Aigul Zabirova,
Chief Research Fellow
KazISS under the President of the RK
From a sociological perspective, gender analysis should not be limited exclusively to women, it is equally important to consider the other half of the system, which is men. In one of the surveys, respondents were asked to evaluate the statement, “When there are not enough jobs, men should have more right to a job than women”. As a result, 52.5% of respondents agreed with this statement to some extent, while 44.9% disagreed[1]. At the same time, while 55.5% of men agreed with this statement, the share among women was slightly lower, 50% of respondents.
The data reveal the internal contradictions within the society’s value framework. Even with notable progress in education and women’s employment, the idea of male priority in times of job scarcity still enjoys significant support, particularly among married, less educated, and economically vulnerable respondents. This reflects the dual nature of gender modernization, where the pursuit of equality coexists with persistent notions of men as the mainstay of the family and bearers of material responsibility.
What are the socio-demographic characteristics? The crosstabulations on gender, age, education, marital status, and income reveal significant patterns:
- Middle age as the zone of greatest tension. Men aged 30–45 show the strongest support for traditional attitudes, and this is quite natural. At this stage of life, such major social responsibilities as paying off a mortgage, raising children, or caring for elderly parents converge. Society places more demands on them while offering fewer guarantees. This imbalance gives rise to a defensive conservatism, a desire to cling to old norms as a way to preserve one’s identity in a rapidly changing world.
- Education and economic autonomy. A higher level of education reduces anxiety and leads to less patriarchal views, not because educated men are necessarily more enlightened, but because they are less dependent on an unstable labor market. They have more professional opportunities, feel greater control over their lives, and therefore can afford equality. Meanwhile, for those in low-income sectors, the sense of control is limited. For them, the idea that a man has a right to work is not an ideology but the last form of social security in an uncertain world.
- Profession and qualifications reduce dependence on patriarchal beliefs. Men with a stable position in the labor market are less in need of gender-based safeguards and are more likely to embrace the idea of equality. Here, patriarchy does not disappear, but it loses its protective function. Among men in unstable professional niches, however, patriarchal logic persists as a form of symbolic compensation for lost control, when success can no longer be guaranteed, maintaining the status of breadwinner becomes the last available form of stability.
- Family structures and the morality of duty. Married men are more likely to support the idea of male labor priority. However, this form of patriarchy is paternalistic in nature, it is rooted in care rather than dominance. A married man feels a moral duty to protect his family and therefore seeks to reinforce his right to work as a form of responsibility. At the same time, among single men, especially in cities, there is a clear trend toward rethinking, work and income are no longer seen as measures of worth, giving way to the idea of partnership.
- Material vulnerability and symbolic support. Cross-tabulations by income emphasize that patriarchal beliefs are strongest among economically vulnerable groups. A man with a low income lives in constant tension between the social norm that he must provide for his family and the market reality, where job stability is far from guaranteed. In this sense, patriarchal thinking becomes a form of psychological defense, restoring a sense of control in a world where rules change faster than one can adapt. Yet these attitudes are rooted in the historical inertia of the social contract, in which the man is the breadwinner and the woman keeps house. The collapse of this model without its moral rethinking leaves men in an identity vacuum. Therefore, the support for male priority should not be interpreted solely as an expression of power but rather as a sign of structural pressure. Until society offers men an alternative, positive model of self-worth, one based not on income, as it has been for decades, but on participation, partnership, and caregiving, they will continue to cling to the old one, because within it, at least, it is still clear who you are and what you live for.
Shift toward a new model of masculinity. Nevertheless, our data indicate an emerging shift. Among young men and women, especially those with higher education and urban socialization, the idea of mutual responsibility and shared family support is gaining strength. For them, equality does not threaten the male role; on the contrary, it relieves it of excessive pressure. This is no longer a battle of the sexes, but a gradual adaptation of the social system in which masculinity ceases to be synonymous with duty and becomes a form of participation. Among young people (18–29 years old), patriarchal views no longer dominate. They do not reject responsibility, they share it. Young men increasingly see the family as a partnership; for them, equality is not a threat but a liberation from the solitary burden of being everything for everyone.
The balance of meaning. As the data show, our society continues to revolve around the “man as a breadwinner” model. It is important to note that this role is shaped not only within the family, through upbringing, but also by the media, professional expectations, and even humor. A man is measured by his degree of responsibility, if the family lives well, it is his achievement; if family struggles, it is his, man, fault. This very cultural belief creates structural pressure on male identity, where the loss of income or employment is perceived as a moral failure.
I predict the objections from the first-generation feminists, who might view these ideas as biased, referring to male dominance in parliament, government, national campaigns, and even the media scene. Indeed, the Olympus remains male. However, the analysis presented here does not concern those at the top, but rather those men who sustain the system, the millions of ordinary men who do not make decisions, but live in their shadow.
Feminists of the second and third generations are known for their sensitivity to the language of softening; for them, patriarchy is not about personal anxiety but about a system of power. Yet it is important to acknowledge that both sides suffer from patriarchy, women from limitation, and men from pressure. The aim here is not to justify, but to describe mutual vulnerability.The new ethics: partnership instead of competition. The data show that a new generation of both men and women is beginning to form a different relationship with work and responsibility. Among young men, the share of supporters of gender equality is noticeably higher, while among young women there is a greater readiness for partnership rather than rivalry. This generational shift may become the starting point for moving beyond the old balance of fear, if society dares to speak honestly about both women and men. Equality does not mean that someone must fall silent. Women need access to power and recognition of their work, while men need the right to be vulnerable and to bear responsibility without guilt. Equality will not grow if society continues to expect iron resilience from men and self-sacrifice from women. The overload of expectations must be lifted from both sides. Success itself needs to be redefined. A strong man is not the one who provides for everyone, but the one who knows how to share responsibility. A strong woman is not the one who endures everything, but the one who stops pretending that it’s easy. And finally, the language must change. Instead of saying a man must and a woman should, we can begin to say WE can. It’s a simple, yet profoundly important shift.
[1] The survey, commissioned by KazISS, was conducted from May 11 to June 22, 2024, and included 8,101 respondents. Participants were adults aged 18 and older from 17 regions of the country, as well as the cities of national significance — Astana, Almaty, and Shymkent.
