Mukhit Assanbayev,
Chief Expert, Department of International Security,
PhD in Political Science,
The Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan
In the contemporary international system, India occupies a distinct position as one of the largest and most rapidly developing powers, playing an increasingly prominent role in global affairs. In its pursuit of greater influence on the world stage, India has been steadily advancing multilateral relations with regions of strategic significance. Among these, Central Asia holds particular importance for New Delhi. Endowed with abundant natural resources and a strategically advantageous geographic location, the region is emerging as a key arena for India’s active engagement in the domains of economics, security, culture, and energy.
Amid growing great power competition, the Central Asian vector in India’s foreign policy is emerging as a key priority. Collectively, India’s positions in Central Asia reflect a transition from declarative intentions to concrete actions that are shaping new political and economic realities both in the region and within the broader framework of global politics.
New Delhi’s aspiration to position itself as a major global actor constitutes a central pillar of India’s foreign policy strategy, particularly in relation to its neighboring and extended Asian partners – whether in the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, East Africa, or Central Asia. While projecting itself as an influential Asian center of power, India also demonstrates notable flexibility and dynamism, clearly evident in its approach toward Central Asia. In this region, New Delhi carefully navigates the competing interests and contradictions of other global powers present, while simultaneously advancing its own agenda across a broad spectrum of bilateral and multilateral initiatives. It is no coincidence that Central Asia is increasingly viewed by India’s political leadership and expert community as a region of growing economic potential and strategic significance.
At the same time, the trajectory of India’s foreign policy towards Central Asia is shaped under the influence of the existing balance of power and interests of Russia, China, the United States, and the European Union in the region. All the major phases of India’s foreign policy strategy toward Central Asia can be examined within this context.
Simultaneously, there are several factors that could intensify India’s policy toward Central Asia in the short term.
Firstly, in the sphere of security and cooperation, the intensification of Indian policy in this region is closely linked to its immediate proximity to Afghanistan and the security threats emanating from that country, including religious extremism, transnational terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal migration. It should be noted that any potential increase in security threats to India originating from Afghanistan constitutes a significant component of the country’s foreign policy agenda. Moreover, India does not discount the possibility of radicalization occurring in other Central Asian states. In such a scenario, New Delhi would be compelled to adjust its policies to address these challenges. Within Indian expert circles, it is widely acknowledged that the rise of religious extremism in Afghanistan and Central Asia could influence the Muslim population of India. At the same time, the impact of domestic politics within India on its foreign policy priorities cannot be overlooked.
For instance, the radical Hindu rhetoric among members of India’s political leadership may lead to a shift in approaches toward regional security issues, potentially resulting in a reduction in the intensity of India’s cooperation with Central Asian countries, not to mention the possible next escalation of Indo-Pakistani relations.
At the same time, it is important to understand that India’s political course concerning the countries of the region will to a considerable extent continue to be shaped by India’s historical narratives regarding the shared cultural-civilizational heritage with the Central Asian states. In the case of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, these narratives appear significantly less compelling compared to those related to the neighboring Tajikistan or Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, this does not preclude the continuation of India’s humanitarian cooperation policy with all countries in the region, ranging from the organization of cultural events and student exchange programs, and the establishment of Hindi language departments, to the provision of material assistance for disaster relief efforts.
Secondly, the significant shift in the balance of power and interests that has been established over the past three decades among Russia, China, and Western countries, coupled with the intensification of rivalry among them in Central Asia, compels India to activate its policies in the region, including in the realms of security and military cooperation. In this context, an intensification of India’s policy in Central Asia can be expected, aimed at balancing the increased influence of global powers in the region and safeguarding New Delhi’s strategic and economic interests. This is particularly relevant given the risk of certain countries in the region—namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan – falling into economic dependence on China, which today motivates India to pursue a more proactive presence in the area.
The promotion of regional self-sufficiency and equidistant diplomacy constitutes a crucial element of India’s Central Asian foreign policy. New Delhi assigns the countries of the region, particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, a pivotal role as key transit points for Indian goods and services destined for the region and beyond. It is no coincidence that India actively participates in the development of transport infrastructure in Central Asia, including the International North-South Transport Corridor, which passes through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and has the potential to connect India with Europe and other countries.
India places great hopes on the implementation of projects related to the North-South Transport Corridor through the Iranian ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar. Although the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas currently remains the primary port in use, the prospects for cargo delivery from India to Iran via this port remain problematic. In this regard, the other Iranian port – Chabahar, which is not subject to U.S. sanctions – is considered more promising for India. India’s interest in developing the infrastructure of the Chabahar port is thus evident. Utilizing it for organizing cargo flows along the North-South corridor enables India to gain access to the natural resources and markets of Afghanistan and Central Asia, as well as to facilitate the supply of goods to Eurasian markets via Kazakhstan’s territory.
India’s deepening engagement within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) should also be understood in this context – as part of broader efforts to expand trade and investment ties, enhance regional connectivity, and strengthen New Delhi’s role in regional security and stability.
Despite these efforts, several constraints continue to hinder India’s more active involvement in Central Asia. Chief among them are persistent transport and logistical challenges. Central Asia’s landlocked geography severely limits India’s direct access to the region’s resources and markets. Distance, underdeveloped infrastructure, and high tariffs remain major barriers to expanding trade and investment. Furthermore, Uzbekistan is the most vulnerable country in the world in terms of transportation and logistics, as it not only lacks direct access to the sea but is also surrounded exclusively by countries that similarly have no access to international seas or oceans. The international sanctions imposed on Iran, security challenges and border disputes with Pakistan, as well as the persistent instability in Afghanistan and the de facto lack of international recognition of the current Afghan government, along with unresolved relations between Kabul and Dushanbe, constitute major obstacles to the intensive advancement of India’s policy in the Central Asian countries.
These challenges will continue to hinder the establishment and maintenance of strong ties between India and the countries of the region in the future. Overcoming such obstacles will require sustained diplomatic efforts, regional cooperation, and strategic adjustments to India’s foreign policy framework. Additionally, addressing issues related to regional security, economic connectivity, and mutual trust will be essential for fostering a stable and mutually beneficial partnership in Central Asia.
Thus, India’s foreign policy strategy in Central Asia in the short- and medium-term perspectives is shaped by a multitude of factors influenced by the changing regional and global conditions. Consequently, India’s foreign policy will undergo continuous transformation in response to evolving global and regional challenges, as well as potential shifts in its domestic politics, leading to a significant intensification of New Delhi’s engagement in the Central Asian countries.
At the same time, India will continue to place strong emphasis on multilateralism in its foreign policy, as it seeks to play a more active role in shaping the global agenda and addressing regional and international security challenges.
In this context, the primary objectives of India’s foreign policy in the foreseeable future are expected to include the following: the continuation of building strong partnership relations with Central Asian countries within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the “India-Central Asia” format; the strengthening of trade, economic, and transport-logistics linkages between India and the countries of the region; and cooperation in the fields of security and defense.
Furthermore, an expansion of the legal and contractual basis for cooperation between India and Central Asian states, as well as an intensification of diplomatic dialogue aimed at resolving regional and international issues, should be anticipated.
