

Kazakhstan Institute  
for Strategic Studies under  
the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

**“EURASIAN SECURITY COMMUNITY  
AND THE ROLE OF THE OSCE”**

**Conference Materials**

**03.10.2013**

Almaty 2014

УДК 338 (574)  
ББК 65.9 (5 Каз)  
Ч 83

*Recommended by the Academic Council  
of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies  
under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan*

**Editorial board:**

**B.K. Sultanov, N.N. Zarudna,**  
R.N. Mustafin, M.A. Dubovitskaya,  
A.A. Arzikulov (Responsible Editor)

**Ч 83 Eurasian Security Community and the Role of the OSCE.** Conference Materials / Responsible editors B.K. Sultanov, N.N. Zarudna – Almaty – the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan, 2014. 180 pages.

**ISBN 978-601-7242-92-3**

On 3 October 2013 in Almaty, the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation's Centre in Astana held an international conference entitled the Eurasian Security Community and the Role of the OSCE.

This compendium, which includes presentations given at the conference by both Kazakhstan's and foreign participants, explores a broad range of topics related to the OSCE's main areas of focus, as well as current international security and regional co-operation issues.

The edition will be of interest to political scientists, international relations experts, civil servants, scholars, educators, university-level students, and broad sections of the public interested in the contemporary development of the OSCE.

Any opinions and recommendations expressed in the materials arising from the conference are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the conference organizers.

**Издание не предназначено для продажи  
и распространяется бесплатно**

УДК 338 (574)  
ББК 65.9 (5 Каз)

**ISBN 978-601-7242-92-3**

© KazISS under the President of the RK, 2014  
© OSCE Centre in Astana, 2014

## СОДЕРЖАНИЕ

<b>Welcoming Speech by Bulat Sultanov.....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Welcoming Speech by Natalia Zarudna.....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Welcoming Speech by Serzhan Abdykarimov.....</b>	<b>17</b>

### FIRST SESSION “ON EURASIAN SECURITY”

<b>Wolfgang Zellner</b> “OSCE priorities Within the Eurasian Space” .....	22
<b>Ömer Burhan Tüzel</b> “Euro Atlantic and Eurasian Security community: a pipe dream?” .....	27
<b>Irina Chernykh</b> “Fragmentation of the Eurasian Space? Regional Security Complex Theory” .....	34
<b>Mykola Sungurovskyi</b> “International Collaboration Challenges for Maintenance Regional and Global Security” .....	39
<b>Rustam Burnashev</b> “Security of Transit States: Insecurity Dilemma” .....	52
<b>Marat Biyekenov</b> “Regional Integration within the Eurasian Space” .....	59
<b>Wolfgang Zellner</b> Summary of the First Session “On Eurasian Security” .....	65

### SECOND SESSION “REGIONAL SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA AND AFGHAN FACTOR”

<b>Akylbek Saliyev</b> “2014: On Capability of Central Asian States and the OSCE to Maintain Regional Security” .....	67
---	----

<b>Georgy Dubovtsev</b>	
“Expert Assessment of Afghanistan in Terms of Maintenance of Regional Security” .....	74
<b>Vladimir Boyko</b>	
“Security Challenges in Eurasia on the Background of the Post 2014 Afghanistan: Regional and National Security Dimension” .....	81
<b>Aurélia Bouchez Kazakhstan</b>	
“European Union and Central Asia within 2014 Security Challenges” .....	93
<b>Beksultan Sarsekov</b>	
“CARICC as Proper Regional Security Mechanism” .....	96
<b>Sanat Kushkumbayev</b>	
“Central Asia and the OSCE at the centre of international security problems” .....	114
<b>Andrew Tesoriere</b>	
Summary of the Second Session “Regional Security in Central Asia and Afghan Factor” .....	122

### THIRD SESSION

#### “TRANSNATIONAL THREATS TO EURASIAN SPACE”

<b>Guli Yuldasheva</b>	
“Transnational Threats From Afghanistan: the Role of the OSCE” .....	127
<b>Thomas Wuchte</b>	
“The OSCE to Prevent and Counter Terrorism” .....	136
<b>Daniel Warner</b>	
“Defence and Security on the Regional Level” .....	143
<b>Saodat Olimova</b>	
“Migration and Islam within the Eurasian Space” .....	147
<b>Lessya Karatayeva</b>	
“Religious Extremism and Terrorism as Security Threats to the Eurasian Space” .....	157
<b>Józef Lang</b>	
“Transnational Terrorist Threats to the Eurasian Space: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Islamic Jihad Union” .....	164

<b>Thomas Wuchte</b>	
Summary of the Second Session “Transnational Threats to Eurasian Space” .....	169
<b>Authors</b> .....	172
<b>About the KazISS</b> .....	175
<b>About the OSCE Centre in Astana</b> .....	177

**Welcoming Speech by Bulat Sultanov,  
Director of the Kazakhstan Institute  
for Strategic Studies under the President  
of the Republic of Kazakhstan**

Your Excellencies,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

It has been almost three years since the OSCE Summit in Astana (2 December 2010), when the Astana Commemorative Declaration ‘Towards a Security Community’ was adopted.

During this period the OSCE has been chaired by Lithuania (2011), Ireland (2012) and Ukraine (this year).

In 2014 the OSCE will be chaired by Switzerland.

In this connection, I would like to remind you of the fifth paragraph of the Astana Declaration, which, in particular, states that: “We recognize that the OSCE, as the most inclusive and comprehensive regional security organization in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area, continues to provide a unique forum,” which works “for promoting open dialogue, preventing and settling conflicts, building mutual understanding and fostering cooperation”.

Unfortunately, the problem of security provision in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space has not been sufficiently elaborated either theoretically or practically.

In our opinion, based on paragraph 1 of the Astana Declaration, which refers to a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security space, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, the talk can only be about the territory of 57 OSCE member states.

In other words, we need to abandon the idea that it is possible to create an effective security community on the huge Eurasian

sub-continent. The more so, that such words as North, South, West and East Eurasia have gained currency now.

We must be realistic and speak only about the creation of a security zone that falls within the OSCE's sphere of responsibility.

Considering the consequences related to the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014, which are difficult to predict, the importance of Central Asia in ensuring security of the OSCE member states – as an outpost against the threats and challenges coming from Afghanistan – is increasing dramatically.

Unfortunately, we do not have full and objective information on what is actually happening in Afghanistan and adjoining countries.

As a result, quite often the Internet and the mass media post items which are far from the truth. Indeed, those who know the truth remain silent, and those who do not know the truth, write things which have nothing to do with reality.

Consequently, it is now of vital importance to have a deep understanding not only of what is happening in each individual country but also in Central Asia, and in the world at large too.

In this connection, once again, I would like to return to the proposal, put forward by the President of Kazakhstan at the Astana OSCE summit, on the creation of an OSCE Security Institute in Central Asia, which could be a scientific coordination centre for the study of and, most importantly, for forecasting the situation in the Central Asian and Caspian region.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Today, owing largely to the efforts of the Head of the OSCE Centre in Astana, Ambassador Natalia Zarudna, we have a very high caliber of participants.

I take this opportunity to wish the participants of our international forum success in their work, fruitful discussion and

elaboration of recommendations, taking into account the rapidly changing geopolitical realities.

\*\*\*

**Welcoming Speech  
by Ambassador Natalia Zarudna,  
Head of the OSCE Centre in Astana**

Distinguished Mr. Sultanov,  
Distinguished colleagues,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

It gives me pleasure that so many representatives of academia and scientific circles from a variety of OSCE countries have responded to our invitation and come together in hospitable Almaty, to discuss the pressing and complex issue of the Eurasian security community in the context of countering challenges and threats.

It is not the first year that our Centre, jointly with our trusted partner, the Kazakh Institute for Strategic Studies, has held international conferences dedicated to various aspects of security in the OSCE region. Thus, in the last few years we have discussed the priorities and outcomes of Kazakhstan's chairmanship of the organisation, as well as the potential of the Astana Commemorative Declaration in the context of further development of the OSCE.

In the same year, we, together with our partners from Ukraine and Switzerland – the current and future chairs of the OSCE – suggested focusing our attention on the topic of the Eurasian security community, especially in connection with challenges and threats that all OSCE member states face, to some degree or other.

We hope that the pool of OSCE experts, analysts and academics from European and Central Asian countries, whom we were able to involve in the discussion of this topic, will be in a position not only to analyse various aspects of the Eurasian security community and efforts to counteract transnational threats, but also

develop specific recommendations for strengthening the role of the OSCE in the context of the Helsinki+40 process.

I would like to believe that this conference will contribute to establishing a wide network of academic institutions and think-tanks within the framework of the OSCE to ensure a more fruitful and multilateral exchange of opinions, suggestions and practices. We are also pleased that Dr. Zellner, the Head of the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE), who was entrusted with the difficult but ambitious task of creating this network, agreed to participate in the current discussion.

Distinguished conference participants,

Before we begin the discussion of specific security issues in the Eurasian context, we need to answer what appears to be a simple question: what is this Eurasian security community, and what are its geographical and geopolitical boundaries?

Can we automatically include in it all the countries situated on the Eurasian continent, as some experts and politicians suggest, or should we restrict it to within the boundaries of the OSCE area? Are there differences between the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security communities, or is it one single community spanning the whole of the OSCE member states?

On what principles and values can and must the cooperation between the countries of this community be based, if we nevertheless decide to go outside the boundaries of the OSCE area? Or perhaps the Eurasian security space can be formed on the basis of cooperation of various regional security and collective defence organisations?

And, finally, to what extent is the OSCE prepared to support the idea put forward by President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan at the Astana Summit, regarding the formation of a common security space from both the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific, and from the Arctic Ocean to the Indian?

At first glance, the Astana Declaration, where this notion was first mentioned, provides clear answers to these questions, emphasizing the commitment of the member states to the “vision of a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, rooted in agreed principles, shared commitments and common goals.”

It “should be aimed at meeting the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and based on our full adherence to common OSCE norms, principles and commitments across all three dimensions. It should unite all OSCE participating States across the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region, free of dividing lines, conflicts, spheres of influence and zones with different levels of security.”

At the same time, it is noted in the Declaration that the Eurasian security community implies cooperation among all member states and among the relevant organisations and institutions, of which they are members. This said, the cooperation must be built upon the principles of equality, partnership cooperation, inclusiveness and transparency.

Furthermore, the Declaration sets an objective to define concrete and tangible goals in addressing the challenges faced by the OSCE and its member states. We hope that in the course of the Helsinki+40 process, and also within the framework of our discussions, such goals and ways of achieving them will be identified, and new ideas will appear, aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the Organisation, maintaining its viability and giving new impetus to the strengthening of security in all its dimensions, both in the OSCE area and beyond it.

Since the security of the OSCE area is inextricably linked to that of adjacent areas, a goal has been set to enhance the level of interaction with partners for co-operation, first of all, in the Mediterranean and in Asia. This, in turn, opens wide opportunities to combine efforts with all participating States and partner organisations.

It should be noted that back in 1999, in Istanbul, the decision regarding closer cooperation with regional organisations was incorporated into the OSCE Charter for European Security. The Astana Declaration then confirmed the need for joint efforts in today’s complex and inter-connected world, including the need to counter transnational threats.

In other words, the OSCE documents quite clearly define the principles and framework of the Eurasian security community. At this stage the goal of creating a common security space throughout the whole of Eurasia has not been set, but such a possibility is not ruled out, provided this involves equal and transparent partner interaction with the inclusion of all parties concerned.

In our age of rapid globalisation the majority of regional and local problems acquire an international character. Often, it proves to be impossible for one country on its own, no matter how large and powerful it may be, to resolve these problems. A clear illustration of this is counteracting transnational security threats.

Counteracting non-military security threats in the foreseeable future will require progressively more attention and efforts on the part of member states. This is related not only to persisting regional hotbeds of conflicts, but also to the wide dissemination of radical ideas leading to violent extremism and terrorism.

Organised crime is operating ever more cynically and sophisticatedly with extensive use of the most recent technologies and covering increasingly more new spheres. Fighting the “cancer” that is cybercrime, the counterfeit product trade and human trafficking requires close interaction and prompt decision-making both at national and regional levels, if we want to avoid the spread of this “cancer” and to achieve positive results.

That is why it is so important to tackle present-day challenges using collective efforts and strengthening interaction. The tendency to form integrated ties within the boundaries of one or sev-

eral regions is becoming increasingly relevant, but, again, on the basis of common principles and common values.

In this context, cooperation between the OSCE and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICA) should be mentioned. CICA representatives regularly take part in the OSCE ministerial meetings, conferences involving our Asian partners for co-operation, sessions on interaction with other organisations and specialised OSCE workshops and conferences. Thus, in June of this year, CICA representatives took part in the “Security Days” in Vienna, and in September, together with representatives of member states for the first time visited an air-base within the framework of the Vienna Document 2011.

The proximity of the OSCE area to the hotbeds of instability makes the problem of collective security provision one of the most urgent. Central Asia in full measure experiences the consequences of this instability, which brings new risks, challenges and threats to security.

When presenting the Kazakhstan-2050 Strategy, President Nazarbayev noted that the balance of powers in the world was undergoing significant changes both on a global level and in individual regions of our planet. Consequently, the role of regional security mechanisms is increasing.

Many international and regional institutions, different in their objectives, format, methods and tools, but, ultimately, geared to achieving a common goal, are dealing with the security issues in the OSCE area.

Kazakhstan is an active and responsible partner with regard to strengthening security at regional and global levels. The OSCE greatly appreciates the principled position of Astana in such regional organisations as the CICA, the OIC and the SCO, whose members include many OSCE member states and partner states.

In the last few years, Kazakhstan has established itself in the role of a specific link, not only between these organisations and

the OSCE, but also between Europe and Asia. In this context, your country is called upon to promote better understanding of mentality, interests and capabilities of each other, within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.

The approach to resolving security issues embraces new challenges and also provides new opportunities for the OSCE and its member states. After all, the Organisation is facing many tasks, in the first place, in the context of the pending withdrawal of the international forces from Afghanistan in 2014.

Furthermore, despite the efforts of the Ukrainian chairmanship and intensification of negotiations on Transnistria, the problem of drawn-out or “frozen” conflicts remains as yet unresolved. There is also a dire need to intensify efforts to combat human trafficking, drug trafficking and the illegal trade in weapons, as well as violent extremism and terrorism, including its funding.

It should be noted that the Astana Commemorative Declaration emphasizes the importance of the anti-terror approach of the OSCE based on the comprehensive concept of security and supported by the rule of law and respect for human rights. According to this document, “respect for and promotion of human rights are by themselves the most effective tools for preventing terrorism, violent extremism and radicalisation, which lead to terrorism.”

Environmental issues have also become more acute; economic and financial systems are still in crisis. There is a clear need for interaction in managing water, energy and other natural resources, the fight for access to which is as yet not abating.

There is also a need to foster a tolerant attitude towards other cultures, religions and ethnic groups, and to establish the rule of law throughout the entire region as well.

All this brings to the fore the issue of adapting the OSCE to the changing realities and enhancing the effectiveness of its activities. However, what remains indisputable is the understanding of the principal need for maintenance and development of the



OSCE in the interests of ensuring regional and international security and adherence to the fundamental principles of international relations, democracy and respect for human rights, which unite the OSCE member states.

The Helsinki+40 initiative reflects the desire of member states to elaborate possible changes and amendments to the core OSCE documents, for the purpose of enhancing the effectiveness of its activities in the context of modern challenges and threats to security, as well as determining further prospects of its development.

Ukraine, as the current OSCE chair, has already started this process, aimed at maximum specificity and result. However, Switzerland, next year's OSCE chair, is entrusted with the most difficult task of preparing the Helsinki+40 Document.

I believe that this Document will set out specific strategic objectives and put forward specific ways and methods of resolving them, allowing the OSCE, whose foundation was laid in the last century, institutionally and content-wise, to step into the 21st century.

In conclusion, once again, I should like to express my appreciation to the Kazakh Institute for Strategic Research, and especially to its Head, Mr. Sultanov, as well as to the Embassies of Switzerland and Ukraine for supporting this conference.

I wish all of us interesting and passionate, but most importantly, constructive and productive discussions! And please remember that our primary objective is not simply to discuss the challenges and problems, but to put forward to the OSCE the recommendations that will be passed on to the Helsinki+40 working group.

Thank you for your attention.

\*\*\*

**Welcoming Speech by Serzhan Abdykarimov,  
Chairman of Committee for Foreign Policy  
Analysis and Forecasting,  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs  
of the Republic of Kazakhstan**

Esteemed Bulat Klychbayevich, Natalia Nikolayevna,  
Distinguished conference participants,

I would like to welcome you all and thank the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the OSCE Centre in Astana, for organising and holding this conference, the subject of which is undoubtedly of great relevance for Kazakhstan.

The expert community discussion process, aimed at determining a clear format for the Eurasian security community, is extremely useful for facilitating the appropriate implementation, by the Current Ukrainian and future Chairmanships, of the OSCE Summit Astana Declaration, in the context of the task set to create a common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.

In our opinion, security challenges in the OSCE Eurasian area are largely determined today by the following factors: 1. Post-2014 Afghanistan development; 2. Processes in Central Asia; 3. The situation in the Middle East.

As highlighted in the Astana Declaration, 'the security of the OSCE area is inextricably linked to that of adjacent areas', as well as with the commitments undertaken on Afghanistan and the enhancement of the level of interaction with the OSCE Partners for Co-operation.

## **Afghanistan**

If the assistance of the international community and our community, despite the complex economic situation in different parts of the OSCE area, is provided in full, then the internal political and socio-economic situation in Afghanistan will begin to stabilise.

One of the conditions for the recovery of the situation will also be the development and the level of participation of the Afghan economy in regional cooperation and implementation of transport, railway and energy projects in this country and with neighbouring countries. This should be facilitated by confidence-building measures in the sphere of commercial and financial-and-economic opportunities as part of the Istanbul process, including fulfilment of commitments undertaken by the international community in the follow-up to the Tokyo and other conferences.

For its part, Kazakhstan is investing in the creation of regional and transcontinental transport infrastructure, training of Afghan human resources, construction of social facilities and the delivery of humanitarian aid. The “Western Europe – Western China” transit corridor, the “Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran” railway route, the Kazakhstan transport infrastructure in the Northern Distribution Network system, the “New Silk Road” initiative – this is our country’s contribution to regional integration.

The resolution of these tasks can be facilitated by the opportunities offered by the city of Almaty – a transport hub and the location for UN system agencies. The establishment of a UN Regional Centre here will focus on the recovery of Afghanistan and sustainable development of the Eurasian space.

Today, the drugs situation in the region and worldwide is largely determined by the drug production in Afghanistan. In this regard, we will offer all support possible to foster cooperation between the OSCE and the CARICC, the headquarters of which are located in this city.

This year’s Almaty Ministerial meeting of the Istanbul process made it possible for the participants to adjust their positions on the Afghan problem. Supporting countries and international organisations voiced their intentions to consolidate joint efforts to promote collaboration on Afghanistan.

The OSCE, in implementing its projects and cooperating with the UN, the CSTO, the CICA, the SCO, NATO and the government of Afghanistan, is in a position to greatly contribute to the country’s security. Utilising bilateral and multilateral formats will promote the achievement of synergy of efforts in the interests of Eurasian space.

Dear friends,

**The development of the situation in Central Asia** is of great importance for the stability and security of the OSCE. The regional problems concerning the rational use of water-and-energy resources, the environment, poverty, illegal labour migration, inter-ethnic conflicts, corruption, the strengthening of the positions of the narcomafia are laden with critical mass. There is an escalation of threats coming from terrorist and religious-extremist groups, and from transnational and criminal networks.

Conscious of the responsibility for stability and safety in the region, Kazakhstan believes that the best way to stabilise Central Asia is to ensure intraregional integration, which will be conducive to the reduction of conflict potential, resolution of socio-economic problems and to the unravelling of a knot of water-and-energy and other differences.

Central Asian countries need to build politically stable relations, consolidate joint efforts in counteracting internal and external threats, and develop comprehensive regional cooperation, with OSCE support within its mandate, too.

Central Asian states, situated at the junction of Eurasian transport corridors, enjoy rich natural resources, an extensive trans-

port-and-communications network, considerable investment attractiveness and high human potential.

Kazakhstan, located within this geo-economic hub, is making joint efforts with other countries to develop a regional commercial-and-economic and interregional transport infrastructure, which is to become the foundation of long-term interaction between Asia and Europe.

Cooperation in the region will be successful provided there is support from external actors which are interested in the development of Central Asia. It is important to build greater trust and dialogue between all parties, the advancement of which is one of the core elements of Kazakhstan's foreign policy.

The resolution of the outlined issues will contribute to the elaboration of a common position to prevent both intraregional and external challenges and threats. The ultimate aim is to transform Central Asia into a single, integrated entity of global policy and economy.

Ladies and gentlemen,

The development of the situation in the Middle East and North Africa is at a critical phase, the impact of which can spread outside the region.

The protracted military conflict in Syria, the complex politico-military situation on the borders of the member states and partners of the OSCE, streams of refugees, the on-going political and socio-economic transformations in the "Arab Spring" countries, and many other related problems have become a serious challenge not only for the OSCE and its areas—South Eurasia, the Caspian and Central Asian regions, but for the entire world.

Kazakhstan advocates rapid stabilisation of the situation in the states of the region, and trusts that all political forces, influencing the situation in those countries, will accept responsibility and

take measures to put an end to violence, to seek dialogue through negotiations and to ensure civil peace and concord.

In this regard, reaching an agreement on chemical weapons in Syria, aiming at holding the next meeting in Geneva, and the first signs of easing in the dialogue on the Iranian nuclear programme, give us hope that the international community will use all opportunities and means available to continue with efforts towards resolving these conflicts in a peaceful manner and bringing the situation back to normal.

Dear friends,

The problems of the OSCE Eurasian dimension are of great interest both to diplomats and representatives of the expert community. I believe that the open discussion within the framework of today's conference, and the proposed recommendations, will be of great help in developing effective solutions on the part of the Current and future Chairmanships of the OSCE for maintaining stability and strengthening security in the zone of responsibility of our Organization and its Eurasian dimension.

I wish you all a fruitful conference.

Thank you.

\*\*\*

## FIRST SESSION ON EURASIAN SECURITY

---

### OSCE priorities Within the Eurasian Space

**Wolfgang Zellner**

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am happy to be here in Almaty and I am sincerely grateful to the organizers for inviting me to this timely event. Almost a year ago, my colleague, Ulrich Kühn, at a comparable conference here, presented the report “Towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community” produced by IDEAS, the Initiative for the Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community. This initiative was established by four think tanks from Germany, France, Poland and Russia at the initiative of the foreign ministers of these four countries. The report tried to concretize the vision of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community adopted by the 2010 Astana Summit meeting and made a number of policy recommendations to the OSCE participating States.

Today, I would like to deal with some more general challenges for the whole OSCE community, as well as some more specific challenges that Central Asia is facing.

The first and single most important challenge for all OSCE countries is overcoming old and new political divisions and co-operating despite the many things that divide us. Despite the recent agreement between Russia and the USA on the chemical weapons in Syria, relations between Russia and major Western countries are worse than at any other point since 1990. This assessment by a leading Russian expert at a security conference

in Moscow in May of this year was unchallenged there and, the Syria agreement notwithstanding, I share this view. The list of disputed areas is long and includes, among other things – yes – still Syria, where the USA and Russia are arming the opposing sides in a civil war, Iran, other conflicts, arms control, and the status of human rights and democracy in the Russian Federation.

It is not at all a trivial question to ask why relations have worsened so badly. Geopolitical competition? Sure, this is certainly one aspect. Differences in the systems of governance – democracies, semi-democracies, more authoritarian countries – might also be a factor, but none of these explain the turn from co-operation to a mix of co-operation and confrontation, where the latter sometimes seems to be dominant. Another important aspect is the lack of a shared vision, the lack of common objectives. And indeed, there has been no discussion in the OSCE on the vision of a security community since its adoption at the Astana summit. Most governments are in permanent crisis mode, their capacity almost completely eaten up by short-term crisis management; long-term perspectives are largely out of the range of vision.

There is an important lesson from this development: We must learn to co-operate regardless of the many things that divide us. Otherwise, problems will grow faster than our capacity to resolve them.

A second challenge is finding a way – I avoid the term strategy – to deal with the crisis in the Arab world, a region close to Europe. Apparently this crisis is deepening, very likely it will last decades, and certainly it will have an important impact on the OSCE area. On the one hand, the cases of Egypt and Syria have taught us that these crises and wars cannot be decisively influenced from the outside, by whomever. On the other hand, the American-Russian agreement on the chemical weapons in Syria shows that joint action *is* possible, at least for containing the worst and most dangerous aspects. Finding a balanced approach

between blind interventionism, on the one hand, and doing nothing, on the other hand, is extremely difficult.

However, one thing is sure: We will experience a wave of Islamic radicalization that will touch parts of the OSCE area, particularly in countries with large Muslim communities. Therefore, I believe that the OSCE should become active in opening and promoting a dialogue between states and Muslim communities. Last year, we had heated discussions in the IDEAS working group on this issue. In the report the account of those discussions reads as follows: “It was argued by some participants that the OSCE has no significant role to play, while other participants supported a dialogue-facilitator role for the organization. Based on the latter interpretation, it can be argued that in some regions within the OSCE space, political Islam is questioning the established norms and regulations of the secular state and the separation of the state and religious institutions.” The developments of the last several months have only underlined the urgency of this task. The OSCE should become active in this respect.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Now I would like to address some specific security challenges faced by the Central Asian countries. I will leave out Afghanistan and transnational threats, in part because we have special panels on these issue areas and in part because I believe that the key challenges for stability in Central Asia are of a domestic nature and must be domestically addressed and resolved.

Put in more general terms, the key challenge for Central Asia is to strengthen governance capacities at all levels, that is, to improve the balance between problems and the capacity to solve those problems. This general task has many aspects. I will focus only on a few of the most important ones.

The first challenge is, from my perspective, fighting poverty and providing more social welfare and equality. This particularly

concerns the resource-poor countries, but not only them. In the long run, social inequality represents a key destabilizing factor. If people do not have a sustainable economic and social future, they become more susceptible to radicalization. Thus, social welfare is a key factor for political stability.

A second challenge, closely related to the first one, involves renewing the Central Asian states’ aging infrastructures, understood in a broader sense to include the education and health systems. With the partial exception of Kazakhstan, there has been very little investment in the infrastructure over the last twenty years. The backbone of the infrastructure is still of Soviet origin from the ninety-seventies and –eighties and has been seriously eroded. I am not an economic specialist, but I ask myself whether the region might need some kind of Eurasian or Central Asian Development bank.

The third challenge, already mentioned, is the quick process of Islamization. Although different in pace and depth, this process will continue. Currently, it has not yet reached the level of a broader politicization. However, sooner or later this stage *will* be reached. The window of opportunity, which can be used for establishing a more stable and reliable relationship between secular governments and Muslim communities, is not too large and it should be used.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

To address these challenges, the current systems of governance must be further developed. As elsewhere in the OSCE area, the societies need more political participation, a more reliable system of the rule of law, more democracy. These developments must come primarily from within the countries themselves. They cannot be implanted from outside, be it by states or international organizations.

Consequently, a modern understanding of an international organization such as the OSCE would be its acting as a service provider in terms of multi-dimensional governance. An OSCE Centre should be seen as a service centre to facilitate a social and political transformation process, its customers being both the state and the society concerned. I thank you for your attention.

\*\*\*

## **Euro Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community – a Pipe Dream?**

**Ömer Burhan Tüzel**

Good morning ladies and gentlemen,

I am the Turkish Ambassador in Astana. However, today, I am here in my personal capacity as a long time cognoscente of the OSCE. The views I am going to express are mine and mine alone. They do not represent official Turkish policy or views.

Last year I participated in the forerunner to this conference on the Eurasian security community. What surprised me then was what a diverse understanding there seemed to be regarding this rather elusive vision or concept. I remember thinking back then to the difficulties in achieving this vision without a common understanding, particularly among the security actors in the Eurasian region, of what exactly a “Eurasian security community” is meant to be. Therefore, I was delighted when Ambassador Zarudna invited me this year to speak on the subject.

Let me start out with a few questions. What is a “Eurasian security community”? For that matter what is Eurasian security? What are its borders? Its geographical scope? Can anybody draw me a map of the Eurasian security space? And who are its actors? Who are its state actors and who are its institutional actors? Are we speaking about a comprehensive concept of security, encompassing the military, economic, human and non traditional dimensions of security, or a select few? What principles, norms and values govern Eurasian security? In other words, what is the common understanding amongst its actors which forms the conceptual framework for Eurasian security? If we were to do a “tour de table” right now, does anybody want to make a bet that each and every person here would have a



different understanding, a different perception and definition of Eurasian security?

But wait! Where did this concept, this vision of a “Eurasian security community” come from in the first place? Because the answer to all of the questions I have just raised lies therein. In order to understand Eurasian security, we have to look at its roots, its conception.

The title of this conference “Eurasian Security Community and the Role of the OSC” is not by chance. Neither is the fact that it is organized by the OSCE Centre in Astana. However, perhaps the title is only half complete. A complete title would have been “The Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community and the role of the OSCE”. Because if we look at the Astana Commemorative Declaration adopted at the OSCE Astana Summit in 2010, it clearly speaks about a “Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community”.

Therefore, the roots of this vision of a “Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community” lie with and are inexorably linked to the OSCE. The moment you take this vision, this concept of a “Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community”, outside the framework of the OSCE, none of the questions I raised at the beginning can be answered within the context of a common understanding.

The Astana Commemorative Declaration says it all in paragraph 1, I quote : “We the Heads of State or Government of the 56 participating States of the OSCE have assembled in Astana... to commit ourselves to the vision of a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro Atlantic and Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, rooted in agreed principles, shared commitments and common goals,” end of quote.

Here, it is evident that the “Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian region” is a synonym for the OSCE area. Therefore, we are in essence talking about a process and a construct rooted in the OSCE

space, with the 57 OSCE participating States as its actors, working within the framework of the OSCE acquis and the Organization’s comprehensive concept of security.

And herein lies the seminal problem and inner contradiction. While the OSCE constitutes the only structural framework within which we can methodically and conceptually discuss constructing a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community, that same framework is insufficient and outdated for this novel construct!

However perhaps the real misfortune lies in the fact that the OSCE lacks the political will to reform itself in order to be able to engage in such a task.

Indeed, even more so, the irony is that the vision of a “Euro-Atlantic and European security community” was conceived by the OSCE for just that purpose, i.e. to reform the OSCE and enable it to meet the threats, risks and challenges of the 21st century, thus giving the OSCE a second lease on life! A chicken and egg situation, so to speak. For if we look at the context in which the vision of a “Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community” was born and is being pursued today, there can be no doubt that it emerged within the context of the “Corfu Process”, a process aimed at the reform of the OSCE, today renamed as the “Helsinki + 40” process.

As a result we have a veritable “Catch 22” situation. The OSCE created the Eurasian security community in order to reform and transform itself, while the present impasse in the Organization and its *modus operandi* is not up to the task!

So where does this leave us? I’ll tell you where. This leaves us in the unfortunate and unenviable position of trying to conceptualize and construct this “Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community” within the soul searching process of the OSCE, as the OSCE tries to redefine itself without being able to go beyond its existing terms, because the political will to do so simply does

not exist. At the risk of being provocative I will submit that this vision, of a “Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community”, is but an attempt by the Organization to rectify all that has not worked in the OSCE. Isn’t this vision then really a camouflage to hide the failures of the OSCE and to try to redefine these failures in such a way that they seem novel, thus presenting the Organization as a model for a new concept of security in the 21st century? Let me say that if today we were able to implement 90% of the OSCE acquis – no, even 75% of the OSCE acquis faithfully – we would not need a new vision or a new model for a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community. The OSCE itself is the vision and model – if it could only be made to work!

Now of course one can make an argument for updating and equipping the OSCE with the necessary tools to increase its capacity in meeting the challenges of the so called “new world order” – or perhaps rather lack of. That this vision of a new security community seeks to conceptualize and address new threats, risks and challenges to security, such as those that did not exist up until a decade ago. Of course I am talking about transnational threats, cyber security, energy security or challenges arising from the scarcity of water or distribution of trans-boundary waters. But can and will an attempt to codify a vision substitute for lack of political will amongst the OSCE participating States in implementing the already existing acquis and ensuring the efficient working of existing instruments and mechanisms? I think not. I will respectfully submit that the OSCE has all the principles, norms, institutions, mechanisms and tools necessary to address the challenges of a new world order, without engaging in an attempt to redefine the OSCE within the context of a so called “vision of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community”.

But let me briefly move on to another point of discussion. In the ongoing attempts to make sense of this rather inflated but

otherwise empty shell, coined “vision of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community” and to imbue it with meaning and a conceptual framework, some work in academic circles comes to light every now and then. I observe how they are grappling to provide value added to the ongoing debate within the OSCE. I very much sympathise with the difficulties they are encountering. I mean, defining the OSCE in OSCE terms while making it look like a novel concept is not at all easy. Therefore, there are attempts to think outside the box, that is, beyond the scope of the OSCE. Now let us for one moment leave aside the contradiction this poses. For after all, as I have tried to set out in the beginning, the Astana Declaration is quite clear about the geographical framework of this vision of a security community. And for argument’s sake, let us also leave out the myriad of security problems in the Euro-Atlantic space and concentrate on the “Eurasian” aspect of this security community, as the title of this conference would like us to do.

I often read that a security community is not something the OSCE can do alone, or achieve through some OSCE founding act, such as the Charter for European Security adopted at the Istanbul Summit in 1999 or the Paris Charter in 1990; that this is a process which will need to be conceptualized together with the input of other actors and institutions that have a stake and a vested interest in Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security. Pray tell me how? When the OSCE community itself is so divided on a common definition and understanding of its own acquis of principles, norms and values and how to implement them, how can we expect Eurasian regional actors and institutions outside the framework of the OSCE – even if they had a vested interest in Eurasian security and were ready to give the OSCE the lead in this task – to define and embrace a common set of principles, norms and values based on those of the OSCE and utilize them as a common basis to carry forward the conceptual work on defining



this vision of a Eurasian security community? For example, do we really believe that the OSCE can achieve a common understanding and acceptance of core principles and values with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, to name but just one? Or will the OSCE, for the purposes of achieving a broader Eurasian security community in conjunction with others, re-negotiate OSCE values, norms and principles or be willing to re-define them at the lowest common denominator?

Let us be clear, outside the context and geographical framework of the OSCE, the Eurasian space today (define its geographical delimitation how you will) does not have a fully fledged regional security structure or common principles, norms and values. It does not have a legal framework regulating the behaviour of States. There aren't sufficient preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution mechanisms to address inter-state security concerns. Indivisible, cooperative and comprehensive security have not yet become bywords. The relevance of the human dimension of security has yet to be understood, let alone codified. Security is conceptualized at its narrowest understanding, being relegated to only a few transnational threats and largely within the context of post ISAF Afghanistan.

And let us not fool ourselves. Any on-going dialogue in regional processes outside the OSCE on a handful of transnational threats, risks and challenges is no substitute for a comprehensive vision of a Eurasian security community. In short, dialogue and cooperation within present day Eurasian institutions with a limited membership is not the product itself. A “Eurasian security community” is not synonymous with a “Eurasian security system”.

Therefore, in conclusion, the broader Eurasian space is not equipped to carry forward the vision of a Eurasian security community either in conceptualizing it or in constructing it. And while the OSCE is equipped, it lacks a common understanding

of its own acquis and the political will to do so. Eurasian security community – a pipe dream? It would certainly seem to be the case. At least for now.

Thank you for your attention.

\*\*\*

## The issue of Eurasian space fragmentation: theory of a regional security complex

Irina Chernykh

Interest in regional security structures as a special subject of research in the field of international relations is determined, first of all, by the fact that after the end of the Cold War the system of international relations began to gradually acquire a regionalized character. The decrease in global tension and the development of the independence of regions in taking key decisions at a regional level have brought to the fore the issues of the formation of regional security systems and the issues of responsibility of the countries of the region for security provision.

A regional level is a central level for analyzing security issues, and as such it represents a connecting link in the study of intra-state conditions and the situation in the countries of the region, the relations between neighbouring regions and the interaction of regional processes with globally acting powers.

Since the beginning of the 1990s the issue of the formation of the Eurasian security systems has become topical. However, this process is related to a number of difficulties:

- **lack of common understanding of what the “Eurasian space” is** (there is no one single definition of this category. The existence of various concepts which view the Eurasian security space in different ways. For example, the Eurasian space is considered within the framework of the OSCE and CSTO zones of responsibility. Or the existence of national (state) concepts of what the Eurasian space is);

- **different understanding of what security is or what kind of security is being talked about** (some countries focus on national security, some – on state security, some – on political regime security);

- **structural differences between the subjects of the Eurasian security space** (Eurasian space is home to both federal and unitary type states, developed and developing countries, etc.)

- **lack of structural ties between the subjects of the Eurasian security space.**

I would like to dwell upon the last thesis in detail because it is the lack of structural ties between the subjects of security that is the key factor which determines its fragmentation.

It is possible to substantiate this thesis, first of all, by putting this or the other theory into operation. The problems of regional security are posed and most effectively resolved within the framework of a regional security complex theory, proposed by B. Buzan at the beginning of the 1990s and then further developed by theoretical scientists belonging to the Copenhagen school of security studies.

The Regional Security Complex is defined as *a set (complex) of states whose main securitization/de-securitization processes are interrelated to such a degree that their security problems cannot be effectively analyzed or resolved separately from one another.*

In other words, all states making up/entering a regional security complex must mainstream the same threats, challenges and security risks, understand them in the same way and jointly devise a policy for their resolution.

A regional security complex is determined by an external boundary and an essential structure developed inside the complex.

The essential structure of a regional security complex includes the following elements:

- **a boundary**, which differentiates a regional security complex from its neighbours;

- **two or more autonomous (independent) states**;

- **polarity** which characterizes the distribution of power (force) among the states;
- a **social construct** which encompasses amity and enmity structures among states. Relations among these states are marked by security interdependence which can be positive or negative but which should be significantly stronger among them rather than between them and states outside the complex.

A regional complex has inner cohesion, and therefore an effective security system can be formed within its framework. **However, none of the formulated perceptions of the Eurasian space matches the notion of a regional security complex.**

In order to support this conclusion, a few examples can be given.

#### The OSCE example

Within the framework of the OSCE there are two security spaces which, for the purposes of discussion, could be called OSCE-Europe and OSCE-Asia.

After the disintegration of the USSR, there has been no full inclusion of post-Soviet countries, and particularly Central Asian countries, in the OSCE space. In the 1990s it was obvious that Western European countries and post-Soviet countries, primarily Russia, securitized/de-securitized issues so different between them that it made no sense to talk about the possibility of the formation of a common security complex between them. This resulted in the beginning of the formation of two separate complexes in Europe: EU-Europe, a complex forming around the EU, and a complex forming around Russia.

As for Central Asia, this split was marked by differences in the perception of such issues as, for example, the expansion of NATO to the East and a civil war in Tajikistan. Thus, European governments demonstrated relative indifference with regard to events in Tajikistan. The possibility of fragmentation of this

country was not considered by them as a threat to European security, which determined the insignificance of their involvement in this conflict (including refusal of significant involvement of the CSCE). In their turn, the governments of Central Asian countries were by and large indifferent towards discussions on NATO expansion, which was an issue of paramount importance for the countries of EU-Europe. None of these governments showed an inclination to support Russia in its attempt to create a “counter-bloc” to oppose NATO. In fact, changes in the military balance in Europe in the 1990s did not affect the processes of securitization/de-securitization in Central Asia.

At the beginning of the 2000s principal ideological differences regarding the security concept manifested themselves. The West considers security and stability as functions of democracy. For the East they are either stand-alone values or derivatives of a country’s sovereignty and its ability to be an actor in international relations. This is the reason for placing the emphasis on different baskets of the OSCE. European OSCE members pay more attention to the issues of the third basket, that is human rights in the post-Soviet countries, whereas the Eastern members bring to the fore the first basket – issues of military-and-political security.

#### The CSTO example

It is considered that the main structure providing collective security in Central Asia is the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Often, the opinion may be voiced that it is “the only multilateral organization in the post-Soviet space that is capable of carrying out military operations”<sup>\*</sup>.

Within the framework of the CSTO, similar to the OSCE, there are several security spaces. It is possible to talk about

<sup>\*</sup> Baranovsky V. The Euro-Atlantic region: security challenges and opportunities for a joint response: a report for the Commission on the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI). Munich, 7-8 February 2010. – Moscow: IMEMO RAN, 2010, page 24.

three autonomous segments within the CSTO sphere of responsibility:

- Russia-Belorussia;
- Russia-Armenia;
- Russia – Central Asian countries.

The segments are united, in fact, by the exclusive (central) position of Russia in the organization, including its role in rendering assistance to its partners regarding the provision of their security. It results in the situation where the interests of CSTO members do not coincide. Equally, securitization of different issues by different members of the organization takes place.

Thus, the regional security complex theory makes it possible to explain, for instance, both the absence of regional integration processes or an effective regional security system in Central Asia, and inefficiency in solving these or those security problems in a broader context via mechanisms of international organizations. In this connection, the time has come to deal with the issue of development of a new effective mechanism of cooperation in the sphere of security provision with consideration of present-day realities.

\*\*\*

## **Systemic Problems of International Cooperation in the Provision of Regional and Global Security**

**Mykola Sungurovsky**

### **BASIC DEFINITIONS**

**International organization (association)** – a structured form of cooperation of governmental or non-governmental actors engaged in international relations, established voluntarily on the basis of certain principles and arrangements aimed at achievement of mutually beneficial results.

**Values (basic needs)** – certain features of an entity (individual, society, state) and/or its environment, the presence or absence of which is perceived by the entity as the most important conditions and benchmarks to support life and development. The aggregate of values sets the general basis and framework of national interests and perception of threats and challenges.

**National interests** – conscious and statutory vital needs of an individual, society or state in respect of which their subject matter (strategic goals) and intentions for their achievement are clearly formulated. As a rule, national interests are considered within the inseparable triad; subject matter of interest – strategic goals; interest actors – carriers, spokesmen and stake-holders who determine and implement strategic goals; process/method of implementation – the aggregate of means to implement strategic goals. The aggregate of national interests pre-determines in general the desirable state of society for a certain term as well as the meaning, reference points and boundaries of social activity.

**Threat** – a factor (set of factors), the effect of which leads to full or partial impossibility for national interests implementation.

**Challenge** – threat to vital interests (problem in their implementation), for the adequate response to which the state or society does not have enough manpower and resources.


**National security** – circumstances under which a citizen, society or state enjoys a situation when no threats are posed to the implementation of national interests, or favourable conditions are provided for their implementation in case of actual and/or anticipated threat impact.

Judging by the reports of international organizations on the results and prospective areas of their activities, even taking into account their self-criticism, the picture we should get is that of "world peace". However, in the period after the Cold War the number of major armed conflicts and their victims has been increasing; in certain regions rapid destabilization of the situation has been observed, there has been aggravation and growing diversity of the forms of international, interethnic and interreligious tension. Adding to the above the serious contradictions between the leading states concerning adequate international response to conflicts, we can come to the conclusion that the world has not become a safer place.

STATE CONFLICTS IN 2002-2011

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Total	32	30	32	32	33	35	37	36	31	37
Intensity										
Low	26	25	25	27	28	31	32	30	27	31
Wars (> 1000 casualties)	6	5	7	5	5	4	5	6	4	6
Category										
Interstate	1	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Intrastate	28	26	28	26	27	30	30	28	22	27
Internationalized domestic	3	2	4	6	6	5	6	8	9	9
Region										
Africa	15	10	10	7	10	12	13	12	10	15

America	2	1	3	2	2	3	3	3	3	2
Asia and Pacific	12	15	14	16	15	14	15	15	12	13
Europe	1	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	1
Middle East	2	3	3	5	5	4	4	5	5	6

NUMBER OF CASUALTIES OF STATE CONFLICTS  
IN 2002-2011

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

The events of the last decade can be considered as a warning that humanity is searching for a new paradigm of existence; and to stabilize the situation we should find non-standard ways of organizing mutually acceptable international relations, including those in the field of security provision.

International relations have seriously changed after the Cold War: enemies turned into allies, former allies into enemies. The previously strong disagreements between the states, based on the "friend-or-foe" principle, are being transformed and replaced by trans-border challenges which cannot be overcome either indi-

vidually or through joint efforts of the existing international organizations with their old frameworks.

The global trade and economic, political, informational and cultural networks are increasingly turning into efficient mechanisms for distributing not only the achievements of humanity but also economic, political and social shocks, crisis phenomena and their consequences.

Regional security is affected not only by the conflicts themselves but also by their settlement, however paradoxical it may seem. In this context, it is worth remembering the destabilization in Mali after the settlement of the Libyan conflict, and paying attention to the security challenges in Central Asia after the planned withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014.

The ability to realize and respond to the diversity of factors predetermines the effectiveness of functioning of states and international organizations, their evolution and ability to work in a dynamic environment.

Successful transition of states, international organizations and mankind on the whole to new stages of cooperation in solving global problems depends on how balanced in their activities the responses to a number of interrelated dilemmas will be, which as yet are not fully resolved, thereby putting to doubt the adequacy and efficiency of the entire system of modern international law.

#### UNRESOLVED DILEMMAS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND IN THE ACTIVITIES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

- correlation of interests: individual – collective (national – union);
- dynamics of traditional values – commercialization of values;
- correlation of priorities: human rights – needs of the state in the spheres of economy and security;

- correlation of hard – soft power;
- positions regarding the right to self-determination – territorial integrity;
- correlation of independence – interdependence of entities in terms of realization of interests and security provision;
- positions with regard to: preservation of sovereignty – transfer of a part of sovereignty to the supranational level; sovereignty protection and strengthening – consolidation of sovereignties, level of political integration;
- correlation of rights, obligations and responsibility of members;
- correlation of legitimacy of activities of international organizations – efficiency of their interaction as a function derived from the number of members;
- strengthening institutional capacity – “bureaucratization” of interests.

The dialogue on the issues of international security often suffers from a lack of structure and specificity. In this regard, I would like to focus on some problems of a systemic nature.

1. Speaking about cooperation in the area of security, the common threats are often presented as the only ground for necessity and expediency of such cooperation, without taking into account that those threats are not always and not fully common (example – contradictions in the negotiations between the US and Russia concerning nuclear disarmament and ABM). The specific features of the threat objects and countering approaches depend greatly on the political views inside a particular country, which are determined by its national interests (or vice versa). Every interest should be considered as a triad: strategic goal (subject matter of interest) – interest carrier (person, society, state) – process of achieving the goal (methods, technology, resources). Each of these components is the object of a threat.




Moreover, it makes sense to speak about all this within certain limits defined by the values. Therefore, speaking about cooperation we should not forget about the need to achieve compatibility, community or, at least, consistency of positions in all these parameters: values, interests, identification of threats and methods to counter them. Naturally, the above factors are not the only prerequisites for productive cooperation, and for the creation and effective performance of international organizations in the field of security. And, of course, achievement of such community is rather the ideal than a practically achievable goal. As a result, we usually have limited effectiveness of cooperation. But, on the other hand, it is necessary to move to such an ideal gradually, starting from those problem areas, where such community is the greatest.

#### **CRITERIA (FACTORS, PREREQUISITES) FOR CREATION AND EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS**


- unity of values;
  - community of interests, strategic goals and approaches to their implementation;
  - community of positions in assessment of threats, their sources and carriers;
  - community of approaches to countering threats (in particular, to application of “hard” or “soft” power);
  - sufficiency of resources for implementation of interests and countering threats;
- as well as*
- historical and cultural closeness of partners, presence of a positive or traumatic historical experience of common existence or neighbourliness;
  - similarity of types of governing regimes (democratic, authoritarian, totalitarian);

- conditions for consolidation (voluntary or forced);
- conditions for interaction (equal or with a dominant partner);
- conditions for interaction between the organization and members (ratio of sovereignty of members and powers of supranational bodies, if any);
- nature of relations between the organization and environment (antagonism of interests, “zero sum”, “all winners”);
- “added value” from implementation of interests and provision of security – for each actor after unification within the organization and for the organization – from each member.

2. The concept of “threat” itself also has a complex structure: object – carrier – reason – escalation process – method of implementation – consequences. These elements also have country-specific features, failure to take account of which may drag out negotiations on cooperation issues, divert them or render them meaningless and ineffective. In particular, escalation of threats has such stages as (slide 6): appearance and building up of contradictions > increase in tension > crisis (conflict) > removal of consequences. Each of these stages, in order to counter the forces and capabilities of the threat carrier, requires the appropriate management bodies, intelligence and law enforcement bodies and armed forces of the entity defending itself. And in case of a trans-border threat – their organized interaction at international level.



**PROVISION OF THE REQUIRED SECURITY LEVEL**  
**EFFECT OF THREAT ON THE NATIONAL INTEREST**





3. Values, unlike interests and threats, are the least changeable factor which was ignored for far too long. However, due to drastic global changes, aggravation of interreligious confrontation, appearance of new actors and new ambitions in the international arena, change of content and forms of interrelations and raising the relevance of self-identification matters, the time has come to review the system of core values. Against the background of unresolved problems of poverty, unemployment and social inequality, the attempts to modify the system of values without the least discussion, through excessive specification of human rights (sexual and religious minorities, gender reassignment, same-sex marriages, etc.) are not attempts to review the core values, but rather a manifestation of lack of readiness of states, international organizations and humanity in general for such a review and inability to overcome vital problems.


On the other hand, if such a review begins (and according to Vladimir Putin, it is already underway in Russia), this will inevitably lead to the necessity to review the remaining prerequisites for cooperation (interests, threats, methods of activities and interaction). This once again emphasizes the fact that humanity has reached the point when the old paradigm does not work any longer and there is no new one.

4. An important component of cooperation is resources. They are not only traditional financial, material-and-technical, human and information resources but also such types as organizational-legal and time resources. Attention should be paid not only to their amounts and timeliness of allocation but also to their compatibility. With regard to human resources, for example, an important role is played by standardization, training and best-practice sharing programmes, including those within the OSCE, NATO and EU export control regimes. When speaking about sharing best practices, it is not only best practices themselves that are important, but also the ability to customize them to national specifics.

5. In the discussions regarding cooperation and rendering assistance, distinctions are often not made between the complexity and systemic nature of the package of proposed activities. If complexity is usually understood as the extent of coverage of subject areas with activities (e.g. three OSCE "baskets"), systemic nature implies both full coverage and the presence of technological links between the activities within a closed process of achieving certain goals. In this regard, coordination of assistance, provided by various international organizations and individual states, as well as their harmonization with national plans and programmes for realization of national interests and provision of security, would be rather desirable for the recipient states.

The plans of various international organizations for the provision of global and regional security require similar coordination. For example, upon the results of the recent Sochi Session of the CSTO Council of Ministers it was announced that the Organization has a strategy in respect of the Afghanistan-2014 problem. The OSCE, the EU, NATO, the USA and other world leading players also have similar strategies. However, even in case of mutual understanding between those players, to what extent are their strategies and plans compatible or at least not contradictory; to what extent do they duplicate or complement each other in the content, terms and resources? I cannot exactly confirm the absence of such evaluations, but, at least, they are not known to the majority of people.

In the light of the foregoing, the final proposals of our conference could include creation and introduction of a universal mechanism of monitoring threats and timely response to them, based on a systematic approach both within the OSCE and other international security organizations.



One element of such a mechanism could be a network of research structures of both public and non-public sectors, specializing in the analysis of threats at the stage of examining them and in the synthesis of obtained knowledge at the stage of preparing threat-counteracting decisions.

Thank you for your attention.

\*\*\*

## Security in Transit States: Insecurity Dilemma

Rustam Burnashev

In the light of the upcoming transformation of the format of the NATO states' military presence in Afghanistan in 2014, and the appropriate use and development of the infrastructure potential of Central Asian countries, the question has been raised regarding involving these countries in the process of the development of Afghanistan, and possible re-formatting of the regionalisation of Central Asia\*. At the same time a number of Afghanistan-linked challenges to the security of Central Asian countries, such as Islamism, terrorism, the illegal spread of drugs of Afghan origin, is becoming pressing. This article substantiates the idea that the main challenges and risks facing Central Asian countries are not so much external, as they are internal.

The perception of Central Asian countries as transit countries with weak statehood, situated on the periphery of the modern system of international relations, serves as the basis for the analysis.

The key feature of the Central Asian states' behaviour in the sphere of security is the securitisation\*\* of issues, which can be interpreted not only as threats or challenges to security, but can also have a significantly less intense interpretation – that of being considered as political or social ones. At the same time, threats are usually regarded as being external. For example, in Central Asian countries there is a popular concept of *the New Great*

---

\* See, for example: the concepts of the *New Silk Road* (Secretary of State 2011) and *Afghanistan's region* (Afghanistan Policy Group 2013).

\*\* Securitisation – "the discursive process through which an inter-subjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat" (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 491).

*Game*\* that describes the current geopolitical situation in Central Asia as a *competition* between external forces (regional and great powers) for "influence, power, hegemony and profits, often referring to the oil and gas industries and reserves in Central Asia and the Caucasus" (Edwards 2003: 85). However, the analysis of the policy of the global powers, as well as regional centres of power shows that Central Asian countries are on the periphery of the modern system of international relations, in which the interests of regional and great powers are not evident and, consequently, do not intersect each other in any significant way (Burnashev and Chernykh, 2005). The presence of great powers in Central Asia is always of a temporary nature. The position of these countries in the respective discursive formations is also peripheral. There is no doubt that such a situation may undergo changes under the influence of a number of factors; for example, in the event of a regime change in one or several such countries, involving one of the great or regional powers, or in the event of the beginning of a military campaign in connection with the controversies surrounding Iran. In view of these events, Central Asian countries and, consequently, the issues of security (both international and regional), related to these countries, may become the focus of quite wide discussions\*\*. However, these changes in any case will have a temporary character, just as it was at the beginning of the 2000s, when the anti-terrorist coalition first deployed its forces in Afghanistan.

As another reason underpinning the importance of external threats to the security of Central Asian states, the point is used that the international structures, which involve Central Asian states, do not form fully-fledged security systems, and as a

---

\* The term «The New Great Game» is an allusion to the so-called Great Game – the 19th century rivalry between the British and Russian Empires for dominance in Central Asia.

\*\* Revealing in this respect is also the growing interest in Central Asia in connection with the contemplated transformation in 2014 of the format of the military presence of NATO countries in Afghanistan.

result, cannot provide effective security guarantees for these states and regimes. This primarily concerns the quasi-regional formations, such as the CSTO and the SCO (Chernykh, 2013). However, in reality, Central Asian countries are protected from traditional security threats (mainly related to the possibility of “territorial disappearance” of these states) by the norms of the modern system of international relations (Job 1992: 12-13; Jackson and Rosberg, 1986). Virtually none of the conflicts in Central Asia and around it has spread beyond the national borders and acquired an interstate dimension. The most revealing examples are:

- the civil war in Tajikistan (1992-1997), which had very limited involvement of other CA countries as peacekeepers;
- the confrontation in Afghanistan between the Taliban movement and the Northern Alliance in 1994-2001, which affected Central Asian countries only in that it caused a limited number of refugees and the deployment of the United Tajik Opposition on the territory of Afghanistan;
- the June 2010 conflict in the southern provinces of Kyrgyzstan: even Uzbekistan, which had all good reason and the prerequisites to become involved, distanced itself from the conflict, and limited its involvement to temporary sheltering of refugees.

Therefore, the specifics of securitisation in Central Asian states are determined by internal factors; above all, by the special positioning of a referent object and a securitising actor\*. Securitising actors in this case are the respective governments/regimes in “a relation of singularity and externality, and thus of transcendence, to his principality” (Foucault 1991: 89–90). Maintaining, reinforcing and protecting not so much the state or the nation, but the

\* Referent objects are entities which are thought to be existentially threatened, and which, in this discursive field have a legitimate and well-grounded claim to survival; securitising actors are actors that declare an existential threat to a referent object, and call for the security action on behalf of it; in doing so, securitising actors lay claim to a special right to use extraordinary means in order to tackle the threat (Buzan et al. 1998: 36).

regime is becoming the purpose of exercising power. Thus, the regime also becomes the principal referent object. Securitisation is used by regimes as the grounds for tightening control over all areas of public life, which becomes the object of control through maximum reduction of personal and social (non-politicised and non-securitised) space, as well as reduction of the scope of open political space due to its securitisation, which makes politics in Central Asian countries virtually non-public.

The key factor determining such a character of securitisation in Central Asian countries is that these countries are marked by weak statehood\*: relatively low infrastructural capacity and coercive potential, but most importantly, a low level of societal (identification) cohesion (Jackson 2010). As shown in the research by Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong, “no one single agent has uniform influence or authority across all state sectors, and state action is neither centralised nor coherent” (2002: 533). There is no consensus in Central Asian countries regarding what the state is; in other words, the state does not exist as a “hegemonic idea” (Migdal 1998: 12).

The key characteristic of weak states is that they lack integrity of the discursive space, it is fragmented: the field of discursivity\*\* does not structurally coincide with the dominant discourse, and the dominant discourse itself is linked more with the regime, rather than with the state. The power structure in weak states is built not on the pattern “centre – periphery”, but suggests a multiplicity of centres that compete in order to preserve and protect the dominant position of their own discursive and non-discursive

\* On dividing states into strong and weak; see, for example, Buzan 1991: 96-107. In order to define the security issues of each Central Asian country, it is important not only to recognise it as a weak state, but also that its immediate surroundings, in which its regionalisation takes place, that is Central Asia, is composed of weak states. This, in turn, determines the fact that «Central Asia» cannot be regarded as an independent regional security complex. It is, at best, an unstructured space fulfilling the functions of an insulator between neighbouring complexes (Burnashev and Chernykh 2006: 336-359).

\*\* A field of discursivity is the aggregate of the possibilities which are excluded by the dominant discursive practice (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 111).

practices (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Each social group, acting as one of many centres of power, in an attempt to enhance its own security, creates insecurity elsewhere in the system. This situation is described as the *insecurity dilemma* (Job 1992), which is self-sustaining: any attempt of the regime to reinforce its security and establish effective state governance by use of force, provokes challenges to its power on the part of influential social groups, and resistance and further weakening of the institutional basis of the state (Jackson 2010: 187).

At the same time, due to the reduction of personal and social space, as well as of the scope of open policy, the discursive practices, alternative to the dominant ones, lose their “right to speak” and find themselves in the situation characterised as *security as silence*, “a situation where the potential subject of security has no, or limited, possibility of speaking its security problem”, when “raising something as a security problem is impossible or might even aggravate the threat” (Hansen 2000: 294, 287). Thus, due to securitisation of the issues of social stability in the dominant discourses of Central Asian countries, the articulation of a number of problems of a societal (identification) character can create additional difficulties for the speaker in question. Possible responses to the loss of the right to speak are:

- resorting to non-traditional communication channels built on the network principle;
- “going onto the streets”, resorting to non-discursive actions (physical articulation of security issues), for example, protest actions, including those in the extreme form.

The fact that the transcendence of regimes in Central Asian countries, while ensuring their security, at the same time eliminates the possibility of reaching consensus on what the state is, due to the population being distanced from the regime, lies at the base of the insecurity dilemma and the forms of realisation of alternative discursive practices. Regimes limit the opportunities of

relevant social groups to express their views and, consequently, to be heard, which pushes these groups towards non-discursive actions. It is the link between the *insecurity dilemma* and the concept of *security as silence* that presents the most important problem for Central Asian states. Related to it, the structural peculiarities of the discursive space of these countries determine the fact that it is the challenges on the part of the social groups, which are built upon identification, competing with that of the state (ethnic, religious, clan-related and ideological) that will, most probably, be securitised, and, at the same time, remain not understood (external) for the dominant discourses.

#### References:

1. Afghanistan Policy Group (2013): *Envisioning Afghanistan Post 2014: Perspectives and Strategies for Constructive Conflict Resolution from the Neighbourhood*, New Delhi: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
2. Burnashev, R. and I. Chernykh (2005): ‘Conditions for Securitization of International Terrorism in Central Asia’, *Connections*, 4 (1): 131-142
3. Buzan, B. (1991): *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
4. Buzan, B. and O. Wæver (2003): *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
5. Buzan, B., O. Wæver, and J. de Wilde (1998): *Security: A New Framework For Analysis*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
6. Edwards, M. (2003): ‘The New Great Game and the new great gamers: disciples of Kipling and Mackinder’, *Central Asian Survey*, 22 (1): 83-103
7. Jackson R. (2010): ‘Regime Security’, *Contemporary Security Studies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 186-201.
8. Jackson, R. and C. Rosberg (1986): ‘Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis’, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 24: 1-31.



9. Job, B. (1992): 'The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World', *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of the Third World States*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner: 11-36.
10. Foucault, M. (1991): 'Governmentality', in Graham Burchell et al. (eds.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 87-104
11. Grzymala-Busse, A. and P. Jones Luong (2002): 'Re-conceptualizing the State: Lessons from Post-Communism', *Politics & Society* 30 (2): 529–554.
12. Hansen, L. (2000): 'The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29 (2): 285–306.
13. Laclau, E. and Ch. Mouffe (1985): *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, London: Verso
14. Migdal, J. (1988): *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
15. Secretary of State (2011): 'Remarks on India and the United States: A Vision for the 21st Century', *US Department of States*, 20 July, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/07/168840.htm>
16. Burnashev, R. и Chernikh, I. (2006): *Security in Central Asia: methodological frames of analysis (Military Sector of Security)*, Almaty: Kazakhstani-German University.
17. Черных, И. (2013): 'Rethinking the role of the CSTO in the context of problems of Central Asian cooperation', *The CSTO and Stability in Central Asia*, Almaty: Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies under the President of republic of Kazakhstan: 74-83.

\*\*\*

## Regional Integration in the Context of Eurasian Security

Marat Biyekenov

Acceleration of regional integration, based on the creation of different economic blocs, is becoming a dominant trend of modern global geo-political and geo-economic processes. At this time of global economic crisis, the all-round consolidation and regional integration of Central Asian states have a great potential for expanding economic, scientific and technological, social and cultural-humanitarian relations. This provides the basis for mainstreaming the process of using regional integration advantages in the interests of improving the competitiveness of Central Asian countries and in the issues of provision of Eurasian security.

Experience shows that the countries which have established regional integration groups can more easily withstand the negative effects of the process of globalization, challenges and risks of external threats.

There is no alternative to integration, and the pulling together of economic cooperation of Central Asian states is mutually beneficial for all entities in the region. Integration is not a problem-free process; it requires time, understanding, experience, analysis of accumulated problems and their reasonable solution. The situation when Central Asian countries could become a region of tension and instability must be prevented.

Political analytics shows that lively discussions around the problems of raising the level of integration processes have been on-going for a number of years. However, this process must not be over-politicized. We believe we should move from discussions to real actions. There is the situation when politicians in the post-Soviet area are trying to find the answer to the most dif-

difficult question, of how to overcome the barriers and obstacles on the way to strengthening regional integration processes. Along with that, all these years, there have existed major controversies, fostering and at the same time hindering the strengthening of regional integration processes, which should be resolved only by the states themselves, without the involvement of any third party.

These include: the fear of losing sovereignty and independence; the confrontational potential of the region; the different degree of statehood development; the different level of economic and political development; the growing competition between Central Asian republics for leadership, as well as the presence of external actors with certain vested interests in this region.

How can the existing conflicts on the way to strengthening the regional integration processes be overcome? The question is pressing and, at the same time, rather difficult, as the problem of good neighbourly relations becomes more and more evident with every year – certain sections of state borders close; threats of breaking the integrated energy ring are made; gas and water disputes have become a permanent feature. Confrontation on different aspects is observed between the countries of the region – Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan – including on many problems of statehood development.

It is obvious that both the Central Asian republics themselves, and to a certain extent the external players, are interested in stabilization of the region. Along with that, each player, pursuing its own interests, cannot fail to understand that implementation of such interests requires political stability in Central Asia. And at the same time a situation has come about in the region, when cooperation-competition of external actors has become one of the factors complicating the integration process.

Central Asian integration is suffering from a lack of political and economic stability as well as a lack of tolerance of the ruling elites. The accumulated regional controversies should be tack-

led at the level of the heads of states and heads of governments through negotiations and consultations. Also, it should be taken into account that while integration of, let us say, the European Union, was founded on centuries of inter-state interaction, integration of the South and North American countries, and the Asian continent – on a few decades.

The countries of the Central Asian region do not yet have significant international integration experience. The experience of cooperation of the Central Asian countries is limited to several years. Accordingly, it may be noted that in the economic area alone there are the beginnings of some tendencies towards the need for integration processes. However, different-level economies maintain integration processes at the level of simple commercial product exchange out of necessity, due to the lack of full access to international markets.

A common, mutually complementary, free trade zone still has not been established in Central Asia. The weakness of the economies of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan definitely does not contribute to full integration. Political instability in Kyrgyzstan, which resulted in two revolutions, leads to confrontation between the government and the opposition. The involvement of Tajikistan in regional processes is weak. Settlement of these and other internal problems is the business of governments and peoples themselves.

The state of migration processes in the region does not meet the level of the modern stages of international development. We suggest that a referendum concerning the promotion of regional integration and establishment of supranational coordination bodies be conducted among the population of Central Asian countries. In view of the foregoing, there are possible scenarios of stages of regional integration development.

The first stage is maintenance and development of a free trade zone of the Central Asian states, the use of common market mechanisms and levers, and strengthening cooperation in matters

concerning Eurasian security and migration of population.

The targets in the economic policies of Central Asian countries must be changed with a transition of the states towards a “green” economy. According to the prognoses of international experts, if demands on the planet continue growing at the same pace, we will need the equivalent of two planets by 2030 and 2.8 planets by 2050 to maintain the same mode of life.

As a result of effective integration in the region, the key sectors, such as agriculture, housing and utilities, energy, forestry, industry, tourism, transport, waste treatment/recycling and water resource management will be developed. The “green” economy creates jobs and stimulates economic progress and at the same time reduces such substantial risks as the effects of climate change and growing deficit of water resources.

The international modelling which was carried out, showed that the “green” investments scenario would ensure higher annual growth rates within 5-10 years rather than investments in regular development. “Greening” of the economy is the way towards eradication of poverty in the Central Asian region. Eradication of poverty is directly related to the efficient management of natural resources and ecosystems, since the poor benefit directly from the increase in natural capital.

The second stage is the consolidation of Central Asian states into one single regional centre of global economy and Eurasian security. To this end, it is necessary to stop being a resources area and develop into a regional entity of prime international importance. For the implementation of this project it is expedient to establish supranational coordination bodies with the adoption of a regional long-term trade and economic development strategy. The project has good prospects and it is worth the allocation of certain resources and funds.

This implies consolidation of efforts of the states within the region to protect their national interests, and develop effective ap-

proaches and mutually beneficial cooperation based on the close intraregional integration that will allow the following: firstly, to ensure a reliable system of high complementarity of economic potential of the region and, secondly, the region may attract interest as one single entity. With such an approach in the long-term the Central Asian region may develop into a new zone of global economic development and security.

At governmental level a major decision must be taken regarding the creation of a mechanism for mutually beneficial cooperation of Central Asian countries for the use of water-and-energy resources of trans-border rivers. Settlement of disputes in respect of using water resources of trans-border rivers requires active interaction of all countries concerned.

Elaboration of a common regional policy on sustainable development and use of water-and-energy resources, acceptable to and beneficial for all the countries, with due consideration of international rules of law, may contribute to the development of a mechanism for mutually beneficial cooperation in the use of water-and-energy resources of trans-border rivers subject to strict compliance with and fulfilment of Intergovernmental Agreements, Treaties and commitments aimed at implementation of feasible integration projects. Regional cooperation will allow countries to resolve their own problems more effectively, rather than being an instrument for achieving the interests of external players.

Regional integration and economic cooperation in the agrarian sector must not be limited to trading but should encompass real economic projects. Integration and coordination of joint actions will give the development of agriculture and agro-industrial system in general a large-scale and more progressive character.

The improvement of competitiveness of national economies should also be based on the development of human capital. Therefore, special importance should be attached to the improve-



ment of the quality of life for the population and the increase in the educational and qualifications level of Central Asian human resources, the creation of welfare societies as well as fostering national interests in the context of regional and global security.

For the purpose of sustainable economic and social development of the Central Asian region special attention should be paid to the adoption of comprehensive measures aimed at improving competitiveness and youth employment growth as well as prevention of unemployment among young people.

Only through the efficient integration of Central Asian countries can specific goals be promoted:

- regional and global security;
- protection of national interests;
- strengthening corporate interests;
- objective response to new challenges and threats to national security;
- establishment of a common market with free movement of goods, capital and labour;
- implementation of the common concept of integration of the countries within the Central Asian region.

With the purpose of elaborating an active strategy to strengthen regional integration processes and to increase the level of competitiveness among the countries of the region at a global level, we consider that regular international economic forums should be held, with the involvement of world-famous experts, public figures, academics and the wider public.

\*\*\*

## Summary of the First Session “On Eurasian Security”

**Wolfgang Zellner**

The session provided less concrete forward-looking proposals for the way ahead towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community than a thorough stocktaking of problems, contradictions and conflicts at different political levels.

*Ambassador Ömer Burhan Tüzel*, the Turkish Ambassador to Kazakhstan, started by stating that the vision of a security community adopted at the 2010 Astana Summit lacks a common understanding among the OSCE participating States. According to Ambassador Tüzel, the OSCE is the only framework in which a security community could work, but this framework is insufficiently equipped to achieve this goal.

*Irina Chernykh*, *Chief Research Fellow*, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, linked the notion of a security community to the theory of “regional security complexes” developed by the Copenhagen School. Her main result is that there is only a weak structural connection between the various sub-regions of the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space and that two security complexes, rather than a single one, exist.

*Mr. Mykola Sungurovskyi*, Director of Military Programs, Razumkov Centre for Economic and Political Studies in Kyiv, Ukraine, focused on domestic factors in a variable geometry among interests, goals, threats and norms, thus re-coupling the substance of a security community to domestic factors.

*Professor Rustam Burnashev*, German-Kazakh University, Almaty, analyzed the triangular interdependence among weak infrastructure, ineffective administration, and weak relations with neighbors as the principle governance dilemma of weak states and obstacle on the way towards a security community.

*Professor Marat Biyekenov*, Kazakh Academy of Public Administration, focused on neighborhood problems, such as gas and water supplies, deplored the lack of regional co-operation and stated a need for supranational integration bodies.

In his opening statement, *Wolfgang Zellner*, *Head of the Centre for OSCE Research*, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, identified a number of challenges for the Central Asian countries, namely fighting poverty, renewing critical infrastructures, and developing the current system of governance with more political participation, rule of law and democracy.

Altogether, the session provided a broad spectrum of analytical elements related to the vision of a security community, from the domestic to the sub-regional to the regional and global levels. However, concrete recommendations were in rather short supply. As a consequence, the participants of a possible follow-up conference should be encouraged from the very beginning to concentrate on concrete suggestions and proposals on the way ahead towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.

\*\*\*

## SECOND SESSION REGIONAL SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA AND AFGHAN FACTOR

---

### 2014, competence of the OSCE and Central Asian countries in the provision of regional security

**Akylbek Saliyev**

Exactly 40 years ago, following the initiative of the USSR and European socialist countries, for the purposes of decreasing military confrontation and strengthening security in Europe, a Meeting on Security and Collaboration in Europe was held. 33 European countries, the USA and Canada decided to establish an on-going international forum which would professionally deal with the issues of security and set up cooperation between West and East.

In the era of confrontation between two world systems, in August 1975 in Helsinki, 35 states signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which set the rules of co-existence for the future. Before the disintegration of the USSR, in November 1990 in France, heads of states and governments signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which officially declared that the Cold War was at an end. In autumn 1991 in Moscow an event of historical importance took place. A document was adopted that for the first time put human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law on an international level, and the commitments in the field of the human dimension stopped being exclusively an internal matter of the member states of the Organization. Speaking of the key documents of the OSCE, undoubtedly the Declaration on a Common

and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century and a Charter for European Security should be mentioned. These documents, as a whole and individually are still being used as reference points in our every-day lives.

Exactly 20 years ago, nearly all the ex-USSR republics in concert became members of the OSCE. Notably, according to eminent European politicians, this scenario of OSCE expansion was not initially welcomed by them. However, the voice of Washington was decisive in this issue when it "recommended" that the Europeans should accept almost each and every post-Soviet republic into the Organization. Nevertheless, if before the disintegration of the USSR the purpose of the OSCE was clear, in the subsequent years serious complaints were levelled at it. It was stated that the Organization had become "an instrument for protecting interests of certain states and groups"; a statement by CIS countries was issued, accusing the OSCE of "practising double standards" and "unwillingness to consider the realities and peculiarities of individual states". There was an appeal to reorganize the OSCE and "to return it to its original principles". Political involvement and bias were the reasons for the statement made by Russia about the possibility of its withdrawal from the OSCE unless the latter switched the focus of its activity from human rights monitoring to military and political collaboration and economy. CIS countries suggested limiting the scope of the work of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. It is the Office that has many problems with forwarding its observers to parliamentary and presidential elections in CIS countries. Concerning Kyrgyzstan, the OSCE has focused on the human dimension and raising the engagement of civil society through the multiple NGO network.

All these facts point to one thing: the OSCE has serious problems on CIS territory. Currently, the OSCE, in its work in Central Asia, is focusing on what is good and what is bad from the point

of view of European perceptions. The established practices of the OSCE's work in Central Asia are not only not up to the existing challenges but the OSCE is in no way prepared to cope with what may be in 2014. Moreover, today the OSCE is not ready to fulfil its main mission should any problems arise among Central Asian members of the Organization. The probability of a conflict situation has been mentioned many times.

Here are a few well-known examples. On 28 September 1993 during the meeting of the General Assembly of the UN, the President of Uzbekistan, I. Karimov, stated as follows: "Presently borders in their classical definition between many countries of this region are absent. Therefore, there is a threat that a conflict occurring in one place may spread throughout the whole region due to purely geographical reasons". The Yugoslavian experience gives reason to some politicians and historians to speak about the possibility of territorial re-division. Imagination fuels the expression of territorial claims. Somebody considers it unfair not to have access to the Caspian Sea and thinks that it is possible to change the situation by force.

In September 2012 the President of Uzbekistan, during his visit to the capital of Kazakhstan, once again mentioned the possibility of military conflict in Central Asia, this time triggered by water resources.

Despite the predictions of the neighbouring country's leader, among post-Soviet republics in Central Asia there is a great variety of other objective and subjective reasons that could cause conflicts of different scale. The most serious of them are the problems connected with the absence of proper state borders and division of water sources. It is important to avoid turning a victim of a conflict into a culprit.

In order to understand the essence of the most important regional problems, a clear understanding of the controversial water resources situation in the region is needed. On 29 June 2001 Kyr-

gyrgyzstan adopted a Law on Water. The document states the country's proprietary right to water bodies, water resources and water facilities located within the country's borders. Further, the law stipulates "chargeable use of water resources at the international level". There are official calculations, according to which the biggest regional waterworks facility in Toktogul (Kyrgyzstan) has allowed its neighbours – Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan – to extend their irrigation area by 400 thousand hectares, and provided up to 90% of water required for irrigation of an additional 918 thousand hectares of land. Kyrgyzstan uses only 7% out of 23 cubic kilometres of water collected in its water reservoirs. The rest of the volume has been going free of charge to neighbouring countries for many decades. Note that Kyrgyzstan does not use the Toktagul water for irrigation of its own lands.

Considering the historic peculiarities of water use in the region, of course, it should be borne in mind that the gift from above in the shape of water does not flow everywhere along natural water-courses. Water is collected in reservoirs and flows through man-made canals built on the territory of Kyrgyzstan to provide high yields of cotton and grain in neighbouring countries. It is not a question of payment for the entire volume of water that flows out of Kyrgyzstan. The afore-mentioned Law refers only to that volume of water which is annually collected in reservoirs and other irrigational facilities in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. For instance, the average annual flow of the Kyrgysian Karkyra river has been 360 million cubic metres for many years; the entire flow of this river goes into the territory of a neighbouring country, and Kyrgyzstan does not request payment for this water.

However, all these problems – borders, water and leaders' ambitions – cannot compare with the potential threat presented by religious radicalism and extremism based on a perverted understanding of the essence of Islam. The reason for the present situation is an absence of adequate policy regarding religion in

all Central Asian countries. The situation has been exacerbated by the attempts of some politicians to use religion for their own ends. However, the most important fact is that the majority of governmental officials does not have objective perception of religion and its role in society. For that very reason, the main counter-measure against religious extremism is prohibition. However, as is generally known, ideas cannot be prohibited. Thus, the question arises: what has been done by the countries in order to oppose the ideology nurtured by the IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), the UIJ (Union of Islamic Jihad) and other extremist organizations? It is assumed that none of the countries has this kind of programme. First of all, it is because the states themselves still have not determined their position regarding the question as to whether God exists or not. All constitutions declare that the states are secular, and also there is a constitutional norm separating Church and State. However, no practical work on ideological opposition to radical religious views has been conducted. In many cases, the clergy themselves are involved in specific business. In Kyrgyzstan, for instance, access to the Spiritual Board and closeness to the Muftiyat guarantee an opportunity to "make money" out of the Hajj. The situation in neighbouring countries is similar.

Today the position and role of the Taliban in Afghanistan are nearly the same as before operation "Enduring Freedom". At the request of the Americans, Pakistan released from prisons more than 30 individuals who were leaders within the Taliban. They all returned to Afghanistan. For that very reason Mullah Omar speaks about the readiness for presidential elections at any time so that people could choose the country's leader by themselves. Mullah Omar himself has no intention of participating in politics any more.

Today many experts are of the opinion that after 2014 our fellow countrymen, who are now fighting against NATO forces

together with Talibs as members of the IMU and the UIJ, will return to Central Asian countries. Based on materials of a Taliban meeting in August, it is known that Mullah Omar set a goal for IMU and UIJ fighters – “to establish order in Afghanistan”, and then the fighters may go back home. So far, IMU fighters have been involved in gathering information in the Central Asian countries. IMU publications on results of their work prove that they are fully aware of the situation in the countries of this region. According to the IMU, during 10 years of military struggle against NATO forces, the Movement has lost one and a half thousand killed, and two thousand have been wounded. However, the main thing is that over these years the Movement has obtained valuable experience of waging war.

It emerges that neither the OSCE nor the countries of the region themselves are ready for the qualitative changes in the situation after 2014. In this connection the objective of the CA countries to be prepared for further complication of the situation and adoption of joint preventive measures is becoming more and more pressing.

What exactly could be done? Article 52 of the United Nations Charter makes it possible to start work on creating an effective system of regional security in Central Asia. This system must represent a mechanism with a ready package of measures aimed at maintaining and reestablishing peace in case of a war or a conflict, and with a generally accepted list of collective diplomatic, economic and other sanctions regarding the perpetrator of a conflict and the violator of border integrity in the region.

I think that the time has come for intelligence services of CSTO and SCO countries to turn to joint work in specific areas, rather than sharing information within the framework of the Antiterrorist Centre and RATS.

Although Uzbekistan has suspended its membership of the CSTO, it does not rid the country of threats to its security. There-

fore, it is appropriate to involve Tashkent in the development of a common Central Asian security system. Within the new form of interaction of Uzbekistan with the CSTO and its neighbours, it would be interesting if Tashkent were to initiate the establishment of a Central Asian Rapid Reaction Force in the region – a sort of international subdivision of “yellow helmets”. After 2014 this subdivision could find itself in great demand by the countries in the region.

For the OSCE, it would be important within the three dimensions to switch the focus onto the organization of analytical work to forecast the incipient international conflicts and to develop measures to prevent them. The existing practice of monitoring is a half-measure which will not have any effect. However, the most important thing is to help countries themselves to fine-tune their own security systems.

\*\*\*



## Expert evaluation of the situation in Afghanistan in the context of ensuring regional security

Georgy Dubovtsev

In connection with the scheduled withdrawal of the majority of the Western coalition forces from Afghanistan in 2014, concerns have been raised regarding the possibility of armed confrontation between various regional and tribal groups escalating into a full-blown civil war, which would represent a serious threat to the security of all Central Asian states.

Let us try to establish if such concerns are well-founded.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) plans to complete handing over responsibility for the situation in the country to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Intensive preparation of these forces is currently underway. However, the situation in Afghanistan remains complicated.

**Firstly**, as analysis shows, the establishment of a "democratic" Afghanistan, which has been carried out under the guidance and with active participation of the USA for almost 12 years, has not yet yielded any significant results. In particular, the fight against the irreconcilable armed opposition has not produced the expected outcomes so far, as is evidenced by the increased activity of the Taliban in virtually every province, including the northern part of the country. Inter-ethnic problems remain as yet unresolved. Experts name large-scale corruption, which significantly slows down the economic recovery of the country, among the problems that pose a threat to Afghanistan. For example, the information in the Western press regarding inefficient use of almost 8 billion US dollars in 2011 bears testimony to the extremely inefficient expenditure of funds allocated to the Afghan government in the form of international aid [1].

The narco-mafia effectively has got the upper hand in the country, having merged with the apparatchiks at the highest level. Afghanistan is responsible for more than 90% of the world production of opium poppy. An increase in drug use has been noted among the population of the country.

A long drawn-out war has left many Afghan people without access to education. Although Afghan sources claim that this year around 10 million children went to school, 40% of whom are girls, at present the nationwide literacy level does not exceed 30%.

Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world, and extreme poverty pushes a significant proportion of its population to collude with the Taliban.

The only hope for the long-term recovery of the Afghan economy lies in the natural resources that are estimated at over 1 trillion dollars. However, if corruption remains at the same level as today, no resources will be able to secure the economy's revival.

According to the experts' evaluations, up to 90% of the expenses of the Afghan government and development costs come from international aid. It cannot be ruled out that following the withdrawal of international forces, financial aid would be significantly curtailed. Just this fact alone could be a disaster for Afghanistan, where two thirds of the population live below the poverty line.

**Secondly**, despite emphatic declarations made by the NATO leadership during the Chicago meeting in 2012 and also by the NATO Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in the 2012 annual report, that by mid-2013 the Afghans would be responsible for security provision in every district of Afghanistan, this has not happened yet. [2] This is evidenced by numerous armed actions of the Talibs in virtually every province of the country, as well as by the attacks on ISAF soldiers, Afghan policemen and

military personnel, which have already become a regular feature. According to NATO reports, Afghan soldiers actively cooperate with the Talibs by selling to them arms, ammunition and various logistical items, sharing secret information, surreptitiously concluding cease-fire agreements and helping the Talibs to infiltrate into their ranks.

**Thirdly**, for the United States and NATO, a swift military operation against international terrorism, initiated by George W. Bush's administration in 2001, turned into a protracted war with the rebels. As of September 2013, Operation Enduring Freedom had resulted in international coalition force casualties amounting to over 3,370 killed and approximately 38,000 wounded. The United States had suffered most losses (2,266), followed by the United Kingdom (444), Canada (158), France (86) and Germany (54) [3].

Military operations against the Taliban proved to be largely ineffective as the militants evade open confrontation, and after carrying out their actions, blend into the local populace, or retreat to neighbouring Pakistan. The foreign military presence causes resentment everywhere within the local population, and contributes to swelling the Taliban ranks. Many Afghans take up arms in response to civilian casualties which, as a rule, accompany each military operation.

**Fourthly**, in the regional context, the armed conflict in Afghanistan has created a hotbed of serious instability in the Middle East. In the beginning, the success of the anti-terrorist operation in 2001-2002 resulted in a large proportion of militants retreating from the Afghani territory into the bordering regions of Pakistan, populated by the Pashtun tribes. A powerful terrorist infrastructure was established there, including supply depots and militant training centres. Thus, the source of Afghani instability moved to the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands. In the Pashtun lands, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban leaderships effectively managed to es-

tablish areas, which are beyond the control of the Pakistani authorities. This created conditions for expanding the Afghani zone of instability into other Pakistani territories, and for radicalising sections of the Pakistani population, especially young people.

All this points to the fact that victory over the Talibs in Afghanistan is hardly achievable by the end of 2014, because in the border provinces of Pakistan they feel quite untouchable. Whether or not the Talibs are supported by the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies, is an open question.

In view of the scheduled withdrawal of the international coalition forces from Afghanistan, it is crucial to tackle a number of problems without delay.

**The first** problem is to eliminate logistics bases and Talib training camps on the territory of Pakistan. In the current state of affairs, Pakistan could easily become the base for international terrorism, similar to what Afghanistan used to be in the early 2000s. In this regard, it is necessary to have other countries actively influence the Pakistani leadership in order to step up the fight against the pro-Talib groups on Pakistani soil.

**Second.** Many experts cast doubt on the degree of readiness of the Afghan army and police to independently and efficiently counteract the Talibs [4].

According to American sources, only **7% of combat units of the Afghan army and 9% of police units** are sufficiently trained to operate on their own, with minimum support of international forces. This proves that there are well-founded concerns about the ability of the Afghan security forces to successfully counteract the restoration of the Taliban regime, and about their actual ability to prevent re-Talibanisation of Afghanistan.

**The third problem** lies in establishing competent authorities both centrally and locally. At any rate, it is the central and local authorities of Afghanistan that must be responsible for ensuring national security, and law and order.

Currently, all efforts must be focused on implementing the programme of national reconciliation that was approved by the pan-Afghan Peace Jirga, which supported the government-opposition model of the future development of Afghani society. In this regard, the 2014 presidential elections will be of great importance.

**The fourth problem**, which needs to be resolved for the purposes of stabilisation of the Afghan situation and ensuring Central Asian security, is to provide the necessary infrastructure and organization to protect the state borders of Afghanistan and of the neighbouring Central Asian states. This will lead to a reduction in the trafficking of drugs and weapons, as well as a reduction in the danger of intrusion by armed militant gangs, war-hardened in Afghanistan.

And, of course, the most challenging is the **fifth problem**, which must be resolved by joint effort – that is providing assistance in restoring the economy, battered by war.

Back at the Berlin conference "Afghanistan and the global community – partnership for the future" (March 31 – April 1, 2004), the Kazakh delegation proposed the development of a special programme aimed at Afghanistan's restoration with the involvement of Central Asian states, envisaging the elaboration of coordinated measures to include Afghanistan in the regional transport-and-communications system, which is currently at the formation stage. At the London conference on Afghanistan in 2006, the agreement between the government of Afghanistan and the international community outlined the prospects for reconstruction of the Afghan economy, priority social and economic projects, as well as pressing issues of regional security, including efforts to combat the production and illegal trafficking of narcotics. Later those were elaborated in detail through the Istanbul Initiatives. Practical implementation of these initiatives will determine how soon the Afghan people will be able to have peace in their lives.

As for the influence of the 2014 factor on regional security, one is compelled to agree with the experts' opinion that the greatest threat to the security of Central Asian countries is posed by their own internal problems and, first and foremost, religious extremism – both today and after the withdrawal of the international forces. Tajik experts are talking and writing about the most dangerous scenarios in the development of the situation, because already at the moment there are formidable militant forces concentrated near the Tajik border, on the Afghani territory of Gorno-Badakhshan.

Uzbek authorities do not raise any particular concern. Apparently they are confident of their own capability.

However, it should be taken into account that against a background of internal political instability and a widening gap in the level of income of various strata of the population, the social tension and protest potential in the countries of the region are on the increase. This situation is used by religious extremists to recruit people who have lost faith in justice, and who have reached the point to start using radical methods of fighting to restore it.

Furthermore, for each of the states in the region there exist their own country-specific challenges and threats to national security. However, on the whole, it is the problems within our countries, as well as between our countries, to which the main threats to regional security in Central Asia both before and after 2014, are related.

#### References

1. Kulikov A. The Afghan conflict – source of pressing threats // *Voenno-promishlenniy kurier*, 4 December 2012.
2. Annual Report of the Secretary-General of NATO for 2012 *roq*// Available from: <[www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/Predictions-2013/SGReport/RU/index](http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/Predictions-2013/SGReport/RU/index)>



3. Operation Enduring Freedom: Coalition Casualties. Available from: <[www.iCasualties.org](http://www.iCasualties.org)>

4. Karpov A., 2012. Prospects of development of the politico-military situation in Afghanistan in connection with the withdrawal of foreign forces // *Military Foreign Review*, № 7 (784):10-16.

\*\*\*

## **Security challenges in Eurasia after 2014: national and regional dimensions\***

**Vladimir Boiko**

*Eurasian security community* is a category that reflects the spatial and political characteristics of the largest macro-region extending from the Baltic to the Pacific Ocean. However, in connection with the problem of security in its politico-military, socio-economic and other formats, special importance is attached to the European factor, which means not only the approaches of the leading European countries to Eurasia in general, but also the destinies of European ethnic groups residing in Asia for centuries (non-Asian nations in the Asian part of Russia, in ethnic Central Asia, etc.), their social position and culture. In this sense, the OSCE and its institutions are perceived not only as guarantors of basic ideas, taken as a foundation for its activities at the interstate level, but also as mechanisms of wider action, ensuring a balance of values and interests at the level of [macro- and micro-] regions, social and political communities. This fact makes the problem of the OSCE network development relevant not only in the post-Soviet part of ethnic Central Asia, but also in its Chinese, Afghan and Russian enclaves, which strengthens representation of international organizations and their capacity of information-and-analytical monitoring and involvement in a Eurasian context.

In view of the forthcoming completion in 2014 of the active phase of operations of the international anti-terrorist coalition in Afghanistan and withdrawal of the major part of foreign military forces from the country, this milestone is considered the most im-

---

\* This material was prepared within the framework of implementation of the Programme of Strategic Development of FSBEI of HPE (Federal State Budget Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education) "Altay State University" for 2012-2016 (Scientific-and-Educational Complex-3, sub-programme (SEC-3)).

portant starting point for the security situation and its prospects both in Afghanistan and in Eurasia as a whole. However, excessive fomenting of tension and expectation of conflict escalation in Afghanistan and around it do not seem inevitable. Although the current Afghan regime and political force that came to power at the end of 2001, for the last ten years or so, did not achieve qualitative improvement of the situation in the country, the country itself – both society and state – has made great progress, if not in the area of economy, certainly in social, political and educational aspects. The military and political jihadist and extremist groups are being replaced by associations of party and coalition format; the leaders of the new generation and profile are developing; political culture is evolving not only among the Afghan elite (native and emigrant communities), but also among ordinary people, who are acquiring, apart from norms of traditional tribal and corporate democracy, electoral and other skills of the modern political process. Persisting mass illiteracy is combined with professional and educational growth both at home and in exile: the Afghan diaspora accounting for 6 million people or more at different times, is a special and rather promising social-demographic and cultural phenomenon for the country of exodus, comparable to the Palestinian and some other communities, generated by large-scale conflicts in the post-colonial East.

Nevertheless, the year 2014 triggers apocalyptic sentiment among the political and expert circles in many countries, especially in the Afghan region, which is generally linked to the possible return of the Taliban to power. At the same time, it is forgotten that this movement, after seizing power due to relaxation of the mujahidin regime of the early 1990s, suffered a crushing defeat both on the governance and economic fronts. Without qualified manpower and expertise and without a sound long-term programme for Afghanistan's rehabilitation and development, it quickly transformed into a regime, acting under the flag of radical

Islam of a fundamentalist nature, which did not receive support from authoritative Islamic centres of that order (in Deoband etc.), although it was officially recognized by some conservative regimes (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE). The military operation of the international coalition headed by the USA in response to the terrorist attacks of 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001 committed by Al-Qaeda, which interfered with the Taliban, resulted in the elimination of their political and governmental structures. Further, it also determined the transformation of the movement into a rebel national-and-patriotic force of a regional scale (Southern and Eastern Afghanistan), which, despite the change of generations and the acquisition of new, mostly politico-military experience, did not increase its governance and other potential. Moreover, it caused internationalization of the Taliban both in a national-territorial and in an ethnic (non-Pashtun) sense, as well as its diversification accompanied by the conflict of generations, depersonalization, etc. All this challenges the ability of the Taliban to maintain even their current role of anti-governmental irreconcilable opposition, although it does not rule out their ability to aggravate the situation on a regional or even on a nation-wide scale after 2014. As the experience of the Afghan parties and forces that left the political stage (Vatan PDPA, nationalist extremist Maoist-type groups, etc.) or even their weakening at institutional-and-organizational or leadership level (Hezb-e-Islami Islamic Party of Afghanistan) show, their return to big-time politics is impossible, or possible at the regional level and as individuals (one of the candidates for presidency is A.R. Sayaf).

### **Policy of regional powers in Afghanistan: go, India!**

In the context of stagnation of the Afghan conflict and its unclear prospects at the stage of completion of the military operation of the international coalition in Afghanistan, the role of regional powers is increasing. Within the large region of AfPak

and AfCA, that will ultimately include Central Asia, the policy of India seems the most convincing in politico-diplomatic and other terms – this growing power looks like a peace-maker with a set of infrastructural, social and educational programmes aimed at restoring the life of the Afghan state and society. The political leaders of India and the circles involved in the development and decision-making, are carrying out intensive work concerning Afghanistan. However, this work would be impossible without India’s involvement in other areas of foreign policy and international cooperation as well. India’s modern approaches to post-Soviet Central Asia are determined by the recently developed and actively implemented strategic programme **Connect Central Asia**. Its provisions were first put forward in June 2012 in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) within the first India-Central Asia dialogue.

The new policy in Central Asia must provide for strategic partnership of India both with individual countries and with the region in general. The Indian side repeatedly stressed that for this very reason it was interested in the integration of this part of the post-Soviet space, as well as in the settlement of the Afghan problem; only then will it be possible to use the energy and transit potential of the region for the needs of the growing Indian economy and its establishment in its new role as the leading Asian power.

The intention of India to increase the “connectivity” of Central Asia for its own needs and for the benefit of its partners is expressed in a number of initiatives: relaxation of the visa regime, expansion of the transport infrastructure (air and surface traffic), cooperation in the sphere of regional security, cultural relations and public diplomacy, establishment of the University of Central Asia, multilateral contacts through the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the expansion of economic relations.

However, the main specific feature of the Indian approach to the Afghan affairs in negotiation and politico-practical formats is

the conducting of semi-official trilateral (India-Pakistan-Afghanistan) and multilateral meetings, lobbying for the most promising, from the Indian point of view, initiatives of the international community and individual states, including Indian projects, and the organizing of multilateral expert forums of the representatives of regional states within the Heart of Asia format (close and far neighbours of Afghanistan, including Russia). Fostering regional efforts, when all existing mechanisms – the SCO, the Heart of Asia and even the New Silk Ways – are considered, is the most important operational component of the Indian strategy for Afghanistan.\*

Regarding the Afghan situation, India is trying to solve the most difficult problems of regional security – **rapprochement with Pakistan on the Afghan and other problems as well as inclusion of Iran in the regional policy**. These problems are being resolved by the Indians through Iranian-American rapprochement, delegating to Iran vital roles in regional programmes of Afghan settlement (e.g. overseeing the historical-and-cultural and partially educational clusters). To this end the Indian side established a dialogue with the authoritative representatives of the political and managerial class of Iran and analysts; it is taking advantage of the cultural-and-civilizational and geopolitical ambitions of the Iranian elite as well as of the peculiarities of the present situation (change of power after the presidential election). In autumn 2012 the Delhi Policy Group, in partnership with the non-governmental Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies, presented the Khurasan project (strengthening interaction within the historical province of Khurasan, which formerly included the territories and parts of territories of present-day Iran, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and even Uzbekistan), involving Iran in the Afghan

\* Large-scale but still corporate project for transcontinental trade development through the creation of transport and other infrastructure within Central and Southern Asia as per the scheme of the Greater Central Asia lobbied by the USA to the detriment of Russia, China as well as Iran.

settlement through the use of Iran’s “soft” power, i.e. delegating to Iran a certain role in the sphere of culture and education, not only with regard to Afghanistan but also in the broader regional context.

**The involvement of Russia within the framework of bilateral and multilateral programmes** is one more important objective of India’s Afghan policy. India is the only country whose representatives seriously consider the SCO as a possible active participant of the Afghan settlement (countering drug trafficking and extremism), not least because a special contact group for Afghanistan was established within the structure of this organization. Although an even more important (“inclusive”) role in the Indian approach is given to the UN, the joint efforts of the maximum possible number of international and regional organizations including the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), etc., are still relied upon. At the same time the Indian representatives openly criticize the present-day distancing of Russia from Afghan affairs, believing that its participation could be more active from the point of view of the interests of Afghanistan, the “Afghan” region and Russia itself. Meanwhile, among the confidence-building measures in this region, Russia is given a significant role which is also specified in the DPG proposals, elaborated during the expert discussions in 2012 (countering terrorism and drug trafficking, cooperation between chambers of commerce and other commercial entities, and participation in the establishment of the regional structure and education).

Indian proposals take into account the World Road Map until 2015, developed by the Supreme Peace Council of Afghanistan and include, in particular, the idea of negotiations with the Taliban movement on condition of approval of even preliminary results by the Afghan Parliament or by the specially assembled Loya Jirga. In order to minimize risks a monitoring group is to be established, which will include representatives of neighbouring

countries and other Heart of Asia states, or a special group of representatives of distant neighbours of Afghanistan; the established group will receive regular information from the Afghan government on the progress of negotiations.

Among the most difficult problems stated by Indian experts and policy-makers is the adoption of the Regional Compact – an international agreement regarding Afghanistan and an agreed detailed programme of joint efforts of the countries of the “Afghan region” based on non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and regard for its sovereignty. Indian plans for settlement of the Afghan problem, elaborated on a partnership basis with the representatives of close and distant neighbours of Afghanistan, reflect the growing concern about the forthcoming changes in the area of conflict in the context of withdrawal of the major part of international forces in 2014. India, with its multi-national population and diverse confessional composition, may become one of the vulnerable instability zones; and its growing ambitions as a regional leader according to the new, more active concept of its foreign policy (“non-alignment-2”, “close neighbours” including the whole of Asia etc.) encourage it to put forward large-scale peace-making initiatives, which may bring about geopolitical, economic, and, to some extent, cultural-and-civilizational effects.

### **The role of Russia in the Afghan settlement after 2014**

**Russia** is playing a waiting game in respect of the Afghan situation at the governmental-and-political level; after a number of principal reconciliatory steps (writing-off the 10 trillion debt of Afghanistan, etc.) it is following a pragmatic course with elements of commercialization (northern supply route of the anti-terrorist coalition, etc.), which enables it to retain freedom to manoeuvre and gradually build up the potential of partnership in relations with the Afghan state, business and society. However,

the outreach and scientific-and-expert components of the Russian policy regarding Afghanistan have drastically declined, although a similar situation has been observed in many countries which have traditional ties with Afghanistan or which are currently expressing interest in Afghan affairs. Trade-and-economic, cultural-and-educational relations as well as public diplomacy are at a low level. The interregional cooperation potential has hardly been used, especially that of territories and districts of the southern border area of Russia; the relevant experience of inter-regional partnership of the late-Soviet period also was not followed up on. There is little demand on the potential of the Afghan diaspora; the needs and problems of the Afghan natives, naturalized or residing in Russia as immigrants, refugees, etc. are ignored.

The above problems dramatically restrict the effect of Russian policy regarding Afghanistan and do not allow taking advantage of the situation when Afghanistan is attempting to rebuild its power structure and lifestyle, and re-evaluate the history and modern state of relations with close and distant neighbours and states outside the region. However, Afghanistan is also the object of regional policy – Russia can and should act in this sphere jointly with other states, in accordance with its national interests and the situation in the region. In this sense partnership with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as well as India, Pakistan and China is the most efficient formula for multilateral actions within the format of the SCO, the Heart of Asia group or other mechanisms of international interaction, not least because settlement of the Afghan problem is a critical imperative of security for Russia itself and its friends, including in Afghanistan. Solving these and other problems requires not only implementation of a number of political measures and foreign economic activities, but also cultural-and-educational programmes, and mobilization of the scientific-and-expert community, based on a network principle, where the scope and format of work should have both fed-

eral and local-regional dimensions, i.e. using the potential of both centre and periphery, which, in its border sectors, still remains a target of the Afghan conflict – the gate-ways for illegal drugs traffic, illegal migration, smuggling, etc.

Interest in Russia as a partner and a country with its closely related Eurasian mentality and culture, rekindled after failures of the international coalition, should be supported by concrete work in various areas of Russo-Afghan cooperation, especially since there are forces in and outside Afghanistan that are trying to focus the Afghan historical memory solely on the conflict period of the 1980s. Furthermore, through the efforts of western propagandists and their Afghan followers, restoration of Afghani independence is associated not with the Anglo-Afghan war of 1919 but with the end of the Soviet military presence in 1989, which is inconsistent with reality and disorients the new Afghan generations in respect of the history of their country, its enemies and friends, neighbours and partners. That is why the Russian side should conduct both practical (in the sphere of diplomacy, economic, cultural-and-educational and other relations, etc.) and scientific-information work in the Russian and other languages. This will allow not only the maintenance of international-political and other presence of Russia in Afghanistan, but also the preservation of those branches of science, culture and education, which are focused on this country and on the broader region of Central and Southern Asia. The change of generations and shortage of professionals in those fields, lack of attention to nearly 100-thousand Afghan diaspora may reduce to zero scientific-and-expert backing of the Russian policy regarding Afghanistan and, in a broader sense, Asia, in these strategic areas.

However, an equally important goal of the Russian policy regarding Afghanistan is the Russo-Indian partnership which is heavily relied upon by both Russia and India, each one in accordance with its state and geopolitical interests, but in the spirit of strategic interaction of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.



### **Regional security and situation in Afghanistan: peculiarities of Kazakhstan's approach**

Kazakhstan, by virtue of its geographical location in Central Asia – no access to the sea and remoteness from conflict zones – has a lower geopolitical value in the eyes of the leading regional and non-regional powers. However the country's leadership tries to compensate for that by numerous initiatives of a broad Eurasian format or acting as a venue for the settlement of pressing international problems. In the last few years the activities of Kazakhstan with regard to Afghanistan too have become noticeable. This work is complicated by a shortage of qualified scientific-and-expert and applied sciences professionals specializing in Afghanistan, but the Kazakh side is carrying out work through the targeted use of the available workforce potential and mobilization of existing governmental analytical structures as well as partnership with a wide range of foreign professionals and organizations. For example, one of the latest scientific-and-research projects of the Kazakh orientalists is devoted to the Baluchistan problem, which has a complex interstate and trans-regional nature and has been used by external forces in the Afghan and other conflicts.

The characteristic feature of the Kazakh approach to the Afghan problem is the testing of various formulas and combinations of the Afghan settlement, including matching Kazakhstani initiatives with the projects of the leading conflict parties. On April 11, 2013 an international conference devoted to the Afghan problem took place in Astana (Kazakhstan). Its organizers were the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies (CMSS – Astana), the Public Opinion Institute and the Pakistani Embassy in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Again, in April 2013 Almaty hosted a Conference of Foreign Ministers of close and distant neighbouring countries of Afghanistan within the Istanbul Process (Heart of Asia), that gave a start to a new direction in Kazakh foreign policy – its transfor-

mation into the main negotiation platform for the Afghan and, possibly, for other international problems. It is in this context that the proposal of RK President Nazarbayev on the creation in Almaty of a UN Centre (a mechanism for prompt consideration and, possibly, resolution of the most pressing issues of international security of the Central Asian region) can be considered.

Among the speeches made at the Astana CMSS Conference the opinion of the Deputy Secretary for National Security of the RK, who stated that the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan would not destabilize the situation in Central Asia, merited special attention. He also noted that the USA was leaving Afghanistan not because it had lost, but because it had achieved its goals. The Kazakh representative believes that the negative potential in the region is generated by internal processes and, primarily, by those which take place in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. They are accompanied by long-lasting environmental and economic problems (food, water supply, etc.). Accordingly, the threat is coming, more likely, from Central Asia itself (for Afghanistan as well) and not the other way round. Islam is gaining strength in this region, and religious extremism and terrorism are more likely to stem from domestic rather than external causes. Inter-ethnic conflicts are also among those threats. The situation in Central Asia is greatly influenced by the processes in the Caspian region, Iran and the South Caucasus – under such conditions the most appropriate line of foreign policy behaviour is *pragmatism*.

**Summary.** For the past two decades, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, post-Soviet Central Asia has turned into a geopolitically important and economically promising region. Central Asian states, as well as sovereign Russia, play a significant role in regional and even in global policy, but its main actors are still the largest powers of Eastern and Southern Asia – China and India respectively, with the increasing role of India as the leader in active peace-making and sustainable development. This means a



restructuring of the system of modern international relations, in which new roles and their actors appear. Kazakhstan is clearly doing very well in this capacity, taking responsibility for the promotion of large-scale international political initiatives (Afghan focus). However, international relations also remain within the traditional spatial and political dimensions, where a great role is played by the European factor represented by the EU, the OSCE and other European or Trans-Atlantic structures. In this regard, the OSCE mandate and activities represent one of the progressive forms of peace-making and security maintenance in all its aspects. However, we would like the OSCE activities in Eurasia to be of a more diversified and less corporatist nature, whether it is in the sphere of human rights, security or education (staff training). For example, the OSCE Academy that has become a real factory churning out experts specifically on the problems of security in Central Asia, is successfully functioning in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan); but its programmes and activities are of a closed or semi-closed nature for applicants from Russia, including representatives of regions directly related to historical and modern Central Asia (Altay, etc.). The same goes for academic forums which are gatherings of metropolitan (Moscow) experts, as a rule, employees of prestigious universities and academic institutions. The OSCE and particularly its specialized structures (scientific-and-educational and information centres, political institutions, etc.) should direct their attentions to the real rather than the “focused” Metropolitan Eurasia and Central Asia, and move their work and, possibly, network, to the “field” – border, conflict and other zones, where the main “non-office” events and processes take place, and where the basis for both security and conflicts is laid.

\*\*\*

## **European Union and Central Asia: Facing the Post 2014 Challenges**

**Aurélia Bouchez**

Excellences, dear colleagues, participants,

I would like to start by thanking the OSCE Centre in Astana, the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, as well as the Embassies of Ukraine and Switzerland for organising this event and inviting me to share the European Union perspective on the regional context of Afghanistan and Central Asia.

As officially announced on a number of occasions the European Union has a long-term commitment towards Afghanistan, which we believe is particularly important during the current transitional period for this country. Every year the EU and its Member States provide Afghanistan with assistance equal to 1 billion euro, focusing on good governance and rule of law, health, rural development.

The EU also supports regional cooperation, such as the Istanbul process, also known as Heart of Asia, because we firmly believe that the neighbours of Afghanistan including Central Asia can contribute to bringing this long conflict situation to an end. Afterwards once the stability conditions are in place, Central Asia could benefit from the big transit potential of Afghanistan, which if successfully realised will also bring significant income to the budget of the country. The EU is confident that the adopted Confidence Building Measure (CBMs) can contribute to achieving stability and improvement of the overall regional security situation, as the CBMs will bring results in the areas of counter narcotics, disaster management (CBM co-chaired by Kazakhstan), trade and investments. At the same time we realise

that the CBMs cannot by themselves create a political process, if the commitment from Afghanistan's neighbours is not there, thus we encourage and support the Central Asian countries to actively participate at the Heart of Asia process.

The EU in its turn continues providing support and assistance in addressing the regional security challenges, including the fight against terrorism. I would like to refer to the increasing focus on security of the EU-Strategy for Central Asia. A good example of EU support in that area was the assistance that has led to the adoption of the Joint Plan of Action for implementation of the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy. The Joint Plan was adopted by all five countries, which made Central Asia become the first region in the world having agreed on such future steps. EU also provides assistance in the border management through the programs BOMCA (Border management Assistance to Central Asia), CADAP (Central Asia Drug Action Program), the new EU-Central Asia action plan on Drugs, as well as the Heroine route programs.

This work makes continuous progress – today is the second day of the meeting of CABS (Central Asia Border Security Initiative), which takes place in Ashgabat and to which Afghanistan is invited at MFA and Border services levels.

In the area of disaster preparedness – for several years the European Union runs the DIPECHO program covering all five Central Asia countries.

All these initiatives require close consultations and exchanges between Central Asia and Afghanistan, and programmatic synergies.

I would like to point out to the establishment of an EU-Central Asia High Level Security dialogue since June 2013, to which Afghanistan official would be associated in 2014. This process is timely and particularly important in view of the upcoming withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

from Afghanistan in 2014. I believe we all share similar concerns regarding what might follow the completion of this process, with consequences reaching beyond the borders of Afghanistan, and which Central Asia should be prepared to face and deal with. I already touched upon some of these transnational threats: drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, extremism, radicalisation and terrorism, illegal migration, trafficking of small arms and light weapons, potential illegal trafficking through the region of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials. Addressing all these threats requires strengthening of the border and customs control, improving the capacity for migration crisis management, significantly improving the coordination between the law enforcement agencies, including through the Eurasian Security Community. The EU, the OSCE, their Member States, other international organisations and countries provide regular assistance to Central Asia in the areas of concern mentioned above.

On the economic level I would like to note the increasing bilateral cooperation between the Central Asia states and Afghanistan (electricity provision, transport, rail, humanitarian support). I would like to encourage further interactions between capitals, not least in order to balance the security links between Central Asia and Afghanistan with commercial opportunities, regional integration, transport, trade, energy (CASA 1000 and TAPI projects).

In concluding I would like to underline that OSCE is well placed to promote cooperation between Central Asia and Afghanistan, and that its field presences in the region are key for that purpose. I express my confidence that with the determination shown also during today's conference we all will succeed in stabilising the region and significantly improving the security situation.

\*\*\*

## CARICC as Proper Regional Security Mechanism

Beksultan Sarsekov


**UNODC**  
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

**CARICC**  
 CENTRAL ASIAN REGIONAL INFORMATION AND COORDINATION CENTRE FOR COMBATING ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTIC DRUGS, PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES AND THEIR PRECURSORS  
 ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОАЗИАТСКИЙ РЕГИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ИНФОРМАЦИОННЫЙ И КООРДИНАЦИОННЫЙ ЦЕНТР ПО БОРЬБЕ С НЕЗАКОННЫМ ОБРОТНОМ НАРКОТИЧЕСКИХ СРЕДСТВ, ПСИХОТРОПНЫХ ВЕЩЕСТВ И ИХ ПРЕКУРСОРОВ

**CARICC**  
 ЦАРИКЦ

**CARICC as a Practical Mechanism of Regional Security**

Beksultan Sarsekov  
 CARICC Director  
 52, Abay avenue,  
 050008, Almaty, Kazakhstan  
 +7 (727) 244 24 03  
[registry@caricc.org](mailto:registry@caricc.org)  
[www.caricc.org](http://www.caricc.org)





**UNODC**  
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

**CARICC**  
ЦАРИКУ

CENTRAL ASIAN REGIONAL INFORMATION AND COORDINATION CENTRE FOR COMBATING ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTIC DRUGS, PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES AND THEIR PRECURSORS  
ЦЕНТРАЛЬНО-АЗИАТСКИЙ ИНФОРМАЦИОННЫЙ И СООПЯСОВАТЕЛЬСКИЙ ЦЕНТР ПО БОРЬБЕ С НЕЗАКОННЫМ ОБОРОТОМ НАРКОТИКОВ, ПСИХОТРОПНЫХ ВЕЩЕСТВ И ИХ ПРЕКУРСОРОВ

## Goal of CARICC Establishment

**Goal** – coordinating efforts of competent authorities of member-states – participants in countering illicit drug trafficking.

**Primary Objectives:**

- Assisting in organization and coordination of joint international operations in combating transnational drug-related crime;
- Collecting, storing, protecting, analyzing and exchanging information on drug-related crime.

**CARICC member-states identify the National Coordinating competent bodies that ensure cooperation with the Center.**

**UNODC**  
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

**CARICC**  
ЦАРИКУ

CENTRAL ASIAN REGIONAL INFORMATION AND COORDINATION CENTRE FOR COMBATING ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTIC DRUGS, PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES AND THEIR PRECURSORS  
ЦЕНТРАЛЬНО-АЗИАТСКИЙ ИНФОРМАЦИОННЫЙ И СООПЯСОВАТЕЛЬСКИЙ ЦЕНТР ПО БОРЬБЕ С НЕЗАКОННЫМ ОБОРОТОМ НАРКОТИКОВ, ПСИХОТРОПНЫХ ВЕЩЕСТВ И ИХ ПРЕКУРСОРОВ

## Observers at CARICC

	<b>Austria</b>		<b>Afghanistan</b>		<b>Great Britain</b>		<b>Germany</b>		<b>Italy</b>		<b>Canada</b>
	<b>China</b>		<b>Pakistan</b>		<b>Romania</b>		<b>Turkey</b>		<b>Ukraine</b>		<b>France</b>
	<b>Finland</b>		<b>USA</b>		<b>Interpol</b>		<b>SELEC</b>				

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

CARICC CENTRAL ASIAN REGIONAL INFORMATION AND COORDINATION CENTRE FOR COMBATING ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTIC DRUGS, PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES AND THEIR PRECURSORS

## Developing Coordination with CARICC

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WCO (Memorandum has been signed)</li> <li>Interpol (an observer status)</li> <li>Europol</li> <li>SECI/SELEC Centre (Memorandum has been signed + an observer status)</li> <li>INCB</li> <li>JPC (Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan)</li> <li>IOCCC</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CIS ATC (Memorandum has been signed)</li> <li>CIS Executive Committee</li> <li>CSTO</li> <li>CIS OCFOC</li> <li>OSCE (letter of cooperation)</li> <li>PATS SCO</li> </ul>	
---	---	--	---

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

CARICC CENTRAL ASIAN REGIONAL INFORMATION AND COORDINATION CENTRE FOR COMBATING ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTIC DRUGS, PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES AND THEIR PRECURSORS


## Assisting in the organization and coordinating joint international operations

- ▶ **Long-term integrated international operations:**
  - Multilateral long-term operation “Black Tulip”;
  - International operation “TARCEP”;
  - Operation “Global Shield”.
- ▶ **One-time operations and investigations:**
  - Special operations be the method of controlled delivery;
  - Checkout activities;
  - Assisting in searching for wanted.











**UNODC**  
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime



**CARICC**  
ЦАРИКЦ


CENTRAL ASIAN REGIONAL INFORMATION AND COORDINATION CENTRE FOR COMBATING ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTIC DRUGS, PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES AND THEIR PRECURSORS  
ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОАЗИАТСКИЙ РЕГИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ИНФОРМАЦИОННО-КООРДИНАЦИОННЫЙ ЦЕНТР ПО БОРЬБЕ С НЕЗАКОННЫМ ОБРОТНОМ НАРКОТИЧЕСКИХ ВЕЩЕСТВ, ПСИХОТРОПНЫХ ВЕЩЕСТВ И ИХ ПРЕКУРСОРОВ

## The example of coordination of controlled delivery by CARICC in case of "Black Tulip" operation




The map illustrates the 'Black Tulip' operation, a coordinated effort between the Kyrgyz Republic and China. A red line traces the path of controlled delivery from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, to Beijing, China, and finally to Guangzhou, China. Two inset images show a commercial airplane and a truck, representing the modes of transport used in the operation. The map also labels other countries in the region, including Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Iran, Pakistan, and India.

**Participants of the joint operation:**  
 GCNS of Kyrgyzstan, CNS of Kazakhstan,  
 MPS of China and CARICC..



**UNODC**  
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime



**CARICC**  
 CENTRAL ASIAN REGIONAL INFORMATION AND COORDINATION CENTRE FOR COMBATING ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTIC DRUGS, PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES AND THEIR PRECURSORS  
 УЎРАҚАШАМАҚАНАԢԱԿԱՆ ԻՆՖՈՐՄԱԿԱՆՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԵՎ ԿՈՕՐԴԻՆԱԿԱՆ ՎԵՐԻՑ ԴՈ ՏՈՒՄԱԼ-ԵՔՍՊԼՈՑԻՎՈՐ ՕՍԵՐՈՒՄԻՆ ԿՈՆԿՐԵՏԱԿԱՆ ՇՐՋԱՆԿՈՒՄԻՆ ԵՎ ԻՆՏԵՐՍՏՐԱԿՏԻՎ ՏՈՒՄԱՆԵՐԻՆ

# CARICC in the operation ‘Global Shield’


## Goal of the Operation:

to identify and dismantle channels of diverting precursors, used in manufacturing improvised explosive devices (IEDs), into illicit trafficking.

**85% of all acts of terrorism in the world are committed by IEDs.**

## A role of CARICC as a regional communication center:

- ▶ Collecting and analyzing information on seizure cases of precursors in CARICC member states;
- ▶ Identifying high-risk deliveries of chemical precursors to the countries' region;
- ▶ Coordinating joint checks on the seizures cases of precursors and their high-risk deliveries.





UNODC  
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

CARICC  
CENTRAL ASIAN REGIONAL INFORMATION AND COORDINATION CENTRE FOR COMBATING ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTIC DRUGS, PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES AND THEIR PRECURSORS  
УПРАВЛЕНИЕ ПО ПРОТИВООПРАВЛЕНИЮ НЕЗАКОННОМУ ОБРОТНОМУ РАССЕЛЕНИЮ НАРКОТИКОВ, ПСИХОТРОПНЫХ ВЕЩЕСТВ И ИХ ПРЕКУРСОРОВ

## Outcomes of the use of CARICC capacities

- ▶ competent authorities in coordination by CARICC had conducted 29 international operations to interdict drug delivery channels of opiates originating in Afghanistan to Central Asia, Russia, Europe, China, Canada and Malaysia;
- ▶ more than 6,174 kg of drugs were seized;
- ▶ 58 organizers and DTOs members were arrested.




UNODC  
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

CARICC  
CENTRAL ASIAN REGIONAL INFORMATION AND COORDINATION CENTRE FOR COMBATING ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF NARCOTIC DRUGS, PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES AND THEIR PRECURSORS  
УПРАВЛЕНИЕ ПО ПРОТИВООПРАВЛЕНИЮ НЕЗАКОННОМУ ОБРОТНОМУ РАССЕЛЕНИЮ НАРКОТИКОВ, ПСИХОТРОПНЫХ ВЕЩЕСТВ И ИХ ПРЕКУРСОРОВ

## Search for offenders utilizing CARICC capacities

- ▶ in 2008, NSC RoK based on the Tajikistan DCA's request, had arrested one of the leaders of Nigerian DTOs in Almaty “T.Sh.K.”;
- ▶ in 2011, as a result of interaction between NSC RoK and DCA RT, an organizer “Z.T.Sh.” of smuggling 78 kg of heroin from Kazakhstan to Russia was arrested in Dushanbe;
- ▶ CARICC facilitated information exchange among the competent authorities of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan on searching R. A. Khaitov, who was arrested on 07.01.2012 in Dushanbe with 8 kg 708 grams of heroin and 33 kg 92 grams of opium;
- ▶ With the assistance of CARICC, Canadian police had arrested a citizen of Kazakhstan, Vice-President of “Kazatomprom”, R. Tursunbayev, wanted by NSC of Kazakhstan, on 10/02/2012, in Toronto.









## Central Asia and the OSCE at the centre of international security problems

Sanat Kushkumbayev

The OSCE continues to be an important dialogue platform to discuss a wide range of issues related to strengthening security, including arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence- and security-building measures, post-conflict settlement, economic and environmental security, human rights and election monitoring, inter alia.

At the same time, the importance of the OSCE should not be overestimated. Given the consensus of the participants, looking forward strategically, the influence and the role of the Organization may increase, but currently, the OSCE remains, and apparently will be in the medium term, a place for debating different approaches – American ones (or Western, in a broader sense) and Russian ones. The essence of the Western understanding of the OSCE role was concisely and clearly stated by Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, the former Secretary General of the OSCE: "The OSCE is neither a military alliance, nor an economic union, but it is a system of common values and common interests".

Based on the afore-going, in the West and in a number of CIS countries, there is a different understanding of the nature of the OSCE. The West looks at the Organization from the point of view of its values, whereas some CIS states see it as a universal institution, a small-scale UN of sorts, which results in speaking "different languages".

Despite the transformation of approaches which had taken place since halfway through the first decade of the 2000s, it is still important for the European countries to promote through the OSCE their own approaches and values (democracy, human

rights, market economy, etc.), and consequently, the role of the humanitarian "basket" for the European members of the OSCE in the foreseeable future will be one of the primary ones.

The similarity of Western approaches is that the key to resolving economic-and- environmental, politico-military and further, international security issues lies in the sphere of values, namely, in promoting Western standards in politics, economy and law. In this context, the OSCE continues to be a tool for involving the post-Soviet countries in the sphere of Western values.

It should not be forgotten that, in general, the role of the OSCE in the political life of Western countries is insignificant for the afore-mentioned reasons. The values and main approaches have been developed and are generally shared by North American and European members of the OSCE.

Relatively effective European and transatlantic instruments exist for the resolution of the pressing problems of security and trade-and-economic interaction. There is no doubt that for Western politicians the roles of the EU and NATO, as functional structures, are far more significant. Their activities are known to the majority of residents of these countries, and these organizations bear larger scale functional responsibilities in the key issues of socio-economic life and international security.

It is obvious that European countries will not consider any substantial overhaul of proven mechanisms of transatlantic security related to NATO and the special role of the United States. Illustrative of this were the words spoken by the President of the European Commission, J.M. Barroso, at the international forum in Brussels on 26 March 2010: "The transatlantic partnership is special in a way that none of these other relationships are. We do not pursue different visions of global order, based on competing values. We are not geopolitical or strategic rivals. Ours is a win-win relationship."<sup>\*</sup>

<sup>\*</sup> H.E. Jose Manuel Barroso, President, European Commission. Keynote Address. // [http://www.gmfus.org/brusselsforum/2010/docs/2010-03-26\\_transatlantic-11624.pdf](http://www.gmfus.org/brusselsforum/2010/docs/2010-03-26_transatlantic-11624.pdf).



For the Western politicians, due to the afore-mentioned reasons, the role of the OSCE will be reduced to that of an instrument for involving and promoting their own standards and values in the direction of “east of Vienna” and other neighbouring regions. Therefore, it is logical that Western countries initiate in the OSCE border areas the creation of mechanisms for involvement and dissemination of their own values; for example, the creation of the OSCE Mediterranean and Asian Partners for Co-operation groups. As is known, within the framework of this group voluntary implementation of OSCE standards and commitments by partner countries is envisaged.

The OSCE is the only large international structure which includes states belonging to different political, military-strategic and economic blocs, organizations and forums, such as the EU, NATO, the CIS, the SCO, the CSTO, the CU and others.

It should be noted that due to significant differences, developed among the member states, the OSCE has suffered an imbalance of the system of agreements, created in the ‘cold war’ period and in the 1990s. The provisions of a number of agreements regulating various aspects of interaction among member states in the sphere of politico-military security must be updated. Such important instruments as the Vienna Documents on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and a number of others have not been fully implemented.

For example, in the field of strategic security, these are the issues concerning further expansion of NATO to the East, the prospects of the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (ACFE), and the suspended issue of the deployment of the US Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence (ABM) elements in the countries of Eastern Europe, inter alia.

The risks of escalation of ethno-territorial conflicts remain; these include the situation in Georgia, in Transnistria, the settle-

ment of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict and instability in Kyrgyzstan. In the field of energy security, conflict potential surrounds such issues as the creation of new energy transportation corridors.

Several important areas of OSCE activity are the subject of debates between Russia and the Western members of the Organization. The Russian side believes that OSCE member states, which are keen on sending their election observers, must not themselves, in their turn, refuse to receive international observers.

For their part, the USA and the EU countries believe that independent monitoring of elections by the ODIHR is one of the main objectives of the OSCE. In their opinion, this mechanism must be preserved and enhanced. In this context, the USA and a number of European countries do not consider the issue of reforming the ODIHR to be relevant.

Due to the large number of members and the stage-by-stage character of the discussion procedure, implementation of new initiatives in the OSCE requires time. In addition, the fact that documents, which are adopted within the framework of the Organization, are not legally binding but represent political commitments only, is an advantage and a certain draw-back of the OSCE.

During its chairmanship, Kazakhstan brought to the fore the question of a more even distribution of the OSCE “three baskets”. As noted above, all three dimensions (politico-military, economic-environmental and humanitarian) of the Organization’s activity are equal, and, in this context, there are positive expectations in a number of post-Soviet countries. In addition, Kazakhstan initiated a discussion on the Eurasian security dimension, which focused, inter alia, on a set of problems related to the settlement of the situation in Afghanistan, as well as on topical issues of regional stability and security in Central Asia, including the situation in Kyrgyzstan.

The tragic events of June 2010 in the south of Kyrgyzstan once again raised the issue of efficient mechanisms of localization and resolution of conflicts. The initiative calling for an international investigation of the interethnic conflict and the involvement of the OSCE Police Advisory Group unfortunately became another watershed in the political life of Kyrgyzstan. Due to internal political debates, which often had a counterproductive character, this initiative failed to materialize.\*

Obviously, security cannot be divided by borders, barriers and the like. There is no doubt, that the idea of realizing Eurasian security in a broader context is a question for the future, perhaps, even the distant future, but modern processes develop rapidly.

Afghanistan borders on the OSCE area, and is a place where the transatlantic and Eurasian security levels meet. After all, both Asian and European countries suffer from problems in Afghanistan. As is known, the lion's share of Afghan narcotics transit through the neighbouring countries on their way to Europe.

The war on the illegal drug trade is still of pressing importance worldwide and in the OSCE area, in particular. As the attempts to resolve this problem show, current efforts, undertaken at the national and international levels, are still insufficient to bring about a fundamental change in this threatening tendency determined by the growing number and widening geography of users, and consequently by the expansion of production and the criminal network of drug supply.

In our opinion, it is a valid point of view that combating illegal drug trafficking will be more effective using a comprehensive approach, which implies closer coordination of national and international efforts, elimination of duplication in the activities of various international organizations, and their targeted and a clear competence.

\* As, for example, protests by young people against allowing the OSCE Police Advisory Group into the country, instigated by some politicians.

In fact, drug production is the basis of the war industry in Afghanistan. In addition, the drug trade is the essential and often key source of financing international terrorism. Accordingly, the destruction of the drug production economy is one of the key conditions for stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. According to experts, there is a direct correlation between the level of security and stability in one or other province of the country, and the production of the opium poppy.

Given the disrupted irrigation system, permanent instability and security threat, the cultivation of the opium poppy is quite often regarded by many Afghan peasants as the only means of survival. The destruction of poppy crops, which is often the only source of income, not supplemented by the development of alternative substitution programmes, will only result in the impoverishment and the growth in armed resistance.

Corruption, another phenomenon accompanying illegal drug trafficking, has reached dangerous proportions in an Afghanistan torn apart by war. According to international and local experts, the drug trade involves not only armed groups, fighting each other and the government, and military commanders, but also high-ranking officials of the country and the army, and Members of Parliament.

The problem of corruption within the state apparatus and law enforcement bodies is a burning issue at present in Central Asian countries. According to expert evaluations, only 2-3 % of drugs, passing through the territory of states in the region, are being seized by the law enforcement bodies.

The difficult socio-economic situation in Afghanistan and neighbouring countries, unemployment and poverty on a large scale are a breeding ground for replenishing the ranks of drug couriers. Moreover, high migration mobility, driven by the search for work, also contributes to the variety of drug traffic channels. In this context, the situation in the Central Asian region is repre-

sentative. In most cases, the police arrest those at the very bottom of criminal pyramids, such as rank-and-file couriers, while the organizers, drug dealers and drug barons, remain out of reach of justice.

In parallel with the measures to fight corruption, it is necessary to enhance the level of competence of and interaction between various bodies at the national (border, customs and police) and international levels (agencies and programmes of different organizations). There is a need for more effective inter-country cooperation at the level of specialized anti-drug agencies in order to prevent the activities of the drug syndicates.

43 OSCE member states are involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. It is necessary to enhance coordination among various international organizations and programmes. The work of the OSCE, NATO, the CSTO, the SCO, the UN, the EU, the CIS, the WB, Interpol and other international organizations and programmes concerning anti-drug activities require enhanced cooperation.

In practice, there has to be a change in the perception of the OSCE partners that together with the importance of the Euro-Atlantic dimension, the Eurasian factor is becoming no less important an element of joint security.

The resolution of security problems include the creation and joint operation of various transport arteries which would connect the Eurasian space. Opening transport communications and improving interstate transport infrastructure have a great potential for interaction. Geo-economic activity of Kazakhstan in this area, in particular in the realization of transcontinental transport corridors Western Europe – Western China and North-South, represents a significant contribution to stability and sustainability of our region.

The problem of international migration, which is increasingly affecting different countries, is extremely pressing. Large-scale

migration flows run from Asia to Europe and North America. Therefore, in order not to play catch-up and to respond appropriately to present-day challenges in the global economy, politics and other spheres, it is necessary to consolidate the common security space.

\*\*\*

## Summary of the Second Session “Regional security in Central Asia and the Afghan factor”

Andrew Tesoriere

The second session assessed Central Asian regional security and the potential impact on it of Afghanistan, in the light of ISAF withdrawal by 2014 and the ongoing Afghan transitional process.

Five presentations were made : three by regional academic experts (one each from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Russia) and two by representatives of multinational institutions (the EU and CARICC, the counter-narcotics regional organisation).

5 broad key messages emerged from this session :

### 1. Afghanistan and Central Asia are interconnected.

The conference considered that Afghanistan *is* part of Central Asia, indelibly connected through history, people, migration patterns, cross-border trade (legal and illicit) and riparian resources. The creation of greater transport and energy links would enhance stability, regional collective interests and shared political will.

### 2. Afghanistan’s future after 2014 is difficult to predict. Central Asian States (CASs) should be prepared for uncertainties.

The presentations and subsequent discussion analysed the seeds of instability in Afghanistan and how these could impact on wider Central Asia. The main drivers of instability in Afghanistan included trenchant pockets of violent extremism ; widespread corruption ; the production and illicit trafficking of drugs ; and public vulnerabilities arising from poverty, inflation and the low literacy rate. These factors represented significant challenges for

the Afghan Authorities, particularly after the departure of ISAF forces.

The conference considered Central Asian States (CASs) should proactively prepare on a contingency basis for further internal instability in Afghanistan. Successful Afghan Presidential elections in 2014 would be indicative but not decisive for future national stability. A few speakers viewed the return of the Taliban as unstoppable. The Afghan Authorities might have to make a tough choice between political negotiation with the Taliban or fighting to the close. Both options would have repercussions for the Central Asian States. A unified CAS’ policy position would be desirable. More effective border security and management between Afghanistan and the CASs was essential given the long and porous contiguous borders.

The conference acknowledged and further encouraged the regional initiatives in support of Afghan stability and prosperity of the Central Asian States as well as of Afghanistan’s other neighbours (China, Iran and Pakistan) and “near neighbours” (Russia, India and Turkey). The collective interests of Afghanistan’s external partners should mobilise them towards still greater cooperation. The Istanbul process (embracing the Heart of Asia initiative) had become the regional assistance standard-bearer. The 6 working groups of the Istanbul Process, which were developing and implementing sectoral confidence-building measures, were fully welcomed by the conference. The conference also noted other innovative ideas coming from among others Iran (eg the “Khorasan” initiative), China with its considerable commercial investments and Russia with its reinvigorated infrastructural and commercial projects. Many of these initiatives offered valuable local employment and training opportunities.

### 3. Unresolved conflict issues within and among Central Asian States needed attention.

The conference highlighted unsettled disputes concerning water and energy use and distribution ; unresolved border delimitation and demarcation ; and shortcomings in human rights, governance and the rule of law, resulting in a deficit in public trust in Authorities. The political will to address some of these difficulties – some a legacy from the demise of the USSR – was lacking at national leadership-level. Nevertheless some progress had been made in areas covered by the OSCE’s third basket, the human dimension, and civil society was becoming more coherent and self-confident. However this progress was uneven across the region.

4. Exchanges between international and regional organisations and between State and civil society should be strengthened to underpin stability in wider Central Asia.

The conference underlined the practical value of building dialogue, trust and cooperation, among and within CASs as well as between the five CASs and Afghanistan.

The EU presentation underlined its long-term commitment to stability and prosperity in Afghanistan and the wider region, based on a partnership approach. The EU’s serious political commitment was reflected in the start in 2013 of an annual EU-Central Asia high-level security dialogue, which Afghanistan will join in 2014.

CARICC briefed the conference on its rapid organisational and operational progress in its initial years of existence, creating well-functioning international and regional liaison channels and achieving significant operational and geographically far-reaching successes in drug seizures and interdictions.

5. The OSCE can continue to contribute to stability in Central Asia and Afghanistan.

The conference welcomed a continued OSCE support for training and peer exchange on counter-narcotics, counter-terror-

ism, border management, civil society support, governance and environmental challenges. Such support could include better use by Central Asian States and Afghanistan of OSCE facilities in-region, notably the OSCE Academy in Bishkek and Border Management Staff College (BMSC) in Dushanbe, but also the good offices of the OSCE Field Presences in all five CASs as well as the wider range of OSCE Institutions (eg ODIHR, HCNM etc).

The EU welcomed OSCE regional engagement, recognising the comparative strength of OSCE Field presences, and sought programmatic complementarity. CARICC appreciated its current liaison with the OSCE and would welcome further training and information sharing opportunities.

**Moderator’s observations and recommendations**

This conference was more descriptive and analytical than commendatory. Nevertheless I would recommend that the underlying 5 key messages outlined above, which represent important local viewpoints, are communicated to the OSCE Troika. While the messages are not new, they provide important reaffirmation of previous work and encourage the OSCE on its current lines of action.

However, one element which may be new is the desire of the conference participants for some shape of forum, which acts as a focal point in Central Asia for background and up-to-date information and analysis on Afghanistan and its relationship with wider Central Asia. I base this remark on the self-declaratory statements from conference delegates that they felt they lacked insight into developments and prospects in Afghanistan. This forum could be “virtual” (eg web-based) or with fixed premises and supporting staff and budget. Options could include developing such a forum as a UN/OSCE joint project. Whatever forum format is chosen, it would be well advised to forge strong links with UNAMA (in Kabul), UNRCCA (in Ashgabat) and OSCE

Field Presences in Central Asia. Another format option would be to augment the OSCE Academy in Bishkek to have such an “Afghanistan observatory” for monitoring, analysis and forecasting synergies between Afghanistan and wider Central Asia.

The OSCE incoming Chair might wish to consider initiating a small project, involving possibly an external consultant, to study the options for such a forum in more detail and offer clear recommendations. This would form an important part of OSCE achieving greater overall coherence and coordination in its Afghanistan-related activities as well as meeting Central Asian regional calls for such a forum, as exemplified in this Conference.

\*\*\*

---

### **THIRD SESSION TRANSNATIONAL THREATS TO EURASIAN SPACE**

---

#### **Transnational Threats Originating from Afghanistan: the Role and Significance of the OSCE**

**Guli Yuldasheva**

#### **Background**

Currently and in the foreseeable future, the vast majority of transnational threats for Central Asia will be mainly associated with neighbouring, unstable Afghanistan. Such threats usually include international terrorism, extremism, transnational organised crime, trafficking of illegal drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors, as well as trafficking of arms, ammunition and explosives, illegal migration and threats to information security. The degree of their presence and the methods to counteract them vary in different CA countries.

It is evident that the biggest threat for the majority of CA countries is posed by various kinds of extremism and the drug trade. The issue of illegal migration is being tackled legislatively and through strict border controls on the part of the Central Asian states. In particular, following the events in Khorog, the government of Tajikistan began to consider the possibility of deporting Afghani refugees. Similar restrictions were placed on Afghan refugees in Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan forced refugees to leave the country as early as the 1990s. Today, the right of entry to Uzbekistan is limited in accordance with the procedure of entry and exit for foreign citizens and stateless persons, approved by the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers<sup>\*</sup>. At the same time, experts

---

<sup>\*</sup> See also: Art. 223 RUz Criminal Code (CC).



note that there are up to 40,000 tons of opium illegally stored in Afghanistan\*. In 2011, law enforcement agencies of the Republic of Uzbekistan alone uncovered 8,171 crimes related to the illegal narcotic and psychotropic substance trade\*\*. Afghan heroin and opium supply remains the primary source for the underground narcotics market in Central Asia.

### “Pro and con” factors

Alongside the persisting potential of the aforementioned threats to Central Asian stability, it is also possible to highlight a number of factors which are not so prominent but, in fact, counteract those threats, such as:

- **The weariness of Afghan society, including representatives of radical circles, of warfare and chaos in the country.** The former Minister of Finance in the Taliban government, Mullah Aga Djan Motasim, recently said\*\*\* that the majority of militants desired reconciliation in Afghanistan, but were being pressured by the leaders of the movement. According to Motasim, the Taliban supreme leader, Mullah Omar, is limited in his powers, and the movement has already partially slipped out of his control. This tendency is reflected in the fact that the Taliban’s second-in-command, Mullah Abdul Gani Baradar, has been released from his Pakistani prison in order to continue negotiations on the reconciliation process with the Afghan government\*\*\*\*.

- **Fragmentation and weakness of militant groups, whose actions are directed solely at gaining access to power and respective protection of their ethno-national and religious interests in the country.** For example, in its report entitled “The

Taliban and perspectives of reconciliation”, the Royal United Services Institute of Great Britain speaks about the existence of two movements within the Taliban. The Talibs’ main demand is to prevent the United States from intervening in Afghanistan’s domestic policy\*. A certain weakness of radical movements, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), was noted in the report of the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, R. Blake\*\*.

- **Strategy of counteracting extremism and drug trafficking on the part of Central Asian countries.** Experts admit that as a result of the complex measures taken to oppose religious extremism (including its prevention), Uzbekistan “generally succeeded in containing the development of the politico-religious situation in the country, as well as in driving the Islamic opposition out of the country”\*\*\*. For its part, the Kazakhstani leadership generally takes timely and appropriate measures to counteract these threats.\*\*\*\* It is not accidental that President Nazarbayev is certain that “nothing critical will happen” after the withdrawal of international coalition forces from Afghanistan.\*\*\*\*\* With regard to countering drug trafficking, it is worth mentioning both local established mechanisms to combat this challenge and the growing interaction among the CA countries within the framework of the CARICC.

- **Over 20 years of co-existence and partnership of the CA states with unstable Afghanistan.** Over this period of time, despite persisting difficulties, Central Asian countries have accumulated certain experience in institution-building, have im-

\* The Russian Federal Drug Control Service is concerned about the militarisation of drug gangs in Northern Afghanistan. Available from: <<http://www.afghanistan.ru/doc/64418.html>>, 20.09.2013>.

\*\* Analysis of the drug situation in the Republic of Uzbekistan in 2011. Available from: <[http://www.ncdc.uz/ru/anti\\_trafficking/prevention/?ELEMENT\\_ID=46](http://www.ncdc.uz/ru/anti_trafficking/prevention/?ELEMENT_ID=46)>.

\*\*\* The former Taliban government Minister: Most militants want peace. Available from: <<http://www.afghanistan.ru/doc/64472.html>>, 23.09.2013>.

\*\*\*\* Mullah Baradar released from Pakistani prison. Available from: <<http://www.afghanistan.ru/doc/64444.html>>, 21.09.2013>.

\* U.S. negotiations with the moderate wing of the Taliban to be continued after the presidential elections. Available from: <[www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=19423](http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=19423)>, 11.09.2012>.

\*\* The United States to assist Central Asia in combating radical Islam. Report by Robert O. Blake, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs of the U.S. Department of State. Available from: <<http://kavpolit.com/ssha-pomozhet-centralnoj-azii-v-borbe-s-radikalnym-islamom/?print>>.

\*\*\* Polyakov K. Methods of counteracting the Islamic opposition in Uzbekistan. Available from: <<http://kavpolit.com/metody-protivodejstviya-islamskoj-oppozicii-v-uzbekistane/>>.

\*\*\*\* Polyakov K.. Islamic extremism in Kazakhstan. Available from: <[kavpolit.com/islamskij-ekstremizm-v-kazaxstane](http://kavpolit.com/islamskij-ekstremizm-v-kazaxstane)>.

\*\*\*\*\* Khorunzhiy N. Will there be a NATO military base in Kazakhstan? Available from: <<http://inforos.ru/?module=news&action=view&id=34321>>, 06.05.2013>.

proved politico-military, law enforcement and diplomatic structures, and have continued to fight for information security. The effectiveness of these measures can be judged by the capability of law enforcement bodies to monitor the situation and not to have allowed, during this period, the spread of pockets of instability throughout the entire region, and to secure necessary conditions for the “small actions strategy” in Afghanistan which has already begun to be implemented in Central Asia. In this regard, experts stress that “it was Uzbekistan with its rather authoritarian regime that has become the major barrier to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia”<sup>\*</sup>.

It goes without saying that under the conditions of the persisting instability in the Middle East and Southern and Central Asia these factors do not remove from the agenda the issues related to border protection and measures to prevent potential bursts of trans-border activity of various radical groups such as the IMU, as well as drug trafficking, which supports their activity. Common regional security threats and challenges in Central Asia demand greater cooperation and coordination of the CA states’ actions to prevent the development of possible negative scenarios following the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces in 2014. The more so, that the persisting difficult socio-economic situation in the transitional societies of Central Asia, and the ideological and spiritual void which followed the collapse of the totalitarian ideology and atheistic propaganda serve, to a large extent, as fertile ground for transnational threats. In these circumstances, some Central Asian nationals, predominantly young people, fall under the influence of dodgy groups and individuals that offer them money, along with their own understanding of Islam, alien to local traditions, resulting in some individuals’ involvement in criminal terrorist activities and drug trafficking.

<sup>\*</sup> Gusev L. The political situation in modern Uzbekistan. Available from: <<http://www.ia-centr.ru/expert/557/>, 03.03.2008>.

Overcoming such challenges and threats requires, above all, the completion of large-scale, long-term reforms in Central Asian countries, in accordance with their strategic goals and objectives in the politico-military, socio-economic and science-and-education spheres, which can significantly reduce the potential of instability in Central Asia.

### **The Role and Significance of the OSCE**

In this connection there is an increase in the role and significance of such international organizations as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which is capable, within the framework of its functions, of ensuring balanced participation of Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian partners, and providing assistance to CA countries in preventing transnational threats within the three dimensions of its activity.

Participation of Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian partners in a common international structure, within a process shared by everybody, makes it possible to realise in practice the principle of indivisibility of comprehensive global security and interconnection of all its components and subjects, which is important for achieving a balance of interests and adopting a common decision in one or other sphere of security. In this respect, a significant role is played by the transnational character of this Organization, and its broad powers and capacity to take practical measures to prevent and settle regional and local conflicts. Rendering all-round assistance in all three dimensions of the OSCE activities – politico-military, economic-and-environmental, and human dimension – is of great importance for the reforming Central Asian countries, surrounded by unstable radical states. In particular, in the politico-military sphere, promoting the reforms of law-enforcement bodies, including funding and relevant infrastructural assistance, measures to strengthen border security, identification of victims of human trafficking, consultative help when training instructors and so on, are of great importance. In the economic-

and-environmental area the OSCE contributes to efforts against money-laundering and terrorism funding, promotes the development of national anti-corruption action plans, assists in improving environmental awareness, monitoring environmental threats and sharing best practices. Thus, on October 3-4 in Tashkent, under the auspices of the OSCE, a regional seminar was held to share best practices in the area of the development of renewable energy sources. As for the third dimension, it should be noted that the OSCE representatives helped Uzbekistan in the issues of developing its mass media, and in the area of human rights law propaganda.

Overall, the OSCE today strives to assist Central Asian states on a bilateral and multilateral basis, relying in its activities on public diplomacy and civil society, aiding democratic reforms, funding and training law-enforcement bodies, carrying out annual consultations, and border control actions, etc. For example, within the framework of the Memorandum signed with Uzbekistan, the OSCE, jointly with the Ministries and governmental departments of Uzbekistan, implemented in all three dimensions 18 successful projects in 2007, 15 in 2008, 14 in 2009 and 12 in 2010. Currently, a total of 30 OSCE projects are being implemented in Uzbekistan. Actively involved in the projects are civil society institutions, including governmental human rights organizations: The Authorised Person of Oliy Mazhilis for Human Rights (Ombudsman), the National Human Rights Centre, as well as NANNOUz (the National Association of Non-Governmental Non-Commercial Organizations of Uzbekistan) and other non-governmental, non-commercial organizations of Uzbekistan.

Nevertheless, these activities are largely episodic and non-regular. It should be remembered that the OSCE relations with CA countries only started gaining momentum in 2010, after Kazakhstan came to office as chair of this Organization. Therefore,

at present, the OSCE activities in the Central Asian region have not yet produced tangible results due to

- the continuing geopolitical differences and disagreements between the member states of the OSCE (USA-Russia, Russia-EU, USA-EU\*), which divert resources and time, bring about a crisis of confidence and prevent compromises being reached when taking political decisions;
- the transitional state of Central Asian societies (manifested, as is known, in institutional weakness, human resource deficiency and a low level of political culture);
- an imbalance in OSCE activities towards excessive focusing on the issues of democratisation of society and human rights ("third basket"). Actually, the OSCE is combating the effect (the result of the historical legacy and the present-day transitional state, which forms a specific culture and leads to violation of humanitarian rights), and not the cause. It is not accidental that the joint declaration of the CIS countries, delivered at the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna, states that the Organization is ineffective and "failed to adapt to the demands of the changing world". The OSCE "field activities" faced the harshest criticism – the activities are limited to "monitoring the situation regarding human rights and democratic institution" \*\*.
- the preoccupation of the EU countries with the problems of their own development, which up to the present has led to a lessening of their interest in the initiatives of the CA region \*\*\*. This is illustrated by the very name of the Organization and the history of its activities focused on the issues of European security alone

\* See, for example: Boonstra Jos, Laruelle Marlene. EU-US Cooperation in Central Asia: Parallel Lines Meet in Infinity?// EUCAM Policy Brief/No 31 – July 2013 – [www.eucentralasia.eu](http://www.eucentralasia.eu).

\*\* Lukianov F. "Final act. CIS countries sentenced the OSCE", *Vremya novostey* #119 as of 9.07.2004 quoted in: Tolipov Farkhod. Uzbekistan armed forces twenty years post-independence. *The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies*, Issue 11, 2010. Available from: <<http://pipss.revues.org/3785>>.

\*\*\* See, for example: Gusarova A. The OSCE Astana Declaration: Outcomes and prospects. *ANALYTIC*. Astana, 2012. № 6 (70). Available from: <<http://kisi.kz/img/docs/6273.pdf>>.

– just to name the OSCE-adopted documents, such as the 1996 Declaration on “A Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century”, the Charter for European Security of 1999, and the 2000 “Declaration on the Role of the OSCE in South-Eastern Europe”.

\*\*\*

The period of close interaction of CA countries with the OSCE since 2010 is too short to draw conclusions regarding any significant progress in tackling the transnational threats in Central Asia. At the same time, substantial work has been carried out in all three dimensions of the OSCE, and a certain amount of time is required to consolidate and further advance the progress in the interaction of the parties achieved within the partnership. It is also quite apparent that final overcoming of the “confidence crisis” among the OSCE members, and adherence to the concept of comprehensive, joint, equal and indivisible security are related, in the first place to resolving geopolitical differences and accelerating socio-economic reforms. However, from a realistic standpoint, it is practically impossible to fully eliminate the geopolitical differences between the leading powers, and consequently, they, coupled with the incomplete reform process in the CA countries, will continue to be fertile ground for persisting transnational threats from the territory of Afghanistan. In order to achieve a greater effect in containing and counteracting the transnational threats, it would be desirable to:

1. reduce the level of geopolitical and other differences between the OSCE member states, and primarily between the leading powers;
2. expand logistical, financial, consultative and training-and-educational support in the areas of reinforcing relevant infrastructures, institutions and human resources, on a bilateral or multilateral basis (for example, within the SCO framework);

3. balance the OSCE activities in Central Asia to achieve a greater emphasis on the economic constituent.

\*\*\*

## **The OSCE’s Partnership in Preventing and Countering Terrorism**

**Thomas Wuchte**

On behalf of OSCE Secretariat, let me thank the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KISI), and the OSCE Centre in Astana for inviting the Transnational Threats Department to this important conference. OSCE participating States agree that terrorism remains one of the most significant threats to peace, security and stability, as well as the enjoyment of human rights and social and economic development, in the OSCE area and beyond. Terrorism seeks to undermine the values that unite OSCE participating States. OSCE participating States stand united in their resolution to implement effective measures to combat terrorism, in all forms and manifestations, as a serious crime that has no justification, whatever its motivation or origin may be. Countering terrorism will therefore remain key importance to the OSCE participating States and to the Organization as a whole.

The invitation to participate in this conference, which focusses on the broader questions of a Eurasian Security Community and the role of the OSCE, is a reminder that regional organizations have a well-defined role and well-received mandate in assisting their participating States in generating political will, raising awareness and building capacity. The OSCE is aware of this challenging responsibility and the first main message is that the Secretariat’s Transnational Threats Department places the OSCE in a position to be your closest partner to effectively develop and integrate a broad variety of transnational strategies among the 57 participating States and 11 Partners for Co-operation of the OSCE – many of who are here today.

Before addressing some more details on our transnational and anti-terrorism efforts, let me return to the broader theme of this conference – creating a Eurasian security community. A security community cannot be created artificially from the top. Instead, it is a long-term, progressive process involving not only governments and political institutions but all sectors of society.

The vision of a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community, as envisaged by our Heads of State at the 2010 Astana Summit, is an important topic that is welcome in this conference. The fact that we are discussing the role of the OSCE reflects the organizers’ interest in considering the future of the organization, its ability to continue to serve as a dialogue forum for bridging differences, ensure respect for commitments and engender broad co-operation on issues that are pertinent to security interests of the participating States.

That is why participating States have now entered the Helsinki +40 reform discussion in an attempt to forge a new consensus – the idea is not about fundamentally changing the nature and working methods of the OSCE, but rather its “optimization” – building on its strengths, expertise and capabilities. By combining a multi-year perspective with a highly symbolic target – the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary – there is both sufficient time for in-depth discussion and a clear timeline which should help concentrate minds.

With this overview, let me now address more specifically the role of the Transnational Threats Department and our partnership in the fight against terrorism.

The Transnational Threats Department brings together OSCE expertise on anti-terrorism, border security, police-related activities, cyber security and potentially other future areas. Acting on behalf of the Secretary General, the Department is a focal point for organization-wide programmatic activities that relate to countering transnational threats to security – ensuring co-or-



dination and coherence of action across all three OSCE dimensions, among all OSCE executive structures, while respecting their mandates.

The Transnational Threats Department assists OSCE participating States, at their request and in close co-ordination with the United Nations, in fulfilling their OSCE commitments and other international obligations in the field of countering terrorism. The Department also supports policing in all OSCE participating States in line with the rule of law and fundamental democratic principles. Various forms of border security and management assistance that increase States' capacity to address transnational threats are also provided through different programmes and projects that TNTD undertakes.

In December 2012, Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OSCE participating States supported the ‘OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism’. This Consolidated Framework builds on decisions, commitments and mandates of the OSCE adopted over the past ten years. The document is important for the Organization, which has contributed considerably to the efforts of the international community aimed at effectively countering terrorism.

Looking ahead, the Consolidated Framework highlights 8 strategic focus areas for the OSCE counter-terrorism activities pointing to OSCE's anti-terrorism profile and comparative advantages. Multi-stakeholder dialogue, awareness raising, exchange of expertise and networking are among the greatest comparative advantages of the OSCE. These components help us focus on the 8 strategic areas which are the following:

- Promoting the implementation of the international legal framework and co-operation in criminal matters related to terrorism;
- Countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism;

- Countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes;
- Promoting dialogue and co-operation in countering terrorism in particular public-private partnerships (PPPs);
- Strengthening travel document security;
- Suppressing the financing of terrorism;
- Supporting national efforts to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004);
- Promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms in the context of counter-terrorism measures.

As a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, co-ordination and co-operation with the United Nations and relevant regional and specialized organizations are crucial for the OSCE, in particular with a view to an effective implementation of the international legal framework against terrorism and the United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy.

Let me highlight, that the OSCE works closely with the United Nations' system – the OSCE has a strong co-operation with the UNODC for instance, who has a field office here in Almaty, as well as with other international and regional organizations. The main OSCE anti-terrorism objectives fully comply with the UN Global CT Strategy, thus making the OSCE an active supporter and a regional facilitator of the implementation of pertinent global efforts. The human dimension is high in the OSCE efforts when addressing counter-terrorism issues.

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) assists our participating States in developing and implementing human rights-compliant anti-terrorism policies. In particular, ODIHR supports them in strengthening their law enforcement capacities to respect fundamental human rights. ODIHR provides also advice and analysis on key human rights issues in the anti-terrorism context, and assists OSCE participating States, upon request, in drafting and strengthening existing anti-terrorism legislation in line with international human rights standards and practices.



The OSCE participating States have pledged to fully respect international law and human rights standards when preventing and countering terrorism. They have reaffirmed on a number of occasions (and in the mentioned Consolidated CT Framework once again) that the struggle against terrorism is not a war against religions, nations or people, and that anti-terrorist action is not aimed against any religion, nation or people. They have also recognized the crucial role played by civil society in anti-terrorism efforts and are committed to solidarity with victims of terrorism, to support them.

The economic dimension of the OSCE is also recognized as an important component in the fight against terrorism. In December 2012, the OSCE participating States adopted the ‘OSCE Ministerial Council Declaration on Strengthening Good Governance and Combating Money-Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism’, which acknowledges that good governance in the public sector is “a major factor of sustainable economic growth and notes that “Weak governance is among the factors conducive to the spread of terrorism”. The declaration calls upon the Office of the Co-ordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities to continue its work to suppress corruption, money-laundering and the financing of terrorism.

Other OSCE executive structures, such as the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media monitors legislation on the prevention of the abuse of information technology for terrorist purposes to ensure consistency with freedom of expression and the free flow of information.

Finally, the 16 OSCE Field Operations offer the ability to have more tailor-made anti-terrorism related assistance to their host countries in line with their respective mandates – which in the course of today’s panel highlights the vital role of the Centre in Astana.

Before concluding, let me present recent examples which illustrate again the comprehensive approach the OSCE is taking in its efforts to counter terrorism.

In 2012 four national seminars allowed state authorities and civil society to discuss threats and responses related to violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism. In addition, two expert roundtables co-organized with ODIHR identified lessons learnt, good practices and recommendations on the role and empowerment of women and youth engagement to counter this phenomenon.

Moreover, in an OSCE-wide conference our participating States identified concrete next steps on how the OSCE can further contribute to international efforts designed to strengthen rule of law-compliant criminal justice systems and institutions. Human rights compliant- and rule of law-based criminal justice systems are integral to ensure that terrorists and their supporters are brought to justice. There are multiple projects in the “pipeline” providing follow-up and further ground for collaboration.

In the remainder of this year and into 2014, the OSCE will build on this important work, co-ordinating and co-operating closely with our international partners. The Transnational Threats Department will work with other OSCE executive structures and participating States to further operationalize the vision outlined in the ‘OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism’ focussing its work on the strategic focus areas outlined therein.

In closing, the OSCE builds consensus and political support among its participating States in order to take comprehensive and effective anti-terrorism action. The Organization contributes to building state capacity to implement and comply with international instruments and standards. On the other hand, the OSCE supports efforts by other international and regional organizations, provides a platform for discussions among its participating

States, and promotes security within a framework which is based on human rights and the rule of law.

Dear colleagues, the OSCE Secretariat appreciates your time and looks forward to building on these points with all the other speakers and partners in this room.

Thank you for your attention.

\*\*\*

## **Defense and/or Security at the Regional Level**

**Daniel Warner**

During the period of the Cold War national priorities in Europe as well as many regions of the world focused on defense. The Warsaw Pact and NATO were defense alliances. Today, security has replaced defense as an overarching concept; defense is but one aspect of national security policies which can include intelligence, police, border management, drug prevention and conflict management.

Security policies within a country are diverse and encompass a variety of bureaucracies. In a globalizing world, more attention is now being given to regional security arrangements in response to an increasing number of transnational challenges. Collective security arrangements are radically different from defense alliances. Whereas previous defense alignments were limited primarily to military cooperation, potential security cooperation is more complex given the variety of transnational issues and the different bureaucracies involved.

The first difficulty is the simple geographic definition of a region or even a sub-region. Proliferations of supranational cooperative efforts, for instance the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), include different actors within a broad geographic region with different forms of cooperation.

Underlying the differences in geographic alignments and forms of cooperation are differences in the reasons for cooperation. At best, regional organizations should be based on similar purposeful objectives. Besides countries being near each other, the best-case scenario for regional cooperation is that the countries have certain common values. If common values are not what

hold the countries together, there are then the more technical reasons for cooperation, more practical reasons such as the obvious advantage of joint border management to control migration or joint police cooperation to deal with criminals.

A major dilemma in political science is to answer the question: Why cooperate? Greater forms of cooperation or integration can come from two factors; either countries see that it is in their best interest to voluntarily cooperate or they are forced to cooperate to join an organization through external coercion such as role players in the Great Game.

This short theoretical preamble is meant to highlight the difficulties of a large collective organization like the OSCE to play a positive catalytic role in fostering regional or even sub regional cooperation. In the context of this meeting, to talk of Central Asia as more than a geographic region is already to assume that the five countries of Central Asia have more than geographic similarities. If we are not able to talk about shared values, then we must search for common interests that will encourage countries to integrate into cooperative activities.

As a large collective security organization from Vancouver to Vladivostok, the OSCE certainly has comparative advantages as a vehicle to foster cooperation. It has experience and expertise. But, because exogenous forces today have less influence than before, the justification for cooperation is more a domestic one: Why should an independent country voluntarily join with or participate with other countries either directly or as part of an organization? In other words, each country must decide why it should cooperate; the OSCE must prove it has a comparative advantage in relation to national policies as well as in relation to other multilateral organizations.

A great deal of attention has turned to predicting what will happen in Afghanistan post 2014 after the NATO-led mission ends. There is no question that the security of Afghanistan is

interconnected with the security of Central Asia as reflected in the Istanbul Conference Declaration adopted in 2011. Although Afghanistan is not a member of the OSCE, there have been several initiatives for helping within the country and for cooperation among the surrounding countries which are members of the OSCE.

For example, the OSCE Academy in Bishkek has organized expert meetings on post-2014 Afghanistan challenges as well as a summer school for young journalists in order to foster dialogue between Afghan and Central Asian expert communities. A research centre to study the impact of challenges from Afghanistan on the Central Asian region is also a very positive step. There is no question that there will be many Afghanistan-related OSCE projects in the future.

But the fundamental questions remain: Why cooperate? Who cooperates? The case of Afghanistan shows and will show that national security policies of countries close to Afghanistan will have to adapt to the changing situation post 2014. As for the OSCE, it will have to show that it is able to present attractive policies that make it worthwhile for countries to collectively work together. In this situation, as with all OSCE activities, the organization will have to prove that its implementation activities are worthwhile. Even countries in the region which are members of the OSCE must be convinced that supranational cooperation is better than national policies or cooperation with other organizations.

In this sense, and following a certain logic, neither shared values nor geographic proximity nor membership in the OSCE will determine who cooperates and how. And neither will cooperation result from force. Rather, the OSCE must show that it is in the national interest of each country in the region to work within the OSCE framework. The supply of projects must meet a clearly articulated demand. In the case of Afghanistan post-2014, countries

will have to see that it is in their interest to cooperate. Whereas ad-hoc, practical projects are not optimal in terms of shared value cooperation, they seem a reasonable solution to a situation that will pose direct challenges to the Central Asian region, no matter how it is defined geographically. For neither geographic proximity nor membership in the OSCE alone will suffice to drive cooperation. They may be necessary, but they will not be sufficient.

Responding to transnational challenges coming from Afghanistan post-2014 will demand cooperation. Which countries will cooperate? How will they cooperate? What will be the role of the OSCE? The answers to all three questions will depend on the relationship between the demand and supply of relevant activities.

\*\*\*

## **Political Islam and Migration**

**Saodat Olimova**

Speaking about global challenges such as terrorism and radicalism, they have to be considered in the context of changes happening in the world, such as the sharp increase in population mobility and development of communications. Migration has become an important instrument of globalisation, and one of the most prominent modern phenomena. It affects society in a variety of ways. These include the support of economic growth, encouragement of investment-driven development, remittances, knowledge and technology transfer, human capital development and so on. At the same time, migration is related to such phenomena as the rise of nationalistic movements, religious confrontation, the spread of xenophobia, intolerance and discrimination.

Speaking about the relation between political Islam and migration, it must be borne in mind that this includes not only religion-motivated migration, such as pilgrimage, religious education-related migration, missionary outreach and preaching, charity trips, etc., but also politico-religious orientations, forms of organization and activities of labour migrants, immigrants and diasporas, both in the countries of origin and destination.

To illustrate that political Islam, as a contemporary phenomenon, is a product of globalisation, and is closely related to the growth in international migration, let us consider the specific case of the spread of Salafism in Central Asia. This radical Islamic movement is experiencing a boom in CA countries following the “Arab Spring”. It is accompanied by heated religious debate, rifts between believers, the emergence of armed groups, acts of terror with high casualty rates, religiously motivated racketeering and zigzags of religious policy of CA states.

Interviews with believers, religious activists, Muslim leaders and experts, conducted in the summer of 2013, served as the empirical basis for this presentation.

**Islam in Central Asia**  
**Table: The Proportion of Muslims within**  
**the population of Central Asian countries**

Country	Population	Proportion of Muslims within the population	Number of mosques
Kazakhstan	16.7 m	70.2%	2,228
Kyrgyzstan	5.5 m	81%	2,200
Tajikistan	8 m	99.4 %	3,950
Turkmenistan	5.2 m	60.2%	400
Uzbekistan	30 m	93%	2,050

**Source:** official data, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population (PDF)*. Pew Research Center (October 2009). Archived from source on February 5, 2012. Reviewed on February 16, 2012.

The majority of populations of CA countries is composed of Muslims that follow the Hanafi madhab of Sunnism. Few Shiites live in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan is also home to a community of Ismailites. In each country there are followers of Sufism, predominantly of the Naqshbandi order. Among Kazakhstani Muslims there are more followers of the Yassawi order. There is also a small number of Qadiri and Kubrawi followers.

### **The dynamics of the development of Salafism within the framework of political Islamic movements in Central Asia**

Political Islam in Central Asia dates back to the 1970s. This was not the result of direct external influence. Having preserved its influence even during the Soviet era, Central Asian Islam got the opportunity to develop, as a result of the Khrushchev Thaw, albeit deep underground. In this period Muslim spiritual leaders in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan vigorously discussed the ways of the development of Islam. Religious discussions in the 1980s, gath-

ering together dozens of prominent Muslim religious scholars and thousands of listeners\*, led to the formation of the Wahhabi movement. Its followers took part in the creation of the Islamic Renaissance Party of the Soviet Union in 1989. Later they were involved in the civil war in Tajikistan, as part of the United Tajik Opposition and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan\*\*.

In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the Wahhabi movement has had the most influence on ethnic minorities (Chechens, Dagestanis, and Uzbeks).

In the early 1990s, the process of religious renaissance began in Central Asia, much like in all new independent states of the former USSR. The fall of the Iron Curtain led to the emergence in Central Asia of a large number of different Islamic organizations, charity foundations, educational institutions, companies, representations and individual missionaries. They were running their own programmes in the area of Islamic education. It was then that Salafi missionaries and preachers from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt and other Arab countries began their activities in Central Asia.

CA countries were then flooded with religious literature in the Tajik, Russian, Uzbek and Arabic languages. At the same time there was a rapid growth of religious education-related migration to the countries of the Middle East and Southern Asia. Central Asian students studied at religious universities in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, etc. Students returning home were more knowledgeable in Islamic studies than local mullahs. They then began working as imam-khatibs, teachers at madrasas and Islamic universities, and as functionaries in the system of governing the religious life in all CA countries.

\* Babadjanov B.M., Muminov A.K., A. von Kugelgen, 2007. Disputes among Muslim religious leaders in Central Asia in the 20th century: critical publications and study of sources. Almaty: Daik-press.

\*\* The Islamic Renaissance Party. ACCORD. Politics of compromise. The Tajikistan peace process, Conciliation Resources, London, 2001, pp.26-27.



In the process of state-building CA countries chose different models of economic and political reforms. Religious policy and attitude towards political Islam also varied, which is why the development of political Islamic movements took different paths\*.

Whereas in 1992-97 Central Asia saw a burst of activity of Arab missionaries, in Tajikistan this process was slowed down due to the armed conflict of 1992-1997; one of the sides was composed of Islamic politico-military organizations – the Islamic Renaissance Movement of Tajikistan (1992-1997) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). In this period of time religiously motivated migration from Tajikistan increased due to a large number of young refugees who were receiving their education at the madrasas in Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and other Arab countries.

In Kazakhstan in that period madrasas were opened with Salafi teachers from Saudi Arabia, and Salafi communities were established in oil-rich Western Kazakhstan – Atyrau, Mangystau and Aktope provinces. Salafi Jamaats were headed by private entrepreneurs linked with Saudi missionaries.\*\*

By the end of the 1990s the first Salafis appeared in Kyrgyzstan. However, Salafism here did not take off widely. Movements like Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami, Nurdjular and Tablighi Jamaat were much more popular in Kyrgyzstan, as was the case with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

In the early 2000s, the religious policies in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were liberal. Tajikistan legalised the Islamic Renaissance Party, and the latter was then able to secure two mandates in the parliamentary elections of 2000. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Salafis “flirted” with the elite and the busi-

ness community. However, by 2004 in Kazakhstan a conflict had begun between Salafis, the authorities and the official spiritual leadership, which led to radicalisation of the Salafi Jamaats. The Jihadism of Kazakhstani Salafis was supported by their ties with Salafis from the Caucasus via Dagestani and Chechen diaspora, as well as with Salafis from Southern Russia and Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan). The major influence on radicalisation of Kazakhstani Salafis was exerted by the preaching of Said Buryatsky, from the “Caucasus Emirate” network organization\*.

**Meanwhile, in Uzbekistan a Salafism movement was also developing.** Underground Jamaats mainly functioned in the city of Tashkent, as well as in the provinces of Tashkent and Fergana. However, in Uzbekistan other radical movements – Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat, which, in a way, became successors to the Wahhabis of the 1990 – spread more widely.

By this time, a certain peculiarity of Central Asian Salafiyya had vividly manifested itself – its connection with the ruling elites. For example, in 2007 an alliance between the Salafis and the ruling elite of Tajikistan was formed. Salafis declared their full support for the policy of the President and government of Tajikistan. Salafi preachers thus gained a foothold on national television, radio and in government newspapers. They spent great amounts of money on building mosques, religious education, free dissemination of literature, audio disks with sermons, as well as on bribery of officials\*\*. In the same period of time Salafis, with the assistance of the Tajik authorities, began their missionary work within the migrant communities in Russia. In response to protests of the traditional clergy and secularists, the Tajik authorities declared that the Salafis were not dangerous to society.

\* Olimova S., Tolipov F. Islamic revival in Central Asia: The cases of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Documentos SIDOB 26. Abril 2011 Available from: <[http://www.cidob.org/cidob\\_news/cidobnews\\_20110401\\_cat-ES.html](http://www.cidob.org/cidob_news/cidobnews_20110401_cat-ES.html)>.

\*\* Tekushev I. Terrorism in Kazakhstan: from religious community to militant underground. Available from: <<http://www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=21146>>.

\* Said Buryatsky in Kazakhstan. Video. Available from: <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m3bgICelMpA>>.

\*\* Khamidova P. Secret of the Salafis. Who is the real threat to stability in Tajikistan? Asia-Plus, 24.07.2008 Available from: <<http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1216929960>>.

Salafism was spreading rapidly in Tajikistan. By the end of 2007, the Salafi following had grown to 20,000 people. However, pressure from neighbours in the region, improvement of relations with Iran, as well as the fear of unity, ambitions and political technologies of the Salafis compelled the Tajik government to change its religious policy. In January 2009, Salafism was banned in Tajikistan, and a number of Salafi activists was arrested.\* Members of the banned movements Tablighi Jamaat and Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami were arrested at the same time. Following these measures, the numbers of Salafis sharply dwindled. The remaining Salafis went underground.

In Kazakhstan, Salafis also attempted to “flirt” with the authorities, but in 2005, the worsening conflict between the Salafis and the authorities led to a split within the Salafist movement, and the branching off of a radical wing. Part of the Salafist community of Kazakhstan migrated to Europe. By 2011 the remaining members formed the core of the jihadist groups. This coincided with a surge of Salafi activity in Kyrgyzstan, especially in its northern part.\*\*

By 2009, in all Central Asian countries, except for Kazakhstan, most movements and organizations of political Islam were banned, including Salafiyya, Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat.

Following the “Arab Spring”, there was a surge of Salafi activity in all CA countries. The desire of Saudis to create Salafist communities abroad is underpinned by their foreign policy and business,\*\*\* and has a positive response in a number of CA countries.\*\*\*\* For example, in Tajikistan, despite the official ban

\* In total, approximately 100 individuals in 2009-2012.

\*\* Tekushev I. Terrorism in Kazakhstan: from religious community to armed underground. Available from: <<http://www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=21146>>.

\*\*\* Alexandre del Valle. How the Persian Gulf monarchies influence Western decision-making. Available from: <<http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1378328220>>; Bobokhonov R. Role and prospects of radical Islam after the «Arab Spring». Available from: <<http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1378474380>>.

\*\*\*\* Almaz Asan. From dusk to dawn. Islamisation of Kazakhstan continues to this day. Available from: <<http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1365000600>>.

on Salafiyya, Qatar is building mosques and madrasas, training imams from Tajikistan, and spreading Salafism through official clergy and state religious structures (the Committee for Religious Affairs, the Islamic Centre and the Ulem Council).\* The number of contacts of Tajik radicals with the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has grown considerably.

Following the “Arab Spring”, other CA countries have experienced a rapid radicalisation of the Salafis. In 2011, the first militant Jamaats appeared in Kazakhstan, which, on behalf of the Jund al-Khalifa and Ansar-Ud-Deen groups, committed a number of acts of terror and openly declared their participation in the global jihad. During 2011-2012 terror acts swept through 7 major cities of Kazakhstan and resulted in dozens of deaths.

In 2012, jihadist Jamaats began operating in Kyrgyzstan, unleashing a wave of terror acts.\*\* Today Salafi bases and mosques are virtually openly operating in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and there are strong Salafist lobbies in the structures of power and business. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan there are super-clandestine, isolated bases and camps for terrorist training. Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the “Caucasus Emirate” train jihadists in warfare skills in major terrorist zones in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Northern Caucasus, and they put these skills into practice in Syria.

### Characteristics of Salafism in Central Asia today

Salafism in CA is characterized by internal inconsistency. Salafi groups differ in views, objectives, activities and contacts. Thus, whereas in Kazakhstan Salafis call for global jihad, Tajik

\* Tutubalina O. Have priorities changed? Available from: <<http://www.news.tj/ru/node/16771>>; First imam training centre opened in Tajikistan. Available from: <<http://news.kob.tj/news/33290>>.

\*\* Kazhegeldinov A. Kyrgyzstan sinks into Islamist radicalism. Available from: <<http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1356420960>>.

Salafis are primarily fighting against Shiism and the influence of Iran.

In general, CA Salafis have a very negative attitude towards traditional Central Asian movements – Maturidism, Sufism and Ismailism. Consequently, the Salafis are in conflict with the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, that is, with the Wahhabists of the 1990s, and traditional clergy.

Connections, contacts and funding sources for the Salafis in Central Asia also vary. The Salafis of Kazakhstan are generally closely linked with the Salafis in the Caucasus and Russia, while Tajik Salafis look mainly to the relatively moderate Qatar.

The Salafis in all Central Asian countries have close links with the criminal world. “Prison Jihad” is widely spread: prisons are used for the recruitment of militants and jihadist propaganda and for acquiring authority for further work outside prison with young people\*. This is extremely important since everywhere Salafiyya is a phenomenon of youth sub-culture. The majority of the Salafis are teenagers and young people. They often move from one organization to another. Many Salafis in the past were followers of Tablighi Jamaat or Hizb ut-Tahrir.

On the whole, Central Asia has not put forward any major Salafi ideologists or leaders. Often control is exercised from the outside. For example, Uzbekistani Salafis are directly controlled by their leaders from Saudi Arabia.

The trans-border nature of Salafi activities is reflected in the fact that jihadist Jamaats from Southern Kazakhstan perpetrated acts of terror in Uzbekistan, the Afghan Talibs control the finances of the Tajik Salafis, and representatives of the Salafist groups from all Central Asian countries are currently fighting in Syria as part of the jihadist international force.

\* Duishebayeva K. A dangerous merging of the criminal world and religious organizations is happening in Kyrgyzstan. Available from: <<http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1378262820>>.

The transnationalism of Salafiyya to a large extent explains its contacts with migrant communities and labour migration networks both in the host countries – Russia and Kazakhstan,\* and the countries of origin – Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. However, it is not only transnationalism that facilitates the spread of Salafi influence among migrants, but also the socio-demographic structure that migrants share with the Salafi adepts: they are marginalised Muslims, youths and young men, who, by design or unwittingly cut themselves off from the social supervision of their maternal environment, and rebelled against past generations. It is not important whether they are rural migrants moving to Russian cities with millions of inhabitants, or young people from the elite, who were sent by their parents to study in the West or Russia and who failed to integrate into the host societies. Both types are on the margins of society, or outside it, and for various reasons are subjected to persecution on the part of state structures. This especially concerns migrants working in Russia. A significant proportion of them is employed in the shadow economy sector, which makes them illegal aliens under Russian law. Illegal status contributes to discrimination against and exploitation of migrants and widespread violations of human rights. As for Islamic radicalism, it flourishes on the fertile ground of islamophobia and wars against terrorism. When migrants return home, they encounter a negative attitude on the part of the state, suffer a lack of social capital and a loss of status, which are very important in the hierarchical patrimonial states.

### Instead of Conclusions

As has been noted many times, Central Asian societies and countries are undergoing a process of identification as an integral part of the Islamic world. The natural process of discovery of the

\* Yevstratov A. Salafism in Russia and the CIS. Available from: <[http://www.iran.ru/news/analytics/86794/Salafizm\\_v\\_Rossii\\_i\\_SNG](http://www.iran.ru/news/analytics/86794/Salafizm_v_Rossii_i_SNG)>.

Central Asian countries by the world involves increased population mobility, migration flows of different character, development of communications and internationalisation of business\*. The development of new technologies such as the internet and mobile communications, as well as the expansion of economic, cultural and personal contacts with other Muslim countries, leads to the inclusion of Central Asian countries in the network of international Islamic movements. Already accumulated experience shows that isolationism and putting barriers in the way of movement of people, commodities, technologies and services, as well as xenophobia, discrimination and religion-motivated persecution, are invariably no-win scenarios.

What can halt the spread of radical Islamism, including Salafism? The experience of various countries shows that counteractive measures could include a dialogue between various branches of Islam, liberal and understanding religious policies of the states, together with a strong youth policy, the development of traditional Islamic sciences, support of Muslim intellectuals and religious scholars capable of resisting radical and extremist ideas. States of the region should develop forms of interaction with various religious movements, avoiding punitive measures.

The OSCE could provide platforms and technical assistance for discussions and dialogues among various movements of Islam, as well as a dialogue between Islam and the West. Such discussions must involve not only Muslim leaders and intellectuals, but also youth leaders, politicians, officials and representatives of civil society, migrant networks and business communities.

\*\*\*

---

\* Yevstratov A. Salafism in Russia and the CIS. Available from: <[http://www.iran.ru/news/analytics/86794/Salafizm\\_v\\_Rossii\\_i\\_SNG](http://www.iran.ru/news/analytics/86794/Salafizm_v_Rossii_i_SNG)>.

## **Religious extremism and terrorism as threats to security and the response issues**

**Lessya Karatayeva**

OSCE member states, having launched the process of forming a common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community, encountered the issue of heterogeneity of the common space. Heterogeneity is characteristic of many spheres of life: cultural aspects and work ethics, ethnic composition and a range of religious beliefs, etc. It is this factor that mostly determines the main question for this panel: to what extent the OSCE is ready for the challenges and threats emerging across the vast area of the Organisation. The answer to this question is both inspiring and worrying.

On the one hand, it is evident that the manifestations of modern challenges and threats are of a complex nature and cannot be evaluated in the context of one dimension only: politico-military, or economic, or human dimension. Thus, in this case, the OSCE is precisely the organisation that is capable of offering the approaches and mechanisms to provide security, which are appropriate for the present situation.

However, at the same time, it must be acknowledged that the common values shared by OSCE member states do not yet guarantee the commonality of national interests. Consequently, states view the same events differently. A vivid example of this is the attitude towards the events in the Middle East, and in Syria in particular. To a certain degree, different evaluations of these or other events are characteristic of the sphere of fighting religious extremism and terrorism too.

Experts have repeatedly acknowledged the problem of fragmentation of the Eurasian area in the context of building a com-

mon and indivisible security space. It should be recognized that the evaluation of terror threats occurs in the same vein. Terrorist organisations that have chosen different "fragments" of the OSCE space as targets of their activities, have different motivations and adhere to different approaches. Whereas the United States of America is experiencing the pressure of "terror International" due to its active foreign policy, Europe, which traditionally suffered from the blows of classic terrorism with political or separatist motivations, is today confronted with the "solo" actions of lone terrorists. Kazakhstan has encountered one of the most illogical types of terrorism, without a specific "addressee", since no political demands are put forward, and without a "sender", since, as a rule, no-one claims responsibility for the terror acts.

At the same time, in practice, the uniform perception and the defining of a certain act, organisation or an individual as terrorist, are of great importance for such types of collective anti-terrorism actions as exchange of intelligence information, mutual legal support, freezing and forfeiture of financial means and extradition. This has great significance, because in defining a certain act as terrorist not only do we claim that it possesses certain characteristics, but also condemn it [1].

However, how well do we, as representatives of any given "fragment" of the OSCE common space, know the specifics of threats, characteristic of other "fragments," and understand their nature? What degree of generalisation and uniformity can we allow ourselves when analysing threats of religious extremism and terrorism, characteristic of the OSCE space? I believe that the approach based on singling out different sub-regional security systems as an object of study, would be more effective. Following this logic, I will focus on religious extremism and terrorism in Central Asia.

Central Asian states are routinely included in the Islamic sub-civilisation, which implies an exceptionally important role of Is-

lam as its basis. Despite the principal similarity of national legislations regulating the sphere of religion, by now each country has established its own unique system of state-religion and inter-denominational relations. Although to a different degree, the problem of religious extremism and terrorism is characteristic of each state in the region. When evaluating the scale of this problem for Central Asia, the following should be taken into account.

Firstly, despite the level playing field in the beginning (as of the time of acquiring independence), by now Central Asian countries have different levels of religious factor politicisation, to a greater degree in Tajikistan, and to a lesser degree in Turkmenistan. In Uzbekistan, the politicizing of religion took place within the framework of forming the illegal opposition in the shape of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). As for Kyrgyzstan, the country is currently undergoing a politico-religious "transit" where Islamisation of politicians is observed, and a discourse is formed stating the necessity of allowing religion into legal political processes.

Secondly, despite the liberal policy of states in the sphere of providing religious rights and freedoms, pursued at the initial stage of independence, practically all states at present have reconsidered their approaches towards toughening separate provisions of the legislation and practical measures aimed at overseeing the activities of religious associations.

Thirdly, it is typical for virtually all countries in the region to equate the notion of "freedom of conscience" with that of "freedom of religion". Despite the fact that national laws on religion use the notion of "atheism", which, as a system of views, has equal rights with religion, in practice, atheism, as a world view, has sunk into oblivion. It should be noted that religion is gradually monopolising the idea of "morality".

Fourthly, the institutional consolidation and realization of the principle of secularization, together with the concurrent religious



renaissance in the socio-cultural sphere, actively supported by the political elites of the states in the region, resulted in the situation where the oppositional environment became the most appropriate field for implementing the political ambitions of religion. In the region where the indigenous population is traditionally Islamic and other denominations are in the minority, Islam has become the only religion that has acquired political ambitions.

Fifthly, the use by the political elites of states in the region of the elements of religious (Islamic) rhetoric, whilst retaining the existing "rules of the game" (corruption, nepotism, etc.), which serve as the basis for the formation of a discourse of "social injustice", is pushing the theologically undereducated and socially vulnerable population towards the structures which interpret Islam in a non-traditional way, including those of the Takfir-Jihadist type. Such factors as aggravation of the socio-economic situation in a number of economically-depressed areas of states in the region, insufficient authority of the Muslim Spiritual Boards and Muftiyats, weak mechanisms of social engineering, an insufficient level of general and theological education of the public at large also contribute to the growing numbers of the followers of these movements.

In the context of counteracting terrorism, the first issue that comes to the fore within the framework of regional problems, is what the militants of the so-called IMU ethnic divisions would do upon the withdrawal of the international coalition forces from Afghanistan. Re-infiltration of armed gangs of Central Asian origin into the territory of the region will have the most pronounced effect, primarily on the countries bordering Afghanistan: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and, perhaps, Turkmenistan. The states will face the so-called "expeditionary" terrorism. This format is already familiar to us. We have been preparing for it for the last 15 years. Effective mechanisms have been created not only on the national level, but also within the framework of collective counteraction.

Kazakhstan is in a more difficult situation. The events of 2011-2012 did not look like "expeditionary" terrorism, but on the face of it resembled "guerrilla" terrorism. However, I think that we have encountered the manifestations of the new reality imposed upon us by international terrorism in the shape of Al-Qaeda. We cannot any longer say that Kazakhstan is not in the focus of attention of this terrorist organisation, because a new strategy of international terrorism, the so-called "thousand cuts" strategy, announced by Al-Qaeda two years ago, aims at covering the entire world [2].

"Cuts" mean spontaneous terrorist acts perpetrated by individuals or small groups, not affiliated with national terrorist underground or international terrorist organisations that we are used to dealing with. The mechanism of terrorism "de-professionalisation" is simple: the global information space is actively flooded with materials containing extremist and terrorist propaganda as effective methods of fighting social injustice, generated by secular regimes and the "soulless world of capital and transnational corporations". Along with the propaganda materials, the information space is also filled with manuals on manufacturing explosive devices, parcel bombs containing chemical and biological poisoning agents, as well as instructions on how to organise and perpetrate terrorist attacks. As a result, any socially disgruntled member of the public, under certain circumstances of an objective or subjective character, is capable of becoming a threat to public safety. It is evident that this kind of approach considerably reduces the role of the detection-and-intelligence section of the counter-terrorism system. If this mechanism becomes fully operational, countries will have to react accordingly. How? The most obvious options are as follows:

1. Toughening of the anti-terrorist legislation norms, which is likely to entail restricting the rights and freedoms of the individual.

2. Increasing financial investments for establishing additional security mechanisms, which will have a negative impact on the national economies.

In any case, the life of the general public will not become better and more comfortable, which will undoubtedly have a negative impact on the image of the states as socio-political institutions, whose aim it is to ensure the protection of people's rights and safety. The principle of the states' secularity will also be jeopardised. Apparently, counting on such an effect, the Al-Qaeda leadership is undertaking a few steps aimed at improving its own image. On September 17, Aiman az-Zawahiri said that terrorists should abandon the use of violence against Muslims. At the same time, al-Zawahiri named Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen and Somalia as the primary targets of their attacks [3].

Under the conditions of the new reality it is necessary to seek asymmetrical solutions. Taking into account the risks which the realization of asymmetrical solutions could entail for personal and public security, it is clear that the search for such solutions should be based upon a sound scientific-and-methodological foundation. At the same time, it should be recognized that at present the scientific-theoretical understanding of terrorism is lagging behind the rate at which this phenomenon is evolving. And this fact alone generates threats to security.

There might be two mechanisms capable of offsetting the aforementioned shortcomings. The first mechanism is the creation of the network of OSCE analytical structures (OSCE Network of Think Tanks), which would allow the think tanks of different countries to pool their research potential within the framework of different projects for the purpose of piecing together a full picture of security in the OSCE area. This mechanism was presented during the OSCE Security Days 2013 in June of this year. The second mechanism is the creation of a network of regional institutes for security studies; for example, an Institute for

the Study of Security Issues in Central Asia. Unfortunately, this mechanism exists only as a concept. These mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they could complement one another, with the first one ensuring the comprehensive nature of the approach, and the second, its systemic character.

#### References

1. Fight against terrorism and human rights. Manual. ODIHR, 2009. p.25 Available from: <<http://www.osce.org/ru/odihr/29104>>.
2. A. Smolin. A thousand knives in the back of rule-of-law society. Available from: <<http://news.rambler.ru/10826820/>>
3. Al-Qaeda leader unveiled the new jihad strategy. Available from: <<http://kz.mirtv.ru/news/7977560>>.

\*\*\*

## **Transnational terrorist threats for the Eurasian security – the examples of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Islamic Jihad Union**

**Józef Lang**

As the number of symmetrical threats in the Eurasia decreases, the danger and quantity of the asymmetrical, transnational terrorist threats, to the contrary, increases. Globalization and digitalization of the Eurasian societies and countries, which resulted in tremendous social, economic and political benefits, have also their dark sides. Even regional terrorist organizations constitute a threat on a much wider, Eurasian scale. An example of such threat are two radical Islamic terrorist organizations closely linked to the Al Qaeda – Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Islamic Jihad Union. These organizations are currently based in Pakistan's Northern Waziristan, yet engage in propaganda, recruitment, fundraising and terrorist operations not only in Central Asia or Russia, but also in countries distant from their traditional area of interest, such as European Union states, South Asia or even the United States. On a micro scale this can be illustrated by example of German jihadist fighting under the command of Uzbek terrorist leader against the ISAF and Afghan forces in Northern Afghanistan, which in effect poses a potential threat to Central Asian states.

In order to understand the phenomena of these organizations and the full range of threats they pose, one must examine their evolution from small, local Islamist groups to global terrorist organizations, which they now are. The history of these organizations and circles which created them can be divided into three main stages:

- The first, which includes the beginnings of Islamic radicalism, such as formation of the Adolat organization by Tohir Yul-

dashev and Jumaboy Khojayev aka Juma Namangani; and the efforts of radicals to exploit the weakness of the region's states in the first decade after the fall of the USSR, such as their participation in the Tajik civil war and the Batken raids in 1999 and 2000;

- The second, which includes the period after the 9/11 attacks and the fall of the Taliban in 2001, when Islamic radicals from Central Asia suffered heavy losses, were forced to escape and found themselves in a new environment, while their direct influence on the situation in Central Asia was diminished

- Finally the current, third stage – during which these organizations not only managed to survive in the Pakistan's Tribal Areas, but also emerged as a powerful terrorist organizations capable of conducting global operations, often as subcontracting service for the compact Al Qaeda.

Crucial to understanding the current state of these terrorist organizations is their stay in the Pakistani Tribal Areas. After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 in Afghanistan and relocation of the Central Asian radical Islamic militants to Pakistan, Yuldashev, the only IMU leader alive, at first concentrated mainly on rebuilding the movement's capabilities in Pakistan's Southern Waziristan. Yuldashev strategy consisted of concentrating on combating the Pakistani forces together with his Pashtun allies and treating Central Asia only as area of auxiliary operations. This caused the IMU to involve itself in the complicated intra-Pashtun political setup of the Tribal Areas. Such strategy was not accepted by all movement's members, some of which left and formed new, much smaller organization – the Islamic Jihad Union. IJU at first concentrated at continuing armed struggle in Central Asia, yet after several attacks conducted by the organization in 2004 in Uzbekistan failed to accomplish their goals, IJU withdrew from this strategy. The organization decided to ally itself with the Afghan Taliban and international Jihadist organizations present in the Tribal Areas, namely Al Qaeda. IJU concentrated on aiding

Taliban in their fight in Afghanistan and conducting subcontracting services for Al Qaeda – mainly recruitment and training of Islamic radicals from Turkey and Western Europe. In the latter IJU is rather successful – for example the organization recruited 80 out of 200 German nationals fighting along the side of Jihadists in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

After Yuldashev's death in 2009, a new generation of leaders came to power in IMU and altered the strategy of the organization to a one already employed by the IJU. Usman Odil, deputy of Yuldashev became the amir of IMU, while an ethnic Kyrgyz Abbas Mansour became the commander of the movement's combat forces. The new strategy comprised of stopping hostilities towards the Pakistani forces, changing the local patron from the anti-Pakistani TTP to the Haqqani Network (which is tolerated and at times even supported by Islamabad); re-establishing previously broken ties with Al Qaeda and involvement in the war in Afghanistan.

Currently the IMU led by Usman Ghazi (previously known as Abdulfattah Ahmadiy) and IJU led by Abdullah Fatih pose a threat in Afghanistan, Central Asia, European Union or even Burma or United States. The nature of these threats is obviously varied.

In Afghanistan IMU has become a de-facto Uzbek wing of the predominantly Pashtun Taliban, starting and leading the insurgency amongst the local ethnic minorities (Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkmens) in the previously tranquil north of country. Until recently these organizations viewed Central Asia mainly as a source of new recruits. The situation seemed to change in 2011, when IJU tried to engage in the unprecedented wave of terrorist attacks in Kazakhstan by forming a Kazakh cell within its ranks – the Jund-ul Khalifat, most probably led by an Al Qaeda operative within its ranks – Swiss citizen of Tunisian descent – Moezidine Garsaloui. This shows the interest of the global jihad towards

Central Asia, which is especially worrying in the context of the 2014 withdrawal of the ISAF forces.

In the Western Europe the IMU and IJU primarily engage in the radicalization of the Muslim communities and recruitment of new volunteers. This is aided by the digitalization and wide spread use of the Internet and digital technologies by these organizations – for example up to date IMU alone has published online over 170 propaganda films, including 20 in English, 20 in Russian and over 30 in German. IJU and IMU also planned several terrorist attacks in Western Europe in 2007 and 2010, yet due to early interception of their communications by the security services, failed in executing them. However, a greater threat is posed by lone and uncoordinated Islamic radicals who were trained by these organizations or even radicalized by them online. An example of this can be the 2012 attacks in the French city of Toulouse perpetrated by Mohammad Merrah, who underwent training in IJU camp in Mir Ali in Northern Waziristan. Similarly in United States IMU and IJU direct their attempts at radicalizing the local Uzbek diaspora, which could be even 50,000 people strong and had successfully recruited online several individuals.

In the ideological framework, these organizations include many different narratives ranging from Jihad against the Central Asian states, or the moral corruption of the West, to persecution of the Rhongiya Muslim community by the military junta in Burma. Similarly, in the theological questions, contrary to most Islamic terrorist organizations, IMU and IJU are rather vague and in their ranks there are adherents of various radical branches of the Sunni Islam. The decentralized and amorphous character of these organizations allows them to engage in varied operations on multiple theatres simultaneously, while at same time being steerable by the amir.

Concluding, previously local Central Asian terrorist organizations became a threat on a Eurasian scale. Except for being active

terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, IJU and IMU are threatening Central Asia and the European Union. In Central Asia the main threat is not the return of IMU and IJU to the region as a compact and cogent force, but rather its involvement in the outbreaks of tensions already present in the region or crises that might occur in the future. Here however, one can observe limitations of these organization – for example due to their mixed ethnic makeup, they cannot engage in any ethnic tensions between groups, whose representatives are present in the IMU and IJU. This could have been seen during the 2010 ethnic conflict in Osh, when IMU, led jointly by an Uzbek Usman Odil and a Kyrgyz Abbas Mansour, limited its reaction only to lukewarm statement condemning the violence. In Europe, the main threat that emanates from the IMU and IJU is their growing influence on the radical Islamic communities in Europe, which also include ethnic German, British or French converts to radical Islam.

Combating the threats originating from the activities of IMU and IJU requires a multidisciplinary international cooperation and exchange of information, not only by police, intelligence or security services, but also by think tanks and academic centres dealing with the issues of terrorism and radicalization. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, with its strong presence in both practical and theoretical aspects of the security in Eurasia, and membership in it of most states affected by the operations of IMU and IJU, seems to be the best suited, natural platform for such cooperation.

\*\*\*

### **Summary of the Third Session “Transnational Threats to Eurasian Space”**

**Thomas Wuchte**

Panel members agreed that terrorism remains one of the most significant threats to peace, security and stability, as well as the enjoyment of human rights and social and economic development, in the OSCE area and beyond.

Yet, the panel members and other interventions noted that priority issues such as jobs and basic good governance needed to be in place to mitigate the conditions conducive to terrorism – which are manifested in Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism (VERLT).

The Transnational Threats Decisions was noted as an important contribution to fulfilling the ambitious mandates given to the OSCE by Ministers in December 2012. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter supports the role of regional organizations in international peace and security. Regional and sub-regional organizations enjoy the support of their members with whom they may have closer ties than to global institutions. They are also aware of problems of the States of their region and specificity of the political and economic situations.

Therefore, speakers noted the OSCE provides fora and opportunities to share experiences and lessons learned, and can add as a capacity-building partner. Secondly, when States and Civil Society are also part of this cooperation, a networking strategy will help to facilitate implementation. Thirdly, a holistic strategy is also applicable when Central Asian states can work together taking into account other high priority development and security concerns. Such strategies to improve cooperation in the OSCE can include the following activities and objectives as recommendations for the next Almaty conference:



- Encourage and develop networked relations with and across public-private organizations noting where guidelines, legislation, and measures might be mutually recognized or harmonized, whether regionally or sub-regionally;

- Create more sub-regional activities and tailored dialogues for more explicit sharing and comparing of experiences and lessons learned on implementation outcomes, including assistance that is absorbed not just delivered – a critical role of OSCE field missions;

- Strengthen information exchanges on missions and needs assessments made by civil society and international organizations by networking among the academic and governmental partners, these approaches can contribute to more understanding of transnational threats;

- When cooperating with regional and subregional organizations, to consider the priorities of development, economic and security issues in an integrated or holistic approach. Undertaking measures to fulfill transnational threats projects can be complementary to efforts dealing with other priority development issues, including post-conflict reconstruction, and with regional security risks and threats, e.g., illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, drugs and crime.

- A series of practical workshops in Central Asia (or elsewhere within the OSCE sphere) could be organized together with the OSCE Transnational Threats Department to discuss specific implementation gaps and challenges to set the basis for the targeted work with individual countries on their specific challenges.

- Depending on the outcome of the aforementioned activities, the interest of participating States and the availability of funds and resources, possible additional programmatic measures could also include:

- The OSCE could, upon request from participating States, provide practical capacity-building in promoting priority areas

of transnational threats. Projects could be carried out in co-operation with other international organizations and, depending on their mandates, the OSCE Field Operations could also contribute to their planning and implementation.

- Capacity-building would be provided in areas where the OSCE already has evident competencies, such as border controls, with courses to be provided by the OSCE Border Management Staff College. The OSCE could also integrate training to foster co-operation among police, prosecutors, customs, border control, intelligence agencies and military authorities to improve the legal, technical and administrative basis for sound and effective national implementation of legislation and its increased harmonization.

- In addition, the OSCE could facilitate the broad engagement of technical expertise resident in civil society. Such cooperation could be provided to pertinent civil society organizations as these can play an important role by functioning as clearing houses for information for states and international organizations and a pool of expertise for states to draw from.

\*\*\*

## AUTHORS

**Akylbek Saliyev** – Director of Institute for Strategic Analysis and Prognosis, Yeltsin Kyrgyz Russian Slavic University (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan)

**Andrew Tesoriere** – Former Head of OSCE Centre in Bishkek

**Aurélia Bouchez** – Head of European Union Delegation to the Republic of Kazakhstan

**Beksultan Sarsekov** – Director of CARICC (Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre for combating the illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors)

**Bulat Sultanov** – Director of Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies

**Daniel Warner** – Assistant Director for International Relations, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

**Georgy Dubovtsev** – Chief Research Fellow, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

**Guli Yuldasheva** – Professor, “Central Eurasia” Analytical Group Advisory Board (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)

**Irina Chernykh** – Chief Research Fellow, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

**Józef Lang** – Central Asia Analyst, Centre for Eastern Studies (Warsaw, Poland)

**Lessya Karatayeva** – Chief Research Fellow, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

**Mykola Sungurovskiy** – Director of Military Programs, Razumkov Centre for Economic and Political Studies (Kyiv, Ukraine)

**Marat Biyekenov** – Professor, Department of State Political Strategy, Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Astana, Kazakhstan)

**Natalia Zarudna** – Ambassador, Head of OSCE Centre in Astana

**Ömer Burhan Tüzel** – Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Embassy of the Republic of Turkey to the Republic of Kazakhstan

**Rustam Burnashev** – Professor, German-Kazakh University (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

**Sanat Kushkumbayev** – Chief Research Fellow, Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

**Saodat Olimova** – Head, Sharq Information and Analytical Centre (Dushanbe, Tajikistan)

**Serzhan Abdykarimov** – Chairman of Committee for Foreign Policy Analysis and Forecasting, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan

**Thomas Wuchte** – OSCE Head on Anti-Terrorism Issues,  
Transnational Threats Department

**Vladimir Boyko** – Director of Centre for Regional Studies  
(Russia and the East), Professor of World History Altai State  
Pedagogical Academy (Barnaul, Russia)

**Wolfgang Zellner** – Head of Centre of OSCE Research (Ham-  
burg, Germany)

### **About the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan**

The Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KazISS) was established on June 16, 1993 by the Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Since its foundation the mission of the KazISS as the national research institution is to provide analytical support to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and public administration agencies of Kazakhstan.

The KazISS enjoys a reputation of the leading think tank of Kazakhstan as it employs a highly professional pool of experts; at present it includes eight doctors and six candidates of sciences, who specialize in political science, history, economics and sociology.

During the twenty-year functioning the KazISS have published more than 250 books on international relations, global and regional security. The Institute publishes three journals: the *Kogam jane Dayir* in Kazakh, the *Kazakhstan-Spectrum* in Russian and the *Central Asia's Affairs* in English. The KazISS has a trilingual website; in Kazakh, Russian, English.

The KazISS holds a great number of international conferences, seminars and round tables, including the Annual Conferences (regularly held since 2003) on the issues of security and cooperation in Central Asia participated by the experts from Kazakhstan, Central Asia as well as Russia, China, Germany, France, India, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Japan, the USA and other countries.

The KazISS is the basis for professional practice work of both students from the leading Kazakhstan universities and fellowship of the experts of foreign research institutions.

The KazISS provides the premise where its employees have all opportunities to improve their expertise.

Contact us for any further information:

The Dostyk Avenue, 87 'b'

050010, Almaty

Republic of Kazakhstan

Tel: +7 (727) 264-34-04

Fax.: +7 (727) 264-49-95

E-mail: [office@kisi.kz](mailto:office@kisi.kz)

[www.kisi.kz](http://www.kisi.kz)

### **About the OSCE Centre in Astana**

The OSCE Centre in Astana started working in Kazakhstan in 1999. According to its mandate, the Centre:

- promotes the implementation of OSCE principles and commitments as well as co-operation of Kazakhstan in all three OSCE dimensions within the OSCE framework approach to cooperative security and in the regional context;
- facilitates contacts and promotes information exchange between the authorities of Kazakhstan and the Chairman-in-Office and OSCE executive structures and institutions, as well as cooperation with international organizations;
- establishes and maintains contacts with central and local authorities, universities and research institutes of the host country, as well as representatives of civil society and NGOs;
- assists in arranging OSCE regional events, inter alia, regional seminars and visits to the area by OSCE delegations, as well as other events with OSCE participation;
- provides assistance to the Government of Kazakhstan, such as raising awareness on OSCE activities, training of designated Kazakh officials, and providing advice on the OSCE to relevant official structures, facilitate information exchange between OSCE institutions and relevant state agencies on OSCE activities.

Following the mandate, the Centre conducts its programmatic activities based on Annual Program Outlines developed under close consultation with the host country and the OSCE Institution. The Centre supports Kazakhstan in promoting OSCE values and principles, facilitates security and confidence building measures within the OSCE area, transparent economic and environmental policy and the implementation of human rights in line with the OSCE commitments.

10, Beibitshilik street, 010000, Astana, Republic of Kazakhstan

Tel: +7 (7172) 58-00-70

Fax.: +7 (7172) 32-83-04

E-mail: [Astana-KZ@osce.org](mailto:Astana-KZ@osce.org)

<http://www.osce.org/astana>

Notes

---



**EURASIAN SECURITY COMMUNITY  
AND THE ROLE OF THE OSCE**

Conference Materials

Cover design **TOO «Sakura Print»**

Layout **А.А. Жумагалиева**

Approved for printing 17.02.2014. Format 60x90 1/16.

Offset paper. Offset printing. Printer's sheet 11,25.

Print run 150 copies.

The Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies  
the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan  
050010, Almaty, Dostyk 87 "b"

Printed by «Волкова Е.В.»  
Almaty