6 September in Vienna proved that there is a lot of interest in this new educational tool. The Participants suggested that the Guidelines should be also translated into the official languages of the participating States and widely circulated by the ministries of education. They also suggested that ODIHR should develop

teaching materials for students on intolerance against Muslims and train teachers on how to counter this phenomenon in schools.

The second roundtable meeting will take place at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris on 5 November, where there will be an opportunity to discuss how to follow up these recommendations. I would call for the delegations to the OSCE inform their ministries of education on this important educational tool and encourage the educational authorities of the participating States to attend these roundtable meetings.

Hate Crimes against Muslims

As explained in ODIHR's draft hate crime report for the year of 2011, hate crimes do not occur in a vacuum, but can be fuelled by racist, xenophobic and discriminatory public discourse. In fact, even where intolerant speech or hate speech does not result in hate crimes, it can inflame social tensions and induce fear among targeted groups.

The report provides an example of desecration of a proposed mosque site in Switzerland, where Muslims felt that such an incident took place in an increasingly anti-Muslim atmosphere after referendum on the prohibition of minarets.

In spite of this, I am concerned that anti-Muslim hate crimes are significantly under-reported and under-recorded. A concrete example of this situation is that today only one participating State provided information on anti-Muslim hate crimes for ODIHR's up-coming report.

Participating States should do more to support ODIHR's efforts to increase the reporting about and recording of hate crimes against Muslims. I am pleased to hear that this year ODIHR conducted civil society training activities on this issue for Spain and Bulgaria and there will be another one for Austria in November. However, ODIHR needs more funding to continue its training of NGOs on hate crimes against Muslims.

Freedom of Religion or Belief

Finally I would like to draw your attention to recent initiatives to curtail certain forms of religious observance common to Muslim and Jewish communities, such as circumcision and ritual slaughter. These initiatives fall into the general pattern of intolerant discourse against the visibility of some religious communities, as in the case of banning wearing of headscarf or construction of minarets.

That's why, we need to do more, on the one hand, to raise awareness on the freedom of religion or belief and, on the other hand, to promote a social climate where religious and cultural diversity is appreciated.

Such efforts will strengthen the foundations of our multiethnic and multicultural societies where every individual is free to maintain his or her identity while participating in social, economic and political life, without any discrimination.

In conclusion

As the recent tragic events demonstrated, religious bigotry and intolerance have devastating affects not only on the daily lives of the faith communities, but also on the whole society and international relations. To remedy this negative and disturbing phenomenon, we need to develop sound strategies and educational approaches which must be vigorously implemented. International co-operation has to be an important component of these efforts, because we can overcome this challenge, only if we work together, with a commitment to protect and promote human rights for everybody.

Thank you for your attention!

* * *

Address by Yevhenii Tsymbaliuk, Deputy Head of the Ukrainian OSCE Chairmanship Task Force

“Path from Astana to the 40th Anniversary of Helsinki: Objectives for Ukraine’s Chairmanship”

(unofficial translation from Russian)

Dear ladies and gentlemen,

First of all, I would like to thank the organisers of today’s conference, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, the OSCE Centre in Astana, and the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies for the invitation and the possibility to take part in it. Because Ukraine will assume the chairmanship of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe from Ireland in 70 days, it is an important opportunity to verify the OSCE’s plans to accomplish its priorities, and to understand the organisation’s approach to global development activities through the lens of its members’ regional perspectives.

In this hall, perhaps there is no need to remind anyone of the challenges and difficulties of chairmanship of the organisation – colleagues from Kazakhstan can do this more ably. In 2010 the country successfully led the OSCE and held a summit that produced the Astana Declaration for participating States.

Having received a mandate from Astana – and as supporters of a process that will lead to a joint vision on a free, democratic, united, and indivisible North-Atlantic and Eurasian security community from Vancouver to Vladivostok – members of the OSCE Troika have agreed to coordinate their future actions based on a joint long-term plan.

How would the agenda of specific chairmanship look under these conditions? Research centres, strategic institutes, and international analysts have not found common ground on which approach the organisation should take at the moment. Some have expressed the view that, first of all, positive changes must occur in the common vision of Europe's strategic context, and improvements must be made in the interactions among the main centres of influence. Another approach calls for focusing attention on the creation of certain regional or sub-regional spaces. A third option is concentrating on one or more functional spheres that are important in the building of a new political configuration on the European continent.

I believe Ukraine's chairmanship cannot afford the luxury of academic findings in only one of the aforementioned approaches. Moreover, I am convinced that in an organisation like the OSCE, a balanced and comprehensive process which focuses on specific elements could produce the desired practical results.

The choice of framework priorities for Ukraine's chairmanship is based precisely on such an approach. I will not discuss them in detail as they were already presented by Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Konstantin Grishchenko in his speech at the OSCE Permanent Council last June, and described by Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich during September debates at the UN General Assembly.

Let me support the aforementioned thesis that even though issues of improving control over conventional armed forces in Europe (protracted conflicts among others), settling in Moldova's Dniester region, and human trafficking are problems of different levels, they require priority attention from the organisation's chairmanship.

Within each approach there are various ways of achieving the desired progress: principles of interaction between states could be improved or perfected, new formats for negotiation could be

found and established, or specific accords on individual issues could be achieved and cemented.

Based on such a vision and a realisation of the significant long-term challenges faced by the organisation, members of the OSCE Troika after 2013 – Ukraine, Switzerland, and Serbia – have generally welcomed the Irish chairmanship's initiative to launch the so-called Helsinki + 40 process. In essence, the process will attempt to create a serious political impetus for the organisation to achieve considerable results in 2015, which will mark the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. This will be nothing but the fulfilment of accords which were reached during the OSCE summit in Astana and were cemented in the corresponding declaration.

A decision on the Helsinki + 40 process still has to be passed by an OSCE ministerial meeting in Dublin.

In addition, a series of consultations we have held with Troika partners (Switzerland and Serbia), other partners, and the OSCE Secretariat have already made it possible to single out specific aspects of the chairmanship as part of this process, which I want to discuss in detail. That is precisely why, in practice, they reflect many elements of the Astana Declaration.

In the sphere of conflicts, this, above all, is the achievement of progress in negotiations on protracted conflicts (within the 5+2 format, Geneva talks and the OSCE Minsk group), including the efficient use of measures to build confidence.

In the sphere of non-military aspects of security, it is necessary to achieve great coordination of objectives and actions in response to the emerging transnational challenges, including border security and management, terrorism, and the illegal drug trade. Coordination is also necessary in training police officers and cooperation in the cyber sphere.

As for OSCE structures, potential, and issues at the junction of dimensions, the OSCE's abilities must be further improved

in conflict prevention, settlement, management, as well as early warning mechanisms and post-conflict rehabilitation. The review of and further actions on the 2003 Maastricht Strategy on fighting challenges to security and stability in the 21st century are outstanding.

The gender strategy is to be developed further.

It is necessary to strengthen the OSCE's judicial apparatus.

The need to increase the efficiency of trips to the field with an account of the priorities and needs of recipient states has been discussed for a long time now.

The adoption of strategic and long-term budget planning will enable the OSCE to determine more appropriate working programmes with acceptable expected costs.

A review of the existing models of chairmanship and the possible creation of a committee of experts, as well as the strengthening of the role of the Troika and the responsibility of the chairmanship, will be useful. We will also aim to increase the efficiency of the decision-making process based on consultation and consensus.

In terms of the political and military dimension of security, the agenda includes the continuation of increased transparency in the military sphere. This concerns strengthening, modernising, revitalising and perfecting control over conventional arms, and also measures to increase confidence and security. The review and better implementation of other OSCE documents, as well as improvement where possible, in the political and military dimension is also very topical.

In terms of the economic and environmental dimension of security, we need to improve the role of the OSCE in the energy security sphere, stressing the development of new and renewable sources of energy, as well as energy efficiency.

The OSCE could play a more important role in the sphere of transportation security.

It would be helpful to strengthen the OSCE apparatus for managing migration.

In many ways, the improvement of the OSCE's early warning mechanisms and its analytical potential to respond to environmental security threats, as well as to provide members with assistance and expert advice on the emerging economic and environmental challenges, is acquiring additional topicality now. We should review a 2003 strategic document in the economic and environmental dimension with the aim of establishing whether the strategy needs to be adapted to new economic and environmental challenges.

In the human dimension of security we call for the strengthening of obligations regarding the media, with a focus on the legislative protection of freedom of the press in OSCE participating States according to international standards and corresponding OSCE obligations.

In connection with this, a review of the existing laws in participating States and an exchange of best practices and experience will be helpful.

The point of this is also to increase the OSCE's capacity to fight intolerance and discrimination and, in general, to improve the fulfilment of all existing OSCE obligations in the human dimension and ensure the improvement of the observance of recommendations and reports by the ODIHR, the HCNM, the Representative on Freedom of the Media, and other OSCE institutions.

One of our priorities is further improvement in the implementation of OSCE obligations regarding human trafficking, with a focus on the implementation of existing recommendations, as well as the Vilnius Ministerial Declaration on Combating All Forms of Human Trafficking.

We aim to ensure full support for civil society's constructive involvement in achieving OSCE objectives.

In terms of cooperation with the organisation's partners we need to expand dialogue and interaction with such partners. The implementation of the Vilnius ministerial resolution on the OSCE and Afghanistan is important.

Generally, the chairmanship should determine and deal with critical aspects of a process for building confidence, in which progress would overcome the present inertia and would create conditions for a sustainable and functioning Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian community. We need to improve long-term relations and cooperation to overcome the legacy of the Cold War and its divisions. It is important to fully assist in the achievement of historical reconciliation to remove old divisive obstacles on the path of progress to a security community.

We can see that the scale and volume of objectives are very vast. That is why their achievement will be practically impossible without reliance on OSCE member participation.

In connection with this, let me express hope for your support to the undertakings of Ukraine and the further implementation of projects by consequent chairmanships.

And then the magic numeric formulas of Helsinki Plus 40 and Astana Plus Five will acquire real, not just festive, content.

Thank you very much for your attention.

* * *

FIRST SESSION
THE OSCE'S POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION:
THE BUILDING OF EURO-ATLANTIC
AND EURASIAN SECURITY COMMUNITY

**OSCE Astana Declaration: Towards Euro-Atlantic
and Eurasian Security**

Serzhan Abdykarimov
(unofficial translation from Russian)

Let me thank the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies and the OSCE Centre for organising this conference and experts for their participation in this event. A wide range of participants, including representatives of international research institutes and diplomatic bodies, shows the international community's genuine interest in the phenomenon of the OSCE Astana Declaration.

The OSCE summit in Astana was an important stage in the history of the OSCE. It was a test of trust and of the relevance of the organisation in the context of some of the 21st century's new realities, including the great transformations over the past decade within other organisations operating in the same sphere. The summit offered an opportunity to raise cooperation within the OSCE to a new level and reset relations after a decade of tension and obstacles to mutual understanding. It was also an attempt by the participating States to overcome challenges to the implementation of a common agenda for the benefit of our countries and peoples.

In many regards the very fact of holding the summit (for the first time since 1999), in addition to the participation of heads of state and government of the majority of members, was a success for the organisation. It proves that after a decade of uncoordinat-

ed actions our political leaders admitted the great significance of the concept of an inclusive, all-encompassing security community from Vancouver to Vladivostok. By gathering our leaders in Central Asia for the first time, we stressed the all-encompassing nature of our organisation. The location of the summit sent a clear signal that our security community does not end at the eastern border of the European Union or in the Ural Mountains. Heads of state and government proposed ways of strengthening security in the region and making our organisation more efficient in dealing with challenges of the 21st century. We are deeply convinced that ideas put forward by our leaders should not be left without response and deserve serious consideration with the aim of further implementation.

All of this has enormous significance for the implementation of an all-encompassing long-term objective of establishing trans-continental security using potential and relative advantages of various regional and sub-regional organisations.

There is a clear understanding of the historical importance of our common success – the adoption of the Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security Community.

The following are specific results of the summit:

1) The adoption of the Astana Declaration, which contains the following important provisions:

a) A common vision of a “free, democratic, common and undivided Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community in an area from Vancouver to Vladivostok based on agreed principles, joint obligations and common objectives,” and the frank admission of hurdles that are faced on the path to the full realisation of this concept;

b) Straightforward confirmation of adherence to all norms, principles and obligations assumed within the OSCE, and of participating States’ responsibility before their citizens and before one another for their full observance. This fact points to the pos-

sibility of overcoming old Cold War era stereotypes and the beginning of a new stage of cooperation among OSCE participating States in the 21st century;

c) Decisive confirmation of obligations assumed within the OSCE’s definition of the human dimension of security, some of which were for the first time adopted in Astana at the level of heads of state and government - they include clearly confirmed key provisions of basic documents on the human dimension of security and acknowledgement of the important role of civil society and media freedom;

d) An obligation to continue the development of mutually beneficial cooperation in resolving problems related to the effects of economic and environmental challenges to security in our region, as well as reviving our dialogue on problems of energy security, including agreed principles of cooperation;

e) An obligation to increase efforts to settle the existing conflicts in the OSCE space using peaceful means - through negotiations, within agreed formats, and with due respect for norms and principles of international law stipulated in the UN Charter as well as the Helsinki Final Act;

f) Forward-looking formulations on arms control and other security- and confidence-building measures, including a specific expectation of progress in negotiations on the issue of conventional arms controls and the renewal of the 1999 Vienna Document;

g) Acknowledgement of the need to achieve a greater commonality of objectives and actions aimed at countering the emerging transnational threats. For the first time, a document adopted at an OSCE summit acknowledged the interdependence among a variety of security challenges and the need for a more consistent approach to them. These challenges include terrorism, organised crime, illegal migration, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, cyber threats, and trafficking in light and small arms, drugs, and human beings;

h) An obligation to increase the level of cooperation with partners and to make a contribution to the international community's efforts to help build a stable, independent, prosperous, and democratic Afghanistan;

i) An obligation to work on increasing the efficiency and performance of the OSCE.

2) An active dialogue among representatives of civil society in preparation for and during the summit contributed to the productivity of the meetings. The final declaration again directly confirmed the OSCE's most important obligations in the sphere of human rights, basic liberties, democracy and the rule of law. Many of these obligations were confirmed for the first time at the level of heads of state and government.

The Astana Declaration represents a fine balance of the interests of all partners, above all on problems of conflict and the human dimension of security. It carries serious political weight and presents a wide range of tasks for the creation of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community in the medium- and long-term.

The fulfilment of this task and the declaration in general will require many years. However, at this stage, two years after the summit, we can see that progress is unsatisfactory.

The only task set by the summit that has been fulfilled is the renewal and adoption of the Vienna Document that was achieved under the Kazakhstan Chairmanship at the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation in the third trimester of 2011.

In Astana we approached the coordination of a detailed framework for a plan of action that would direct the OSCE's activities in the near future. The Declaration contained an order for the subsequent chairs to complete this work. Unfortunately, neither the Lithuania nor Ireland Chairmanship dared to continue negotiations on the draft framework. In connection with this, the "Helsinki plus 40" process, initiated by the Ireland Chairmanship, may serve as a roadmap for the implementation of the As-

tana Declaration. The negotiation process on "Helsinki plus 40" has started. We hope that members will manage to achieve consensus on this issue by the OSCE Ministerial Meeting in Dublin (6-7 December 2012).

It is worth noting that in 2012 interesting discussions were held in academic circles on devising a clearer form and format for a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.

For instance, IDEAS seminars were held on a joint initiative advanced by academic circles in Poland, France, Germany and Russia. Despite these discussions being far from the Astana Declaration, which also outlines the principles and format of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community, this process is extremely useful for the theoretical definition of the "security community" thesis.

During the OSCE Security Days event ahead of the OSCE Annual Security Review Conference (25 June 2012), the issue of building a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community was also discussed. This initiative belongs to OSCE Secretary-General Lamberto Zannier. The discussion involved a large number of participants, including delegations from participating States, academic circles, NGOs and civil society activists. Discussions were broadcast online on the OSCE website. Online participants of the discussions were offered the possibility of asking their questions or making comments on Twitter and Facebook. This event was highly praised and is expected to continue on an annual basis.

Such initiatives, as well as today's conference, are extremely important in advancing the appropriate implementation of the Astana Declaration and creating a strong and firm, united and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.

Thank you very much for your attention.

* * *

The Initiative for the Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community (IDEAS): Report Findings

Ulrich Kühn

Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me start by expressing my sincere gratitude to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, The OSCE Centre in Astana and The Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan, for giving me the opportunity to present the IDEAS report—a report jointly drafted by the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE) Hamburg, The Polish Institute for International Affairs (PISM), the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the MFA of Russia (MGIMO). I also would like to thank Ambassador Zarudna for chairing this panel and the distinguished expert that share it with me. Finally, it is a pleasure to see Ambassador Kobieracki here, who has accompanied us through almost the whole process with workshops in Berlin, Warsaw, Paris and Moscow.

Please allow me some personal remarks on the report and the process of drafting. I am not giving away a secret by saying that elaborating this report was hard. We had long, and sometimes heated discussions on a number of issues. Finding common language was not easy, but in the end – in most cases – it was possible. We felt the impact of the overall political situation. However, we were tasked by the four ministers of foreign affairs of France, Germany, Poland and the Russian Federation to draft a report on the prospects of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community and we had to deliver. With their initiative,

the ministers have refocused the discussion on the issue of a security community.

The IDEAS report is evolutionary in quality. It does not contain visionary dreams or *deus ex machina* solutions. Rather, many of its proposals have already been considered by this or that government. **BUT**, and this is a big but, if all states were able to agree on the substance of this report, we would have achieved another quality of cooperation in the OSCE space.

The report starts from the condition that governments and societies have quite different ideas of the meaning or even the necessity of a security community and of the way towards this goal. It is important to respect all these ideas and to dismiss none of them. If we understand the way towards a security community as a process and **not** as a one-time founding act, then we can pursue quite different conceptions of a security community in parallel.

On the way towards a security community, it is important to strengthen convergence and co-operation in as many areas as possible, building on what we have already achieved. And this is not insignificant. There has been a remarkable process of normative convergence throughout the OSCE area over the past two decades, even though it has been uneven in terms of implementation. Further convergence is resulting from the membership of most states in a number of international organizations or their cooperation with them – the Council of Europe, the EU, the WTO, and NATO. And finally, there is increasing cooperation on transnational threats and challenges. This is the bright side of the balance-sheet.

The dark side is that we have had to observe, particularly over the last decade, an increasing trend of divergence. States disagree on more and more issues from arms control to unresolved sub-regional conflicts to normative issues. This is a reflection of strategic uncertainty and of the uneven processes of economic, social

and normative development. Different states have different interests and have arrived at different options. From this perspective, the prospect of a security community is less convincing than it was twenty years ago.

Altogether, we are passing through an ambiguous period of transition. Processes of convergence and cooperation run in parallel to processes of divergence and conflict. It is impossible to say which tendency will prevail. However, I doubt whether we can afford another decade of drifting further apart **if** a security community is to remain a valid objective. Only if states realize that they will profit more from cooperation, is a process towards a security community possible.

The key task is to make the existing trends of convergence irreversible and thus clear the way towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community. From the 1950s on, the European Union and its forerunners were successful in forging such a process that led to a security community for a relevant part of Europe. This historical achievement was rightly honored with the Nobel Peace Prize. Extending this space of peace and cooperation to the whole OSCE area is the task for the next one or two generations.

A process of such complexity cannot simply be planned at a green table. **What is possible**, however – and this we did in our report – is drafting guiding principles. One of those principles is that shaping a process towards a security community is more important than striving for quick fixes. It is important to address as many issues as possible in parallel, both potential game-changers and rather non-controversial issues. Also to have a good mix of items of the old agenda inherited from the Cold War and a new agenda related to forthcoming challenges and opportunities. And it is imperative to depoliticize and de-securitize issues. Altogether, we need a change in thinking much more urgently than institutional adaptations, and such a change can only happen if both

political leaderships and civil society actors engage themselves in an active manner.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

As you will see from the report, we have drafted a number of recommendations to the OSCE, some more detailed than others. A limited number of copies will be available here after the end of this session but the report is also available online.

As my time is almost over, only a few final remarks:

- Arms control remains essential. Particularly the early phases of the process towards a security community are unthinkable without it. However, the form of arms control can change substantially and should incorporate enhanced CSBMs and greater transparency.
- Reconciliation is not a new issue for the OSCE, but one where the Organization can realize a huge additional potential based on its comparative advantages.
- Stability in Central Asia and in Afghanistan will require more attention, not only because of the withdrawal of the allied forces from Afghanistan, but also because of multiple sources of instability in Central Asia itself.
- A much better implementation of the human dimension commitments and a more effective review process represent key challenges for the OSCE and, at the same time, an essential element on the way towards a security community. This requires a de-politicization of human dimension issues.

- Initiating a dialogue with Muslim communities was one of the issues most hotly debated within the IDEAS group. In my view, this represents a priority challenge for the OSCE.

- And finally, we stand ready to participate in establishing an OSCE Network of Academic Institutions as proposed by Secretary General Lamberto Zannier.

My time is up, ten minutes is not much for presenting a report we have worked on for half a year, thank you very much for your attention.

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The OSCE Astana Declaration and Security in Eurasia

*Murat Laumulin
(unofficial translation from Russian)*

The year 2010 in the history of Kazakhstan and its external policy will be marked by many significant events. Undoubtedly, the brightest among those events is the OSCE Astana Summit. Soon two years will have passed since the OSCE Astana Declaration was adopted. This is the first document of its kind, connecting Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security systems. But has that document had a real impact on Eurasian security?

As subsequent events have shown, the general level of security and stability in Central Asia has been maintained at the previous level. The central issue in the region – Afghanistan – is still topical. Moreover, as we are approaching 2014, uncertainty surrounding the situation in Afghanistan is increasing. Let's review this issue in more detail.

From a short-term perspective, the security and international situation of Central Asian countries, including Kazakhstan, will be strongly influenced by deteriorating geopolitical conditions in the adjacent regions. One cannot eliminate the possibility that countries of the region will be dragged into the zone of turbulence. Several issues are associated with this situation.

The increasing lack of stability and predictability in the social and political situation that is developing in the region is a serious issue for Central Asian countries. For regional countries this creates a need to make serious adjustments to their policies and refine new mechanisms of social mobilization. One major issue is the lack of a power succession mechanism, which dramatically reduces the management efficiency and capability of almost all institutions of power.

When considering how to effect the transformation of political regimes in Central Asia using the influence of massive protest movements, one should take into account that at present – due to differences in the political, economic, and social development models of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – it is not possible to view Central Asia as a monolithic region. Fragmentation of this space is intensified by external actions, including the implementation of some other regional integration tools, primarily the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia. As a result, the stability of the current regimes in Central Asia differs depending on a number of factors.

It is impossible to state that at present external players can be expressly divided into those who strive for changing and those who strive for maintaining political regimes in certain countries. In the short-term only the interests of China are clearly vulnerable in the case of a “color” or “Arab Spring” style revolution in Central Asia.

On the other hand, at present none of the most powerful nations have shown any interest in destabilizing the existing regimes. The strategic uncertainty surrounding the conflict over Iran’s nuclear program, along with the prospect of transformation in the Middle East and South Asia, means that responsible governments in Central Asia are in the short-term interest of the United States, Russia, China and EU countries. In addition, Central Asia is a buffer zone for and transit route to Afghanistan, which is an extremely important position in light of the planned reduction of U.S. military presence.

In addition to the Great Powers, one should also take into account the position of Islamic groups. In general, they are interested in the overthrow of the existing regimes in Central Asia. However, as the experience of Arab revolutions has shown, the Islamists realize that such change should originate from the countries themselves.

Therefore, one can state that the initiation of power changes in Central Asia inspired by the “color revolution” model and encouraged by the Great Powers is unlikely in the short term. However, if an “Arab Spring” revolution or “palace coup” is initiated, powerful external players will undoubtedly exert maximum effort to promote forces loyal to them.

In 2012 the first (and probably the last) term of Barack Obama will be over. If the Democratic Party wins the elections in November of this year, one cannot exclude the possibility of changes in White House policy toward Central Asia. If Mr. Romney’s team of Republicans wins, one can predict an almost certain hardening of US policy in the region. Such strategic uncertainty makes forecasts of future U.S. policy in Central Asia topical.

U.S. policy toward Central Asia used to be driven by inertia. President Obama’s administration continues the policy set by their predecessors, though with adjustments that as a rule is associated with sharp changes in the current situation. Major components of this strategy include viewing Central Asia through the lens of Afghanistan, moderately supporting NGOs, accomplishing symbolic debates on human rights, supporting pipeline projects that bypass Russia and Iran, intensifying military cooperation with the region’s countries, and focusing on cooperation with Kazakhstan outside the bilateral framework.

A new aspect of Obama’s policy toward Central Asia was cautiousness toward Russia and a consideration of their interests. In the future Washington’s concerns are likely to involve the strengthening positions of China and Iran in the region. This factor will probably result in the convergence of American and Russian positions in the region, as Moscow will start to intuitively seek a counterbalance in order to offset the influence of Beijing and Tehran.

The U.S. presence in and influence on Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union takes place on three levels: (1) mil-

itary-political and strategic; (2) ideological, or the implementing of so-called “western” regulatory values; and (3) economic, or investments and development of local markets. The United States has changed the priority of these levels during different periods of post-Soviet history. Immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union all three dimensions were successfully developing. In the second half of the 1990s the geo-economic approach (economic emphasis with geopolitical implications) started prevailing in the context of the fight over the Caspian region.

Following 2001 and the start of operations in Afghanistan, the issues of security and combating international terrorism came to the forefront. However, by the middle of the decade, the administration of George W. Bush had completely shifted to the concept of encouraging the so-called “color revolutions.” Obama’s administration exclusively employs an approach of military-strategic expediency in relations with Central Asian countries in order to achieve a painless withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Thus, at present, pragmatic interests fully dominate in relations between Washington and Central Asian countries due to the mutual interest in resolving the Afghan problem and ensuring regional security.

However, the forthcoming withdrawal of coalition troops from Afghanistan, and the possible movement of weapons and operating bases into the territory of certain countries in the region, makes the issue of the extension and strengthening of the American presence in Central Asia more urgent. In general such scenarios must affect the interests of Russia and China, thus raising the issue of the CSTO and SCO as actors in the regional security system.

The first signal of possible developments based on such a scenario was the recent exit of Uzbekistan from the CSTO (as the Organization’s Charter prohibits location of military bases of third countries at territories of its member countries).

In light of the forthcoming withdrawal of coalition troops from Afghanistan, which is to be completed by the end of 2014, and prospects for the potential strengthening of U.S. military presence in the region, this issue becomes especially topical. It should be noted that two trends are observable in the development of this situation: (1) the attempt to create permanent bases in Afghanistan (U.S.), and (2) the possible expansion of the network of military sites in the region (U.S. and Russia). The Strategic Agreement between the U.S. and Afghanistan signed on May 2, 2012 became a practical embodiment of that declaration.

The agreement assigns to Afghanistan, which is not a NATO member, the status of major ally of the United States. Such a position puts the country in a category with Japan, Israel and Australia, and entails certain dividends, primarily in the military and technical fields. The central issue of the Agreement was the prospect of future U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. The document confirms that American servicemen will be provided with access to assets owned by Afghan military forces after 2014. Details of this issue will be cemented in a separate bilateral security treaty. The United States is obliged not to use Afghanistan’s territory and assets for an invasion into third countries. At the same time the parties agreed to conduct urgent consultations in case of external aggressions against Afghanistan and to take necessary measures, including joint political, diplomatic, economic, or military ones.

However, a serious barrier for the implementation of U.S. strategy is the consistent position of the Taliban movement – the major opposition force in Afghanistan – that the presence of foreign troops in the territory of Afghanistan is not acceptable.

From the point of view of the national interests of Central Asian countries, it should be noted with a certain degree of conditionality that maintaining foreign military presence in a neighboring country has certain positive aspects. U.S. military assets in the north of

Afghanistan can become a base for counteracting today's threats and an important contribution toward ensuring the border security of countries in the region. However, attaining this goal presupposes both that regional realities and the interests of Central Asian countries will be taken into account in the formation of a Central Asian strategy, and that the U.S. administration has the political will to conduct a real fight against such threats as the illicit drug trade.

Like in Afghanistan, the U.S. announced its plans to create military assets in Central Asia. In particular, the Counter-Drug Fund of the United States Central Command announced its intention to allocate over USD 40 million to create military training centers in Osh (Kyrgyzstan) and Karatag (Tajikistan), and a dog service center and helicopter shed near Almaty.

Washington published data on the amount of assistance it intends to provide to the post-Soviet countries in 2013. Military assistance to Uzbekistan will amount to USD 1.5 million. Similar amounts will be provided to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while a little bit more will go to Kazakhstan (over USD 1.8M) and significantly less to Turkmenistan (USD 685,000).

After the 2014 withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops from Afghanistan, American military equipment may stay in Central Asian countries. The Pentagon is conducting closed negotiations with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Implementation of this plan will allow the U.S. to strengthen military cooperation with the CSTO behind Moscow's back.

The Pentagon is working on the transfer of military equipment and machinery, currently in use by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan after 2014. Part of the transfer will be free of charge and the rest will be maintained for safekeeping.* Kabul

* Armored vehicles, as well as trailers for tank carrying, tow trucks, fuel transporters, special-purpose grading machines, bulldozers and water carriers. In addition, the Pentagon is ready to transfer medical equipment, communication means, firefighting appliances, and even mobile fitness centers and other facilities to Afghanistan's neighbors.

is striving to persuade American commanders to leave the maximum number of items of equipment and military assets possible for the needs of the National Army. In any case, the amount of American equipment in Afghanistan is much more than will be necessary for national security forces.

Tajikistan would like to get new military equipment for border control and machinery for military operations in mountainous terrain. Kyrgyzstan is targeting pilotless aircraft. That request was made in Bishkek in April during the meeting of Secretary of the Defense Board Busurmankula Tabaldiev with General James Mattis, Head of U.S. Central Command.

Apparently the Pentagon came to a conclusion: it is not reasonable to return a major part of the equipment back home or to leave it in Afghanistan. First, the U.S. is afraid that if the Taliban comes to power, weapons will be in the hands of America's implacable enemies. Second, much of the equipment is not worth the amount it will cost to transport it, particularly in view of the unresolved issue of transit through Pakistan – Islamabad increased the price to 20 times the initial cost, from USD 250 to USD 5,000 per one container. Third, the U.S. proceeds from the notion that military assets used in Afghanistan should not be withdrawn too far from the region as they may be needed again in Afghanistan, Central Asia, or Pakistan.

The decision on military equipment considerably strengthens Washington's position in Central Asia. The U.S. prefers to discuss these issues within bilateral agreements, without involving regional organizations such as the CSTO. On December 20, 2011, at a CSTO summit, presidents of member countries agreed that the location of military infrastructure assets on their territory must be agreed upon in concert with their allies.

In June 2012, NATO was reported to have signed new agreements with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan on the transit of cargo and military equipment from Afghanistan. If previous

agreements implied only air transportation, new ones opened inland routes through the territory of these countries. New agreements will provide NATO with new opportunities and a new flexible transportation network to withdraw troops, machinery, and equipment from Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

In effect, the signing of new agreements is evidence that the parties have agreed on the price for “back-transit” of supplies from Afghanistan along the northern network, as well as on economic, political, and military benefits that will be obtained by the countries of the region during and after the withdrawal of alliance troops from Afghanistan.

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan – countries that have a direct border with Afghanistan – have already won a lot from close cooperation with the U.S. This includes railroad construction, highway repair, bridge construction to and from Afghanistan, and delivery of non-military cargo through the territory of Central Asian countries to Afghan border areas.

Nevertheless, the U.S. has not neglected the promotion of democracy, freedom of speech and political parties, and the observance of human rights in Central Asia. But they have not made it a cornerstone for establishing other, more pragmatic dimensions of bilateral relations. And, in its turn, this allows United States to more efficiently promote the interests of its business in Central Asia and therefore strengthen its position in the entire region.

According to the American administration, it would be advantageous for Central Asian countries to jointly combat drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Europe, help the U.S. more actively in fighting international terrorism, and use available energy resources including the sale of surplus electricity to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. A uniform energy project would contribute to this goal, which could unite the energy systems of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The U.S. is also inter-

ested in such cooperation at the level of public administration and private companies.

Thus, American long-term strategic interests in Central Asia are as follows:

- 1) Facilitate stabilization of the region through its democratization and through involving it in the process of globalization
- 2) Prevent another country (Russia or China) from obtaining a “control stake” of political influence

Destabilization, according to Washington, may have the following elements:

- 1) Threat of the implementation of Iran’s nuclear program
- 2) Risk of social and political destabilization in Pakistan and Afghanistan
- 3) Escalation of the India-Pakistan conflict
- 4) Non-participation of the U.S. in determining the status and distribution of resources around the Caspian Sea
- 5) Increasing involvement of Central Asia in the orbit of transnational terrorist groups and transformation of the region into a base for extreme Islamists
- 6) Aggravation of new challenges and threats (drug trade, illegal migration)
- 7) Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and lack of control over uranium ore reserves and available nuclear technologies

Thus, while American troops stay in Afghanistan, Central Asia will not escape the view of American external political interests in the region. In the meantime America does not want and is not able to independently resolve all of the issues and challenges faced by the region.

External military presence and the availability of foreign military bases exert serious influence on strategic stability in the re-

gion. Being an “instrument of power projection,” military bases are not limited in purpose. The region’s vicinity to such geopolitical opponents as the PRC, Iran, and Russia suggests that one of the possible purposes of the establishment of American military bases (including in Central Asia) is to create a sort of ring around these countries.

In particular, Iran lies within the tight ring of U.S. military bases located in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and the Persian Gulf countries. “Shindand” air base (Herat, Afghanistan), where foreign military troops are present, is located only 35km from the border of Iran.

Certain researchers state that Manas is used to monitor the air space of PRC border areas and for reconnaissance operations. Chinese experts also wrote about the threat of long-lasting American presence in Central Asia (i.e., in the vicinity of the Chinese borders) to the interests of their country. Thus, U.S. military presence in Central Asia, which is a mandatory part of their comprehensive strategy, has both a regional and anti-terrorism orientation, and is of a global nature.

The establishment of military assets in Central Asian countries may negatively affect their bilateral relations and facilitate geopolitical competition between the U.S., Russia, and the PRC for primary influence in the region. Certainly, such an outcome does not suit the interests of Central Asian countries.

Thanks to its geopolitical situation, as well as historic and civilizational ties with Central Asia, Russia is a traditional party to regional relations. Maintaining military presence in the region always used to be one of the major political priorities for Russia. The initiation of counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of the U.S. and its allies’ troops in the region only led to the strengthening and expansion of that process. In the new Russia’s Military Doctrine, “any activation (enhancement) of a military contingent of foreign states in territories adjacent to the

Russian Federation and its allies” is determined to be an external military threat.

Unlike the U.S., which operated on a bilateral basis, an important external political instrument of Russia in Central Asia is the creation of multilateral alliances; in particular, certain actions were taken within the CSTO. It is remarkable that the transformation of a treaty (CST) into an organization (CSTO) started from the creation of the Joint Rapid Deployment Task Force of Central Asia back in 2001. At present this Joint Task Force includes military units from Russia (about 4,000 people) and three Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The aviation component of the Joint Task Force is Airbase 999 of the Russian Air Force in Kant, with up to 750 military personnel and equipped with over 20 aircraft and helicopters. This was the first Russian airbase established in an overseas location following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the significance of this military asset for the Russian Federation is proven by the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin attended its opening in April 2003.

The legal framework of the Kant military base is regulated by the Agreement on Status of Servicemen of the Russian Federation in Kyrgyzstan (September 22, 2003), with a 15-year period and the possibility of automatic extension for 5 years upon mutual agreement of the parties.

Kant is not the sole military asset of Russia in Kyrgyzstan. The RF Ministry of Defense has Communications Center 338 of the RF Naval Forces, which is able to conduct communications surveillance in the region (town of Kara-Balta); Test Center 954, which conducts torpedo testing at Lake Issyk-Kul; and a seismic verification system station (Mailuu Suu village). In March 2008 the Kyrgyz Parliament ratified an intergovernmental agreement according to which Russia obtained the right to use three military assets in the territory of Kyrgyzstan within 15 years.

The April 1999 agreement between Russia and Tajikistan, “On the Status and Conditions of the Presence of the Russian Military Base on the Territory of the Republic of Tajikistan,” stipulated the establishment of the largest Russian military base in Central Asia (4th Base of the RF Ministry of Defense) for the use of the 201st Motor Rifle Division in the Privolzhsk-Uralsk Military Command. The base started operating de jure five years after the moment when the agreement was signed, which occurred on October 16, 2004. The opening ceremony of the 4th Military Base of the RF Ministry of Defense took place on October 17, 2004, and the presidents of the RF and Tajikistan attended (in 2005 it was renamed the 201st Military Base). Currently base 201 is comprised of three battalions: one in Dushanbe, one in Kurgan-Tiube, and one in Kuliab. The total number of servicemen is up to 5,500.

Within the context of expanding Russian military presence in the region, the most topical issues are the prospects for the establishment of a military base in the south of Kyrgyzstan (within the CSTO) and the transfer of the military airdrome Aini (Tajikistan), as well as the return of Russian frontier sentries for the surveillance of the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border.

Russia’s efforts to deploy a military unit (with up to battalion strength) and establish a training center are supposed to be implemented under the auspice of the CSTO. A memorandum of intention was signed by the two heads of state on August 1, 2009, during an informal summit of the organization. The parties are currently working on the signing of an agreement on the status and conditions of joint Russian military base presence in Kyrgyzstan. It is stated that the base’s presence may have a positive impact on the stabilization of the military and political situation in Central Asia and become a reliable barrier in the way of any aggressive forces. The issue of possible economic dividends is not neglected (for example, the possibility of creating additional jobs). It is intended that all Russian military as-

sets located in Kyrgyzstan will be transferred to Kyrgyz hands, including the air base in Kant, which is Russia’s major military asset in the country.

It should be noted that foreign military presence in the Fergana Valley does not meet the security interests of any Central Asian country. This explains Uzbekistan’s position, which expressed official disagreement with the potential appearance of a foreign (Russian) military asset in the region. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan stated that the “Uzbek party does not think it is necessary or reasonable to implement plans of deploying an additional contingent of Russian military forces in the south of Kyrgyzstan,” as the implementation of such projects at the junction of three countries in the region may lead to increasing militarization as well as the growth of nationalistic and radical sentiments fraught with negative consequences.

The fact that Tajikistan shares a border with China and Afghanistan, along with its proximity to Iran and Pakistan, and its possible access to the Karakorum highway running from the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous region of China to Afghanistan, predetermines the geopolitical interest of Russia, the U.S., and India in the military airdrome Aini.

The emergence of new foreign military bases in the region cannot be viewed either as an effective response to modern threats or as an efficient integral component of the security system being formed in Central Asia. Foreign military presence can become a reason for the escalation of tensions in interstate relations and can lead to an increase in geopolitical competition as well as a disturbance of military and political balance in the region, thus increasing the exposure of Central Asian countries.

In this regard, the active use of OSCE potential in the security of Eurasia becomes more topical. An international legal document laying the foundation for increasing the OSCE role is in place: the Astana Declaration.

Thus, the Astana Summit was an impressive culmination not only of the year 2010, but also of this entire era in the history of Kazakhstan's external policy. Our country proved to be a responsible member of the international community; one that is able to organize meetings of such importance. At the summit, the OSCE Astana Declaration was adopted – a document of prime geopolitical importance that connected Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security into an integrated whole.

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Rethinking the Eurasian Space – Theses for Thought

Dr. Arne K. Seifert
(unofficial translation from Russian)

Introduction: Joint Eurasian space is unique “strategic reserve”

In terms of its size the Eurasian space is unique: for countries that are located in this region it is an important, and in all regards, “strategic reserve” in terms of material and human resources as well as intellectual, technological, and economic potential. It is also a reserve of civilisational, cultural, and religious mutually enriching diversity.

For “Old Europe” this region is of outstanding importance. It could become a driving force of economic development and even a “source of youthfulness” for Europe.

This is specifically true for Germany. In reality, interaction with the Eurasian region and its political atmosphere is already influencing the lives of Germans.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that Central Asian countries and peoples are also interested in expanding relations and cooperation with Europe.

If so, the *harmonisation* of interests may mobilise possibilities for Eurasian cooperation that have not yet been fully realised, both in terms of the economy and international politics.

In the context of problems related to the “harmonisation of interests” I would like to advance two theses:

- *First, we need a strong political “locomotive” that pushes forward productive ideas on the structure, or, let us say, “skeleton,” of the Eurasian project.*

- *The second thesis concerns a balance between hegemony and democratic character in the Eurasian process. Hegemony is a cul-de-sac for the Eurasian project, whereas, in practice, we need consistently democratic interstate mutual relations.*

Regarding the first thesis, the majority of states in the vast Eurasian region are united by one political organisation – the OSCE.

That is why, dear colleagues, the existence of the OSCE may be regarded as a fortunate circumstance for all of us. This organisation has assumed the role of “locomotive” or “guiding star” in Eurasian progress, driving through the opaque screen behind which many Eurasian players have taken refuge with their individual interests.

Although, dear colleagues, we know that the interests of countries to the east and west of Vienna diverge on many issues, the OSCE Astana summit, chaired by Kazakhstan, has secured a victory by making apparent the fact that we all need a *Eurasian and Euro-Atlantic security community* that unites us.

Such a decision instils some optimism in us because it shows a change in the *parameters of mutual relations in favour of strategic partnership and cooperation in the Eurasian space*. And there is no doubt that it is precisely Kazakhstan that has played a significant role in this.

However, the Astana Declaration also contains other important points:

- *Firstly*, it pragmatically acknowledges the real change in the balance of Eurasian and Euro-Atlantic forces, in particular the important role of China, India, and Russia in the international arena and Eurasian politics;

- *Secondly*, it stresses the need to jointly solve security problems in the Eurasian and Euro-Atlantic space; and

- *Thirdly*, the emergence of such phenomena as the specific interests of Eurasian political players has been acknowledged.

We can conclude from this that conditions exist for the mutual coordination of pluralistic processes within a Eurasian and Euro-Atlantic security community.

Dear colleagues, these new parameters directly relate to our Eurasian discussion: a change in the balance of forces leads to the conclusion that the participants have to talk to one another in a consistently democratic manner. In the Europe-Asia-trans-Atlantic West (especially the U.S.) triangle, the use of military force in the pursuit of interests is no longer a real option. This is also true for the use of conventional weapons, which has been convincingly confirmed through the experience of waging decades-long wars and military interventions in the Middle and Near East.

A key lesson learned is that, in interstate relations, *no one player is any longer capable of successfully (!) claiming the role of hegemony!*

Here comes, dear colleagues, **my second thesis**: *hegemony is a cul-de-sac for the Eurasian project, whereas we need consistently democratic interstate relations.*

What does this question have to do with our discussion?

In my opinion, it is very simple: any hegemony leads the Eurasian discourse to a cul-de-sac. It also complicates the implementation of the OSCE's role as “locomotive” and “guiding star” of Eurasian development.

We need to clearly understand that the Eurasian discourse without a Euro-Atlantic component is not realistic. Neither component of the thesis will be successfully implemented if we do not again overcome the atmosphere of mutual mistrust that complicates security and cooperation in Eurasia and the OSCE.

Mistrust is the most serious threat to the idea of Eurasia and Eurasian development. A “new Great Game,” a clash of interests among great powers in Central Asia, various new alliances, complicated relations between neighbours, and so on – all this is a poison for the Eurasian project.

The roots of mistrust may be found in an inability to democratically solve new challenges – challenges that are hard to deal with already.

The OSCE has changed its traditional socio-political and socio-cultural nature. Now it is a conglomerate of Eurasian states and values, which has multiple cultures, religions, ethnic groups, and nations, all with differing traditions and interests. The political and economic systems of OSCE participating States are also developing at varying paces. Islam has become an integral part of Eurasian reality and it influences religious and political processes on the continent.

Although these facts are known among Western members, it is hard for them to fully realise and accept them. In their understanding the OSCE is still the embodiment of a community of *European* values.

At any rate, if we look at the OSCE from the *Eurasian* perspective, its new pluralistic nature corresponds perfectly to the role of the “locomotive” of Eurasian development. This is precisely its specific force.

From this angle we should face reality and act pragmatically, because the hope that our Western model of political development might take root in the vast post-Soviet space is running low.

On the other hand, unresolved economic, social and political problems are forcing young states to more boldly democratise their political systems in order to avoid social conflicts.

That is why, dear colleagues, the Eurasian project will require new answers to new questions, for example:

- How should the architecture of the foundations of Eurasian cooperation look?
- How could the peaceful coexistence of countries with different socio-political systems be organised?

Dear colleagues, the Eurasian project contains invaluable potential for strengthening our confidence if we manage to bring our true potential – a union of different parts of Eurasia in all their diversity – into the game.

In conclusion, I would like to thank, from the bottom of my heart, our Kazakh hosts for their hospitality, and would like to ask them to reveal the “secret” of their unique architecture of coexistence among several types of political systems and civilisations – from individual to collective societies, from Central Asian to European, Russian, Chinese, and Islamic civilisations.

Perhaps such inimitable treasure is possessed only by Kazakhstan, which had the rare opportunity to chair three major international organisations: the OSCE, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the Islamic Cooperation Organisation.

That is why I suggest we ask our Kazakh colleagues to jointly study this experience in order to bring it into our Eurasian discourse.

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SECOND SESSION
ECONOMIC AND ECOLOGICAL SECURITY
CHALLENGES

Poverty and inequality in the security discourse

Toktobiubiu Dyikanbaeva
(unofficial translation from Russian)

The issue of how to ensure security has always faced humanity. Even in the last century this problem was viewed through the prism of nuclear confrontation. The adoption of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe generated for many people the hope of a more secure world. However, in a very short period of time after the conference a major global change occurred: the Cold War ended. Positive adjustments were made in regulating military issues, but the world still faces security crises. This may be due to the fact that humanity, when resolving certain security issues, at the same time creates new sources of threats and risks.

As far as national security is concerned this problem is universally acknowledged, and it is a multi-faceted one. This is due to the intrinsic complexity of a subject that involves the intersection of various political, social, and military matters.

If J. Tinbergen's opinion is correct, and national security is indeed a "group spirit" reflecting a probability that both now and in the future the nation's existence will be guaranteed, it is likely that such a group spirit is possible only if each member of the society feels secure. As a result, I would say that the social and economic spheres play a key role in the national security system. It is in these spheres that the endurance and harmony of social re-

lations are tested, and in these spheres that any existing conflicts between society and state are revealed.

The major threat to national security in the social sphere involves striking differences in income and levels of consumption among a society's population, as well as the increase of poverty. Widespread poverty restricts access to the most important resources for the majority of a population, which ultimately generates a sense of cultural humiliation. In fact, the Astana Declaration states that the "dignity of the individual is at the core of comprehensive security."

Speaking in general terms, poverty is a consequence of many interrelated factors, including economic, social, demographic, political, and geographic.

In the context of security, the most difficult situation seems to emerge when the results of poverty interact and combine with the social strains of income inequality. For example, economic and social conditions that result from and aggravate income inequality can create political conflicts that turn into armed conflicts. This may result in even further increases in poverty and social dislocation, creating a cycle of poverty and violence. The "Arab Spring" countries appear to validate this analysis.

In Kyrgyzstan, poverty has been steadily increasing since 2000, with an annual rate at about 4%. A significant regional difference in poverty levels could be observed, with certain depressed regions experiencing poor labor markets intensified by geography. The majority of poor Kyrgyz are rural residents. Poverty and inequality were key motivators for the political events of 2005 and 2010. The events of 2010 were more socially destructive than those that accompanied the previous change of power in 2005. A few days before the armed conflict in June 2010 that followed the April revolution, the country lost over 20,000 jobs in the south, which increased the exodus of the working population from the country.

In a situation like the Kyrgyz revolution of 2010 one must look for the causal link in the chain of events that occurred. In order to do this one must attempt a sound analysis of factors that have contributed to poverty in the past. Here one should acknowledge the primary role of external transfers. Regrettably, however, a major part of those transfers was spent on consumption. This created a rather high consumer demand in the southern regions of Kyrgyzstan, but that increased demand in rural regions did not entail the growth of employment or entrepreneurship. One of the reasons for this break in the economic chain was an outflow of the working age population from the south to the capital and to other countries. Again the circle is closed.

Effectively, the most important source of poverty reduction is the development of small and medium forms of entrepreneurship. Therefore, societies need governmental programs that are focused on creating conditions that allow for the independent recovery of the working population from poverty. This should be the aim of macroeconomic and institutional regulation.

In conclusion, I would say that for a long period of time, due to a number of objective and subjective reasons, economic reforms failed to take social policy into account. As a result, economic transformation frequently promoted increased prosperity for a rather small category of people, while living standards continued to decline sharply for the majority of citizens.

The result was a significant differentiation in terms of per capita income for the population. If at the beginning of reforms, for example, the nominal income of high-earners was 2.7 times higher than that of low-earners, then after the reforms the disparity increased to more than 3 times.

Since 2000, levels of poverty and inequality have been decreasing. Inequality, if viewed using the Gini coefficient, grew to its peak in 2006, followed by a sharp decline. This is explained

by the fact that by 2007 the growth of state revenue was able to support the growth of population incomes.

At the same time, it should be stressed that in the national economy the majority of income remains hidden. Therefore, even if actual inequality was not clear from the statistics, societal polarization according to income status was still perceived by citizens of the country, generating strong social tensions.

In this regard, measures are needed that will encourage domestic demand by increasing levels of income, purchasing power, and savings while reducing income inequality. It should be taken into consideration that stage-by-stage income growth will result in overall economic growth if certain ratios are preserved (global experience shows that the ratio of incomes for the top 10% of families to the bottom 10% families should not exceed 10:1).

Key efforts should therefore be aimed at:

- Ensuring the growth of monetary income of the population, income stability, and reduction of inequality based on wage increases as well as an increase in the share of payroll as a percentage of GDP;
- Improving pension coverage through pension reform and improving the targeted support of parts of the population;
- Creating economic conditions for the working population that would allow citizens, at their own incomes, to maintain a higher level of consumption, including comfortable housing conditions, better quality of education and health care services, and decent living standards late in life;
- Strengthening insurance principles for the social welfare of the population in case of retirement, disease, or industrial accidents and occupational hazards;
- Ensuring universal access to and the acceptable quality of critical social benefits, which primarily include health care, social services, and education.

In addition, it is necessary to fully understand the criteria of governmental performance. At present these criteria are GDP growth rates, inflation rates, and external debt. I believe governmental performance should be measured by the number of new jobs and small and medium enterprises created.

As it was mentioned, during the 20th century the major discussion in the field of security was the topic of “war and peace.” In the 21st century the major discussion seems to be development in all its aspects.

Therefore, an absolute priority of social policy should be investment in human development, primarily in education, which is an essential tool for improving the competitiveness of the country in the global economy. The major message is that social policy should be subordinated to a comprehensive national strategy aimed at a complete modernization of the economy, which is a unified task to be accomplished by state power.

Resolving these tasks can be a guarantor of social consensus.

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**On Urgent Environmental Security Challenges
in Central Asia:
Public Opinion within the Context of the Post-Rio
and OSCE Astana Declaration**

*Kaisha Atakhanova
(unofficial translation from Russian)*

Twenty years have passed since the UN Environmental Conference held in Rio de Janeiro and ten years since the Global Earth Summit held in Johannesburg. In June 2012 heads of state and government convened in Rio de Janeiro under the banner, “The Future We Want” at the UN Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development. The Final Document of the Rio+20 Conference confirmed commitment to the course toward sustainable development - building an economically, socially and environmentally sustainable future for our planet and for current and future generations. On July 27, 2012 the 66th Session of the UN General Assembly was held in New York, where the resolution was passed on the Final Document entitled “The Future We Want.” Mr. Nasir Abulaziz al Naser, President of the UN General Assembly, stressed that the Rio+20 Final Document represents a new start, and outlines a new vision of future development that should be equal and inclusive, as well as respectful towards the limits of the planet. This future is now possible if the commitments of the Rio+20 Conference are implemented. However, it has been noted that the majority of commitments undertaken at both the 1992 UN Conference on Sustainable Development and the 2002 Global Summit in Johannesburg were not fully implemented. In addition, the international public is aware of the inability of many nations to make specific commitments and take effective measures.

A look at the current situation can be instructive. Heads of state and government from the 56 OSCE participating States convened in Astana 11 years after the previous top-level meeting in Istanbul. At this meeting they passed the Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security Community, which commemorates the considerable progress achieved, but at the same time recognizes that much more should be done in order to ensure full observance and fulfillment of the key principles and commitments undertaken by countries in the politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimensions of security, particularly in the field of human rights and freedoms. Paragraph 7 of the Astana Declaration stipulates that serious threats and challenges still remain in our way. We should overcome the lack of trust and the differences in our security perceptions. Our commitments in the politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimensions of security should be fulfilled to the full extent. There should be further development of mutually beneficial cooperation in resolving issues associated with the impact of economic and environmental challenges on our region's economy. Dialogue should be intensified on energy security issues, including dialogue on the agreed principles of our cooperation.

It has become obvious that in global and regional policy an issue that should be constantly considered is *how the energy of the political process can be recovered and how the idea that multilateral approaches are to a great extent associated with indecision and inaction can be overcome*. That is why, in spite of the existing progress in the global and regional political processes, the Central Asian region will continue to face new environmental challenges requiring urgent decision-making, such as *climate change and its consequences*.

Within the context of global and regional security new dimensions have emerged in Central Asia, such as energy security, food security, environmental security, and water security. Thus,

water security comprises new security dimension that deals with transboundary water resources and international conflicts. Experts acknowledge that, concordant with other natural factors, water security issues will be influenced by new environmental challenges such as *climate change and trans-border issues*. National reliance on water resources that cross borders is verified by UNESCO data, Paris and State Institute of Hydrology (Saint-Petersburg, I.A. Shiklomanov, 1999).

Global saline and fresh water reserves are as follows:

- Saline water: 97% (365,000,000 km³)
- Fresh water: 2.5% (35,000,000 km³); of which 0.3% is in lakes and rivers, 30.8% in underground water (including groundwater), and 68.9% in *glaciers and snow cover*.

Thus, trans-border waters include:

- 263 international river basins
- 50% of the earth's surface
- 60% of global surface water resources
- 40% of the world's population (145 countries)
- Danube basin – 17 countries
- Nile basin – 10 countries
- Congo, Niger, Rhine and Zambezi basins – 9 countries
- Aral Sea basin: 2 rivers and 6 countries
- Trans-border underground water.

As a result, it is difficult to overestimate the role of Central Asian countries' involvement in international water negotiations and agreements aimed at preventing and regulating the deficit of water resources, as well as the development of international water law in Central Asia. At present the international legal framework is rather developed in Central Asia, and institutional mechanisms are in place to implement water agreements, such as

ICWC, IFAS, and BVO. Examples of CA countries' participation in agreements of different levels include the following:

- Regional agreements
- 1992 Agreement (multilateral)
- 1996 Agreement on the Amu-Darya River (Uzbekistan – Turkmenistan)
- 1998 Agreement on the Syr-Darya River (multilateral)
- 2000 Agreement on the Chu-Talas River (Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan)
- Participation in global and regional UN ECE agreements:
- Uzbekistan: 1997 UN Convention on International Watercourses
- Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan: 1992 UN ECE Helsinki Water Convention
- Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: 1991 Espo Convention on EIA
- Kazakhstan: 1992 Convention on Transboundary Consequences of Industrial Incidents
- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan: 1998 Aarhus Convention of Public Involvement.

The results of the ENVSEC initiative review (2011) project growth of water demand and potential conflicts with adjacent states, e.g., an increase of water consumption in the Amu-Darya basin involves Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. As part of the Amu-Darya basin is located in Afghan territory, the country will soon start playing a more significant role in the development of regional mechanisms for managing water resources and agreements.

The economic development of China, a country adjacent to the trans-border Irtysh and Ili-Balkhash basins, has an impact on Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The 2001 China – Kazakhstan Agreement can regulate their relations.

Below is a table that demonstrates Kazakhstan's reliance upon water resources that cross the country's border.

Major Transboundary Rivers of Kazakhstan
(A. Kenshimov, Institute of Water Resources, SEF, 2012)

Transboundary rivers	Adjacent countries in the basin	Territory of the core zone of river flow formation
Ural	Russian Federation	Russian Federation
Tobol		Kazakhstan, Russian Federation
Esil (Ishim)		Kazakhstan
Ertys (Irtysh)	Russian Federation, People's Republic of China	Kazakhstan, People's Republic of China
Ile (Ili)	People's Republic of China	People's Republic of China, Kazakhstan
Shu (Chu)	Kyrgyz Republic	Kyrgyz Republic
Talas	Kyrgyz Republic	Kyrgyz Republic
Syrdarya	Republic of Uzbekistan, Republic of Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic	Kyrgyz Republic

One of the examples of implementing an agreement on the use of water resources from trans-border rivers in Central Asia is the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on the use of intergovernmental water facilities at the Shu and Talas rivers (Astana, January 21, 2000). It came into effect on April 16, 2002. The agreement and its protocols address and regulate issues related to the use of intergovernmental water facilities, funding the Secretariat of the Commission from the national budgets of the signatories, simplification of vehicle and personnel border crossing, and mechanisms to accomplish maintenance and overhaul at sites of intergovernmental significance.

However, a lot of issues arose during the implementation of the Shu-Talas Agreement that require resolution:

- Lack of intergovernmental Basin Committees on water resources management in general for the basins (at intergovernmental level)
- Lack of intergovernmental water facility repair and construction organization to accomplish maintenance of water facilities of intergovernmental significance.
- Kyrgyzstan has not ratified international Water Conventions (Helsinki 1992, New York 1997).

According to experts, the UN ECE/OSCE Project entitled “Development of Cooperation in Shu and Talas River Basins” made a considerable contribution into the development of the Shu-Talas Agreement, but it is necessary to expand the scope of activities conducted by international organizations, such as the OSCE, in order to develop mechanisms for observing obligations and enforcing international water law in CA countries.

The OSCE mandate in the economic and environmental as well as the human dimension of security allows for the expansion of the OSCE’s scope of activities, *particularly related to the basic human right to potable water*. Due to the low quality of potable water in the European region:

- Over 13,000 children under 14 die from diarrhea annually (5.3% of total mortality rate in this demographic)
- 140 million people (16%) are not connected to a centralized water supply
- 85 million (10%) have no access to better sanitary systems

Thus, over the past 15 years the situation has not improved. In Central and Eastern Europe water is safe in only 30-40% households, and 20 million people have no access to better sanitary conditions. *Potable water and sanitary conditions are priorities for Central Asian countries.*

At this point the *Protocol on Water and Health Issues* is the only legal document in the world aimed at reducing water-related mortality and morbidity through improved water resource management. The Protocol is a practical tool to attain water-related Millennium Development Goals. **This is the first international act aimed at ensuring the right to water and sanitation.** Adopted in 1999 by 36 countries, the document came into force in 2005. It is currently ratified by 25 countries.

The goals of the Protocol include access to potable water and sanitary conditions for everyone, as well as a *legal framework to ensure human right to water and the reduction of poverty*. Under the Protocol, assistance projects are being implemented in Ukraine and Moldova, to be followed by capacity building activities in Georgia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Activities include small-scale water supply and sanitary systems, equal access to water, and the human right to water and sanitation. However, during project implementation, the countries face various challenges. Cooperation between all involved parties is not always easily attained, cooperation between authorities and NGOs is often weak, and funding for the implementation plans is not always guaranteed, all of which hinder the process.

Regrettably, in Central Asia not all countries are ready to join the Protocol, including Kazakhstan. The OSCE could provide technical assistance to countries in accession and enforcement of the Protocol. The OSCE, jointly with the WHO, could provide international support to national initiatives and develop mechanisms to support project implementation.

The OSCE could provide considerable input on NGO initiatives related to climate, energy, water, and health issues in Central Asian countries. This may help strengthen network interaction among NGOs in the region on adaptation to climate change, reforms in water and energy policy, and food security. It is necessary to assist in creating intergovernmental basin

boards, including the Shu-Talas Basin Board and the Public Committee of the Aral Sea Basin. It is also necessary to ensure the public transparency and accountability of intergovernmental committees, and to employ open information policies in the water and energy sectors related to climate change. In addition, it is advisable to create opportunities in the region to share best practices and technologies in the field of water and sanitation using renewable energy sources, and to study lessons learned.

In conclusion, it should be stressed that in the future competition will increase in the field of water resource allocation, and that international law is the only instrument that resolves transboundary water disputes in a peaceful way. International water law provides nations with the following:

- Legal frameworks for determining mutual rights and obligations
- Mechanisms to ensure observance of agreements and dispute resolution processes
- Legislative framework to **exercise the human right to water and the reduction of poverty.**

The **Water and Sanitary** provision the Rio+20 Conference Final Document, section i. 119, stipulates that water resources are one of the cornerstones of sustainable development, as they are closely interrelated with a number of common global challenges. That is why heads of state declare again the necessity to take into consideration the water resource factor within the context of sustainable development, and to stress the extreme importance of water supply and sanitation within the three components of sustainable development. Paragraph 121 of the document reads: “We reaffirm our commitments regarding the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation, to be progressively realized for our populations with full respect for national sovereignty. We also

highlight our commitment to the 2005-2015 International Decade of Action, ‘Water for Life.’”

In this regard it should be stressed that within the Astana Declaration and post-Rio+20 process, the OSCE can provide support to the states of the region in formulating water and energy strategies for the future on a more sustainable basis. The OSCE can provide for the development of a dialogue on implementing international and regional agreements, develop effective mechanisms for fulfilling obligations in the field of water and energy security, and help ensure the fundamental human right to water and poverty reduction.

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Kazakhstan's Economic Security: Main Threats

Leila Muzaparova
(unofficial translation from Russian)

The seventh clause of the OSCE Astana Declaration proclaims the need to further develop mutually beneficial cooperation aimed at addressing the impact of economic and environmental challenges to security in the OSCE region.

I would like to talk about economic security challenges that are important to our country today and are relevant, to a certain extent, to many OSCE countries. According to the Astana Declaration, these challenges can be mitigated by means of joint efforts and cooperation among the OSCE countries.

This year our institute began to monitor Kazakhstan's economic security and identified a number of threats that need to be addressed. We have considered four groups of economic security indicators:

1. Key macroeconomic indicators
2. Social indicators
3. Financial sector indicators
4. External factors influencing Kazakhstan's economy

Among the key macroeconomic indicators, a serious threat to economic security is the extensive nature of Kazakhstan's economy. This model has almost exhausted its potential because the growth in oil production has slowed down sharply and oil prices have reached a level at which it is impossible to expect further growth at similarly high rates.

The stability and sustainable growth of Kazakhstan's economy in the last fifteen years were mainly backed by increasing production in mining sectors, primarily oil and gas, including ris-

ing prices and the continuous increase of production volumes. Oil production grew by almost 300%, from 20.5 million tonnes in 1995 to 80 million tonnes in 2011. Another important factor in economic growth was the surge in oil prices, which increased by 600% from 1995 to 2012 (from \$17.5 to \$125). These two factors – increased oil production and growing oil prices – caused an increase in the dollar value of Kazakhstan's oil by approximately 28 times.

Kazakhstan's GDP (measured in USD) over the same period increased eleven-fold, from \$16.6bn to \$178bn. This means that a 10% increase in the price of Kazakh oil triggered an average increase of approximately 3% in the country's GDP. The oil factor and, in particular, its price component, underpinned the growth of all key macroeconomic indicators, including industrial production, GDP, exports, and budget revenues. Figure 1 shows the correlation between exports, GDP and world oil prices, confirming that oil prices have significantly influenced the growth of key macroeconomic indicators.

It should be said that despite the economic development programmes implemented in recent years, most of Kazakhstan's economic indicators are still closely tied to the global oil market. This is proven by a very high correlation between the price of oil and these indicators, between 0.88 and 0.92.

Oil production in recent years has slowed down: it increased by a mere 5% over four years. Even if production growth speeds up and reaches 85 million tonnes by 2014, as expected by the State Program for Boosted Industrial and Innovation Development, this growth will be moderate compared to the period from the late 1990s to the late 2000s and will only amount to 6.5% (from 2009) against almost 200% recorded from 1998-2009. This actually means that one of the factors of quick economic growth – the increase in oil production – is no longer relevant for Kazakhstan.




Figure 1. A comparison of changes in oil prices, exports and Kazakhstan's GDP from 1995-2011*

Another key sector of Kazakhstan's economy – metallurgy (which accounts for 41% of production by processing sectors and 12.1% of Kazakhstan's exports) – also demonstrates lower growth in the production of many articles.

The price factor has also been practically exhausted since it is impossible to expect a similar surge in oil prices in the next ten or, moreover, twenty years because this would mean that they will reach almost \$600 by 2020 and approximately \$3,000 by 2030, or a 400% increase over ten years, as happened from 2001-2011.

Exhausting these two factors in Kazakhstan's extensive economic growth will have very negative consequences, including a sharp decrease in GDP growth and budget revenues, a worsened balance of payments, and an imbalance in the financial sector.

* Calculated by Vyacheslav Dodonov, KazISS.

The opportunity to develop the economy on the basis of oil alone will be exhausted in ten to fifteen years. Therefore, a new strategy for economic growth is acutely needed and must be based on the concept of intensive development and an increase in projects and sectors with high added value and performance.

We have also studied social indicators in the course of our economic security monitoring. This group includes three critical and moderate threats to economic security that have the potential to grow (Table 1).

Table 1. Threshold and actual values of the social indicators of economic security

Indicators	Threshold value (global standard)	Actual value for Kazakhstan (2012)
The ratio of the average income of the richest 10% to the poorest 10%	8	29
Proportion of people earning below the living wage, %	7	4.1 (6.4 in rural localities)
Unemployment, %	8	5.2

The gap between the population's incomes is a significant (or a critical) threat to the country's economic security. Despite the growth in recent years of the population's average per capita nominal and real incomes, the gap between the richest and the poorest in Kazakhstan is also increasing, having reached a ratio of 29 versus 4.8 in developed countries and a global threshold of 8.

Poverty, or the proportion of people earning below the living wage, is a moderate threat to economic security. This indicator is decreasing in the country as a whole, though it stood at 4.1% in the first six months of 2012 (Figure 2). The rural population is particularly exposed to poverty: in the second quarter of 2012 the proportion of people earning below the living wage was 6.4%, which is close to the threshold value of this threat (7%).




Figure 2. Poverty dynamics

Unemployment is another threat to economic security. In the third quarter of 2012, the unemployment rate was 5.2% in Kazakhstan (against a threshold of 8%). Despite a seemingly stable situation in the employment market, the country has 475,300 unemployed persons (of which only 54,700 are registered as such) and almost 2.7 million of the so-called self-employed (3% of the country's working population).

The third group of indicators – the condition of the financial sector – presents another threat to economic security. This is the growing intercompany debt in the structure of the gross foreign debt. The intercompany debt* stands at \$63.4bn, or 49% of the gross foreign debt. It should be pointed out that branches of foreign companies, which are running large projects in the oil and gas sector, account for the largest portion of this (\$48.1bn, or 37.2% of the gross foreign debt).

* The intercompany debt includes liabilities to foreign parent undertakings, subsidiaries and associates, as well as liabilities of branches of foreign companies operating in Kazakhstan.




Figure 3. Kazakhstan's key labour market indicators from 1999-2011




Figure 4. Intercompany debt and its share in Kazakhstan's gross foreign debt

Although intercompany debts are not guaranteed by the state, their growth is still a threat to Kazakhstan's economic security. If these liabilities are to be paid to parent undertakings, this will affect the balance of payments on the current account and the stability of the exchange rate as well as the country's international reserves, which will have to be used to maintain the stability of the national currency. Since exchange rate fluctuations usually provoke panic in the market and business environment, this may have a negative effect for the real sector.

Another financial threat to economic security is the growing volume of non-performing loans. This indicator has risen for most of the second-tier banks and has reached 4.127 billion tenge. The high ratio of non-performing loans (37.7%) in the overall loan portfolio is a real threat to the stability of Kazakhstan's banking sector. In Russia, for example, the share of NPL is 5.6%, in Belarus 2.3% and in the U.S. 4.7%.



Figure 5. Banking sector's liabilities from January-June 2012

The low profitability of pension funds and their inability to match inflation is also a threat to economic security (Table 2). If the existing large gap between inflation and the nominal return on pension assets remains unchanged, while the number of pensioners receiving payments from the National Pension Fund continues to grow, the burden on the state budget will increase sharply. By 2020 the National Pension Fund's annual payments will be approximately 1.5 trillion tenge for 1.6 million pensioners, and this means that the state will have to pay more than 1 trillion tenge in pensions a year. This is a serious threat to the stability of the financial sector and, more importantly, to the guarantee of future benefit payments that are commensurate with recipients' pension contributions.

Table 2. Ratios of pension funds' nominal yield

	For a 5-year period	For a 3-year period	For 12 months
Weighted average ratio for a moderate investment portfolio	26.66	13.87	1.57
Weighted average ratio for a conservative investment portfolio	25.63	13.83	1.40
Cumulative inflation	56.81	21.44	4.90

Finally, the main threat among the external factors that influence Kazakhstan's economy is the price of Kazakhstan's main exports such as oil, metals and grains. While high oil prices have a positive effect on the country's economy, high grain prices are a real threat to its food security.

I would like to emphasize once again that the above challenges to economic security are relevant not only to Kazakhstan, but also, to a certain extent, to many OSCE countries. This means that, according to the Astana Declaration, these challenges can be addressed by means of joint efforts and cooperation among the OSCE countries.

Unfortunately, the OSCE has not yet become a forum for finding ways to overcome economic recession, which has affected both its member states and other countries for which the organisation is responsible. For this reason, the issues of economic security we raise still call for the OSCE's proactive participation in their resolution.

* * *

The Impact of Modern Threats on the Economic Integration in the OSCE Area

Anar Rakhimzhanova
(unofficial translation from Russian)

Economic stability is one of the basics of security. The combining of efforts by stakeholders to adopt a common view on the basics of security and the organizing of interaction to create and maintain the necessary conditions for stability are the most important tasks in the present turbulent situation. The growth in the number of destabilizing factors and their negative impacts, along with the increase in opportunities for countering these factors and a desire for advantages among participating States, has created a fertile environment for the discussion and analysis of obstacles to economic integration in the OSCE area. This can be done using the existing experience of the organization and its dimensions of security.

Agreements reached during negotiations and preparations for the commemorative Astana Declaration make it possible to speak about some common and differing approaches to ensuring security through cooperation in the OSCE area. In particular, as the Astana Declaration emphasized, "Mutually beneficial cooperation aimed at addressing the impact on our region's security of economic and environmental challenges must be further developed." In the past two decades the problem of organizing and strengthening a system of early warning and response, especially in terms of economic, social, and environmental security, has surfaced repeatedly. In this respect it is very important to establish cooperation within the OSCE and interaction with international economic and financial institutions to hold a dialogue, exchange information, and deepen cooperation on the implementation of

regional and sub-regional cooperation initiatives. This helps build confidence and develop good, neighborly relations.

Overcoming challenges caused by the ongoing transformation of global, regional, and national economic systems requires, in part, the deeper integration of individual countries into the international system of trade and finance. This integration must be based on compliance with standards that acknowledge discipline as well as the benefits of the system. At the same time, we should bear in mind that a system of economic integration that includes the convergence of economic policies has two main aims: (1) fiscal and monetary policies that promote balanced, sustainable economic growth and development; and (2) domestic and foreign policies that are aimed at expanding free trade, capital flows, and investment, along with repatriation of profits. A failure to comply with these conditions or the rejection of these conditions by individual partners could destabilize the whole economic system, as is happening in the EU. On the other hand, economic integration, as we will show below, should from the very beginning develop based upon jointly agreed principles and accepted estimates of benefits and losses.

The diversification of economic relations attempts to create favorable conditions for development on the basis of internationally adopted standards that are, in turn, based upon agreements on improving business conditions, infrastructure, and market practices for enterprises. As economic relations become stronger we all have grounds to believe that growth in prosperity will have a positive impact on socio-political processes and social stability.

In terms of the OSCE's influence on evaluation and maintenance processes in the area of economic and environmental security, the potential exists to determine the boundaries of the impact of the decision-making processes, including the currently discussed "V&V" process, of participating States. They may also be able to implement economic policies that have an impact on

socio-economic stability in OSCE states and their partner countries. Moreover, established procedures and principles for the formulation and discussion of work in the economic dimension of security have generated great interest in the OSCE Economic Forum. At the same time, the OSCE should encourage a certain direction in the analysis of economic, social, and environmental causes of tension and crises.

It is worth noting that in 2011, in the hope of implementing decisions made at the Astana summit in 2010, participating States established a more intensive political dialogue on the economic and environmental dimension of security. This dialogue was held, in particular, by the Economic and Environmental Committee, which also conducted specific work on the ground to implement decisions made at the previous meetings of the Council of Ministers. In a year characterized by continuity and progress, they passed important resolutions on improving and strengthening procedures and the structure of measures in the sphere of the second dimension of security. In particular, they decided to hold annual conferences to review the observance of obligations in the economic and environmental dimension.

An important aspect of economic security is social stability, including a predictable, clear and efficient legal framework, as well as a balanced economic structure that avoids excessive income disparities among the different strata of society.

The current process of the integration of OSCE members into the global economic system, and their involvement in international economic and financial institutions, are both of great significance.

Economic integration is one of the priorities of the OSCE because it focuses attention on the economic aspects of security and building closer trade and transport links. It also has transparent decision-making procedures, which are important in an environment of constant change.

Among the reasons for the development of international integration is the desire to improve economic productivity, because integration is economic in nature. The rapid growth of economic integration blocs observed in the past two decades reflects the development of the international division of labour and international industrial cooperation. This has resulted in the international socialisation of production, which is the internationalisation of production chains. The internationalisation of production is taking place both globally regionally. In order to encourage this process special supranational economic organisations have been created to regulate the global economy and take over certain aspects of economic sovereignty from nation states.

The internationalisation of production can develop according to different principles. The simplest is the principle of complementarity. In this case, countries gain mutual benefits, but their economies grow somewhat one-dimensionally and depend heavily on the global market. This trend now dominates the global economy, which has widened the gap between developed and developing countries. This trend has become one of the causes of the current global crisis.

This has led many countries to adopt protectionist policies in their domestic markets in order to reduce unemployment and maintain domestic production. This problem has become one of the major challenges to the expansion of economic integration, including in the OSCE area. It could be solved by determining the efficiency of production operations in individual economies, the degree of their participation in the international division of labour, and the level of public spending and revenue.

This, therefore, indicates a need to achieve a higher level of internationalisation, involving levelling the economic parameters of participating States. Internationally, UN economic organisations such as UNCTAD try to direct this process. However, their performance still looks very insignificant. With much greater ef-

fects such internationalisation is taking place not globally but regionally through the creation of integration blocs among groups of countries.

Apart from purely economic reasons, regional integration also has political incentives. Strengthening close economic relations between countries and intertwining national economies reduces the likelihood of political conflict and makes it possible to pursue a common policy toward other countries. For example, the involvement of Germany and France in the EU has removed their political standoff, which had lasted since the Thirty Years' War, and has allowed them to act as a "united front" against common rivals. The establishment of integration blocs has become a peaceful form of contemporary geo-economic and geopolitical competition.

The economic integration process removes certain economic barriers (differences) between countries that join a trade bloc. As a result, within the boundaries of the bloc a single market space is formed, with all member states benefiting from an increase in the efficiency of firms and a reduction in government spending on customs services. However, an increase in the level of dependence also poses a threat when one of the parties involved seeks to gain more than others. In addition, achieving the required level of the freedom of movement of resources requires a high level of intergovernmental coordination and a gradual transfer of powers to supranational bodies, which faces some political and social resistance.

The main criterion of the stability of an integration group is the share of mutual trade among partner countries as a part of their total foreign trade. If members of a bloc trade mainly with one another, and the share of their trade is on the rise (as is the case with the EU and NAFTA), this shows that they have achieved a high degree of integration. If the share of mutual trade is small and, moreover, is falling, this integration is unsustainable.

In general, the willingness to integrate (i.e., the achievement of the economic efficiency of public production) can be observed in the global economy, which is now clearly divided into levels of integration: bilateral agreements, multilateral agreements within a region, and agreements between regions.

The success of regional economic integration is defined by a number of factors, both objective and subjective. These factors include similar levels of economic development in the countries involved, a sufficiently high level of economic development, consistent expansion of the scope of integration, a balance of power, political will, and a willingness to achieve mutual benefits. In general, integration based on economic incentives may be more stable than politically motivated integration, but it may also be less stable in the long-term, especially under the influence of political processes. On the other hand, the political will to adopt and, especially, implement common and coordinated decisions within the integration group ensures the balance of power and a resistance to centrifugal trends in the longer run.

In view of the profound and rapid changes in the global economy it is necessary to consider and discuss issues of further strengthening cooperation in economics, science, and technology. The expansion and strengthening of cooperation will make it possible to focus national efforts and capacities to achieve sustainable development. At the same time, this cooperation needs to involve members of other associations in order to promote economic reform and solve problems confronting sustainable social development. Regulations and guidelines outlined in the founding documents of the OSCE still remain relevant, including the goals of improving cooperation in personnel training, intensifying scientific and technical cooperation to include innovation exchange, improving business conditions for commercial exchanges, and developing networks of business cooperation.

The contents of the OSCE's basic document on the economic and environmental dimension of security, the Maastricht Strategy of 2003, have not been realized to an extent that would enable us to talk about the achievement of earlier agreed upon goals. Not only do discriminatory measures persist but they are also on the rise. In some cases, trade relations and obligations that would create open, integrated market rules in the OSCE areas that operate based on compatible principles have not been implemented.

The global financial crisis has only exacerbated the existing shortcomings. The post-crisis reality has changed economic models, financial architecture, technology, and social institutions. Such notions as flexibility and adaptability have suddenly become more urgent. The need to develop collective responses to new challenges and threats has been clearly confirmed, and it was highlighted at the OSCE summit in Astana. President Nursultan Nazarbayev's proposal to draft a Maastricht Plus document on the subject was backed by the participants. Of course, the existing problems are already being discussed in various international and regional formats. And the OSCE aims not to substitute, but to complement and deepen, cooperation among states, international economic and environmental organizations, and financial institutions. This complementary role will proceed on the basis of dialogue with business circles and non-governmental organizations, taking into account the existing organizational and institutional experience of the OSCE.

One of the basic principles of the development of cooperation on common security should be avoiding the creation of new dividing lines in the OSCE area, especially regarding levels of development. This should be complemented by the discovery of solutions for removing geographic and functional employment imbalances. This will have a positive impact on the flexibility and adaptability of the OSCE in the changing environment.

As a result, the impact of modern challenges on the process of economic integration is twofold: on the one hand, a country under the influence of the global financial and economic crisis tends to increase protectionist policies, while, on the other hand, the crisis has inspired the formation of different levels of integrated networks and the determination to solve problems created by the crisis, including trade disputes. OSCE instruments could help support the process of searching for and devising mutually acceptable solutions in the sphere of economic cooperation. This is one of the foundations for overcoming the consequences of the global economic crisis and choosing the direction for further development, with a goal of maintaining prosperity and quality of life for the population.

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THIRD SESSION CO-OPERATION ON HUMAN DIMENSION TOPICS

Human Dimension of Eurasian Security

Zhanat Zakiyeva
(unofficial translation from Russian)

The Astana Declaration, *Towards a Security Community*, adopted at the OSCE Summit in 2010 states that “the inherent dignity of the individual is at the core of comprehensive security” and that “human rights and fundamental freedoms are inalienable, and that their protection and promotion is our first responsibility.”

The objectives set forth by the Astana Declaration echo the UN Millennium Development Goals, which are based on the right of the individual to live in dignity, including Goal 3, “promoting gender equality and empowering women.”

In the new economic conditions the problem of gender equality acquires a global nature. The issues of women’s leadership are topical not only in each country, but in the world as a whole. The global experience proves that, for the dynamic and sustainable development of a state, socioeconomic programmes must include measures to promote gender equality.

The indicators of gender equality include the existence of a law on equal rights and equal opportunities for men and women, the number of female executives at decision-making levels, the proportion of women in the parliament, politics and political parties, and the availability of mechanisms to promote women in state institutions.

The global parliamentary experience has shown that if women in a legislative body make up less than 10% of that body, this

compromises the adoption of laws to protect children. Research undertaken by international centres and institutes proves that the participation of women at all levels is a stabilising factor. In countries where women make up 30-40% of employees in governmental structures, the society develops in a more stable fashion and it is more socially orientated.

Harvard University's research among women in politics concludes that women have significant moral strength and higher ethical standards, as well as a special ability to establish and maintain good relationships with people: all qualities of a true politician.

Therefore, governments need women because they catalyse reform. In other words, women should go to governmental structures because this is an objective condition necessary to improve the status of females in the society as a whole, and that of each separate woman.

Global practice suggests that the only effective means to increase representation of women in politics is quotas. The UN and OSCE standards require a quota of 30% and the OIC 33%.

Northern European countries are leaders in terms of women's representation in legislative bodies, where they make up 42% of deputies. Arabian parliaments have the lowest percentage of women deputies, although they have also demonstrated a certain progress: the figure has grown from 4.3% in 1995 to 11.7% in 2011. The highest percentages of women in parliaments were recorded in Rwanda (49%), Sweden (45%), Denmark (38%), Finland (38%), Norway (36%), Belgium (35%), and Austria (34%), and the lowest in Egypt (less than 2%).

In the Americas, Cuba and Costa Rica had the highest representation of women in politics (45% and 39% respectively), while the U.S. had only 17%.

Over the years of the independence of Central Asian republics, gender policy priorities have changed significantly. In the

first years of sovereignty, the main issues on the agenda were the protection of the general civil and social rights of women, maternity, and children, and now an attempt is being made to solve the issue of the equal and fair representation of women in the business, economic and political life of the countries.

Today, some CIS and, in particular, Central Asian countries are witnessing positive changes such as the increase in the percentage of women at decision-making levels. Among the former Soviet republics, women have the highest representation in the parliaments of Belarus (31.8%), Kazakhstan (24.3%), Kyrgyzstan (23.3%), and Uzbekistan (22%), and the lowest in Georgia (6%), Ukraine (8%), and Armenia (10%).

Tajikistan, where women comprise approximately 25% of government officials, has adopted a number of statutes, including the presidential decree *On Improving the Role of Women in Society*, which requires that women occupy one of the executive positions in all regions, cities, ministries and institutions (except law enforcement bodies).

Kazakhstan has attained a lot in the area of gender equality over the years of independence. In 2010, out of the 8.5 million economically active people, 4.2 million (or 52%) were women. As of 1 January 2012, women made up almost two thirds (58%) of all government officials, compared to 54% in 2000. The percentage of women among political officers is 11% (8.8% in 2000), including 9.7% in central offices (9.5% in 2000). The number of women among administrative officials grew to 59% (56.2% in 2000) and to 60.1% in central offices (55.2% in 2000). A similar situation can be observed in the regions.

The percentage of female deputies at *maslikhats* (local representative bodies) is also significant: 31% in Kostanai, 28% in Aktobe, and 23% in Pavlodar. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union's report published in 2011, Kazakhstan ranked 69th among countries in terms of the percentage of female parliamentarians.

The country has the laws *On Equal Rights and Equal Opportunities for Men and Women* and *On Domestic Violence*, and has the respective tools to implement these acts. In addition, it has the National Family and Women's Commission accountable to the President of Kazakhstan, which is implementing the National Plan of Action to Improve the Status of Women in Kazakhstan and the Gender Policy Blueprint. The parliament comprises the Otbasylar (Family) group of deputies. The National Centre for Human Rights has a sector for the protection of the rights of women and children.

In 2010, the Republican School of Women's Political Leadership was launched. The Kazakh National Teacher's University named after Abai and the Kazakh National Al-Farabi University set up the Social and Gender Research Institute and the Gender Education Centre in 2000 and 2005, respectively. The country has other research centres as well. Gender research is being undertaken in various social and humanitarian areas. Training is provided in the political and economic promotion of women. About 300 non-governmental organisations and public associations are working for the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of the family, women, and children (including 150 women's organisations), and are working to resolve social problems.

Kazakhstan cooperates with international institutions involved in gender equality issues. The country is a party to more than 60 agreements on human rights, including the Convention Eliminating All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Kazakhstan's report on the performance of CEDAW was highly rated by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. Kazakhstan has also ratified the UN Conventions on the Political Rights of Women and on the Nationality of Married Women, and signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and other documents. The society of Kazakhstan is an active par-

ticipant in the UNiTE To End Violence Against Women initiative launched by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.

In Social Watch's Gender Equity Index 2012, Kazakhstan ranked 33rd out of 154 countries, ahead of almost all CIS countries and eight places higher than last year. At the World Economic Forum in 2010, Kazakhstan ranked 41st out of 134 countries in terms of gender equality and became one of the top fifty most developed countries, leaving behind fourteen states of the European Union. Kazakhstan's election to the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women has confirmed the international recognition of the success of its gender policy.

However, despite this international recognition, at present women still have a poor representation at decision-making levels in public institutions and at high-paying jobs in various economic sectors. Their involvement in governmental and political structures is insufficient. In addition, we have a gender "power vertical," which is widely used in the post-Soviet space and where women are well represented in low- and mid-level posts, but have almost zero representation in higher positions (the decision-making level). In fact, good education does not guarantee women career growth. The Gender Equality Strategy for 2006-2016's goal to achieve a 30% representation of women among public executives has not been attained to date. In 2010 this figure was only 10%. The obvious minority of women at decision-making levels diminishes their opportunities to take part in the creation of a fair society.

In 2011, the President of Kazakhstan said at the First Women's Congress that, "Women are very rarely promoted to executive positions in central bodies and locally. Men prevent this because it will become clear at once that women work better than men. The country doesn't have a single female *akim* of an oblast or a city and it only has three female *akims* of districts and five female deputy *akims* of oblasts."

The fifth Astana Economic Forum on 23 May 2012 hosted the First Central Asian Congress of Businesswomen organised by the Kazakh-British Chamber of Commerce and the Industry and Nomad Media Group. The key topics discussed on this dialogue platform were women's leadership in the modern world and the improvement of their economic potential. The forum decided that dialogue platforms for the discussion of gender balance were to be expanded and that the Central Asian Congress of Businesswomen was to be held regularly.

The participants in the congress came to a conclusion that gender imbalances could not be explained by women's passivity, their narrow social roles, low level of education or competencies – a modern woman is equally good at realising her professional, family and private potential. The reason is that men are unwilling to share power and authority and to promote women to the upper levels of the corporate ladder. In Kazakhstan there are only a few women in top corporate positions, though they are capable of managing companies that are important to the country's economy. Quotas are one of the more effective practices in overcoming the "glass ceiling," which is present in many western countries and in some Central Asian states.

In connection with this, the Plan of Action until 2016 to promote women to decision-making levels is being implemented in Kazakhstan as ordered by the Head of State. The National Commission includes a republican network of schools of women's leadership, which comprises 69 NGOs. Eleven regional clubs of female politicians have opened, and they exert a great deal of effort to strengthen the institution of the family, protect maternity and the rights of children, and to promote women's political influence in society. Kazakhstan, after improving its gender situation in the short term, is expected to become a benchmark for other countries where gender issues are still of lower importance.

Kazakhstan's gender policy is aimed at achieving a higher representation of women at decision-making levels in public bodies; improving legislation and forming institutions to ensure gender equality; fostering the adoption of the law *On Equal Rights and Equal Opportunities for Men and Women*; continuing work to provide legal tools for the protection of the rights of women; creating conditions for the greater involvement of women in the economy; creating economic benefits and preferences for women; taking measures to improve the health of mothers and children; and significantly enhancing legal and social guarantees for women.

Kazakh women are employed in important economic sectors and form up to 40% of the country's GDP. At present, women's contribution to GDP is not proportionate to the percentage of women in the economically active population.

In terms of professions, women make up 79% of all teachers and 87% of doctors and healthcare personnel. The so-called "self-employed" population is mainly women for whom trade is the only source of income for the whole family. In 2011, 34% of women were employed by small businesses and 47% by large and medium-sized businesses. The self-employment of women in the agrarian sector is very high, reaching 60%. The state has been implementing programmes to support women's businesses since 2002. The government of Kazakhstan supports a loan facility to develop businesses among women. A total of 2.2 billion tenge was allocated for these purposes in 2011 alone. A network of centres to train women in administration and business management, and for their professional development, has been set up. New laws have simplified the procedures for obtaining and increasing loans to the population. Measures to involve women in business have resulted in an increase in the percentage of female executives in small and medium-sized businesses to 52% and among individual entrepreneurs to 66%. A total of 56% of the employees

at the National Bank of Kazakhstan are women and they account for 42% of its management.

In order to attain the 30% representation of women at decision-making levels in governmental bodies, the following measures are needed: women should be promoted to various available positions; job descriptions of government officials should prohibit gender discrimination in professions; the training and preparation of female politicians should be continued with the help of international organisations; and party lists should be compiled with gender balance taken into account when women and men are promoted to executive positions and elected bodies at the national and local levels.

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International Cooperation of Uzbekistan and the OSCE in the Humanitarian Domain

Murat Bakhadirov
(unofficial translation from Russian)

The modern world is experiencing a period of deep transformations. Fundamentals of international relations are being rethought. The existing values and methods of managing international processes are also experiencing a crisis in many regards, and often do not correspond to actual current conditions. One of the major trends is the formation of a new world order.

Since the 1990s international jurists and politicians have been debating how a new international system of relations should look, the key component of this system being a new world order. However, no common opinion exists in this regard.

In this environment some transnational forces have arisen, and having increased international tensions, have become a source of destabilization.

During such periods the role of international security structures, which are legitimate international actors and can become a platform to determine common goals and a mechanism to ensure stability in international relations, moves to the forefront. The OSCE is one of these structures.

The OSCE was created during the period when the bipolar system was collapsing and the international system was undergoing transformation. As a structure created during the Cold War period, it met the requirements of that period to a large degree. However, following the collapse of the bipolar system, it experienced a number of transformations as it adapted to the changing world. Therefore, the role of the organization in maintaining security and creating an environment of cooperation changed in many respects.

Threats and risks have now been trans-nationalized to such an extent that they are taking on a new institutional shape. It has become impossible to ensure the security of a state or a region without the involvement of neighboring countries and regions. Therefore, the idea put forward at the Astana summit – that the OSCE security space should be expanded – is very interesting. Non-European members should be viewed not only as organization members or as a buffer zone for European security. They should become a key component of the organization.

Since becoming an OSCE member, Uzbekistan has maintained comprehensive cooperation with the organization. Uzbekistan became an OSCE member on February 26, 1992. In 1994 the OSCE Representative Office of the Republic of Uzbekistan was established.

It should be noted that the relations between Uzbekistan and the OSCE have experienced periods of differing intensity. In the 1990s the level of cooperation increased. In 1995, at Uzbekistan's initiative, an OSCE Bureau for Relations with Central Asia was opened in Tashkent. This bureau worked to establish contacts at different levels and to encourage interaction in areas of mutual interest. In 1999 the Bureau was renamed the OSCE Center in Tashkent.

The key priority of cooperation for the OSCE during the first period (1992-1995) was the domain of regional security and the creation of conditions appropriate for systematic dialogue among OSCE members.

During the period from 1999 to 2004, the OSCE adjusted its activities, instead focusing on the implementation of specific projects and trying to operate evenly in all three dimensions of security.

Within the OSCE framework Uzbekistan took the position not just as a side observer, but also as an active participant putting

forward its own initiatives. Some of them were integrated into a number of the following OSCE documents:

- 1996 Lisbon Declaration: the full-fledged participation of Central Asian countries in OSCE activities was established, as was the termination of illicit weapons deliveries to conflict zones
- 1999 Istanbul Charter of European Security: a thesis on the presence and danger of external threats to security within the OSCE space

In 2006, following Uzbekistan's proposal, the OSCE Permanent Council made a decision to establish an office for Coordinator of OSCE projects in Uzbekistan. In July 2006 the Government of Uzbekistan signed a memorandum establishing this position

Uzbekistan is continuously pursuing deliberate and constructive positions in its relationship with the OSCE. OSCE activities in Uzbekistan are aimed at the implementation of projects that are a priority for the Uzbeks, as well as strengthening interactions between Uzbekistan and the organization.

In 2007, 18 projects were implemented in the three OSCE security dimensions; in 2008, 15 projects; in 2009, 14 projects; in 2010, 12 projects; and in 2011, 12 projects. In 2012, 30 OSCE projects are being implemented in the country.

The major focus of cooperation is on following national principles and implementing obligations undertaken within the framework of the organization in all three dimensions. This is done while taking into account both new security challenges and threats, and the international agenda and national interests of Uzbekistan.

Thus, Uzbekistan does not consider any of the individual dimensions as a priority. They are instead a set of priorities to ensure security and stability in the country.

In Uzbekistan much attention is paid to the protection of human rights and combating transnational crime, which threatens

the development of the society and state. Specific focus is placed on prevention of such crimes.

In 2010 the President of Uzbekistan, I.A. Karimov, put forward an initiative to further develop democratic reforms and the construction of civil society, whose area of responsibility is being gradually transferred to more practical activity within the country. The implementation of this initiative promotes, in many ways, the objectives of the human dimension of security, as the issues raised in it are associated with political and economic freedoms, civil society development, and freedom of speech.

The implementation of human dimension projects actively involves civil society institutes, governmental institutions for the protection of human rights such as the Ombudsman and National Center for Human Rights, and other non-commercial organizations of Uzbekistan.

Representatives of ministries and agencies take regular part in OSCE conferences, forums, workshops, and trainings conducted overseas on the human dimension of security.

Uzbek delegations participate in annual meetings of the OSCE Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, sending the Minister of Foreign Affairs or Deputy as a representative. Uzbekistan's delegation, headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, took part in the OSCE summit held on December 1-2, 2010, in Astana. The text of the final declaration of the summit incorporated Uzbekistan's positions, in particular on Afghan issues.

The OSCE Project Coordinator supports efforts to mitigate the consequences of the Aral Sea disaster by raising public awareness about environmental issues and promoting support for farming development.

Uzbekistan has taken a compelling stand against trafficking in persons. In 2008 the country adopted the following laws: On Counteracting Trafficking in Persons; On Ratifying the Protocol on the Prevention and Preclusion of Trafficking in Persons, Par-

ticularly Women and Children, and Related Punishment, which complements the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (New York, November 15, 2000); and the National Action Plan to Improve Efficiency of Combating Trafficking in Persons. In 2008 Uzbekistan also established the National Inter-agency Commission to combat trafficking in persons.

Uzbekistan has intensified its activities not only in combating, but also in preventing, the trafficking of persons. Law enforcement bodies, in cooperation with public organizations, conduct educational programs such as training seminars and round tables, thus communicating to the population the consequences of trafficking in persons.

Uzbekistan is a party to the majority of international documents aimed at combating trafficking in persons and associated crimes, including the UN Convention and GA Resolutions.

Uzbekistan and the OSCE are also cooperating to protect the interests of national minorities. On March 28, 2012, Uzbekistan was visited by an OSCE delegation on national minorities headed by High Commissioner Ambassador Knut Vollebaek. The Ambassador noted that special attention is paid in Uzbekistan to ensuring national consent. He also noted that members of all nations and ethnic groups live peacefully irrespective of their native languages, religious confessions, or social origins, and that their rights are guaranteed by law. The delegation also stressed that cooperation will be expanded and strengthened in the future.

Dunja Mijatović, the OSCE Representative on Media Freedom, recently attended a round table discussion on TV and radio broadcasting legislation. She noted Uzbekistan's willingness to reform mass media legislation, and the ongoing public discussion of the reforming process.

The importance of such legislative reform was elevated after President Karimov put forward the "Concept of Further Deep-

ening of Democratic Reforms and Forming Civil Society in the Country.”

One of the elements in forming an advanced political and legal culture among the public is education. Quality of education underpins the ability of a society to understand its freedom.

In 1997 the National Program for Staff Training, an education reform project, was adopted in Uzbekistan. It is an integral part of the “Uzbek model” of reform.

Over 60% of Uzbekistan’s population is under the age of 30. This figure demonstrates the importance of reforming education, which should be accessible for all citizens of the country.

Uzbekistan has implemented a compulsory and free 12-year education system. During this period of time young people receive an education and prepare for their occupation or profession. In 2012, 500,000 high-school students received a diploma marking them as medium-qualification specialists.

Education in Uzbekistan is provided in seven languages: Uzbek, Karakalpak, Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, and Tajik.

Over 230,000 students study in Uzbek universities. Branches of highly reputable European and Asian universities operate in the country, including Westminster University, the Singapore Institute of Management Development, Turin Polytechnic University, the Russian University of Oil and Gas named after I. Gubkin, Moscow State University named after M. Lomonosov, and the Russian Economic University named after G. Plekhanov. An experimental Training Center of High Technology is being created jointly with Cambridge University.

Annual costs for educational development and reform in Uzbekistan make up to 10-12% of the nation’s GDP, and their share in the state budget expenditures exceeds 35%. Foreign technical assistance to the education sector exceeds USD 500 million.

The purpose of the education reform program is to develop young people who possess current knowledge and are skilled in

advanced technologies, which are both keys to success in state modernization, democratization, and the transition from a strong state to a strong civil society.

Thus, in spite of complicated relations between Uzbekistan and the OSCE, cooperation on the human dimension of security is ongoing. Uzbekistan is accomplishing reforms in political and economic freedom. These reforms are continually evolving and are based on the Uzbek national model.

* * *

Freedom of Speech in Central Asia: Declarations and Realities

Tamara Kaleyeva
(unofficial translation from Russian)

I would like to begin with a quotation from the Astana Declaration: “We value the important role played by civil society and free media in helping us to ensure full respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, including free and fair elections, and the rule of law...Respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law must be safeguarded and strengthened.”

Speaking about the development of the situation regarding freedom of speech in post-Soviet Central Asia, we can definitely state that the nations fully understand the important role played by civil society and free media. And, realising this role, some countries are trying to undermine it. The only exception is Kyrgyzstan, where reforms in the media sector have been truly democratic and impressive in scale. Kyrgyzstan decriminalised libel in 2011, and is developing public television as well as promoting community radio. They also have problems, of course, and they are significant.

The situation is exactly the opposite in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Much yet has to be done there: privatisation in the media sector, the emergence of independent and opposition-minded publications, and real, not declarative, freedom of speech.

The situation in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan is very similar, with one major difference. I will cite Nuriddin Karshiboyev, the leader of the Tajikistan National Association of Independent Mass Media: “The main problems facing media freedom and free speech in Tajikistan involve imperfections in media legislation. Another

problem is the failure to apply laws consistently in the media sector...Publications owned by media holdings have become popular because they are loyal to government policy. Critical publications in Tajikistan fall out of favour with authorities and experience all sorts of pressure from government agencies...Access to information is made extremely complicated through the extrajudicial blocking of independent media websites...Cases of state-run and private publishing houses refusing without grounds to print independent newspapers have become frequent.”

All of this can be fully applied to Kazakhstan as well. The main difference is that President Rahmon of Tajikistan decriminalised libel and insulting in June 2012. In Kyrgyzstan, by the way, former President Roza Otunbayeva ended criminal responsibility for defamation.

According to most accounts in Kazakhstan, neither OSCE principles and declarations nor presidential instructions regarding the decriminalisation of libel and insulting have any force. In spring 2011, in an interview with *The Washington Post*, Nursultan Nazarbayev clearly favoured the classification of libel and insulting as civil offences. I quote: “We are listening to our growing civil society about speeding up change in the culture on rights and freedom. We will, for example, make defamation a civil rather than a criminal offence to encourage free speech and bring us into line with international best practices.” I will not quote well-known principles and direct recommendations of the OSCE on these matters. None of these recommendations have ever been challenged. Nevertheless, our government is sticking to the criminal punishment of journalists as a last resort.

“Freedom of speech, the fight against crime, and other externally socially beneficial actions should not be instruments of unlawful intrusion into the private lives of citizens, or encroachment on their honour and dignity...Based on these positions it would be premature to decriminalise libel and insulting, which now have a

strong preventive component,” reads a new draft Criminal Code of Kazakhstan, published almost a year ago in November 2011. A draft, published this year, does not contain explicit statements that support continued criminal responsibility for libel and insulting, but the entire motivational part justifying this has been preserved without change. As a result, our government officials believe, the constitutional right to freedom of speech in Kazakhstan is an “externally beneficial action,” while criminal prosecution for defamation is a “strong preventive component.”

The notion of “free media,” “pluralism of views,” and “independent editorial policy” has totally disappeared from the parlance of government officials at all levels. The vocabulary is increasingly being replaced by Soviet-era concepts and, what is more worrying, by concepts from the period of the revolutionary fight against dissent. Not only provisions of the law *On Mass Media* but also those of the country’s constitution have been forgotten: the constitution celebrates freedom of speech and bans censorship. At the recent trial of Vladimir Kozlov, the leader of the unregistered opposition party Alga!, the remaining two opposition newspapers were accused of trying to “criticise in a destructive manner” and it was further said that, I quote, “the aim of these media outlets is the creation of quantitative and qualitative advantages for the adoption of strong associations, plots and myths that meet the interests of an organised criminal group.” It is worth recalling here a commentary by the Kazakh Constitutional Council: “The ban of censorship means the removal ideological control over the content of work, which includes the topics on which works should be written, what characters should be brought onto the pages of this work, which values should be propagandised and the coverage of what should be avoided.”

The latest, but not the only, case of this kind of complete neglect of constitutional principles regarding freedom of speech

and expression is the resignation of the entire team (60 people in total) at the Almaty television channel in protest against the diktat by the head of the press service, Mr. Kuyanov. Mr. Kuyanov himself does not even realise that he has grossly violated the constitution by engaging in censorship, and he explained: “The 100% shareholder of the channel is the city administration and 100% of state order comes from the administration, which is why it is my direct duty to interfere with its work and determine its information policy.”

Censorship and diktats by owners and the state, who act as a major source of media funding, have become commonplace. In Almaty, the city administration considers itself the master of media; at the national level the master is the Ministry of Culture and Information. In August, for instance, Minister of Culture and Information Darkhan Mynbayev advised Kazakh media outlets to find new ways of operating and new methods of presenting information. He believes journalists “need to regularly promote examples of men of labour and their professional successes.” The minister suggested the organisation of a “series of radio conferences with successful people; people who are passionate about their profession and heroes of creative work.” Such recommendations are a recollection of Soviet times, because they do not just come from a desire to destroy independent journalism and turn it into a “henchman of the party,” in this case the ruling Nur Otan party, but also are a practical means to that end. This is also proven by the law *On Broadcasting*, which was hastily passed last year and which subjects all private television channels to strict dependence on government agencies; and the law *On National Security in the Republic of Kazakhstan*, which regards “influence on public and individual consciousness related to the deliberate distortion [of information] and spread of false information to the detriment of national security” as a threat to national security.

Civil society in Kazakhstan has long been actively demanding the liberalisation of legislation regarding freedom of speech, and has been making many competent proposals. It all depends on political will that aims at the real, not declarative, implementation of the Astana Declaration.

* * *

The State of Civil Society and Its Institutions in Kazakhstan in Light of the Principles of the OSCE Astana Declaration

*Andrei Chebotaryov
(unofficial translation from Russian)*

The OSCE Astana Declaration was signed at the 7th Summit of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which took place on 1-2 December 2010 in Astana. In particular, the document states, “We value the important role played by civil society and free media in helping us to ensure full respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, including free and fair elections, and the rule of law.”

Kazakhstan’s compliance with this provision of the OSCE Astana Declaration is a controversial issue. On the one hand, the state and its bodies regularly declare the importance of civil society and take measures to interact with its institutions in a constructive way.

An illustration of this is the following quotation from President Nazarbayev’s article *The Social Modernisation of Kazakhstan: Twenty Steps towards a Society of Universal Labour*, which was published this year: “The government administration should partner with the non-governmental sector. It is important for the state to create and support various dialogue platforms and arrange joint events.”

On the other hand, the current condition of civil society, as well as its nature, forms, and the mechanisms of its interaction with the state, suggests that there are factors that restrict the advancement of these institutions and their influence on the socio-political and other spheres of life in Kazakhstan.

Last year, the Blueprint for the Development of Civil Society in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2006-2011 officially expired.

However, many pressing issues related to the improvement of conditions for the creation and functioning of civil society institutions, and to the expansion of their role in the administration of societal and state affairs, have not been resolved. This concerns, in particular, local self-government and its institutions, which exist either as a mere formality (meetings) or have not been recognised as such (KSK).

In practice the implementation of the blueprint was largely focused on the activities of the state and its bodies with respect to non-for-profit non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In particular, the state financed socially important projects implemented by certain NGOs in the form of social public orders and arranged regular Civil Forums (three forums were organised from 2007 to 2011) where NGOs were the main participants. However, no serious or systemic measures were taken at the legislative level with respect to NGOs.

The important questions, such as enhancing cooperation between businesses and civil society institutions, as well as the social responsibility of businesses, have not been resolved either. Throughout the period of the blueprint, businesses expressed no serious interest in making any tangible contribution to the development of civil society or implementing any joint projects with its institutions. In addition, the country still lacks a legislative framework for the advancement of charity and patronship.

The fulfilment of the Plan of Action to Implement the Blueprint for the Development of Civil Society in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2006-2011, which was approved by a governmental resolution on 30 September 2006, should not be regarded as a criterion in assessing the performance of the blueprint. It is clear that this document includes one-time, not systemic, measures. In addition, the reports on its performance primarily record how state bodies used budget funds in the areas over which the plan gave them control.

The fact that the government has not appointed an official coordinator for the plan and blueprint, but has instead distributed tasks among central and local executive bodies, is a serious error. A significant indicator of this mistake was that no official report on the fulfilment of the blueprint was published during the first two stages from 2008 to 2010.

Therefore, the Blueprint for the Development of Civil Society in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2006-2011, although it has expired officially, remains unfulfilled as regards the fullest possible attainment of its goals and objectives.

For these reasons, it is advisable to correct the existing problems that will impact future interaction between the state and civil society institutions. In particular, this concerns the following areas of relationships between the state and NGOs:

1. State Registration and Re-registration of NGOs

The state registration and re-registration procedure for NGOs involves the citizens' right to freedom of association, an important principle proclaimed by the Constitution of Kazakhstan. However, the procedure as it is set forth by law includes certain aspects that both ensure the exercise of this right and restrict it.

It should be said that many representatives of the liberal general public desire a significant reform of this procedure by making registration not a matter of permission or authorisation by state bodies, but a process wherein notification would be enough to consider an organisation registered. However, in order to maintain certain state control over the creation of NGOs and their activities, it would be reasonable to keep the existing registration and re-registration procedure, provided that it is streamlined and made easier.

In the first place, this procedure includes all not-for-profit organisations in a single registry. This means that NGOs are registered together with political parties, professional unions, religious

associations, state institutions, notary chambers, bar associations, and other not-for-profit organisations, although different registration requirements apply to almost every one of these organisations.

For this reason – and since the law *On Social Public Orders* distinguishes NGOs from parties, trade unions, and religious associations – we would recommend the amendment of laws governing the registration of legal entities so that a separate registry is created for NGOs. This will make it possible to distinguish them from other not-for-profit organisations and be useful not only for their registration/re-registration but also for the keeping of records and statistics.

The laws restrict the physical territory in which public associations may operate. Article 7 of the law *On Public Associations* dated 31 May 1996 states that public associations must be local, regional, or national. Regional associations must have structural divisions (branches and/or representative offices) in one or more oblasts and national associations in more than one half of oblasts in the country.

In particular, this approach means that a local association registered and operating in one oblast may not work in other oblasts, and a regional public association may not work nationwide. However, these territorial requirements do not apply to NGOs created in the form of a private institution, a public foundation, or an association (union) of legal entities. Therefore, this provision contradicts the principle of the equality of all NGOs before the law.

For this reason, we would propose the application of territorial restrictions to political parties and professional unions only, making it possible for other public associations to work nationwide. To implement this in practice, it would be enough to abolish Article 7 of the law *On Public Associations*, which describes their status.

Another issue is the legal status of branches and representative offices of NGOs. In accordance with Article 43.3 of the Civil Code (General Part), branches and representative offices of a legal entity are not recognised as legal entities themselves. For this reason they are registered by means of making a secondary record only.

However, NGOs must pay a fee for the registration of their branches and/or representative offices just as they do for the main office. In addition, this fee is the same as the fee for the registration of the parent organisation. With the above circumstances in mind, this provision is not legitimate and adds financial constraints to the creation and registration of territorial divisions by NGOs.

In accordance with Article 456 of the code *On Taxes and Other Compulsory Payments (Tax Code)* dated 10 December 2008, the fee for the state registration of children's and youth public associations as well as associations of the disabled is two monthly calculation indexes (MCIs), while the registration of other NGOs is 6.5 MCIs. This requirement violates the principle of the equality of NGOs before the law.

In order to remedy these primarily financial constraints on the creation and operation of NGOs, we would propose:

- a) The abolition of fees for the registration/re-registration of branches and representative offices of NGOs; and
- b) The use of a registration fee of 2 MCIs, which is affordable for all NGOs.

The respective amendments could be made to the law *On the State Registration of Legal Entities, Branches and Representative Offices* dated 17 April 1995, and to the Tax Code.

2. Social Public Orders to NGOs

The existing practice of providing state finance to NGOs in the form of social public orders has the following significant drawbacks:

a) The system of social public orders tends to become another source of corruption for governmental officials who provide funds to certain NGOs in exchange for kickbacks. This suggests that the main procedures for making social public orders are non-transparent and unfair;

b) There is no clear and systematised information on the provision of social public orders by central and local executive bodies or on the performance of the respective services by NGOs who have received these orders;

c) Some NGOs fail to provide quality services under the orders they receive from state bodies; and

d) The services provided by NGOs under social public orders have no serious socio-political outcomes.

In order to gradually remedy the above failures and improve the system of social public orders, we would recommend taking certain measures through amendments to the law *On Social Public Orders*.

In the first place, in order to improve the transparency of tenders for social public orders and ensure the fairness and lawfulness of their results:

a) A single procedure for the organising of tenders by state bodies should be prescribed by law;

b) A provision should be added that tender boards must include deputies of the Majilis of the Parliament and *maslikhats* (or, depending on the level of a state body, the contracting authority) as well as representatives of prosecutor's offices, financial control bodies, and NGOs who are not suppliers of services for the respective state bodies; and that these representatives must be present during key tender procedures; and

c) A provision should be added that only those NGOs whose goals, objectives, and operations as stated in their charters fully correspond to the nature of services required under the respective order, may be admitted to take part in tenders for social public orders.

In order to ensure that social public orders are implemented in an efficient and transparent manner, we would recommend introducing a legal requirement that the respective state bodies publish, on their official websites, recipient NGOs' performance reports. These reports should include information on the NGOs' activities, measures taken to implement the respective social public orders, and the use of budget funds.

To fulfil the above recommendations, ministries and other state bodies that provide social public orders should add a special *Social Public Orders* section on their websites where they can publish:

a) Announcements about tenders and tender documents;

b) Tender results, including the names of NGOs who receive social public orders, the list of services they provide, and the amount of provided budget funds; and

c) NGOs' reports on the fulfilment of social public orders.

3. Improving Work of Advisory Bodies (Public Councils) to Central and Local Executive Bodies

An important area of interaction between the state and non-governmental actors is the participation of NGOs in the work of advisory bodies to central and local executive bodies. These advisory bodies are, in particular:

– The Coordination Council for Interaction with Non-Governmental Organisations under the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan;

– The Public Council for the Control of Police under the Ministry of Internal Affairs;

– The Public Council for the Protection of the Rights of Patients under the Ministry of Health;

– The Public Anti-Corruption Council under the Agency for the Fight against Economic Crimes and Corruption (Financial Police);

- The Public Council for Ensuring the Rule of Law under the Prosecutor General’s Office;
- The Expert Council for Entrepreneurial Affairs under the Ministry of Industry and New Technologies;
- The Expert Councils for the Protection of Competition in the Oil Products Market and in the Medicines Market under the Competition Protection Agency; and
- The Public Council for Interaction with Non-Governmental Organisations and the Public Youth Council under the East Kazakhstan Oblast Akimat, among others.

These bodies provide NGOs with an opportunity to take part in preparing recommendations on corresponding aspects of state policy.

However, almost all of these bodies (public councils) have the following common drawbacks:

- a) Irregular meetings;
- b) Insufficient, or the total lack of, information available to the general public about their work;
- c) More representatives of state bodies than NGOs;
- d) The lack of mechanisms for conveying the bodies’ recommendations to decision-makers.

For these reasons, such public and experts’ councils remain purely formal structures that are unable to ensure comprehensive interaction between the state and non-governmental actors.

In order to improve the function these structures, their activities should be fully systematized. To this end, a law *On Advisory Bodies (Public Councils) to Central and Local Executive Bodies* should be prepared and adopted. In particular, the law should require that:

- 1) Representatives of NGOs comprise at least 70% of the membership of public councils;
- 2) Meetings of public councils be held regularly – at least once every two to three months;

- 3) Official websites of the respective state bodies contain special sections describing the work of public councils and providing up-to-date information about their work;
- 4) The mass media is present at meetings of these bodies; and
- 5) Public councils have the right to request and receive information from heads of the state bodies under which they have been created and are functioning. This includes information on the fulfilment of the recommendations and proposals they have made with respect to socially important issues, and proposals addressed to the respective officials.

The proposed measures should significantly strengthen the legal mechanisms of interaction between state bodies and NGOs as key institutions of civil society, and as a result, make this interaction more effective and mutually beneficial.

* * *

IDEAS Report: Towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community

From Vision to Reality

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Table of Contents

Purpose of the Report

Executive Summary

1. The Vision of a Security Community

2. Arguments in Favour of a Security Community of the OSCE
Participating States

3. Developments in the OSCE Space

4. The Way towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security
Community: Guiding Principles of a Strategy

5. What the OSCE Can Contribute to Building a Security
Community

5.1 Re-engaging in the Security Dimension

5.1.1 Developing Arms Control, CSBMs and Military Co-
operation

5.1.2 Taking Responsibility for Protracted Conflicts

5.1.3 Supporting Stability in Central Asia and Afghanistan

5.1.4 Encouraging Reconciliation as Means of Conflict
Resolution and Rapprochement

5.1.5 Addressing Transnational Threats and Challenges

5.2 Engaging in the Economic and Environmental Dimension

5.3 Engaging in the Human Dimension

5.3.1 Improving the Effectiveness of the OSCE's HD
Events Cycle

5.3.2 Opening Dialogue with Muslim Communities

5.4 Creating an OSCE Network of Academic Institutions

5.5 Arranging Institutional Issues

6. A Call for the OSCE

Purpose of the Report

In late 2011, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Germany, France, Poland and the Russian Federation asked the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE) at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the Russian Foreign Ministry (MGIMO) to organize a series of workshops in order to advance the discussion on the future character of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community and to present a report with recommendations to the participating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Vienna. With their initiative, the Ministers took up the idea of establishing a network of academic institutions, a proposal made by OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier during his inaugural speech to the Permanent Council on 4 July 2011.

The purpose of this report is to contribute to a critical and illuminating debate on the conceptualization of a security community. We are fully aware that, as we present this report, Europe in particular is going through a fundamental economic and political crisis. However, we believe that the very fact of this crisis makes the objective of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community and the benefits it offers all the more urgent and necessary.

This report builds on four workshops held in Berlin, Warsaw, Paris and Moscow from March through July 2012. The workshops were attended by a total of about 300 participants and guests from 40 countries and four international organizations. The working group established by the four institutes benefitted from additional meetings with officials in each of the four capitals.

The institutes have also greatly profited from co-operation with the Foreign Ministries of the four countries, including their Permanent Delegations to the OSCE, and from the assistance given by the Irish OSCE Chairmanship. Outstanding contributions were made at the workshops and in discussions by Minister Guido Westerwelle, former Ministers Igor Ivanov and Adam Daniel Rotfeld, former OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, Deputy Minister Bogusław Winid, Deputy Minister Alexander Grushko, and former State Secretary Wolfgang Ischinger. The discussions at all workshops were most informal and deeply enriching. The participants and guests at the workshops deserve a special acknowledgement for this. Any shortcomings in this report are the sole responsibility of its authors.

Executive Summary

The vision of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community, as advanced by the 2010 Astana OSCE Summit meeting, is particularly important against the background of the strategic uncertainty the OSCE area faces now and in the future. The global shift in the balance of economic power, the refocusing of international politics towards the Pacific, the crisis of the Euro zone and the uncertainty regarding the future of the European Union and of Russia make the appeal of this vision less plausible than it was twenty-two years ago when the Charter of Paris for a New Europe was adopted.

Against this background, the emergence of a genuine security community throughout the OSCE area cannot be taken for granted. However, the acknowledgement of the challenges ahead only emphasizes the importance of the vision of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community offered by the OSCE Heads of State or Government. It reminds us that the OSCE participating States can benefit more from coming closer together via increasing convergence in all areas than they can from drifting further apart.

The strategic uncertainties within the OSCE, manifested in political and institutional divergence among the participating States, have increased over the past decade. All participating States appear to share the expectation that developing a security community should make war among its members impossible, regardless of whether they are members of alliances or not. However, states have different views on what needs to be done to achieve this goal. Whereas some concentrate on the traditional politico-military 'hard security' issues, others emphasize the primary importance of developing a viable community of values.

If developing a security community is conceptualized as a process rather than as a single act, these two approaches need not

be seen as mutually exclusive, but can rather be followed in parallel. A security community cannot be successful if the security or normative concerns of individual states are not appropriately addressed. Nor can it be reduced to inter-state relations or ‘hard security’ issues. A security community can only grow through the active involvement and engagement of the societies at all levels.

Building a security community in the OSCE area cannot be delegated to the OSCE alone. States benefit from the existence of a dense network of European, Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian institutions. Despite problems in specific relations, all OSCE participating States work together in multiple institutional settings, whether as full members or associate partners. Building a security community will thus involve a number of different institutional formats. At the same time, being the single most inclusive organization in this area, with a comprehensive mandate, the OSCE has an important role to play in this process.

Starting from its current agenda, the OSCE participating States can contribute to building a security community in the OSCE area by:

1. Preserving the existing arms control *acquis*, further pursuing conventional arms control and substantially modernizing confidence- and security-building measures.
2. Making concerted efforts to solve protracted conflicts, and, as a matter of urgency, to prevent any increase of tensions.
3. Assessing the effects that the situation in Afghanistan may have on the OSCE area after 2014 and appropriately adjusting relevant activities.
4. Promoting long-term reconciliation processes throughout the OSCE area.
5. Further developing the OSCE transnational threats agenda, concentrating on cyber security, countering terrorism, and combating illicit drug trafficking.
6. Developing its own initiatives for dialogue and promoting the implementation of relevant international instruments in the economic and environmental dimension throughout the OSCE area.
7. Improving the effectiveness of the OSCE’s human dimension work by monitoring the compliance of all OSCE participating States in an equal manner and by streamlining the human dimension events cycle.

8. Providing a platform for enhancing understanding between states and Muslim communities and engaging with the new political and societal forces of the Arab Spring.

9. Developing an OSCE network of academic institutions to facilitate open debate and communication on the relevant issues on the OSCE agenda.

10. Making better use of the institutional richness in the OSCE area through more effective co-operation, particularly with the organizations in the Eastern part of the OSCE space.

1. The Vision of a Security Community

At their 2010 Astana Summit meeting, the Heads of State or Government of the 56 OSCE participating States committed themselves “to the vision of a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, rooted in agreed principles, shared commitments and common goals.”

The Astana Commemorative Declaration further elaborates on the concept of “comprehensive, cooperative, equal and indivisible security, which relates the maintenance of peace to the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and links economic and environmental co-operation with peaceful inter-State relations”. It further develops a vision of a security community which “should be aimed at meeting the challenges of the 21st century”, is “based on full adherence to common OSCE norms, principles and commitments across all three dimensions”, and should “unite all OSCE participating States across the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region, free of dividing lines, conflicts, spheres of influence and zones with different levels of security”.

With this far-reaching vision, the Astana Commemorative Declaration advanced what the Heads of State or Government had endeavoured to achieve twenty years earlier in the 1990 Charter of Paris: “The era of confrontation and division in Europe has ended. We declare that henceforth our relations will be founded on respect and co-operation. [...] Ours is a time for fulfilling the hopes and expectations our peoples have cherished for decades: steadfast commitment to democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms; prosperity through economic liberty and social justice; and equal security for all our countries.”

A security community is a bold vision that can only materialize if states and societies actively pursue this goal. However, the majority of political elites and the broader public have not

taken any notice of it. Furthermore, individual states often define the concept of a security community in quite different – even contradictory – terms. Whereas some states believe that the way towards a security community must begin by addressing ‘hard security’ issues, other point out that a genuine security community presupposes the existence of a community of values. Any viable process towards building a security community in the OSCE area will have to reconcile these different approaches.

This report proceeds on the basis of the understanding that a security community stands for a community of states and societies whose values, social orders and identities converge to such a degree that war among them becomes unthinkable. A security community means stable and lasting peace among states and within societies where there are no longer zones of different security, regardless of whether individual states belong to alliances or not. Disputes are resolved by peaceful means only.

The notion of a security community is not limited to relations between states, but includes all sectors and levels of societies that are interconnected by multiple channels of free communication and free movement. It also allows for more effective common responses to shared threats and challenges.

A security community cannot be created by a single founding act, but is rather the result of a long-term process that allows the overcoming of the legacies of the past, the creation of mutual trust, an increase in convergence, and the development of common identities and institutions. A security community is not an alliance directed against any outside state or alliance.

The process towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community extends beyond the OSCE. However, as the most comprehensive and inclusive international organization in its region, the OSCE has to play an important role as a ‘security community-building institution’.

2. Arguments in Favour of a Security Community of the OSCE Participating States

While individual OSCE participating States may have different visions of a security community and see different rationales for engaging in security community-building, there is solid common ground for the pursuit of this goal.

Shared Identity of Europeanness

All OSCE participating States share an identity of Europeanness, a common history and culture, which builds on a centuries-old heritage of economic exchange and political and cultural communication.

Safeguarding Common Principles and Values

A Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community would safeguard and consolidate our joint principles and values. Starting with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, the OSCE participating States committed themselves to a comprehensive *acquis* of shared values and commitments, which they confirmed at the Astana Summit meeting in the context of declaring their support for a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community. This common *acquis*, and the shared OSCE institutions, have brought them together and kept them together even in most difficult periods of the OSCE’s history. Although much of the *acquis* remains to be fully implemented, it has continuously contributed to developing and strengthening a sense of a common normative space.

Addressing Transnational Threats and Challenges

In the 21st century, the OSCE participating States share new threats and challenges which are transnational and often global in nature. Some of them, such as global warming, climate change, cyber security, transnational terrorism and drug trafficking chal-

lenge the very foundations of states and societies in the OSCE area. Finding appropriate responses to transnational threats has emerged as an important area of convergence among the OSCE participating States.

Utilizing Economic Complementarity for the Challenge of Modernization

In a world that is expected to be home to eight billion people by 2025, and which is increasingly shaped by emerging powers, all OSCE participating States have a great deal to gain by strengthening and expanding economic, technological and scientific cooperation with each other, particularly in view of the high level of interdependence and complementarity of their economies. The conjunction in the OSCE area of a wealth of energy and mineral resources, highly developed knowledge-based industries and services, advanced technological development and the capacity for innovation, as well as accumulated human capital, allows the participating States to jointly meet the mounting challenges of competition and modernization in the globalized world.

Setting Global Standards

With its technological lead, strong institutions and high standards of governance, rule of law and comprehensive transparency, a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community could provide a model for a norm- and rule-based international order.

3. Developments in the OSCE Space

Building a security community in the OSCE area does not start from scratch. Over the past two decades, the process of increasing convergence within the OSCE area has significantly advanced in many areas, although it has been accompanied by repeated setbacks.

The Threat of a Major War – A Feature of the Past

The greatest achievement of the last two decades is that a major war in Europe between states and alliances – the ever-present threat during the era of East-West confrontation – has become inconceivable. Although differences between states persist, there are no more antagonistic or major ideological divides within the OSCE space. However, the 2008 Georgian-Russian conflict and earlier conflicts have clearly demonstrated that the use of force on a smaller scale is still possible within the OSCE area.

Trends towards Convergence

Almost all OSCE participating States are now market economies, even if their forms vary considerably. The economies within the OSCE space are highly interconnected, and states and societies are aware of this growing interdependence. The ongoing economic and financial crisis has made it evident that the welfare of each society depends on the welfare of all the others.

There has been a remarkable process of normative convergence throughout the OSCE area over the past two decades, even though it has been uneven in terms of implementation. All OSCE participating States have declared their adherence to the same values and norms, including respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy based on political pluralism and the rule of law. In the Astana Commemorative Declaration, they reaffirmed “categorically and irrevocably that the commitments

undertaken in the field of the human dimension are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned”.

Further convergence is resulting from the membership of an increasing number of states in or their co-operation with other international organizations in the OSCE area. Almost all participating States are members of or observers in the Council of Europe. Most of them have become members in the World Trade Organization. And many states that are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the European Union (EU) have developed partnership relations of varying degrees of intensity with them.

As far as transnational threats are concerned, there is increasing co-operation among a wide range of organizations. The density of bilateral co-operation between businesses and civil society organizations, as well as of cultural and human contacts in general has increased dramatically. All participating States now share a common information space that allows for a freer flow of information across their borders.

Newly Emerging Areas of Divergence

More recently, however, new lines of divergence have formed between the OSCE participating States. They are pursuing contradictory agendas and disagree on an increasing number of issues. The culture of compromise is in decline. The implementation of the agreed norms and commitments is uneven. The predominance of the security dilemma results in zero-sum games and deep mutual mistrust – many states still share the perception that optimizing one’s own security is only possible at the price of less security for others. Despite the declared commitment to indivisible and co-operative security, there are different levels of security within the OSCE space. Already achieved levels of co-operative security are being eroded. Many areas, such as energy,

natural resources and migration, have been excessively politicized. Recent efforts to turn things around, such as the OSCE’s Corfu Process, have failed to produce conclusive results.

Lack of Proper Communication

Existing differences and contradictions are exacerbated by different underlying patterns of understanding and interpretation. The dominant perception in the West is that the lack of democracy and human rights abuses in post-Soviet states lead to non-co-operative foreign policy. From the Eastern perspective, the Western democracy discourse is seen as part of the traditional pursuit of geopolitics and a remnant of Cold War rhetoric and thinking. Discussions are often of a tactical nature. Open dialogue over strategic interests and objectives does not take place. The result is mutual frustration and the recurring confirmation of mutual mistrust.

The Effects of the Financial and Economic Crisis

The overall situation has been further exacerbated by the effects of the current economic and financial crisis. Individual countries and groups of countries tend to turn inwards, are absorbed by addressing their own pressing problems and are less inclined to invest in joint projects, shared institutions and a common future. The crisis has once again highlighted substantial differences in terms of economic output, productivity, the capacity for innovation, employment and welfare as well as of the levels of stateness in the OSCE area. A failure to sincerely address those fundamental challenges and to develop a more sustainable economic model would represent a serious stumbling block for a genuine security community in the OSCE area. On the other hand, working more closely together in identifying appropriate responses to the current crisis would inevitably boost the process of security community-building.

The Crisis of Institutions

Almost all international organizations in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space are facing complex challenges. Overcoming the current financial and economic crisis poses an unprecedented challenge to the European Union. The current alternatives are deeper integration or increasing fragmentation. Overcoming the crisis will take time and energy and will have implications for the EU's external engagement.

NATO, for its part, is reassessing its post-Afghanistan role in the context of severe constraints on military spending. The model of consecutive enlargements seems to be exhausted, at least for the time being. The NATO-Russia-Council has failed to play a role in crisis management in the OSCE space.

The OSCE is strongly affected by increasing divergence among its participating States and by the lack of political will for pan-European co-operation. As the most comprehensive and inclusive regional institution, it is, at the same time, the weakest of the major Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian international organizations. A number of governments have significantly decreased their investments in the OSCE.

The political divergence over the last decade has led to some initial indications of an emerging institutional divide. Russia and other countries in the new East have increasingly invested in different institutions, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Customs Union, which are facing their own challenges as well.

Against this background, security community-building would require that the OSCE participating States increasingly invest in interconnecting the existing institutions in a more co-operative and efficient way.

Unfinished Integration Processes

Although integration within the OSCE space has advanced significantly since the early 1990s, it has remained unfinished. Russia and the West are no longer enemies, but they have not yet become genuine partners. There has not been much progress in shaping a new treaty on the strategic partnership between the European Union and the Russian Federation. NATO-Russia relations have remained fragile and do not live up to the 2010 Lisbon Summit promise to open "a new stage of co-operation towards a true strategic partnership". The progress achieved to date has not been sufficiently translated into resolving existing problems and conflicts.

Turkey is facing comparable integration deficits. Prospects for EU accession are uncertain and negotiations with the EU Commission have, so far, yielded only little progress. At the same time, Turkey is taking on a new role as a regional power.

No Solutions for Conflicts

The protracted conflicts have not been solved mainly because of unilateral strategies used by the parties to these conflicts and their lack of political will to find compromises. Lack of initiative and leadership plus vested interests in the continuation and instrumentalization of these conflicts have allowed many regressive steps and prevented any major breakthrough. The use of force in subregional conflicts is no longer taboo. Despite the efforts of the Minsk Group, a potential war over Nagorno-Karabakh is a possibility that could entail a significant danger of escalation, particularly in case of the inclusion of relevant regional powers. While conflicts in the South Caucasus, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe have not been fully resolved, new ones are looming. There is a risk of a possible spillover of conflicts from the regions adjacent to the OSCE area.

Stagnation in Arms Control

Since 1990, Europe has made historical progress in reducing its armed forces. Arms control has been one of the drivers of political rapprochement and co-operation. However, in recent years, arms control has degenerated from an instrument of co-operative security into a bone of contention. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), once hailed as the ‘cornerstone of European security’, is no longer functioning properly. Discussions aiming to unlock the situation have ended in stalemate. Success in modernizing the Vienna Document has been quite limited. The functioning of the Open Skies Treaty is hampered by disputes between individual states. The situation has been further complicated by the emergence of new issues, subjects of concern raised by various participating States, which have not yet been addressed in a proper way, such as missile defence deployments or tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Nevertheless, the level of military transparency has remained comparatively high.

Challenges for the Observance of Human Dimension Commitments

Respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law, which, according to the 1999 OSCE Charter for European Security, “is at the core of the OSCE’s comprehensive concept of security”, is continuously confronted with old and new challenges. The process of democratization has been slower, less consistent and more contradictory than originally expected. A number of autocratic regimes persist in the OSCE area and have consolidated their rule. Key ingredients of democratic governance, such as the rule of law and freedom of the media are increasingly challenged throughout the OSCE area. Human rights are often abused in the context of combating terrorism. The defence of human dignity remains a fundamental challenge throughout the OSCE space. Progress in

the human dimension is an indispensable element for increasing convergence among the OSCE participating States and thus for the growth of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.

Progress Insufficiently Translated into Joint Action

The current situation in the OSCE space is ambiguous. Advances towards greater convergence are paralleled by divergences preventing joint action. The main divergence is political and concerns a lack of cohesive policy approaches to many issues in various fields. This opens up space for parochial vested interests to create vicious cycles of old problems, old behaviour and new mistrust. Positive change requires continuous and energetic engagement by both political leaderships and societies. The building of a security community would help to narrow and close old and new gaps and the divergences currently dividing the OSCE participating States by promoting greater cohesion and convergence.

4. The Way towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community: Guiding Principles of a Strategy

Drafting a detailed strategy for developing a security community in the OSCE area goes beyond the scope of this report. We will therefore focus here on some guidelines that can direct the process towards building a security community.

First: Economic interdependence, even if it is strong, does not lead automatically to peace and stability. Asymmetric interdependence can even produce conflicts. One therefore cannot rely on economic factors alone. Rather, states and societies must take political action. Peace is not the result of benign conditions alone. Whoever wants peace has to *make* peace through direct, focused and sustained action.

Second: Progress towards a security community is achieved through increasing convergence and overcoming divergence among the OSCE participating States and their societies with respect to reducing existing security concerns and broadening shared interests, values and identities as the basis for lasting peaceful behaviour. Pursuing the objective of a security community therefore requires enhancing the whole OSCE *acquis* in all its dimensions and a qualitatively better implementation of these commitments.

Third: Shaping the process towards a security community is more important than striving for quick fixes. A security community is not established by a single founding act. The task is not to fix the *status quo*, but rather to manage the process of ongoing change and gradually direct it towards a security community.

Fourth: It is essential to address as many issues as possible in parallel. Substantive results should be accompanied by ef-

forts towards reconciliation and the reduction of mistrust among and within states and communities. Agreements of all kinds in as many sectors as possible – regimes, politically binding agreements, legally binding treaties etc. – add up over time to an ever denser network of mutual ties and commitments that enhance trust and make wars and violent conflicts practically impossible. This is reflected by the fact that no one – governments and peoples alike – any longer expects organized acts of violence by another state or any relevant societal group. If this state of affairs is established and assured over a longer period, one can speak of a security community.

Fifth: There should be a balance between items of the old agenda inherited from the Cold War and a new agenda related to forthcoming challenges and opportunities, including transnational threats. Neither of these agendas can be neglected. Rather, they should be dealt with in parallel. Elements of the new agenda including reconciliation, which deals with a legacy issue in a novel way, should increase in importance.

Sixth: It is important to address both potential game changers, such as developing co-operative missile defence, and relatively non-controversial issues. Focusing on game changers alone runs the risk of their turning into spoilers where no political breakthrough can be achieved. In the same way, it is important to pursue, in a balanced way, long-term objectives, such as reconciliation, and short-term goals that can yield results relatively quickly. Early successes of any kind – even small ones – are essential, because the existing mistrust can only be reduced by deeds, not by mere declarations.

Seventh: It is imperative to depoliticize controversial issues – in general and in all individual issue areas. The degree of de-

politicization achieved can be seen as a sign of success on the way towards a security community.

Eighth: We need a change in thinking. So-called ‘soft issues’ such as reconciliation, the rule of law including international law, people-to-people contacts, expert communities and business co-operation might prove more important, in the long term, than so-called ‘hard security’ issues. This is the case because the main task ahead is changing ways of thinking, values and identities. This is even true for ‘hard security’ issues such as arms control, where the creation of transparency and trust and the establishment of firm bonds of co-operation are more important than setting balances and limiting military items.

Ninth: Embarking on a path towards a security community requires the active engagement of the political leaderships. At the same time, broad societal participation and ownership are essential if the process is to become robust and sustainable. This goes far beyond the traditional notion of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and includes business leaders, representatives of trade unions, religious communities, expert communities and many others. It means fostering the gradual evolution of a new culture of peaceful conflict regulation.

Tenth: As the most comprehensive and inclusive international organization in its area of application and as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), the OSCE has played and can continue to play an important role as a ‘security community-building institution’. Moving ahead towards a security community would require the positive involvement and co-operation of the EU, NATO, the CSTO, the Customs Union, the OSCE and other organizations. For this reason, the OSCE should strengthen its co-operation with the UN

institutions, with the regional and sub-regional organizations in its area, and with its Mediterranean and Asian Partners for Co-operation.

5. What the OSCE Can Contribute to Building a Security Community

By improving their co-operation in all areas of the OSCE's activities – in the security, economic and environmental and human dimensions – the participating States can show political will and send a strong message that they want to advance towards a security community. They can engage in a few selected topics and projects that are significant and visible.

5.1 *Re-engaging in the Security Dimension*

The long-term objective in the security dimension is the gradual demilitarization and de-securitization of interstate, and, where necessary, intrastate relations up to the point where the use of organized force is no longer thinkable. This requires a common understanding of military security, functioning arms control and military co-operation, as well as the resolution of protracted violent conflicts and the prevention of new ones, reconciliation among former adversaries and jointly addressing transnational threats and challenges.

5.1.1 *Developing Arms Control, CSBMs and Military Co-operation*

The erosion of the conventional arms control regime in Europe, and specifically of the CFE Treaty, poses a challenge to the OSCE region. Sharply divergent perceptions of 'hard security' issues make concerted action to salvage arms control a matter of urgent need, but at the same time harder to achieve. The further pursuit of arms control remains an essential tool for building a co-operative and indivisible security space and thereby paving the way towards a security community. To prevent further deterioration, participating States should:

a) Abstain from steps which could jeopardize the remaining arms control regimes in Europe.

b) Exercise restraint in conventional armed forces deployments, since any substantial build-up not commensurate with national security requirements could exacerbate existing concerns. If, however, the stalemate over CFE is overcome, new opportunities for addressing the current security concerns of the participating States could open, particularly since the dramatically changed security landscape in Europe has made many CFE provisions obsolete. The following guidelines could be helpful for participating States in pursuing a renewed arms control dialogue:

c) Consider the option of extending conventional arms control to new weapons categories and complex military capabilities.

d) Consider making new weapons categories the subject of monitoring rather than of limitations.

e) Pursue an arms control dialogue where all concerns expressed would be heard and discussed without taboos.

f) Fully engage defence establishments in the arms control dialogue.

The OSCE has a particular role to play in improving transparency and predictability by further developing confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). This task is all the more important as the armed forces of the participating States undergo profound reductions and modernization processes.

The negotiation of a substantial Vienna Document (VD) modernization is just beginning. Participating States advocate differ-

ent views with respect to which particular measures should be developed. They also differ on the issue of whether the current level of intrusiveness of the CSBMs is sufficient or whether it should be stepped up.

The main objective should be to provide for an improved baseline agreement while encouraging individual states to engage in more specific arrangements wherever appropriate. In particular, the participating States should be encouraged to provide extensive advance information about military exercises and be ready to address concerns raised by other participating States, to conclude further bilateral and regional CSBM agreements, or to practice tailored CSBMs voluntarily and unilaterally. At the same time, CSBMs, although important, should not be treated as a substitute for arms control mechanisms.

The OSCE's role in arms control and confidence- and security-building measures could be advanced through:

- g) Resuming consultations with the goal of adopting a mandate for negotiations on a modern conventional arms control agreement.
- h) Intensifying efforts to overcome the difficulties with the Treaty on Open Skies.
- i) Conducting joint threat assessments and discussing appropriate joint responses in conjunction with national military and defence doctrines.
- j) Encouraging military co-operation, including through joint training and exercises for crisis management.

5.1.2 Taking Responsibility for Protracted Conflicts

The protracted conflicts remain an issue of growing concern to the OSCE participating States. No genuine security community can be developed if the use of force is not ruled out. Protracted conflicts represent the context in which the fundamental principle of non-use of force is most likely to be broken. For about two decades, states have been striving to settle these conflicts, but have been unable to do so because of divergent views among the parties to the conflicts and other states involved. As long as the protracted conflicts are not solved, any discussion on a security community will lack substance.

Improving the effectiveness of the OSCE early warning, conflict prevention, resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation was a major issue during the 2010 Corfu Process and has continued to be so in the subsequent discussions. Despite the progress achieved, the participating States take different views regarding which particular measures will enable the OSCE to most effectively address the challenges posed by a possible violent escalation of the protracted conflicts.

While this divergence blocks substantial progress, there is room for the OSCE to improve its performance in preventing any escalation of violence in the OSCE area. Building on the 2012 Report by the Secretary General on the progress made and possible options on the way forward with respect to the 2011 Vilnius Ministerial Council (MC) decision on the conflict cycle, the OSCE should concentrate on early warning and early action. Continued attention should be paid to innovative approaches, such as developing a conflict mediation capacity within the OSCE. The Chairmanship, in close cooperation with the Secretariat, should seek to fully utilize available tools to take appropriate action to prevent and/or to stop any escalation of violence.

5.1.3 Supporting Stability in Central Asia and Afghanistan

For years, the OSCE has been fostering stability in Central Asia. Based on the mandate of the 2007 Madrid Ministerial Council meeting, which reflected the concern that the situation in Afghanistan could affect security in the OSCE area, the OSCE has also engaged in addressing relevant challenges. This has concerned, in particular, supporting measures for securing the borders between the Central Asian states and Afghanistan, intensifying the involvement of Afghan counterparts in OSCE activities related to border security and management, policing and combating drug trafficking at educational and training facilities in Central Asia and in the rest of the OSCE area, and co-ordinating its activities with the United Nations and other relevant regional and international organizations.

Now, as the anticipated deadline for the termination of the engagement of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan by the end of 2014 approaches and the international community considers strategies to ensure stability after the government of Afghanistan has taken full responsibility for the security of the country, the OSCE participating States are urged to examine whether and what adjustments need to be made in the OSCE's efforts to address the challenges of a new security environment in Afghanistan. The OSCE should:

- a) Engage in intense consultations with the relevant participating States and Partners for Co-operation, particularly with the Central Asian States and with Afghanistan, in order to assess the need for adjusting current activities within the Madrid mandate.
- b) Become engaged in broader international consultations, on the basis of the OSCE Platform for Co-operative Security, particularly with the United Nations, NATO, the EU and the CSTO,

as well as with the relevant Partners for Co-operation, in order to co-ordinate further activities, realize synergies and avoid unnecessary duplication of international efforts after 2014.

- c) The forthcoming Dublin Ministerial Council meeting should mandate the OSCE Secretariat to undertake an examination of the OSCE's engagement subject to proper discussion within the Permanent Council and a review by a Ministerial Council meeting no later than in 2014.

5.1.4 Encouraging Reconciliation as Means of Conflict Resolution and Rapprochement

Reconciliation is crucial for overcoming deficits of trust in the OSCE area and finding solutions to protracted conflicts, territorial disputes and interethnic, inter-religious and other tensions in various parts of Europe. While an important dimension of reconciliation consists of governmental activities, sustainable reconciliation can only be achieved through a lasting change of perceptions by the relevant societies. Reaching a basic level of mutual understanding of common history including the causes and dynamics of past conflicts remains an indispensable part of this process. Reconciliation is usually a long-term process. It cannot be seen as a tool of quick-fix crisis management.

While there is no universal template for pursuing reconciliation, the OSCE can promote reconciliation processes in significant international, transnational, inter-ethnic or other contexts. Such efforts aimed at restoring mutual respect can pave the way towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.

Many OSCE activities over the last several years have focused on promoting and encouraging reconciliation, not least with respect to the protracted conflicts. The importance of these efforts should be further highlighted through concrete OSCE actions.

This can be done by adjusting the priorities of OSCE institutions, or by formulating specific tasks for the Organization. The significance of reconciliation should also be reflected in the communication strategy of the OSCE. Moreover, the OSCE can focus particularly on the following objectives:

a) Identifying best practices from historical cases (France and Germany, Northern Ireland, Poland and Germany) and some of the current processes (South-Eastern Europe, Poland and Russia).

b) Identifying ‘reconciliation stakeholders’ at the levels of regions and states, and in civil societies, the media and business circles.

c) Supporting the parties concerned in identifying and overcoming specific ‘choke points’ in the process of reconciliation.

d) Standing ready to provide, upon request, a tailored set of proposals for reconciliation activities in particular conflict areas or contexts.

Specific tasks for the OSCE could include:

e) Conducting a series of seminars on the subject of ‘The Link between Reconciliation, Conflict Resolution and Security in Europe: Experiences and Needs’.

f) Producing reports to summarize past reconciliation efforts (including failed ones).

g) Producing a ‘Handbook of Best Practices in Reconciliation’ using the aforementioned reconciliation reports.

h) Preparing and making available to interested parties a database of experts with experience in reconciliation processes.

i) Exploring possibilities for reconciliation efforts created by technological advances and new modes of social interaction and networking.

j) Devising a programme, funded by voluntary contributions, to encourage reconciliation efforts by civil societies, focusing on student exchanges, the establishment of cross-border cultural and sporting events, the funding of cross-cultural media projects, and support for regional cross-border trade fairs.

5.1.5 Addressing Transnational Threats and Challenges

For years, numerous reports by the UN, other international organizations or various NGOs have been raising the alarm about transnational threats and challenges as key concerns for international peace and stability. Among the most critical threats are the interrelated issues of trafficking in drugs, human beings and small arms and light weapons, organized crime, corruption and money laundering. Terrorism benefits greatly from these phenomena, which are rooted in economic asymmetries and social divisions, bad governance and weak or failing statehood. Climate change is also a major crisis multiplier.

Across the OSCE area, states are confronted with various forms of terrorism. States differ in their threat assessments, definitions of terrorism, interests and goals. They also differ in the ways and means they attempt to prevent and combat terrorism: Some states follow a comprehensive approach and are more focused on the processes leading to terrorism; others concentrate on searching for the motives of terrorism. In addition, combating terrorism requires a sensitive balance between the security of the state and the observance of human rights.

Cyber security is receiving increasing attention. This complex and fast-moving subject is particularly difficult to grasp from both a technological and a political point of view.

Regardless of existing differences in approaches, the last decade has shown that the OSCE participating States have found it easier to agree on joint actions to combat transnational threats than on many other issues. With its comprehensive and inclusive approach, the Organization is well equipped to address this kind of issues. However, the OSCE is not the only international organization doing so. To identify its appropriate contribution to addressing transnational threats, the OSCE should enhance its interaction with other international organizations such as the UN, the EU, NATO and the CSTO and take advantage of its ties with civil societies and its Partner States.

The OSCE should further develop the agenda it has been working on in recent years – that is antiterrorism, cyber security, anti-drugs activities, and the related field of police issues. Practical contributions could include:

- a) Conducting a transparency-building seminar on ‘Military Doctrines and Cyberspace: The Problem of Definitions’.
- b) Launching an OSCE cyber dialogue framework on ‘Joint Risk and Needs Assessments and Interstate Communication in Cases of Cyber Incidents’.
- c) Conducting a series of seminars on ‘Aligning National Cyber Defence Systems of Critical Infrastructures to the Most Advanced International Standards’.
- d) Adopting an OSCE document on cyber security confidence-building measures.

e) Adopting a consolidated OSCE framework for the fight against terrorism.

f) Conducting regional seminars with civil society representatives on ‘The OSCE Experience with Preventing Radicalization and the Problem of Identification, De-radicalization and Reintegration of (Former) Terrorist Supporters’.

g) Conducting a seminar on ‘Experiences in Countering the Spread of Mafia Organizations’.

h) Elaborating a ‘Handbook for Business Practitioners on Lessons Learned in Fighting Drug-Related Crime’, including the international trade in chemical precursors.

i) Developing joint activities with the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF).

5.2 *Engaging in the Economic and Environmental Dimension*

The long-term objective in the economic and environmental dimension is a gradual process towards a converging, economically and socially prosperous region that ensures environmental sustainability. A security community will be rooted in a progressive convergence of economic policies and will increasingly interconnect the national economies between Vancouver and Vladivostok. This implies the advancement of democratic institutions, the rule of law and economic freedom. The most visible expression of this would be the creation of a free-trade and free-travel zone for the whole OSCE space.

Moving towards a security community that relies on economic freedom implies free competition. It does not rule out the possibility of conflicting interests among the various economic play-

ers. Conflicting interests are an integral part of a security community. What is essential is that disputes be resolved by peaceful means alone and that there be a strict renunciation of the use of force. This poses particular challenges with respect to political communication, joint legal and other regulatory arrangements and commercial arbitration procedures or, in other words, good economic governance at all levels.

In the *economic area*, the OSCE should focus on issues that are relevant for improving the political atmosphere among the participating States. It can neither replace specialized organizations nor interfere in the internal affairs of participating States or regional organizations. The OSCE should, however, contribute to raising awareness and developing common understanding and a gradual consensus on issues that are both controversial and symbolic, such as energy security, water management, and obstacles to economic freedom such as restricted labour migration, visa-regimes and market barriers.

In the *area of environmental protection*, the OSCE should continue to concentrate on issues that link environmental protection and sustainable development to public participation and interstate co-operation. The Organization should also discuss sensitive issues such as access to natural resources in cross-border or sub-regional contexts. It should engage in mediation in cases of disputed trans-boundary matters such as cross-border water-courses and aquifers.

The OSCE should continue its efforts to assist the participating States in implementing relevant international regulatory frameworks, particularly the 1991 UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context and the 1998 UNECE Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.

5.3 Engaging in the Human Dimension

Greater convergence of norms and identities is essential for creating the long-term conditions for a security community. This requires a better and more balanced implementation of the whole OSCE *acquis* in its human dimension (HD), more assistance with implementation, addressing new questions and challenges and elaborating related commitments, as well as initiating people-to-people programmes between different sub-regions and different strata of the populations.

5.3.1 Improving the Effectiveness of the OSCE's HD Events Cycle

Two statements in the 2005 report "Common Purpose: Towards a More Effective OSCE" by the "Panel of Eminent Persons" can serve as guidance for further strengthening the process of reviewing the implementation of the OSCE's human dimension commitments:

"Monitoring of the implementation of human dimension standards is a particularly challenging and, in many situations, highly sensitive task. To encourage equal treatment and improve transparency, OSCE monitoring should be done in an unbiased and more standardized way."

"If a Human Dimension Committee is established [...], the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (HDIM) can be reduced to a maximum of five days."

Monitoring the individual states' compliance with their human dimension commitments is the basis for the subsequent implementation discussion among states and civil society actors. The objective is to monitor the compliance of all OSCE participating States, without exception, in a transparent and less politicized manner, and to connect the review process with a subsequent

decision-making process in a more effective way. The following proposals might serve these objectives:

a) The OSCE's process of reviewing the implementation of its HD commitments should combine the activities of the HDIM and the Human Dimension Committee (HDC) in an integrated manner.

b) To facilitate this, and to create a common base of reference, a questionnaire-based state reporting system could be introduced. This would help the HDC to prepare the HDIMs, which, in turn, would provide feedback for further consideration by the HDC.

c) As the HDIM currently takes place in September/October, the time is frequently too short to consider its recommendations at the subsequent MC meetings. Consequently, in order to facilitate the decision-making process, the HDIM should be convened in the first half of the year.

d) If the review process were to be improved by taking these proposed steps, shortening the duration of the HDIM should be considered without changing its comprehensive agenda and the participation of NGOs.

5.3.2 Opening Dialogue with Muslim Communities

The participants of the Initiative for the Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community (IDEAS) project have discussed the issue of the OSCE's role in fostering a dialogue between the participating States and their Muslim communities. It was argued by some participants that the OSCE has no significant role to play, while other participants supported a

dialogue-facilitator role for the organization. Based on the latter interpretation, it can be argued that in some regions within the OSCE space, political Islam is questioning the established norms and regulations of the secular state and the separation of the state and religious institutions. These problems are often aggravated by social hardship, bad governance, intolerance and discrimination. In other regions, they are frequently related to the broader issues of migration from Islam-dominated regions and the integration policies of particular states. Outside the OSCE area, the uncertain evolution of the Arab Spring shows the new dimension and urgency of these issues.

While debates with and about Muslim communities are taking place in a number of states, they usually lack a wider context. This is the point where the OSCE can bring together all those who are interested in the preservation of stability, including secular and reformist Islamic forces. Even though the issue affects different states in different ways, the OSCE could address the dilemma of mistrust between secular policymakers and political Islam. Likewise, the OSCE could initiate discussions on the commonalities and discrepancies between secular and Islamic concepts of state and nation building, democracy, rule of law, human rights, women's rights and gender equality, and education.

Building on its experience and activities related to good governance, education, and specifically fighting intolerance and discrimination, the OSCE can serve as a useful facilitator by:

a) Launching a discussion on societal confidence-building between secular governments, civil-society representatives and Islamic parties, movements and dignitaries. The goal is to overcome misunderstandings, to identify and avert sources of escalation and to prevent possible radicalization processes.

b) Initiating discussions to explore the relationship between Muslim communities and secular states in different OSCE sub-regions. Such discussions should particularly highlight positive historical and present-day experiences with the integration of Muslim communities, and involve the OSCE Mediterranean and Asian Partners for Co-operation.

c) Launching a discussion on lessons-learned in preventing radicalization with key stakeholders and opinion-shapers from Muslim communities and representatives of political Islam and integrating them into the day-to-day activities of the OSCE in areas including conflict prevention and conflict resolution.

d) Conducting a roundtable with the OSCE's Mediterranean and Asian Partners for Cooperation to enhance understanding of the ongoing processes of the Arab Spring and to engage with new political and societal forces.

5.4 *Creating an OSCE Network of Academic Institutions*

The OSCE has always been open to input from and communication with civil society actors. Transnational civic networks can foster communication and identity-building, and by so doing, contribute to creating the conditions for a security community. They can help to advance the discussion on a security community within and beyond the OSCE.

An OSCE network of academic institutions was first proposed by the OSCE Secretary General, Ambassador Lamberto Zannier. Such a network can:

a) Give advice, expertise and assistance to the OSCE and its participating States.

b) Organize the academic debate on a security community.

c) Serve as a platform for discussion of crucial issues, particularly in the context of the Irish Chairmanship's "Helsinki + 40" initiative.

The creation of an OSCE network of academic institutions can build on a number of existing elements, such as the "OSCE Security Days", which were held for the first time in June 2012 and included a large number of academic and think tank experts; the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI) and the Initiative for the Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community (IDEAS).

These existing elements can be further developed, building on the three key criteria of innovation, inclusiveness and continuity.

d) If the "OSCE Security Days" were held regularly, they could serve as a platform for exchanging ideas between the members of the network and the OSCE participating States.

e) In order to focus discussions, an annually changing key theme could be defined following consultations between the network and OSCE institutions. In addition, the Chairmanship or the Secretariat could ask the network for expertise on specific issues.

f) Discussions in Vienna might be complemented by local or sub-regional activities including those of the OSCE Academy in Bishkek. These discussions could be brought together under the banner of the "OSCE Security Days".

g) The four IDEAS institutes stand ready to participate in establishing such an OSCE Network of Academic Institutions.

5.5 Arranging Institutional Issues

The OSCE area is characterized by a particularly high density of regional and sub-regional international organizations. In spite of some overlaps and parallelism, this institutional richness represents an important building-block for the establishment of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.

As a consequence, the OSCE space is not in need of new organizations. Rather, the present and future task is to improve and streamline co-operation among the existing organizations. This should also include the emerging organizations in the Eastern part of the OSCE area such as the CSTO, the Customs Union, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The objective should be full-scale co-operation among all organizations. In this way, an ever denser network of organizations could emerge, with each organization advancing the process towards a security community according to its own characteristics and capacities. To achieve inter-institutional progress, the OSCE could observe two guidelines:

- a) The potential of the emerging organizations in the Eastern part of the OSCE space should be acknowledged and they should be integrated into co-operation networks.
- b) Institutionalized co-operation bodies such as the NATO-Russia Council should be able to operate effectively under all conditions.

6. A Call for the OSCE

The most important comparative advantages of the OSCE are its geographic, political and substantial comprehensiveness and inclusiveness. No other international organization stretches over three continents with 56 states and integrates such a broad array of issues relating to internal and external security. Preserving this feature at a time when divergent tendencies prevail in many areas is no small success. However, the other side of this achievement is that such an organization necessarily embraces all kinds of conflicts, tensions and contradictions among its participants. This is precisely the task the OSCE has to address.

The OSCE is primarily a reflection of the state of the relations among its 56 participating States. The more divergent the positions of its participating States, the harder it is for the OSCE to act. Conversely, the better the relations among the states, the more the OSCE is able to act in a decisive and high-profile manner. As a consequence, the Organization, particularly in politically difficult times, is more an arena for holding states together and engaging them in dialogue, and less a strong player. In terms of its ability to take action, the OSCE is a rather weak organization. In terms of its ability to continue and safeguard the political process, it is not weak at all. It is therefore no surprise that the OSCE has had difficulties in becoming more active against the background of the current political conditions.

That the OSCE is still functioning demonstrates a high level of institutional perseverance on the part of the Organization and its participating States. The permanent security dialogue in Vienna represents a collective philosophy and practice that distinguishes Europe fundamentally from all other continents. Although the OSCE's human dimension has been a bone of contention for more than a decade, its daily operations, such as conducting human dimension events or election observation missions, do func-

tion. And although there is a deadlock in arms control, the participating States nonetheless want to maintain the OSCE's arms control *acquis*. This high degree of institutional steadiness equips the OSCE to pass through the extended period of transition that we are currently experiencing.

Paradoxically, the OSCE's relative weakness offers advantages: It is *because* it is not the decisive game-changer that it enjoys the freedom to serve as a laboratory and test field for innovative ideas – the best example is the discussion of a security community. Thus, the OSCE's opportunity lies in encouraging new thinking and in testing innovative ideas in a broad communication process with civil society actors, other international organizations and Partner States. Its opportunity lies in starting political projects that strengthen convergence among states and societies and thus clear the way towards a security community.

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The Initiative for the Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community (IDEAS) is a Track II initiative jointly carried out by the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE) at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the Russian Foreign Ministry (MGIMO). It aims at conceptualizing a “free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok”, as envisioned by the OSCE participating States in their 2010 Astana Commemorative Declaration. In late 2011, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Germany, France, Poland and the Russian Federation asked the four institutes to organize a series of workshops to advance the discussion on the future character of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community and to present a report with recommendations to the participating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Vienna. With their initiative, the Ministers took up the idea of establishing a network of academic institutions, a proposal made by OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier.

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**Organization for Security
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**ASTANA COMMEMORATIVE DECLARATION
TOWARDS A SECURITY COMMUNITY**

1. We, the Heads of State or Government of the 56 participating States of the OSCE, have assembled in Astana, eleven years after the last OSCE Summit in Istanbul, to recommit ourselves to the vision of a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, rooted in agreed principles, shared commitments and common goals. As we mark the 35th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act and the 20th anniversary of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, we reaffirm the relevance of, and our commitment to, the principles on which this Organization is based. While we have made much progress, we also acknowledge that more must be done to ensure full respect for, and implementation of, these core principles and commitments that we have undertaken in the politico-military dimension, the economic and environmental dimension, and the human dimension, notably in the areas of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

* Incorporates a correction to attachment 1 to the Declaration.

2. We reaffirm our full adherence to the Charter of the United Nations and to all OSCE norms, principles and commitments, starting from the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, the Charter for European Security and all other OSCE documents to which we have agreed, and our responsibility to implement them fully and in good faith. We reiterate our commitment to the concept, initiated in the Final Act, of comprehensive, co-operative, equal and indivisible security, which relates the maintenance of peace to the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and links economic and environmental co-operation with peaceful inter-State relations.

3. The security of each participating State is inseparably linked to that of all others. Each participating State has an equal right to security. We reaffirm the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve. Each State also has the right to neutrality. Each participating State will respect the rights of all others in these regards. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States. Within the OSCE no State, group of States or organization can have any pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area or can consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence. We will maintain only those military capabilities that are commensurate with our legitimate individual or collective security needs, taking into account obligations under international law, as well as the legitimate security concerns of other States. We further reaffirm that all OSCE principles and commitments, without exception, apply equally to each participating State, and we emphasize that we are accountable to our citizens and responsible to each other for their full implementation. We regard these commitments as our common

achievement, and therefore consider them to be matters of immediate and legitimate concern to all participating States.

4. These norms, principles and commitments have enabled us to make progress in putting old confrontations behind us and in moving us closer to democracy, peace and unity throughout the OSCE area. They must continue to guide us in the 21st century as we work together to make the ambitious vision of Helsinki and Paris a reality for all our peoples. These and all other OSCE documents establish clear standards for the participating States in their treatment of each other and of all individuals within their territories. Resolved to build further upon this strong foundation, we reaffirm our commitment to strengthen security, trust and good-neighbourly relations among our States and peoples. In this respect we are convinced that the role of the OSCE remains crucial, and should be further enhanced. We will further work towards strengthening the OSCE's effectiveness and efficiency.

5. We recognize that the OSCE, as the most inclusive and comprehensive regional security organization in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area, continues to provide a unique forum, operating on the basis of consensus and the sovereign equality of States, for promoting open dialogue, preventing and settling conflicts, building mutual understanding and fostering co-operation. We stress the importance of the work carried out by the OSCE Secretariat, High Commissioner on National Minorities, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and Representative on Freedom of the Media, as well as the OSCE field operations, in accordance with their respective mandates, in assisting participating States with implementing their OSCE commitments. We are determined to intensify co-operation with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and encourage its efforts to promote security, democracy and prosperity throughout the OSCE

area and within participating States and to increase confidence among participating States. We also acknowledge the Organization's significant role in establishing effective confidence- and security-building measures. We reaffirm our commitment to their full implementation and our determination to ensure that they continue to make a substantial contribution to our common and indivisible security.

6. The OSCE's comprehensive and co-operative approach to security, which addresses the human, economic and environmental, political and military dimensions of security as an integral whole, remains indispensable. Convinced that the inherent dignity of the individual is at the core of comprehensive security, we reiterate that human rights and fundamental freedoms are inalienable, and that their protection and promotion is our first responsibility. We reaffirm categorically and irrevocably that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned. We value the important role played by civil society and free media in helping us to ensure full respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, including free and fair elections, and the rule of law.

7. Serious threats and challenges remain. Mistrust and divergent security perceptions must be overcome. Our commitments in the politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimensions need to be fully implemented. Respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law must be safeguarded and strengthened. Greater efforts must be made to promote freedom of religion or belief and to combat intolerance and discrimination. Mutually beneficial co-operation aimed at addressing the impact on our region's security of eco-

conomic and environmental challenges must be further developed. Our energy security dialogue, including on agreed principles of our co-operation, must be enhanced. Increased efforts should be made to resolve existing conflicts in the OSCE area in a peaceful and negotiated manner, within agreed formats, fully respecting the norms and principles of international law enshrined in the United Nations Charter, as well as the Helsinki Final Act. New crises must be prevented. We pledge to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations or with the ten Principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

8. Conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building regimes remain major instruments for ensuring military stability, predictability and transparency, and should be revitalized, updated and modernized. We value the work of the Forum for Security Co-operation, and look forward to the updating of the Vienna Document 1999. We value the CFE Treaty's contribution to the creation of a stable and predictable environment for all OSCE participating States. We note that the CFE Treaty is not being implemented to its full capacity and the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty (ACFE) has not entered into force. Recognizing intensified efforts to overcome the current impasse, we express our support for the ongoing consultations aiming at opening the way for negotiations in 2011.

9. At the same time, in today's complex and inter-connected world, we must achieve greater unity of purpose and action in facing emerging transnational threats, such as terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber threats and the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, drugs and human beings. Such threats can originate within or outside our region.

10. We recognize that the security of the OSCE area is inextricably linked to that of adjacent areas, notably in the Mediterranean and in Asia. We must therefore enhance the level of our interaction with our Partners for Co-operation. In particular, we underscore the need to contribute effectively, based on the capacity and national interest of each participating State, to collective international efforts to promote a stable, independent, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan.

11. We welcome initiatives aimed at strengthening European security. Our security dialogue, enhanced by the Corfu Process, has helped to sharpen our focus on these and other challenges we face in all three dimensions. The time has now come to act, and we must define concrete and tangible goals in addressing these challenges. We are determined to work together to fully realize the vision of a comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security community throughout our shared OSCE area. This security community should be aimed at meeting the challenges of the 21st century and based on our full adherence to common OSCE norms, principles and commitments across all three dimensions. It should unite all OSCE participating States across the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region, free of dividing lines, conflicts, spheres of influence and zones with different levels of security. We will work to ensure that co-operation among our States, and among the relevant organizations and institutions of which they are members, will be guided by the principles of equality, partnership co-operation, inclusiveness and transparency. Drawing strength from our diversity, we resolve to achieve this overarching goal through sustained determination and common effort, acting within the OSCE and in other formats.

12. To this end, we task the incoming Chairmanship-in-Office with organizing a follow-up process within existing formats,

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**INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER
PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES
OF PROCEDURE OF THE ORGANIZATION
FOR SECURITY AND
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE**

taking into consideration ideas and proposals put forward by the participating States, including in the framework of the Corfu Process and in the preparation of the Astana Summit, and pledge to do all we can to assist the incoming Chairmanships-in-Office in developing a concrete action plan based on the work done by the Kazakhstan Chairmanship. Progress achieved will be reviewed at the next OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Vilnius on 6 and 7 December 2011.

13. We express our deep gratitude to Kazakhstan for hosting our meeting, and for the energy and vitality the country has brought to the challenging task of chairing the OSCE in 2010. We welcome Lithuania's Chairmanship of the Organization in 2011, Ireland's in 2012 and Ukraine's in 2013.

By the European Union:

“The delegation of Belgium gave the floor to the Head of the European Union delegation.

On the occasion of the adoption of the Summit Document, the European Union would like to make the following interpretative statement:

The European Union thanks the Kazakh Chairmanship-in-Office for its hard work and commitment throughout 2010, in particular in preparing and conducting the Summit.

We welcome the reaffirmation of the OSCE principles and commitments, as well as the intensified efforts concerning the CFE.

The European Union also welcomes the joint statement at the OSCE Astana Summit by the Heads of Delegation of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries and the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The European Union has taken a constructive approach in the run up to the Summit. The Summit Document confirms our joint vision of a security community for the future. Regrettably, it has not been possible to agree yet on the comprehensive and concrete

* Incorporates a correction to the text.

action plan we have called for in order for this vision to become reality.

We will continue to put forward proposals on the basis of the European Union's four priorities, which are widely shared by OSCE participating States. These are:

- Improving capabilities for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts, and making progress on resolving the protracted conflicts;
 - Strengthening conventional arms control including security- and confidence-building measures;
 - Strengthening implementation of norms, principles and commitments, in particular in the human dimension, including full support for the work of the relevant OSCE institutions;
 - Tackling transnational and emerging threats and challenges.
- In addition, as regards Georgia, the European Union:
- Reaffirms its firm and consistent commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders, in full respect of international law and the Helsinki Final Act;
 - Reaffirms its continued support to international conflict resolution efforts, including the Geneva International Discussions, to stabilize the security situation and address the humanitarian and human rights issues on the ground, including full implementation of the 12 August 2008 agreement and subsequent arrangements;
 - Reaffirms its support for the OSCE engagement in Georgia, including for the restoration of a meaningful OSCE presence;
 - Recalls the importance of full international access to the entire territory of Georgia.

As regards the Republic of Moldova, the European Union:

- Reaffirms its commitment to the 5+2 settlement process as the only legitimate negotiating format;
- Calls for an immediate and unconditional resumption of the formal 5+2 negotiations with the aim to achieve a lasting political settlement on the basis of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova;
- Supports confidence- and security-building measures to promote transparency, stability and previously agreed military reductions consistent with OSCE goals, statements and commitments.

The European Union is eager to build on the momentum that our joint work here in Astana has generated. We have all pledged to work together to support the incoming Chairmanships in this ambitious task. While we regret that the Summit could not approve an action plan, we see that our future work can be energized by the ideas negotiated during the preparations for the Summit. We are committed to moving ahead starting next year to assist the Lithuanian Chairmanship, in our work in the appropriate decision-making bodies. The European Union is confident the Chairmanship will be fully supported by the OSCE Troika, Secretary General and the executive structures, to further build upon and realize the vision of a comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security community throughout our shared OSCE area.

Mr. Chairperson, I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.

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3 December 2010
Attachmant 1

SUM.DOC/1/10/Corr.1
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Attachmant 2

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**INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER
PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES
OF PROCEDURE OF THE ORGANIZATION
FOR SECURITY AND
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE**

The candidate countries Croatia*, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* and Iceland**, the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, the European Free Trade Association countries and members of the European Economic Area Liechtenstein and Norway, as well as Georgia, Andorra and San Marino align themselves with this statement.”

By the delegation of Canada:

“Mr. Chairperson,

I have the honour to deliver this interpretive statement on behalf of the Honourable Peter Kent, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Canada.

We congratulate Kazakhstan for doing its utmost this past year as Chair of the OSCE and in convening the Astana Summit, which is indeed historic.

Your efforts have helped build trust within our vast OSCE region. After many weeks of negotiations, the Astana Declaration is a modest first step towards a framework for action in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area.

While it reaffirms that we are still on the same page when it comes to our shared values, principles and OSCE commitments, Canada came to this Summit expecting more.

Canada regrets that OSCE participating States were not able to reach consensus over the important issue of protracted conflicts in order to secure a result-based Action Plan, which was our goal for the Summit, including enhancing the OSCE’s engagement with Afghanistan and on threats stemming from Afghanistan. This would have underscored the relevance of this Organization for tackling twenty-first century security challenges.

* Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

** Iceland continues to be a member of the EFTA and the European Economic Area.

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3 December 2010
Attachmant 2

SUM.DOC/1/10/Corr.1
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Attachmant 3

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**INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER
PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES
OF PROCEDURE OF THE ORGANIZATION
FOR SECURITY AND
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE**

With the Astana Summit, you have managed to bring participating States closer than we have been in recent years in addressing pressing regional issues and conflicts; it is with regret that we realize that more time and efforts are needed.

As founding member of the OSCE, you can count on Canada's continued constructive engagement towards a forward looking road map for our Organization's future work, and especially in promoting human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy throughout our region — issues for which our Organization is known and must remain in the forefront.

Mr. Chairperson,

I would kindly ask you to attach this statement to the journal of the day.

Thank you.

By the delegation of Moldova:

“On the occasion of the adoption of the Astana Commemorative Declaration, the Republic of Moldova would like to make the following interpretative statement:

While the delegation of the Republic of Moldova joined consensus on the Astana Declaration, we stress that this Document is not fully consistent with the expectations from the first OSCE Summit in more than a decade. It is regrettable that, despite tremendous efforts on behalf of most delegations, we failed to produce neither a substantive political Declaration nor a forward-looking Action Plan. The adopted Document is far from perfect as it does not adequately address some of the core security concerns of my country and other participating States. However, lack of any document agreed at the Summit would have seriously damaged the credibility of our Organization.

At the same time, the credibility and relevance of the OSCE resides not only in the documents we adopt, but also in our capacity to implement previous commitments and properly address key challenges faced by participating States. Protracted conflicts, including the Transnistrian one, as well as the continuous stationing of foreign military forces on the territory of sovereign States

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**INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER
PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES
OF PROCEDURE OF THE ORGANIZATION
FOR SECURITY AND
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE**

without host nation consent, definitely should be among our top priorities.

In our negotiations on the language for the Action Plan, we believe that we were close to a reasonable compromise. Therefore, we should not waste the momentum generated by these efforts and continue to work in order to provide our Organization with a robust and comprehensive roadmap for the future. Our delegation stands ready to continue to engage actively and constructively towards achieving this goal.

To this end, we would like to reiterate the key elements that shape our approach:

- Immediate and unconditional resumption of the formal 5+2 negotiations with the aim to achieve a viable political settlement of the Transnistrian conflict ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova;
- Further implementation of comprehensive confidence-building measures, including free movement of people, goods and services;
- Resumption and completion of the withdrawal of Russian military forces and munitions from Moldova in compliance with commitments undertaken at the Istanbul OSCE Summit;
- Transformation of the current peacekeeping arrangement into a multinational civilian mission under an appropriate international mandate.

In conclusion, we would like to commend the Kazakh Chairmanship-in-Office for organizing this Summit and we wish the incoming Lithuanian Chairmanship success in this challenging endeavour.

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.”

By the delegation of Romania:

“Mr. Chairperson,

In addition to the interpretative statement delivered by the European Union, which Romania fully supports, I would like to add the following:

Romania regrets that at the OSCE Astana Summit, credited as a summit for restoration of trust, the participating States failed to agree upon a substantial political document. While this document does not properly address some of the issues that are of particular concern for our common security, we have joined this commemorative declaration as a result of our strong adherence and respect to the OSCE values and principles, represented by the comprehensive concept of security.

The absence of an Action Plan outlining concrete measures that would accompany the fulfilment of a new security vision represents an important missed opportunity. We assess that the main unfulfilment of our meeting lies with the lack of progress on the resolution of the protracted conflicts confronting the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

Throughout the preparations of this Summit, including within the Corfu Process, Romania advocated for the advancement of

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**INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER
PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES
OF PROCEDURE OF THE ORGANIZATION
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the resolution of the protracted conflicts based on an understanding that decisions previously undertaken require due implementation. It is still the case.

For Romania it was important that the declarative part of the Summit Document should have spelled out that the protracted conflicts continue to pose a serious threat to our common security, while the Action Plan — concrete measures to be taken in order to advance their resolution towards a final settlement. Despite impressive efforts displayed by a majority of participating States, we are far from meeting the objective of restoring trust and confidence.

The conflict in the Transnistrian separatist region of the Republic of Moldova continues to remain a security challenge for the OSCE region. Romania continues to support the immediate and unconditional resumption of the formal negotiations in the “5+2” format aiming at a just and lasting resolution that respects fully the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova.

Back at the 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul we had a far more generous backbone to build the resolution of the protracted conflicts than we have now. Our consequent failure for eight years by now to produce political declarations at ministerial levels testifies in fact to the lack of political will.

Romania reaffirms its adherence to the values and principles on which the activity of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is based and considers that solidarity from participating States should be equally employed in the implementation of its decisions not only in reaffirming them.

Mr. Chairperson, I would kindly request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.”

By the delegation of the Czech Republic:

“Mr. Chairperson,

We support the statement made by the European Union Presidency.

Heads of State and government and our ministers gathered here not only to commemorate the outstanding work of our predecessors accomplished thirty-five years ago in Helsinki and twenty years ago in Paris, the commemoration itself is not enough.

We regret that during the long process of the preparation of the final outcome document of this Summit, that started with the Corfu process almost two years ago, we failed to make more progress, namely to adopt the Declaration document with the Action Plan.

Together with our European Union partners we have made proposals to achieve substantive outcome at this Summit. The Action Plan should have defined the practical way to continue to restore trust and confidence among OSCE participating States. This opportunity was lost. So was the relevance of the OSCE.

We are convinced that to address the protracted conflicts is of utmost importance. Namely, it is necessary to restore the full territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia, formally resume

SUM.DOC/1/10/Corr.1
3 December 2010
Attachmant 5

the 5 plus 2 talks on Moldova and make a progress on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. Where do we have better occasion to attempt to find a way forward than at the meeting of our heads of State and government. The conflicts have to be outlined as a priority area of work if the OSCE is to regain relevance and credibility.

In conclusion, my delegation would like to thank the Kazakh Chairmanship for their hospitality that we have been enjoying here in Astana.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.”

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About the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

The Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KazISS) was established on June 16, 1993 by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Since its foundation the mission of the KazISS as the national research institution is to provide analytical support to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and public administration agencies of Kazakhstan.

The KazISS enjoys a reputation of the leading think tank of Kazakhstan as it employs a highly professional pool of experts; at present it includes nine doctors and nine candidates of sciences, who specialize in political science, history, economics and sociology.

The KazISS have published more than 200 books on international relations, global and regional security. The Institute publishes three journals: the *Kogam jane Dayir* in Kazakh, the *Kazakhstan-Spectrum* in Russian and the *Central Asia's Affairs* in English. The KazISS has a trilingual website; in Kazakh, Russian, English.

The KazISS holds a great number of international conferences, seminars and round tables, including the Annual Conferences (regularly held since 2003) on the issues of security and cooperation in Central Asia participated by the experts from Kazakhstan, Central Asia as well as Russia, China, Germany, France, India, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Japan, the USA and other countries.

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About the OSCE Centre in Astana

The OSCE Centre in Astana started working in Kazakhstan in 1999. According to its mandate, the Centre:

- Promotes the implementation of OSCE principles and commitments as well as co-operation of Kazakhstan in all three OSCE dimensions within the OSCE framework approach to co-operative security and in the regional context;
- Facilitates contacts and promotes information exchange between the authorities of Kazakhstan and the Chairman-in-Office and OSCE executive structures and institutions, as well as co-operation with international organizations;
- Establishes and maintains contacts with central and local authorities, universities and research institutes of the host country, as well as representatives of civil society and NGOs;
- Assists in arranging OSCE regional events, inter alia, regional seminars and visits to the area by OSCE delegations, as well as other events with OSCE participation;
- Provides assistance to the Government of Kazakhstan, such as raising awareness on OSCE activities, training of designated Kazakh officials, and providing advice on the OSCE to relevant official structures, facilitate information exchange between OSCE institutions and relevant state agencies on OSCE activities.

Following the mandate, the Centre conducts its programmatic activities based on Annual Program Outlines developed under close consultation with the host country and the OSCE Institution. The Centre supports Kazakhstan in promoting OSCE values and principles, facilitates security and confidence building measures

within the OSCE area, transparent economic and environmental policy and the implementation of human rights in line with the OSCE commitments.

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